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Editorial

Continuing in the tradition of its precursors, this volume of *African Nebula* features articles from different regions in a sense that affirms the consolidation of the international texture of the journal. The contributions also cut across fields in the humanities, thus allowing for a wide range of views and discourses relating to Africa, its Diaspora and the location of the continent in relation to the rest of the world.

The volume is nevertheless unique for featuring a revised version of one of the seminar papers presented at the International Summer Seminar Series of the College of Humanities and Culture of Osun State University in August 2010. This is the article by Jendele Hungbo of the University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa. The said article titled “‘Emerging’ Communities and New Understandings of the Self: Talk Radio in Post-apartheid South Africa”, extends discussions on the apprehension of communities as “imagined”. As a lead article, it provides a fresh perspective on the understanding of post-apartheid realities by problematizing the notion of the rainbow nation, illuminating in the process the implications of mediated radio communities which rest substantially on an imagined configuration to address questions of politics, economics, and other similarly conceived challenges that South Africa faces in a post-apartheid dispensation. By privileging an analysis of two radio talk shows programmes (SAFM’s ‘The After Eight Debate’ and Talk Radio 702’s ‘The Redi Direko Show’), Hugbo contends that “the persistence of markers of difference in different forms questions the idea of ‘shared interests’ and continues to threaten social relations that form the basis for emerging communities or ‘new’ communities in present-day South Africa”.

Autobiographical in slant and nuance, Rowell Makombe’s article, organizes personal thoughts around the memory of Zimbabwe’s recent past of economic and political downturn in order to affirm the veracity of literary articulations about the audacity of survival of the marginalized through a process of interpolation on the discourse and practice of domination. This is so irrespective of the temporality of domination-- be it Euro-American racism, apartheid or post-colonial tyranny. Crucial to his illustration are “Richard Wright’s depiction of Jimcrow America in *Native Son* and *Black Boy*, Athol Fugard’s and Lewis Nkosi’s portrayal of apartheid South Africa in *Sizwe Bansi is Dead* and *Mating Birds* respectively”. Olumide Ayeniwo contends that while the Nigerian urban poor face a number of challenges, especially with respect to “affordable housing ownership”, there is nonetheless a lot to be learned and harnessed from the strategies of “adoption of co-operative Housing Scheme and the involvement of International Donor Agencies in addressing housing problems of the urban poor.” Central to this, he contends, is the vital role women can play in realizing the housing ownership prospect on account of their population. Bolu Folayan’s contribution centralizes the fate of Nigerian children who are exposed to adult video films through the agency of Nollywood, expressing concerns over their future in the face of the resulting moral compromise and the toll the consumption of *mass culture* is taking on them.

Olumide Ayeniwo addresses the problems militating against the urban poor in achieving home ownership in Nigeria. In doing this, he reviews the existing National Housing Policy and identifies the issue of mortgage loans affordability, which has been identified as the major constraint against the urban poor in having access to housing finance and subsequently denying them of housing ownership. The paper attempts to proffer appropriate strategies and

recommendations for addressing the problem of housing in Nigeria. Closely following on the heels of Ayeniyo, Jacob Babarinde's article presents some methods and strategies by which the commercialisation of Old Ibadan Airport was professionally evaluated at inception and later subjected to legal action by some of the aggrieved land allottees following a perceived breach of contract by the project's owners. After presenting some possible options that policy makers and key stakeholders could have considered and adopted in resolving the impasse facing the implementation of the project, the author concludes that locational conflicts can always be resolved if opposing parties are willing, able and ready to invest in cooperative dialogue based on mutual respect, rather than resorting to the force of arms in the interest of local, regional and national sustainability.

If the pro-colonial aggression of Nupe people led to the resettlement of Yagba people from their original location to inaccessible mountain-top settlements, A. T. Ekundayo, through an application of historical analytical tools, contends that bringing them back to participate in the succeeding modernization project of British colonialism was not as easy as anybody would think, as the memory of Nupe aggression with a combination of other factors served to explain their reluctance to relocate to the original settlements. It was on account of this that British colonial authorities had to adopt stringent measures, including burning down some of their settlements for them to descend from the mountains to occupy what is now mostly known as their present location in Kogi State of Nigeria.

The next article by Nike Akinjobi presents an investigation of the relevance of academic competence to linguistic performance in the use of English intonation tunes in Nigeria. From an empirical cum linguistic point of view, the paper reveals that academic competence has little or no effect on the appropriate assignment of intonation tunes in polite requests, complex sentences and attitudinal functions.

The field of strategic studies is of significant interest to Zhe Zhang and Omon Osiki. In this last article the authors analyse the historical forces that shaped the strategic thinking of Xiang Yu, Hannibal and Shaka the Zulu and discuss their tremendous contributions to the development of military science and history. From a comparative perspective the authors argue that these three historical personalities shared remarkable military ingenuity in the prosecution of their respective battles and contend that the three military strategists significantly transformed warfare from a 'ritualized' exercise into a true method of subjugation and professional endeavour.

With this array of articles, prospective readers as scholars, students and others will find this volume interesting particularly for the fresh and incisive insights it provides on issues ranging from media to literature to history to strategic studies and to urban planning.

Happy reading!

Senayon S. Olaoluwa and Olukoya Ogen
September, 2011

‘Emerging’ Communities and New Understandings of the Self: Talk Radio in Post-apartheid South Africa

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Abstract

The intricacies of communities (real or imagined) are quite poignant in postcolonial contexts. In Africa, there have been series of attempts to define or represent the continent, its individual political units or in some cases nationalities as constituting unified communities where the interests and aspirations of the members tilt towards unanimity of purpose. In the case of South Africa, the historical verities that define the policy of racial segregation and the social stratification inherent in contemporary life have continued to make a questioning of the ‘emerging’ communities a more urgent obligation. This paper seeks to understand the nature and character of communities in post-apartheid South Africa as epitomised by public debates on two radio talk shows (SAFM’s ‘The After Eight Debate’ and Talk Radio 702’s ‘The Redi Direko Show’). Drawing on qualitative data obtained from episodes of the two programmes around important media moments in recent South African history, the paper hopes to bring to the fore the dynamics of membership of such emerging communities which are products of the interactivity of the medium of radio as well as the reinforcement of identities through conscious representations on radio talk shows. The paper concludes that the persistence of markers of difference in different forms questions the idea of ‘shared interests’ and continues to threaten social relations that form the basis for emerging communities or ‘new’ communities in present-day South Africa.

Introduction

The use of the term community has become variously conflated in recent times such that it has become imperative that anyone having anything to do with the term needs to set the records straight in order to give a clear sense of what community really means, or more precisely what sense of the expression is intended for focus in the particular instance. There is therefore no unified or easy way to approach the use of community as it signifies different things for different scholars depending on the purpose for which the term is deployed. As a construct, community has been traditionally referred to as ‘an empirical entity to be discovered and described by ethnographers, a natural territorial unit of human organisation linking culture and society’ (Knapp, 2003: 566). In this regard communities:

are usually characterized as sharing residence or space, and bearing a collective consciousness, knowledge, and experiences. Typically the community is reckoned to be a fundamental social institution, internally homogeneous and externally bounded, in which all cultural, biological, and social reproduction took place (Ibid: 566).

In looking at the concept of community from this kind of perspective, Bernard Knapp attempts an all-inclusive definition in which the basic considerations for the existence of any form of community could be said to be present. This is however a very difficult task to achieve as it

would be extremely difficult to pin down community to specific physical and ideological boundaries like we encounter in the above definition. As a form of social group, a community may display some of the characteristics that Knapp talks about like 'sharing residence or space' or external boundedness. These characteristics may however not be enough to take care of the numerous complexities that attend the composition of different kinds of communities in the modern world. While some communities are defined by the occupation of similar space or cohabitation, others are not as clearly defined or visible. This kind of understanding of community approaches the idea from a sociological perspective as it is more concerned with the institutional dimension of community as a term. However, it is also possible to approach the understanding of community from a psychological perspective where the idea of a sense of community which is a major component in the appreciation of the interactions which people have with other individuals on a daily basis. This way, our understanding of community extends beyond a geographical definition of the term to include more profound elements which contribute largely to the composition of the individual self. In other words, there is a way in which community transcends the mere understanding of it as place, where place is viewed ordinarily as space or a demographical entity. Community involves different forms of ethical and aesthetic orientation to both place and location. The idea of community can therefore be looked at from both sociological and psychological perspectives.

Scholarship dealing with community has become more amplified since Benedict Anderson emerged with his theorising of community as 'imagined' (Anderson, 1991). Anderson's idea of 'imagined communities' appears to have built upon Melvin Webbers' (1963) concept of community which seeks to counter the exaggeration of the impact which modernity and the forages of cosmopolitanism could possibly have on the various bonds or relationships existing in modern society. Webber's argument makes it clear that relationships could be maintained at a distance while it is also possible for communities to emerge in spite of spatial dispersion. In other words, communities can still exist even when there is what Craig Calhoun describes as 'time-space distancing' (1998: 374). This argument therefore reveals 'a sound appreciation of the growing choice, flexibility and multiplicity of relational groupings' (Ibid). Like Webber, Anderson makes it clear that community goes beyond the physical presence of the members involved as common interests and feelings may also be shared in virtual spaces. Community is thus a mode of social integration which allows us to have a better sense of interactions and social practices in which people engage as a group. Anderson's work, like those of many others, brought a lot of dynamism into the way in which the concept was theorised and used in the description of social relations among people in society. While it clearly advances the frontiers of the study of community beyond merely looking at the physical entity which occupies space, it has also generated reactions which point to the difficulty in theory which is likely to emerge from a complete transposition of the understanding of community in its orthodox sense into the new sense that discards the reality of the existence of any form of it.

For some people the idea of community evokes images of a small group of people where the terrain and characters are well known and understood. It is in the words of Bess *et al* 'an idealization in place and time of feeling a part of a place, with those around knowing us and caring about us' (2002: 3). In many ways, it shows the extent to which people strive to do away with individuality and adopt a more inclusive approach to relations which gives preference to group activities. This choice of doing things in a group rather than individually, when closely

examined, appears to be a response to a psychological need in the individual to have a feeling of being considered important to others and at the same time being able to partake in what goes on in the lives of others and the larger community. In other words, it caters for the need for a sense of community in the everyday lives of people who either occupy a physical space or are connected by other means. In this way, community is better understood as ‘practices of social interaction’ (Calhoun, 1998: 373) which seek to link lives and relationships in specific circumstances. So, community is best understood as ‘the life people live in dense, multiplex, relatively autonomous networks of social relationships. Community, thus, is not a place or simply a small-scale population aggregate, but a mode of relating variable in extent’ (Calhoun, 1998: 391).

Community Life in South Africa

Conflicting representations of Africans and their ‘imagined’ communities abound in literature across different disciplines. The colonisation of the continent, by mainly Europeans, can also be said to be a major factor in the negative representations that Africa and its people got from European writers and scholars. Such disparaging portrayals were in most cases meant to specifically justify the colonisation of the continent and imposition of new forms of ‘civilisations’ which tend to serve foreign interests. In South Africa, white supremacist views which eventually culminated in the imposition of the state policy of apartheid created divergent ‘imagined’ communities which separated different categories of people based on skin pigmentation. With a peculiar history that sets it apart from other postcolonial African states, South Africa has always had its own impediments to the cultivation or nurturing of communities. During the apartheid days, community life in South Africa was highly regulated. This regulation was a weapon for keeping the ‘natives’ in check and preventing the possibility of mobilization for resistance. The strictures of apartheid laws and regulations made the mixing of the races a serious crime. This official prohibition was effected through the Immorality Act of 1927, the Mixed Marriages Act of 1949 and the Immorality (Amendment) Act of 1950 all of which sought to prohibit amorous relationships between the different races especially between so called ‘natives’ and people of European descent. A provincial amendment to the 1927 Immorality Act in the Transvaal even made matters worse by disenfranchising any white person who violated the legislation. The Transvaal legislature’s Ordinance No.4 of 1927 had a provision to the effect that ‘white persons cohabiting with native or coloured persons shall not be entitled to be enrolled on the Voters’ roll for any municipality, nor qualified to vote at any elections’ (Martens, 2007: 224). Apart from the overt legislations keeping the different races apart, intra-racial community was also limited in the apartheid days as individuals and families perceived to constitute ‘threats’ to the state were kept under security watch and contacts with them by other people could have grave consequences. In narrating the difficulty inherent in associating with ‘marked’ individuals and families during this period, Mamphela Ramphele in a memoir writes that the quality of communal life that people lived under apartheid depended on factors like ‘the temperament of the local security police’ (Ramphele, 1999: 92). During this period, a good number of the people involved in the liberation struggle lived isolated lives in fear of arrest. As Ramphele puts it, ‘many South Africans spent miserable years imprisoned in their own homes’ (Ibid: 93). Ramphele’s ordeals which symbolize the kind of strictures under which many people lived during the apartheid days stem from her relationship with Bantu Steve Biko, a strong figure in

the anti-apartheid liberation struggle¹. The politics of space going on at this period obviously favoured a particular race over others. The national space became segregated in such a way that the pleasures of community were denied the majority black population whose identity has much to do with communality. The philosophy of *ubuntu* which defines relations among native South Africans 'has descriptive senses to the effect that one's identity as a human being causally and even metaphysically depends on a community. It also has prescriptive senses to the effect that one ought to be a *mensch*, in other words, morally one should support the community in certain ways' (Metz, 2007: 323). The difficulty imposed by the manipulation of space by the apartheid authorities made the practice of community difficult and dangerous for the people leading to a life of individualism with its implications for the structuring of relationships. As a result, the people occupied multiple imaginary communities defined by highly contested and politicised understandings of community.

There is no gainsaying the fact that apartheid was greatly divisive, necessitating the idea of a 'new' nation after the emergence of democratic governance in 1994. As Muiu puts it, 'the first encounter between Dutch colonizers and the indigenous community resulted in master/slave relations. Progressively, these relations became competitive and hostile, as Dutch colonizers encroached on indigenous land' (2008: 22). This shows that tensions had existed between Dutch settlers and 'native' South Africans before the arrival of the British. The implication of this is the absence of any cohesive community prior to colonisation. The later appearance on the scene by British imperial authority did not help matters either. For the British, the land in Africa which technically included the indigenous population was lacking in 'civilization' and the Dutch who were presumed by the British and other Europeans to have lost their 'Europeanness' and the 'sophisticated' civilization that goes with it had not really been of any good help to this local population as they themselves had 'degenerated' as a result of contact with the rugged African environment. The important thing to note here is that in the history of colonialism the interest of the colonized and that of the colonizer are often at variance with each other.

The absence of a common interest therefore triggers mutual suspicion and a vicious struggle for space, domination and myriad forms of resistance which tend to make the idea of a unified conceptual community impossible. The reprieve which self-determination, or the demise of apartheid in the case of South Africa, is expected to bring appears to be long in materializing, creating further anxieties about the possibility of community. It is important to note that the anti-social policies of the state which are meant in many instances to provide shields for private corporations erode social cohesion and threaten human well being and potential. In other words, 'new regimes of accumulation of different forms of capital' (Isin and Turner, 2002: 1) has led to less emphasis on the communal values of *ubuntu* which places higher premium on caring for the less privileged. The emphasis on the market and the embrace of the lure of the new industrial state throws up what Chatterjee sees as 'the underside of modern individualism—the callous impersonality and massification of market-driven societies that destroy age-old institutions of sociability and community living without putting anything in their place' (1998: 278). The noticeable practice of exclusion of the less privileged in policies by the state is also the trigger for upheavals in community such as are exemplified by service delivery protests and charged debates on media platforms in contemporary South Africa.

¹ Mamphela Ramphele was a co-founder of the Black Consciousness Movement and Steve Biko's lover, a relationship that exposed her to constant brushes with the state.

Nationalism(S) in Post-Apartheid South Africa

Closely linked to the idea of community is the issue of nationalism. As Geoff Eley and Ronald Suny argue, 'ordinary people need to see themselves as the bearers of an identity centered elsewhere, imagine themselves as an abstract community' (1996: 22) for nationalism to work. In this way, nationalism becomes an invention of sorts just the same way Anderson sees communities as 'imagined'. Discourses on nationalism are not new to Africa. The various struggles against colonialism and different other forms of oppression in the past have made the African continent a place of the expression of sentiments which tend to place the love of place at the centre of academic and political discourses. Beyond the expression of this love, however, is the viciousness of nationalism as history is replete with instances across the world where individuals and groups have committed heinous crimes against the 'other', in whatever form construed, as a result of sentiments bordering on difference. Relating this negative kind of nationalism to experience in Africa and Asia in the 1970s, a period less than a decade after the attainment of independence in some African countries, Partha Chatterjee argues that:

nationalism had become a matter of ethnic politics, the reason why people in the Third World killed each other—sometimes in wars between regular armies, sometimes, more distressingly, in cruel and often protracted civil wars, and increasingly it seemed, by technologically sophisticated and virtually unstoppable acts of terrorism (Chatterjee, 1996: 214-215).

What Chatterjee construes as terrorism is often given expression in different forms in different places and at different times. While it rears its head as civil wars in certain instances, it manifests as inter-tribal hostilities, racial tensions, ethno-religious crises or xenophobia in other climes. The beauty of Chatterjee's thesis also lies in the fact that it sensitizes us to the realization that African nationalism, and by extension South African nationalism is not defined solely by the struggles for independence. As Ivor Chipkin argues there is the need to rise above the understanding of African nationalism 'simply as resistance to colonial authority, irrespective of its form' (2007: 11). Chatterjee's theorizing of the concept seems to have met this need even before Chipkin raises the question and concludes that nationalism especially in Africa is being 'viewed as a dark, elemental, unpredictable force of primordial nature threatening the orderly calm of civilized life' (Chatterjee, 1996: 215). Chatterjee's argument clearly extends the conceptual boundaries of Anderson's 'imagined communities' and opens up the discursive space with new possibilities which offer scholars of the postcolony a multidimensional prism with which to view the concept of nationalism.

In classifying the kind of insufferable deployment of nationalism, which Chatterjee and Chipkin separately engage with, Arjun Appadurai identifies such practices as 'the politics of affect' (1996: 144). For Appadurai, 'there is always a real substrate of primordialist affect that is perpetual tinder waiting to be exploited by specific political interests at a given moment in the history of any given nation-state' (Ibid: 144). In a manner of connecting back to Frantz Fanon, Appadurai lays the blame for the nourishment of this harmful tendency at the doorsteps of a class of elites who grow on the wings of neocolonialist or neoliberal ideologies that have little or no

regard for the interest of the constituents of the national community. Fanon's theorizing of what he classifies as 'the pitfalls of national consciousness' (1963: 119) identifies the culpability of 'the national middle class which takes over power at the end of the colonial regime' (Ibid: 119-120), in concert with the national bourgeoisie, in creating difficult conditions which further strain relations in the post-colonial state. Appadurai, like Fanon also attributes constant crises in the national community to the 'new elites and new gaps between castes and classes, which may not have arisen except for various neocolonialist projects in the new states' (Appadurai: 1996: 144). The overbearing narcissism of the elite groups coupled with the contestations among different other groups in society often makes the attainment of a national community difficult. This often leads to a proliferation of narrow nationalisms based on the philosophies of different categories of difference. The defining characteristic of this kind of situation in most cases is the spectre of imagination which places the individual or one's group and its interest far and above the larger humanistic ideal.

In the new South Africa, the different conditions outlined by the scholars whose works were examined above seem to be playing out in numerous ways as a new group of political leadership has taken charge of the country after the demise of apartheid. As Mueni wa Muiu argues:

...the achievement of equal political rights in the new democracy was premised on the acceptance of unequal economic relations among different classes, genders, and races. Furthermore, the middle-class in all its multiracial and multiethnic diversity constantly faces threats from above and below. Popular demands from below sometimes lead the middle-class to partially satisfy the majority's economic and social demands. Pressures from various economic interests (particularly the business community) limit its room for manoeuvre. These pressures force the middle class to make compromises that are detrimental to the economic interests of the majority of the population. (Muiu, 2008: 1)

In addition to making compromises, members of the middle class, some of whom also have access to institutional employment, engage in subversive practices which further impede progress and heighten the prospect of degeneracy which forms the basis for continuous agitation. In other words, bribery and corruption become options which the middle class adopts to make up for perceived losses arising from the various pressures it has to cope with from below and above. This problem of helping oneself to the till has also become quite evidently one of the major issues leading to apathy and despondency on the part of the larger population which seizes every little opportunity that avails itself to question the sincerity of the members of the ruling class and in the process putting their sense of nationalism or commitment to the common good to question. The deduction that can be made from this scenario is that there has been a form of 'multiracial nationalism in the wake of the transition from apartheid to liberal democracy, without a simultaneous transformation of economic relations' (Ibid: 1).

Embedded in the idea of nationalism is the understanding that individuals have of themselves as integral parts of the space they inhabit. In trying to figure out their stake in the national community, people grapple with different imaginings of the self as citizen or as entitled beings whose presence and agency become important in the constitution and sustenance of a national

community. The question of citizenship is therefore considered against the background of inclusion and exclusion. In other words, who should qualify as citizen of the national community and who should not? Again, what should be the obligations of the state towards such individuals and what are the expectations of the state or the responsibilities heaved on such citizens by the state which also retains the power of social control over its constituents? The notion of nationalism often invokes sentimental affections of belonging, communality and allegiance. In some cases however, this kind of feeling generates debates around the classifications of 'insider' and 'outside' especially in multicultural or diverse communities where the competition for scarce resources is heightened by a new world order that seeks to advocate globalization and the need to protect boundaries and local privileges at the same time. The next section of this paper, therefore, tries to point to instances in the 'The After Eight Debate' and 'The Redi Direko Show' where participants as well as the show hosts are involved in creating a discourse community as they take on different issues of common interest in the polity. The material drawn from the actual programmes is also complemented by interviews conducted with listeners who call in to these shows and some invited guests.

Practices of Community in 'The After Eight Debate' and 'The Redi Direko Show'

European settlers, both Dutch and British, saw indigenous South Africa as emblematically bounded, timeless and static. This could be said to be as a result of a lack of proper understanding of the prevailing ways of life of the African population that the colonisers met at inception. The structure of every community is often influenced by the different categories of people that can be found within it. In the case of South Africa, the population is composed of different classes, races, ethnicities and genders, dimming the prospects of a unified community as the interests and aspirations of each of the component groups differ extensively. This also leads to different forms of nationalism as people become loyal not just to the nation construed as a unified entity but also to cleavages based on several other interests and categorizations of affinity. In mediatised discourses like we have in radio talk shows, there is a way in which presenters or anchors may also become part of the discourse community. This is achieved by their not just posturing as a part of the group that meets at regular intervals to take a look at issues of concern but also by showing concern for others within the particular frame of reference that defines association. For instance, the presenter of a show may express a sense of community by making reference to other members of the production team like we have in the following example:

Let me welcome you to my controller, Thomas. I have got three bosses here. Nobuhle, Mpheni, they are my producers. And Thomas tells me when to speak, when to shut up, when to go to on break. He's been away and is nice to have him back, we love you Thomas. Anyway that's it the whole team is back together. These are the people who make the show happen. We keep it together and I wouldn't achieve a quarter of all I do without them. (Redi Direko Show, 19 January 2009)

The above statement apart from showing deference to the individuals mentioned by the show host also creates an ambience and feeling of community that attempts to legitimize the show itself as a product of group work, leading to the assumption that it is neither arbitrary nor unilateral. In a similar vein, Tim Modise, the host of 'The After Eight Debate' on SAFM usually concludes the show by making reference to members of the production team who are all deemed

to have been part of the day's show. In signing off on one episode of the programme which featured the Secretary General of the ANC, for instance, Modise makes the following concluding remarks:

Ok, Gwede Mantashe thanks very much for talking to us this morning. He is the ANC Secretary General and talking to us from East London. Misho Shandalala, Tshililo Tshivase, Harriet Nait, Marumo Kekana, Mark Pryler, Phuti Mosimane, Cleo Leshoro, Thandanani Dlamini, Nhlakanipho Zulu, thanks again for putting Am Live together. It has been a great week and I hope you have a great weekend. I'm Tim Modise. Wish you a great weekend. We'll be back with you again next Monday and bring you events from around the world. (After Eight Debate, 9 January 2009).

Although the voice of the show host usually dominates the airwaves during the course of the main programme, the reeling out of the names of members of the team at the end is to suggest to the listening public a sense community and communality. In the case of Modise, he mentions the names of nine other people who have been involved in the process that produces the day's programme.

An important point to note in understanding the community of talk radio beyond relationships among professional colleagues in the studios is the fact that people involved in this programme genre are never complete strangers to one another. Since the issues raised on the shows are often drawn from things happening in particular places at a time, the people who respond to such issues through their participation are usually people in the same community under reference who might be affected in one way or the other by the subject being discussed. Even where contributors are not known in person, they may become familiar voices either because of where they call from or by being regular callers or participants on these shows. This kind of relationship is evident in the response of James, a teacher who has featured as guest contributor on many talk shows in South Africa, including 'The After Eight Debate' and 'The Redi Direko Show'. According to him, there are certain individuals in the public who become quite familiar as a result of either the frequency of their participation or the kind of views they express on these shows. Such people help the producers of the shows to keep them going. In his words:

... they also have people who are very much part of the talk show who sustain it. These are people who phone in on a regular basis and they literally know their opinions and whatever. There are many of them if you look at all these programmes. There is Prophet OJ, there is Pat from, you know, wherever, who used to be a former student here. (James Interview, 20 May 2010).

From the above statement, it is evident that James is familiar with some of the people with whom he participates on talk shows, though each of them may play different roles. It is also apparent that the show producers would have been familiar with certain individuals who they expect to hear from during their shows. The talk show then facilitates a form of social congregation which translates into a community made up of both familiar people as well as possible strangers. On the same episode of her programme referred to earlier, Redi Direko dwells on the election victory of American president Barack Obama:

How many of you saw the concert last night on M-net? A host of stars on a special concert last night to welcome Barack Obama to Washington. And it was very moving....what stood out for me was that this didn't feel like a democrat victory. You see where I am going with this; it didn't feel like the democrats' victory. It felt like the American nation victory because they kept quoting from past republican presidents, past democrat candidates and all of that....And I suppose that is the kind of democracy we want to get to. We want to get to a point where you agree with people on principle even if they come from a different party, even if they come from a different culture. You want to be able to say the DA's Hellen Zille says ABC even if you are in ANC and vice versa, DA giving praise and credit to ANC when it is due. That's the kind of unity that came through for me. Apart from that, the fact that the Americans can put together a blooming heart party. I mean they raise the bar.... Anyway give us a call with whatever is on your mind this morning. (Redi Direko Show, 19 January 2009)

The reference to Obama and the presidential elections in the United States of America seems to raise a major question about the boundaries of community. In short, it points to the expansiveness of community. The expression of a feeling of community may extend beyond physical territorial boundaries to include people and events which are of relevance to the identity of individuals or groups. The American event, in spite of its taking place in a distant clime, becomes a reference point on 'The Redi Direko Show' because of its relevance to contemporary South African politics in terms of racial equations and aspirations for a community defined by democratic tenets. In making a reference to relationship between the Democrats and the Republicans the host expresses aspirations about political contestations in South Africa by calling on the ruling ANC and opposition parties to emulate the culture of tolerance in political disputations. In addition to this, the fact that Obama is the first black president of the United States becomes a major trope in addressing the conditions of the black majority in South Africa who as a result of long years of oppression under apartheid still have to struggle to imbibe self-confidence and the will to rise above the challenges of life.

Community building practices are also noticeable in the ways in which these talk shows invite members of the public to participate in them. For instance, a subtle invitation is extended to listeners to call in and give information about their observation of particular events or phenomena. One of such occasions is seen during the hosting of the Minister of Safety and Security, Comrade Nathi Mutetwa on the programme shortly after the New Year holidays, a season when crime is believed to be palpable in major South African cities:

We are probing affairs in the safety and security environment area and asking whether the claims made by the police are true that they have reduced criminal activities over the past holiday season and whether you have been able to confirm this for yourself or what your observations tell you and also talking about the various initiatives that the minister of safety and security Nathi Mthethwa embarked upon once he got appointed as

Safety and Security Minister and he joins us on the line. (After Eight Debate, 5 January 2009)

The first feeling that is obvious here is that there is a great concern for the safety of the community which constitutes the coverage area for this particular programme. In addition to this, the show host attempts to compose a community of discourse by immediately inviting the audience to join in the discussion, either by sharing their own personal experiences or by asking the minister some questions. Another point to note here is the way in which security concerns contribute to the formation of certain forms of community. The preservation of life and the avoidance of harm of any form are very important elements in differentiating between the way people relate with complete strangers and people they know. In other words, while people may feel secure with acquaintances they may be scared or feel highly exposed when they deal with people of whom they know little or nothing. Apart from the racial divides which determine the realisation of communities, security concerns may therefore play crucial roles in the way people associate with others or even the way access to communities is mapped. It is important to also note however that the emergence and maintenance of stratified communities cannot be limited to the racially determined, as secluded communities now form across racial lines and people are unified by their security concerns to create impregnable abodes which give a sense of or a semblance of safety to the inhabitants. In such instances class, more than anything else, appears to unify more as a result of the values of materiality that determine vulnerability.

There is a noticeable transformation of the media itself brought about by the nature and structure of talk shows generally. With these shows, audiences become a part of a professional media community through the generation of content in the form of participation. Participants are given some form of space in the professional community to give information about things happening in their environment. This quasi-reportage of events, which has been generally designated as user-generated content, creates a new relationship between media and their audiences as the audience moves from the zone of passive consumption to that of active production. On this same episode of the show a caller who identifies himself as Jason volunteers information about the activities of criminals in Umkomasi where he claims to call from:

My question is the syndicates operating in South Africa. We had a case here where Tanzanians were caught for housebreaking and then they were said to be deported. They came back and tormented the people for the second time. Now I know in fact that in Mozambique or Tanzania because we worked there you daren't commit crime there because you won't even be deported you'll be tried and imprisoned there and be treated like one of their own people. (After Eight Debate, 5 January 2009)

The contribution by Jason is a direct reportage of crime linked to foreigners, specifically Tanzanians, in his community. The question of crime and its 'foreign' colouration, it should be noted, has been a major discourse in contemporary South African society. The belief is rife that most crimes in the country are committed by mainly foreigners from neighbouring African countries. So this reporting of crime committed by Tanzanians in Umkomasi speaks to the larger national discourse in which the rise in criminal activities in the country is attributed to the post-1994 increasing presence of foreign nationals from the rest of Africa. Though it is not clear in

Jason's contribution whether or not he had personally been a victim of crime, the sense one gets of his contribution is a concern to see a larger territorial space free of crime. The larger territory which goes beyond the boundaries of Jason's home or individual self is Umkomasi town where the caller is just a member of a large collectivity. In addition to this is the possibility that the criminals referred to by Jason are also a member of the community. If they do not live in Umkomasi, they most likely would live at least in the larger national community of South Africa, of which Jason and other listeners and participants are also members. This is indicative of the difference between membership and citizenship in community to which I will return later. The anxiety over crime therefore speaks to the interdependence of participants of community whereby the actions or even inactions of some members could impact on the lives of others. In conceptualizing this principle of interdependence in communities Tamotsu Shibutani argues that 'participants are interdependent; each person must do his share or the unit as a whole breaks down' (1987: 35).

On 'The Redi Direko Show' the host often invites listeners to call and 'tell us what is happening in your area' or 'what happened over the weekend.' These kinds of calls provide an opportunity to interact with listeners located in different places. In addition to this the host and other listeners at that particular time are also able to share in the experiences of such listeners who call in with a narrative of events around them. In playing this role of the 'eyewitness'² members share experiences and concerns and further build a community of people who interact more freely, radicalizing the concept of production and reception in radio broadcasting. As one of the respondent listeners, Mmathapelo observes in an interview, the main value of talk radio is in its ability to create a form of immediacy and intimate people with what goes on around them and in other places that may be of interest to the community:

The listeners interact with the radio like directly. They give them time to talk about current things, current affairs, things as they arise, they don't wait for tomorrow. If something happens, like on Radio 702 they actually give listeners a chance to call. If you see an accident, if you see something happening, a newsworthy thing you call them and give them the information and as they report in their news they say so and so is on ground and so this is happening and here is an eyewitness who was there. I think it makes news more interesting (Mmathapelo Interview, 26 April 2010).

She goes forward to talk about how radio talk shows may further reinvigorate her interest in political issues as well as other contentious matters going on around her. In other words,¹¹ these talk shows may make her share the interests of other people around her and in the course of this bring her into the fold of an imagined community of discourse. In her view:

With me when there is a hot topic on politics like the Julius Malema thing I obviously look forward to him coming so if they announce that he's going to come I actually sit down to listen to him. If there is a war of words between AWB and the ANC Youth League and they say they are inviting one of them or both of them I look forward to those people. So, it's about what is happening there (Mmathapelo Interview, 26 April 2010).

² Talk Radio 702 actually has a news slot called 'Eyewitness News' which features on-the-spot reportage of events.

Prophet O. J. is another participant on SAFM's 'The After Eight Debate' who had featured as an invited guest:

When one is on air you even, it's like you feel people who are listening, it's like you are seeing them, it's like you are with them. You know it comes to a point when you say a word knowing that somebody in Cape Town is listening, somebody in Johannesburg is listening, somebody maybe even in England is listening. It comes to a point whereby it's like that person is with you....You are sort of driven to give the person who is listening the humbleness and the respect that that person deserves as if that person is looking straight into your eyes (Prophet O. J. Interview, 22 April 2010).

There is a sense of community evident in the above response by Prophet O. J. It also shows that people who participate as invited guests on 'The After Eight Debate' may do so with the awareness that they are part of a community made up of different kinds of individuals. In talking about giving people the kind of 'humbleness and respect' they deserve, this participant calls attention to the consciousness of a position of power in the community by having the privilege to speak on radio while at the same time hinting at the need to be mindful of the arrays of difference that may characterize membership of the community.

In this kind of environment the interactivity that comes into the work of media especially radio becomes important especially in societies undergoing transformation where the need for people to voice their concerns and anxieties is very important for the appreciation of progress and the planning of responses to outstanding areas of concern. The analysis so far positions radio talk shows as 'a community of characters' which 'depends on a core group of citizens to give it life and support' (Peters, 1999: 9). As members of this virtual community, each member acts based on different levels of consciousness. This raises a further question in relation to feelings of nationalism which is to some extent premised on the amount of interest that an individual has in the entity towards which the nationalistic affection is directed. The answer to this question can be made manifest in the unpacking of the idea of citizenship which in a sense draws in the politics of inclusion and exclusion in culturally diverse communities like we find in post-apartheid South Africa.

Citizenship and New Imaginings of the Self

Beyond the question of nationalism, the idea of citizenship may further illuminate the concept of community especially in relation to how the state relates with its subjects or those who inhabit its border space. In addition to this, an understanding of the concept of citizenship in the contemporary world will make people aware of the meanings of belonging which further defines the individual, his roles and obligations in society. This awareness is expected to throw more light on the crucial phenomenon of civic engagement. To begin with, it is important to observe that the concept of citizenship keeps mutating thus challenging traditional modes of belonging and creating new practices of membership of groups and territories. As Engin Isin and Bryan Turner argue:

Major social issues such as the status of immigrants, aboriginal peoples, refugees, diasporic groups, environmental injustices, and homelessness have increasingly been expressed through the language of rights and obligations, and hence of citizenship. Moreover, not only are the rights and obligations of citizens being redefined, but also what it means to be a citizen and which individuals and groups are enabled to possess such rights have become issues of concern (2002: 1).

Isin and Turner further argue that in the new globalised world citizenship is being redefined and reconfigured along three important axis of '*extent* (rules and norms of inclusion and exclusion), *content* (rights and responsibilities) and *depth* (thickness or thinness)' (Ibid: 2). In this manner it is possible for some members of a particular community to claim to be 'more citizen' than others. This claim to superior citizenship could be based on different kinds of factors ranging from indigeneity to membership of a particular social class. In most cases such claims collide with other forms of agitation for inclusion which extend the contestation for membership of the particular community in question beyond passivity into an active demand for redistribution. Given this kind of scenario:

...various struggles based upon identity and difference (whether sexual, 'racial', 'ethnic', diasporic, ecological, technological, or cosmopolitan) have found new ways of articulating their claims as claims of citizenship understood not simply as legal status but as political and social recognition and economic redistribution (Ibid: 2).

Citizenship in South Africa has been a highly contested concept because of the flawed racial conditions imposed by the apartheid government. This racialised citizenship falls short of expectations in the modern 'democratic' state. During apartheid, there were different ways of defining citizenship. Jeremy Martens (2007) identifies two of such definitions of citizenship. While the first stipulates that only 'civilized' men had the right to citizenship, the second gave citizenship to all white men by virtue of their race. This kind of imagining of citizenship resulted in frequent changes in the political landscape as well as constant altering of identities of people based on their different racial backgrounds (Hyslop, 1995³; Martens, 2007). The racialisation of citizenship and political participation implied the exclusion of the majority black population from taking part in civil society activities. Since the demise of apartheid the South African state has tried to redefine the concept of citizenship through various means. The most obvious of these means however is the South African constitution, a heavily advertised document, persuasively paraded as the most liberal in the world and by implication the best that can be found in the whole of sub-Saharan Africa where South Africa is perceived to be a big player. Apart from the constitution, there have been several references to the concepts of African brotherhood and the spirit of *ubuntu* which creates the impression of South Africa as an inclusive state, receptive to people from other parts of the world especially those from other African countries. A good example of this kind of reference can be found in former president Thabo Mbeki's matrix of the

³ Although Hyslop's argument about anti-miscegenation, which is a response to J.M Coetzee's (1991) theorising of apartheid as a product of collective irrationality, provides a gendered reading of history, it clearly shows like the prevalent conferment of citizenship along racial lines which divided South African society and reinforced diverse nationalisms.

‘African Renaissance’ which he vigorously and constantly emphasised while in office. This form of African nationalism expressed by the former president, coupled with the provisions of the constitution which was based on the Freedom Charter of 1955 created the impression of South Africa as an all-inclusive cosmopolitan community ready to accommodate people from different backgrounds and from all parts of the world. In short, the transition to a new order in South Africa has seen several attempts to present to the world the picture of a new and more inclusive territory. This new disposition is, no doubt, without the attempt to create the impression, as Hein Marais puts it, that ‘the exclusionary basis of South African society would be replaced with an inclusionary one’ (2001: 94).

However, the realities in contemporary South Africa seem to provide a different picture as the country still battles with problems of abuse of women’s rights, homophobia and xenophobic attacks against foreigners especially those from neighbouring African countries. While focusing on the aspect of violent attacks against foreign nationals as one of the conditions that make citizenship problematic in South Africa, Francis Nyamnjoh argues that:

With the exception of occasional intervention of the Human Rights Commission, the failure of the South African Constitution and authorities to protect the rights of non-citizens is clearly at variance with all claims that South Africa is building a ‘culture of human rights’. By limiting entitlements only to national citizens, the South African state has shifted the emphasis to keep out those who do not belong and preventing anyone else from joining, especially those who have the “wrong citizenship”,[or the] “wrong gender” (Nyamnjoh, 2006: 41).

The implication of Nyamnjoh’s argument is clearly captured in Weintraub’s caveat that ‘membership in community does not necessarily constitute citizenship [as] citizenship entails participation in a particular kind of community ...one marked by, among other things, fundamental equality and the consideration and resolution of public issues through conscious collective decision making’ (1997: 13).

There is also a marked difference between the attainment of citizenship and attempts to become what Chipkin calls ‘an authentic national subject’ (2007: 12). While the citizen tries to convince about his/her entitlement to belonging the national subject, ‘authentic’ or not, often seeks to defend mainstream ideologies which represent the position of the state in an attempt to conjure an imaginary national community or its semblance. The problem of citizenship is made more complex in the new South Africa by the social and economic exclusion evident in the public domain. While pockets of service delivery protests signpost the discontent of the masses and their frustration with the new leadership, more serious disruptive actions like xenophobia and other forms of subversive behaviour against individual ‘others’ and the state hint at a form of popular resistance borne out of frustration with a system that offers less than the expectations of the majority. In addition to these visible forms of expressing discontent, the media provide a platform for the expression of the feelings of the people on how they imagine themselves and others as citizens of the national community.

Radio offers this kind of expressive platform through talk shows like ‘The After Eight Debate’ and ‘The Redi Direko Show’ which form the basic material for this study. In grappling with the different implications of being part of the national community the likelihood emerges for people to see their being part of that community beyond the modern conception of citizenship as ‘merely a status held under the authority of a state’ (Isin and Turner, 2002: 2). On the other hand they are persuaded more to see themselves as subjects existing in relation to various other realities which they have to cope with in an intricate process of negotiating their membership of different states of being which they need to inhabit at the different times. In other words, they see themselves as victims of a differentiated citizenship which ‘accords dissimilar treatments to members of different social groups’ (Young, 1989: 258). This new understanding of the self is often enacted in the public domain and through acts of agency which portend apathy and seek to protect individual or group interests above the collective. A practice antithetical to community and social cohesion, such defence mechanisms are seen, by victims of differentiated citizenship especially, as survival strategies with which they cope with official exclusion. These ‘ways of belonging’ (Baumeister, 2003) then become a scheme for the management of the deprived self in order to carry on with life.

The public domain is a veritable part of community. More than anything else, it is an imaginary space that offers the platform for the performance of the different roles which individuals either take upon themselves or are called upon to undertake in the community. Guided by normative codes and protocols of entering into it and engaging in discourse, the public domain or what Jurgen Habermas theorizes as the public sphere provides a normative open community where the exchange of ideas and the questioning of deeds or even misdeeds resonate for the enablement of the practice of democratic ideals which further enhance citizens’ claim to membership of the national community and the benefits that go with such membership. In the imagining of this space that tries to validate the membership of citizens, the media are often called to action through the deployment of different technologies which create different levels of information exchange aimed at the provision of as much information as possible for citizens to engage in practices of belonging. Radio talk shows, in offering the kind of platform which provides for the expression of individual and group aspirations, make the move towards the achievement of community possible by bringing people from different backgrounds together in a discursive relationship.

In the South African context, this role of talk radio is very crucial especially when considered against the background of the difficulty of open expression which characterized the days of apartheid. Before the demise of apartheid and the return to democratic rule in 1994 there had been centres of community, albeit of a different character. Such discursive communities were found in subversive radio broadcasts and unofficial dissemination of information about the state in clandestine fashion. In the 1960s for example a few radio presenters, producers and scriptwriters working in the section of the state broadcaster SABC, known then as Radio Bantu, adopted strategies identified by Liz Gunner as ‘the rhetoric of resistance’ (2005: 163) to destabilize the apartheid order of complete control over the airwaves. Citing the particular example of a versatile radio presenter, Buthelezi, Gunner concludes that the traditional Zulu narrative forms used by some of the clever presenters at that time ‘may have been potentially far more subversive than [their] surface innocence, or sheer eccentricity, suggested’ (Ibid: 166). In other words, the local language presenters of this era, while constituting a unique kind of

deliberative community, have found in the traditional artistic forms ‘a spoon long enough to sup with the devil’ (Ibid: 163). In addition to this form of alternative sources of information for the community is the resort to what Stephen Ellis calls ‘pavement radio’ or ‘*radio trottoir*’. This refers to the thriving of rumours or ‘the popular and unofficial discussion of current affairs in Africa, particularly in towns’ (Ellis, 1989: 321). This kind of information peddling is often a product of a lack of trust between the people and institutions charged with the responsibility of keeping them informed (Shibutani, 1966; Obadare, 2005; Fine, 2007). In putting this in proper perspective, Gary Fine contends that:

In one sense, rumor indicates a breakdown of institutional trust. The existence of rumor suggests that those who disseminate such claims argue—implicitly or explicitly—that information from authoritative sources is either incomplete or inaccurate. Either they are incomplete or immoral (2007: 7).

In the event of this loss of confidence in mainstream channels of information rumour becomes a form of ‘improvised news’ (Shibutani, 1966) which helps individuals and communities ‘cope with the ambiguities and strains of an uncertain present [as it] reflects the future through the recent past (Ibid: 7).

Conclusion

Community in South Africa is still in the evolution phase where affiliational structures keep emerging with no certainty yet as to what the outcome might eventually be. This is as a result of the coalescing of different groups along different racial, class and even gender lines. With such different formations, the idea of a ‘rainbow nation’ which is central to the formation or shaping of identities in post-apartheid South Africa seems to still remain, at best, a distant possibility. There is ample evidence to believe that attempts to build a cohesive new South African nation are apparent in the two radio talk shows selected for this study. In seeking to do this, the shows try as much as possible to be as open as possible in order to give access to a wide range of participants. The various contestations in society as seen in the array of topics coming up for discussion on shows and the variety of the views and positions taken by people of different racial as well as socio-political backgrounds show that the different allegiances which people still hold especially to race or ethnic affiliations make the attainment of this cohesion a very difficult task. What becomes more visible therefore is the continuous building of new alliances or communities based on numerous other factors which keep coming into the picture as the reality of the new South Africa unfolds. It is indeed important to note that even the community that the participants on shows themselves constitute is as diverse as the different physical and social locations from which they come to be part of the shows. In a way, the representation of South African nationalism as multiracial is an attempt at forging a South African community which validates the post-apartheid slogan of the rainbow nation. The series of challenges which confront this effort as evidenced by altercations in public discourse tend to point in the direction of diverse emerging communities in the new nation. The expression of perverse nationalism(s) by participants on both ‘The After Eight Debate’ and ‘The Redi Direko Show’ is a public testimony to the precariousness of community in post-apartheid South Africa.

In any case, it suffices to say that it is from this kind of discordant communities which ‘dramatize a series of questions around recognition and non-recognition’ (Nuttall, 2001: 392)

that a new nation must emerge where there is mutual respect not just in acts of doing but also in perception of different racial groups and classes of people who make up the new rainbow nation. There seems therefore an attempt to forge a new kind of civilization that turns a blind eye to differences and seeks new ways of integrating the hitherto disparate people and groups. This attempt is more visible in official efforts to build a common nationalism which continues to give the impression of an imaginary unified community. The major predicament of such efforts though is inherent in the fact that authorities seek more to mould national subjects rather than citizens. In defiance of these efforts, therefore, participants on radio talk shows can be said to have found a public domain through which they engage themselves in emerging communities where issues of their everyday lives take centre stage. In this domain, even the socially disinherited may have voice or even the latitude to raise questions concerning their membership of the community or different kinds of community which they view as a common legacy not to be appropriated or assigned on the basis of privilege and disadvantage. In this manner, an existing social hierarchy of subordination which hinders the unification of different imagined communities may begin to give way to a new form of agency that derives inspiration from the margins of power in contemporary South Africa.

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Crime and Survival in the Post Colonial World/Text

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Abstract

*While oppressive regimes seek to suppress, dominate and at times dehumanize subject peoples, they also, by so doing create spaces which the oppressed manipulate and/or navigate for their own purposes. This paper takes up Bill Ashcroft's theory of postcolonial transformation so as to demonstrate that subjects of repressive regimes do not suffer in passivity; rather they actively negotiate through repressive structures in the same way that the colonized manipulated and transformed colonial discourse. In his theory of postcolonial transformation, Bill Ashcroft insists that the colonized were not mere victims of colonial repression; instead they devised ways of interjecting colonial hegemony in order to ensure their own survival. Similarly, this paper argues that in a repressive environment, where all avenues of personal growth have been blocked, the instinct for survival takes precedence over moral considerations. As a result, deviant subcultures emerge in an attempt to challenge and/or navigate the conventional culture instituted by the repressive regime. In order to substantiate these claims, I refer to Richard Wright's depiction of Jimcrow America in *Native Son* and *Black Boy*, Athol Fugard's and Lewis Nkosi's portrayal of apartheid South Africa in *Sizwe Bansi is Dead* and *Mating Birds* respectively. While the selected texts focus on Jimcrow America and apartheid South Africa, I also allude to my experiences of repression in Zimbabwe.*

Introduction

‘What happens to the concept of home when home is colonized, when the very ways of conceiving home, of talking about home, writing about it, remembering it, begin to occur through the medium of the colonizer's way of seeing the world.’ (Ashcroft, 2001:15)

Repressive regimes have a tendency to monopolise discourse, manipulate and censor public opinion, control and silence any kind of dissent. I am thinking about apartheid South Africa, Jim Crow America, Hitler's Nazi Germany and many other repressive regimes that have emerged the world over. When every aspect of life has fallen under the firm grip of a totalitarian regime, how do the subjects of that regime find space for their own personhood and survival? This paper investigates the ways in which subjects of oppressive regimes interpolate exclusive power structures for purposes of registering their own subjectivity. To this end, I will use Richard Wright's fictional representations in *Black Boy* and *Native Son*, Athol Fugard's *Sizwe Bansi is Dead* and Lewis Nkosi's *Mating Birds*. I want to slightly alter Bill Ashcroft's question and bring it into perspective within the scope of this paper: ‘What happens to the concept of home when home is [under a ruthless dictatorship], when the very ways of conceiving home, of talking about home, writing about it, begin to occur through the medium of the [dictator's way] of seeing the world?’

Bill Ashcroft's question is indeed pertinent especially in the context of the emergence of totalitarian regimes in the postcolonial world. What happens, I want to ask alongside the postcolonial theorist, when home is under the firm grip of a ruthless dictator? How do we

refashion and reposition ourselves in the new home? How do 'the interpellated subjects within it interpolate the various modes of imperial (dictatorial) discourse to use it for different purposes, to counter its effects by transforming them?' (Ashcroft, 2001:14). As much as the colonized embrace and in the same breath transform the discourse of the colonizer, subjects of oppressive regimes also find ways of refashioning their habitation to serve their own purposes. While Bill Ashcroft's theory of postcolonial transformation was designed particularly to demonstrate the ways in which the postcolonial society engages with and translates the hegemonic discourses of the colonizer, in this paper, I want to argue that Ashcroft is equally relevant in conceptualizing the way the oppressed in totalitarian regimes manipulate fractures within the dominant discourse for their own purposes.

My readings in African-American and South African literature and personal experiences in Zimbabwe since the late 1990s have inspired me to launch an inquiry into the correlation between criminality and survival. The thesis of this paper, if I should mention it at this early stage, is that any kind of repressive regime or oppressive system seeks to interpellate, to silence and even objectify those it dominates. In fact the whole idea of domination, as we have seen through Said's *Orientalism* is an attempt to institute a totalitarian discourse of knowledge and power, so that the knowledge of the dominant is the knowledge that rules. Bhabha would call this 'a form of governmentality that in marking out a 'subject nation,' appropriates, directs and dominates its various spheres of activity.' (1994: 70). However as Bill Ashcroft and Homi Bhabha have argued, the subaltern, to use a term popularly associated with Spivak, have a way of opening spaces within the dominant discourse without confronting it violently and in the process transforming it. Any kind of oppression-- and colonial oppression is a case in point--keeps those that it oppresses under extreme pressure of one sort or another; it also keeps them pressed, hard up like a spring pressed down and awaiting an opportunity to 'snap' and in order to survive, the oppressed often seek alternative ways of 'sticking with the alienating experience' (Bhabha, 2000: 373).

The main discursive site of interpolative contestation, as we shall see in the following pages, in any oppressive society is located in the instinctual quest for survival, in 'excess' as Ashcroft (2001) argues. This is the third space of enunciation, the gap between consumption and production as Ashcroft puts it (2001:43). In simple terms, Karl Marx has argued that basic material needs like food and shelter always come first before man engages in making history. So when the instinct for survival goes ahead of every other consideration, it follows that questions of integrity, decency and morality are overtaken if not replaced by that need to survive.

Interpolative Contestations and Survival across Spaces

This paper was inspired in an immediate sense by a conversation that I had with a co-lecturer in the Department of English and comparative studies at the University of Fort Hare (South Africa). While it is difficult to generalize human behaviour or to prescribe an all embracing theoretical framework for it, it is plausible that there are certain circumstances, social, political, ideological etc. that make certain forms of behaviour possible. Sociologists and criminologists have done much to substantiate this claim. In a repressive political system like Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe for example, oppressed subjects often engage with and translate the discourse of the oppressor on the rhizomic continuum (political, economic, religious etc) as Ashcroft puts it, manipulating *certain* fractures in the hegemonic discourse and thus transforming it in a *particular* way. 'Postcolonial subjects, in their ordinary dialogic engagement with the world, are not passive ciphers of discursive practices.' (Ashcroft, 2001: 48). For example, a man may know that taking a bribe is wrong, but under certain

circumstances he may find himself accepting it with a straight face. The question is: under what circumstances can a man/woman engage in subversive criminal activity with a clear conscience and a sense of self-justification. I must testify that I lived/ 'survived' through the economic hardships in Zimbabwe, particularly in the hyper-inflation years of 2007 to 2008. I was really stunned when my co-lecturer, in the conversation highlighted above, told me that he had refused to take a good bribe of about R30 000. This is not to say that what he did was anathema to me in particular because I am Zimbabwean or that no Zimbabwean would have refused such a bribe. That would be a grand generalization, but my point is that such men are becoming scarce in our times. I was surprised because I was thinking like a worker or a peasant in Zimbabwe between 2007 and 2008 and I asked myself how a man could refuse such a fat bribe unless his financial circumstances were reasonably stable. Suppose his wife was sick and there was no money for her to see the doctor or his children had just been sent back from school for unpaid fees. Suppose there was no money for rent and he was imminently faced with the possibility of eviction or being endorsed to the reserves as we see in the case of Aniko in Athol Fugard's play, *The Coat*. Was he going to refuse the bribe?

Let me briefly narrate the story that my co-lecturer told me. He had been given a contract by a certain company to supply sand to a construction site and while he was working on it, one man called him and said, 'Man, here is a chance to make money. Can you simply sign here and confirm you are going to provide us with a TLB.' Mr. Mdebele, my co-lecturer, didn't have a TLB on site, not even at home. So he went up to the man and said, 'No, I cannot sign because I don't have that kind of equipment, either on site or anywhere else.' But the man insisted, explaining that it was not necessary at all for him to have the TLB, all he had to do was sign, get the money involved and split it. Deal sealed. Immediately, his conscience whispered to him, 'this is corruption' so he said to the man. 'I am sorry I can't take this offer. I just can't take it.' Mr. Mdebele really meant what he said. He didn't take the offer. But that money could have sent five poor kids to school, I said to myself. Thirty thousand rand was a year's salary for a Zimbabwean teacher in those tumultuous years. Why couldn't he simply take it? When he finished telling the story, I said to him, 'You are strong man- that was a real challenge. How did you escape that?' Then he went on to tell me about his conscience and how he was going to feel if he had taken the money, so he decided to let it go, he said.

One of the facts about living in any kind of repressive regime, and this is my thesis in this paper, whether it is apartheid South Africa, Idi Amin's Uganda or Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe, is that public conscience simply dies a natural death and survival becomes the ultimate goal. I was glad my brother still had a conscience. My experience in Robert Mugabe's dictatorship has taught me that any form of oppression has a claustrophobic effect on the victims of that oppression- it stifles; it restricts, it keeps anxious. It also dehumanizes. To borrow a phrase from Frantz Fanon (1963), it keeps you penned in. One feels muffled and cramped so much that when an opportunity avails, perhaps through a fracture in the system, one literally snaps like a spring and the consequences are often criminal as we shall see in the unfolding pages. The question that should be asked in the post colonial world/text is: why has it become so difficult for us in the post colonial world/text to stand on our dignities and integrities and overcome the temptation to take bribes or engage in any other criminal activity?

When I read Richard Wright's *Native Son*, I was fascinated by that incident when Bigger Thomas suffocated Mary Dalton to death, brutally severed her head with a hatchet and threw her body into a blazing furnace. How could anybody in his right senses do a thing like that? When I read *Black Boy* I also came across very interesting incidents of how people living in

an oppressive society go about opening spaces for survival. I then realized that Bigger's 'black boy' experience in segregationist America is no different from Sizwe Bansi and Ndi Sibiya's experiences in apartheid South Africa as represented in Athol Fugard's *Sizwe Bansi is Dead* and Lewis Nkosi's *Mating Birds* respectively. The point I am making is that in a repressive socio-political environment, crime becomes a very attractive adventure if not an inevitable option-- it becomes a way of negotiating fractures within the system (and in a dictatorship the fractures are plenty). Bigger is overtly violent while Sizwe Bansi in Fugard's play, for instance, is strategic and tactical- manipulating crevices within the system for his own purposes. The difference is only in terms of methodology, how to deal with the system so as to make it work for one's purposes.

As Bill Ashcroft argues 'the most effective post colonial resistance has been the wrestling, from imperial hands, of some measure of political control, ... to culturally make use of aspects of the colonizing culture so as to generate transformative cultural production.' (2001: 47). Ndi Sibiya in Lewis Nkosi's *Mating Birds* has just been sacked from University for refusing to keep where he belongs as a black South African. Now restless, he finds himself fatally attracted to Veronica Slatter, a white woman, who by apartheid law is a no-go area for black South Africans. Sibiya negotiates the interstitial space between the stairwells of extreme cultural poles-- black and white-- through metaphorically having intercourse with Veronica Slatter in his imagination. He uses his eyes in place of his hands and penis, to fondle Veronica, negotiate through her smooth white thighs and enjoy the forbidden territory. It is fascinating to note that both Sibiya and Veronica actually reach an organism in their imaginations. The repression that is symbolized by the 'for whites only' billboard is destroyed by Sibiya's anxious eyes (how does it feel like to be caressing that soft white skin!). This anxiety penetrates the artificial wall of racial separation and thus in the end he performs his fantasy by actually raping Veronica. But what is important is that Veronica is first raped psychologically, to imply that the marginalized always have a way of interpolating dominant discourses even in their imaginations.

The first incident that I would like to scrutinize is an episode in Richard Wright's *Black Boy*. Richard, the protagonist, gets to a point where he is so desperately hungry that he decides to sell his dog, Betsy, in spite of his love for it. He walks around the white suburbs, looking for someone to buy it. Fortunately, one white woman offers to buy the dog and Richard is excited at the prospect of earning some money. We see Richard standing there, looking desperate as any other hungry 'nigger' of his time could be. The white woman goes back into her mansion and when she comes back, she only has ninety seven cents, meaning that the money is three cents short. Richard takes the money, counts it and says, 'But this is only ninety seven cents, my dog is worth a dollar.' 'Ninety seven cents is almost a dollar boy, take it,' the white woman says. The woman is white, and she lives in a mansion (which means she is privileged in this society) and yet she cannot pay a dollar for the dog. Richard insists that his dog is worth a dollar and refuses to take the ninety seven cents. Case closed. In this particular incident it is clear that Richard has a very limited choice. He must either give in (sell his dog at three cents less) or refuse to be patronized and starve. In this case, he takes one option. He refuses to be patronized by the white woman and hence when he walks away, hungry and moneyless, his future is obviously bleak.

The question that immediately comes to our minds is: how is he going to survive. One is actually tempted to castigate him as a stupid boy who must face the consequences of his complacency. He is hungry yet he refuses ninety seven cents? Is there any integrity in hunger and starvation? Is a hungry man a dignified man? It is clear that Richard's quest for self pride

will definitely be short lived. How long is he going to hold on to the hunger in his stomach? The point is that survival is more urgent than his pride. That is why later in the text we see him embezzling money at the hotel and fleeing to the north, inevitably succumbing to the demands of his environment. In Lewis Nkosi's *Mating Birds* a similar predicament is projected in the case of Nonkanyezi, the narrator's mother-- a proud Zulu woman from a respectable traditional Zulu family-- who in spite of her royal Zulu background, strategically transforms her life to ensure survival in the city. She abandons her traditional Zulu pride, becoming a shebeen queen in the process, not because she is inclined to moral decadence but because running a shebeen is the fastest way she can earn enough money to educate her son, just as much as embezzling money at the hotel is Richard's fastest way of liberating himself financially. For all her Zulu pride, Nonkanyezi ends up sleeping with her new found lover, Big Joe in full view of her son.

In another incident, in Wright's *Black Boy*, Richard finds a job at a shop in town. One day his white employer comes to him and tells him to be very careful in his dealings with Harrison, a young black boy who is also working at a nearby shop. 'Why should I be careful,' Richard asks, 'I don't have anything to do with that boy'? But his white employer says he also doesn't know. All he knows is that Harrison wants to stab him. This is just a warning. Richard is afraid and worried now. So the white man buys him a knife for self defense. Harrison's master also says the same thing to him, 'be careful with Richard, he is always carrying a knife to stab you.' Now the boys are pitted against each other. Each one carries a knife everywhere he goes in self defence. They keep sizing each other up-- each hating the other but always wondering why. One day, the boys manage to overcome their fears and come together to discuss the matter, only to find that the idea of a fight has been created and planted in their minds by their white employers. None of them had actually wanted to fight. When the white masters see that their plan to get the two boys cut each other has failed, they decide to use money as bait. They tell the boys that if they agreed to fight they would pay them five dollars each. This is indeed a lot of money especially for someone who earns as little as twelve dollars a month. At first, Richard is reluctant to take the offer because he does not want to fight for white people. But Harrison is so desperate that he immediately takes the offer. He needs the money to make a lay bye for a suit. Hence they take up the fight, promising not to hurt each other. Their white employers sit on the stairs, laughing and shouting obscenities at them.

What we learn in this story is that oppressors create situations like this among the oppressed, what Frantz Fanon calls 'internecine feuds.' In this case, conscience simply dies a natural death and the instinct for survival takes precedence. Harrison's position is that as a black boy in the segregationist American south, he has no dignity to protect or maintain. All that matters to him is the money that can allow him to purchase a suit. With this attitude it is clear that Harrison has totally lost any sense of self worth. As far as he is concerned he can only be someone if he has money to buy a suit. I want to argue that this is the same kind of predicament faced by most people living in a repressive environment. Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe is a case in point. Although the middle class and other social classes may be corrupted differently, ordinary people, the Harrisons and Richards of this world, are trapped in this situation, a situation where they must choose between their very humanity and 'survival.'

The question is-- how do we maintain our pride and dignity in a society like this, how do we avoid normalizing criminality in an environment where the equation of life is: lying+dishonesty+trickery = to food on the table? Let us look at my co-lecturer's story first.

It was indeed a noble idea that he refused to take the bribe and thus managed to hold on to his pride and dignity. It is probable that he couldn't take the offer because the circumstances of his life at that point weren't so dire that his principles preceded the instinct to survive. When you live under a repressive regime, and all avenues of survival are tightly closed (as all repressive regimes are capable of doing), an opportunity like that simply ceases to be corruption. It becomes a matter of choosing between life and death. It becomes an opportunity to survive.

I remember there was a time in Zimbabwe, between 2007 and 2008, when the Zimbabwean dollar was depreciating every hour or perhaps every minute, to be more precise. At that time, the situation was so bad that you could get paid now only to discover that by the time you got to town to do your shopping; all the money in your pocket (I mean a whole month's salary) could not buy you a loaf of bread. Someone asked me at that time –How do Zimbabwean workers survive? They go to work every day, yet the money they earn at the end of the month cannot buy them a loaf of bread. I said, 'The answer is very simple. When the going gets tough, the tough get going.' That was exactly what most Zimbabweans were doing. In those days, we had to break the law in order to live.

What I learnt through the Zimbabwean experience is that the human instinct for survival dies hard. The heart of the matter is that when life becomes difficult, as it was in Zimbabwe at that time, people simply alter their definitions of theft and corruption. For many, in those years, to steal was to survive. But this theft was 'acceptable' because 'everyone' was doing it. If you didn't steal, then you had to suffer more than those who were corrupt. As a matter of fact, those who lived through illegal means became role models. One pastor in a fastest growing Pentecostal church, in which I was a member, actually burnt his house because he was selling petrol illegally. This is perhaps what Chinua Achebe is talking about in his *Things Fall Apart* through the story of Eneke the bird. Eneke says 'since man has learnt to shoot without missing, I have also learnt to fly without perching.' When people are under pressure to survive or just to put food on the table, issues of self pride and dignity become a luxury.

When I was a teacher at a high school in Zimbabwe, there was a certain male teacher who used to make and sell sweets to his students. These students used to borrow from him and some of them were truants when it was pay time. I really sympathized with this teacher because at some point he had to ask female students to pay in kind and they did. Someone may argue and say, this had nothing to do with the crisis in the country; this teacher was merely abusing students. However, what must be understood is that victims of abuse are always likely to abuse others. When you are oppressed, you are always depressed, pressed down like a spring, so when opportunity arises, you also turn around to look for someone smaller than you to oppress as well. At that time, teachers could not even afford to pay fees for their own children, yet they were teaching other people's kids. Some could not afford to pay for their extra marital sexual needs, so they had to compromise with students-- teenagers whom they could easily con into sexual relationships. Fanon has a point when he says that the trauma of such experiences is psycho- pathological. I want to add that it is psychic as well, given that everything becomes so abnormal that one's behaviour cannot be predicted even against the backdrop of cultural norms and values.

It was a pity those days that you could see a student with pocket money double the teacher's salary. There were cases also of teachers who borrowed money from students only to fail to repay. Some even went to the extent of asking students to buy them liquor when they met them at the beer halls. The question is when a society has degenerated to this extent, when

home has become a new place, how do we go about inhabiting it without losing our dignity and self worth. How is it possible in a situation like this to talk about pride and dignity? How do we define what is criminal and what is non criminal.

Was it not Albert Memmi who proposed that the condition of being colonized is a nervous condition? I want to propose that living in any kind of repressive regime is equally a nervous condition. Living under colonial repression may be better because at least the white man has the entire paraphernalia of reasons to support his ruthless behaviour. The first one being the obvious difference in the color of his skin, followed by all those claims to intellectual superiority backed by what his race has done by way of inventions over the years while the black man was still in the mantle of his sleep. Any people living under a repressive regime are necessarily given to anger of the Bigger Thomas type. I want to argue that this state of anger can degenerate into subcultures of corruption, immorality and even physical violence. This is the spring's 'snap' effect that I mentioned before. When you live under a repressive regime, you are always angry because at every turn in your life, whether it is to the east or to the west, you have to find yourself bumping into something that turns your very bowels. It may be in the form of a news bulletin that is out rightly false, as was the case with Zimbabwe's media.

This is exactly Bigger Thomas's crisis and in Bigger's case the burning anger inside him is so powerful that it consumes him and everything around him. The way he beats his friend Gus has nothing to do with their failed plan to rob Blum's shop. His behaviour is typical of anyone living under any form of repression, be it political, cultural, sexual, psychological, etc. I want to believe that many people who were not properly connected to the powers that be, in Zimbabwe of 2007/2008, experienced this type of anger. This is the reason why Bigger Thomas is so angry. He has no education, no decent job or any money in his pocket but just across the line someone has millions of dollars in the bank. That person can even afford to spend some on ping pong. Perhaps our consolation in Bigger's case is that the Daltons are white, so they must be better than him. He is black, so he must learn not to overstep his limits, as Fanon puts it. But Bigger's predicament is not isolated to Jimcrow America, neither is Ndi Sibiya's case in Lewis Nkosi's *Mating Birds* isolated to apartheid South Africa. It is a trend in any kind of environment that chokes/suffocates the individual with any kind of repression.

Ndi Sibiya's case is very fascinating especially if we take cognizance of the fact that he consciously puts himself in a dangerous situation that attracts a death penalty. But it is clear that the artificial boundary demarcated by the 'for whites only' billboard on the beach stimulates the burning anxiety in Sibiya. Like Bigger in *Native Son*, he is curious to explore the treasure in the white woman. 'It was I, the narrator says, 'who chose to run after the girl; out of my own inclination, with no other purpose in mind than to discover the sexual reasons for the white man's singular protectiveness towards his womenfolk...' (p. 24). Sibiya is driven to rape by the way apartheid legislation over-protects the white woman as if she has unique feminine qualities that a black man is being deprived of. Veronica, the white lady that Sibiya later rapes, is in his imagination, more of a goddess than a human being. Because his desire has been restricted for so long, Sibiya is actually breaking down when he rapes Veronica, the way Bigger is also breaking down when he kills and metaphorically 'rapes' Mary Dalton. The two cannot hold it any longer and as Fanon says about Bigger Thomas, when the tension reaches its climax, he acts. (1952: 139). This is a breakdown because he has been withholding this desire for too long, he has tried his best to keep it where it belongs, but when he acts the pressure has become so powerful he can't hold it anymore.

This is the spring's 'snap' effect that I have hinted on previously. When Bigger and Sibiya 'snap' like springs that have just been released, the consequences are destructive. In Sibiya's case, his anxiety for the white woman takes a suicidal dimension. He wants the white woman in exchange for his very life. While Bigger is overwhelmed by the possibilities of his proximity to Mary Dalton, Sibiya cannot withstand the power of Veronica's soft skin, especially when the girl undresses in full view, exposing the forbidden treasures of her white body. What we see through Bigger Thomas and Ndi Sibiya is the power of repression to stir feelings of anxiety that often finds an outlet through the spring's snap effect.

Bigger Thomas is all anger because everything around him makes him sick. He does not need to try anything because he knows, it is bound to fail or get him into trouble. When he kills Mary Dalton, he is releasing that hatred, that anger that has been part of his life. Mary Dalton is a fragile tender girl, but the way Bigger Thomas kills her, the brutality applied, tells us that Bigger Thomas is not actually killing her. He is exorcising himself by releasing the tension that has accumulated inside of him for years. The anger that Bigger exudes is the very same anger that a Zimbabwean teacher felt when the President said, 'I was once a teacher also, and that's why I left teaching and joined politics. That profession does not pay.' That level of arrogance broke you down if you were a teacher awaiting the President's word pertaining a strike that has taken weeks on end. How do we maintain our dignity and self pride in a socio-political environment like this? How can we be honest citizens? We are hungry. Our children are hungry and the president says 'that profession doesn't pay.'

The white woman who gives Richard ninety seven cents is a typical oppressor. She knows that Richard is desperate. Hence she gives him ninety seven cents because she believes that in his desperation he will take it. If the oppressed are not prepared to take up the struggle like Sembene Ousmane's workers in *God's Bits of Wood*, their plight will never be alleviated. The oppressor's strategy is that he gets the oppressed desperate so as to cheapen their bargain. During those tumultuous days in Zimbabwe, some civil servants actually lost their jobs when they refused to obey an order to take up a proposed 'destitute salary.' I had an opportunity to work with one of those fellows who had been victimized for participating in an 'illegal' strike. Mr Mlambo was his name. The government didn't reinstate him just like that. He was charged with dissent and the punishment was for him to work for six months (half a year) without pay. To make matters worse, Mr. Mlambo's wife (presumably because she came from a well to do family) got an opportunity to go to London. She never came back and in those difficult times, Mlambo was toiling without a salary, abandoned by his own wife.

In the conversation that I narrated at the beginning of this paper, I remember telling my compatriot that he didn't take the 'fat bribe' because his situation was not very dire. Perhaps I was wrong because Richard's situation in Wright's *Black Boy* was very desperate yet he refused to take the ninety cents and stood on his pride, sacrificing his growling stomach. But is it really possible for a poor little boy like Richard to lead an innocent life in a society founded on corrupt values, violence, deception, stereotype, racism, discrimination- you name it? Yes, for one day perhaps, like what Mr. Mndebele did-- but on a daily basis, this is very difficult. That's why we see the young Richard later becoming a thief, embezzling money at the hotel and escaping to the north.

Does a hungry man have any dignity? Does he have a choice? Is it possible to stick to values of self pride and dignity, to say 'no' to crime when one has been reduced to a state of abject poverty? This is the question that Athol Fugard, the South African playwright is asking in

Sizwe Bansi is Dead. If our pride will only get us into trouble with the authorities or get us deported to the dry and barren Ciskei, does it benefit anything. If we abandon self pride and integrity as core values of life, how do we live? As we see through Sizwe Bansi's case, without these values, one becomes a ghost and what a ghost does is that it gives no rest to the living. If a colonial condition is a psychopathological one as Fanon has argued and if dictatorships are equally dismembering as argued in this paper, living in any kind of repressive regime, I want to insist, is living like a ghost. Sizwe Bansi has no identity to think about. His children may as well be called after Robert Zwelinzima. What is important for him is survival for the moment. Yet the question that immediately comes to mind is whether food can be so important that we can sacrifice our very identity for it. I want to maintain that when people live in conditions of abject poverty, anything goes for them. In the Richard/ Harrison story, we see that the two boys are keen to protect their integrity. They cannot fight for white men. Yet they end up fighting because they need five dollars.

Conclusion

What do we do when home is Jim Crow America, apartheid South Africa, or Mugabe's Zimbabwe? Do we allow ourselves to be dehumanized, to engage in a fight and hurt each other for a living like Richard and Harrison or do we hold on to our pride and die? Does pride have any meaning if it cannot guarantee food on the table? The issue of survival is indeed pertinent especially in the post colonial world/text. This is perhaps the bone of contention in Zimbabwean politics to date. Do we go it alone and starve or we allow ourselves to be exploited and live? But what kind of survival can we have without our self pride, our integrity and our self respect. And if we stick to self pride without food, can we survive. Should we perish firing to the last bullet or we should relinquish the struggle and explore other avenues of survival? One of the lessons that we draw from Richard and Harrison's predicament is that even if they fought and felt embarrassed, they managed to get the money they needed and moved on with life. Perhaps the question is whether we can call that 'moving on.' Is dignified survival possible in the post colonial world/text?

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Challenges and Strategies for Affordable Housing Ownership for the Nigerian Urban Poor

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Abstract

This paper addresses the problems militating against the urban poor in achieving home ownership in Nigeria. In doing this, it reviews the existing National Housing Policy and identifies the issue of mortgage loans affordability, which has been identified as the major constraint against the urban poor in having access to housing finance and subsequently denying them of housing ownership. The paper, therefore, attempts to proffer the appropriate strategies, which includes adoption of co-operative housing schemes and the involvement of international donor agencies in addressing the housing problems of the urban poor. This can be done through making small grants available to local co-operative groups. Indeed, for almost a decade now, more than 40 initiatives in 17 nations have received such support. The deployment of the funds demonstrate that incremental housing ownership can be achieved using local co-operative housing scheme once there is financial support from international donor agencies.

Introduction

Housing goes beyond the mere assemblage of bricks and mortar. It encompasses the totality of the environment and infrastructure which provides human comfort, enhance people's health and productivity as well as enable them to sustain their psycho-social or psycho-pathological balance. Housing characteristics and the process by which housing is constructed and occupied, are key aspects of the living standards of households in developing countries. Housing is of great importance to households in both developed and developing economies, because it is the largest fixed capital investment that households make. In developing countries, housing accounts for 10-30 percent of households expenditure, 6-20 percent of Gross Domestic Products (GDP), and 10-50 percent of gross fixed capital formation (Malpezzi, 1987). Furthermore, as the economy develops, the proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) accounted for by housing investment rises. Other than human capital, housing and land are the types of capital that are most widely owned. To this extent, housing is usually used as a barometer for measuring the health and wealth of a nation.

Essentially, housing delivery involves series of processes by which housing resources such as land, labour, finance and building materials are combined to produce new housing units. It could also involve the upgrading of existing units as well as distribution of both new and existing housing to consumers (Agbola and Alabi 2000). The supply, while fixed in the short-run, involves lots of constraints, including access to land, funding, technology and perhaps executive capacity. It is therefore rewarding both at the micro and macro levels that the objectives of a project are eventually fairly achieved after putting in a lot of resources.

The heaviest burden imposed by poor living, housing and working conditions on low-income areas is mostly felt by women with children. It is important to note that women constitute over 50 percent of the world population, which currently stands at about 7 billion (National Population Commission, 2012). Here in Nigeria, with the population of about 167 million, women make up over 50%. Indeed, one can safely conclude that women make up more than half of the population of any community in the world at large. As far as affordable housing is

concerned, the most critical situation is found among single women that are household heads. Women are responsible for the health care, nutrition and education of children, adolescents and the elderly. They have their problems aggravated by the lack of proper urban services, less formal ownership ratio and lower housing quality. Ramos (1994) investigates the effects of macro-economic factors on the evolution of poverty and indigence in Brazil during the 1980s in order to identify the socio-economic groups most acutely affected by poverty and penury. Using Pnad-micro data for several years and decomposition analysis to assess the importance of different socio-economic group to total poverty, he showed that the chronically poverty-stricken groups in Brazil are: female-headed households, the illiterate, young people with no monetary earning or informal employees, which are over-represented among the poor and are even more pronounced amongst the indigent members of the population.

Rakodi (2007) in his research work titled “Land for Housing in African Cities: Are Informal Delivery Systems Institutionally Robust and Pro-Poor” noted that informal land market in Eldoret, the fifth largest town in Kenya, restrains married women from purchasing land in their own names, as a result of social unacceptability. Also, in this study, Rakodi (2007) reported that in Gaborone, the capital of Botswana, housing land delivery scheme through state sanctioned channels allows women heads of households to obtain land with a certificate in their own names, and in theory married women could do so also. However, in practice social norms adhered to by both purchasers and Board officials mean that married women would not do so in practice without the explicit permission of their husbands. Here in Nigeria, Rakodi (2007) while studying housing land delivery system through customary channels in Enugu, discovers that access to land through this medium is restricted almost entirely to men, and women can only gain access to such land through their relationship with men (normally their husbands).

Gender issues in housing ownership should include access to housing inputs such as land, labour, finance and building materials. Housing ownership is stimulated and sustained by the demand and supply mechanism. The fact that there is an unmet need for housing ownership encourages investors to explore the possibility of embarking on housing provisions which might meet the need of particular groups in the society. Therefore, the various tensions and shortages between demands for housing and its supply tend to keep the housing market alive, since the housing delivery process is substantially subjected to various dynamics in the housing markets. To this end, it becomes imperative to encourage every potential participant to be involved in housing market, regardless of sex.

Housing Ownership and the Urban Poor

By year 2000, some 900 million urban dwellers in low-and middle-income households worldwide were “living in poverty” suffering from poor quality housing, insecure tenure and/or inadequate basic services (Diana Mithin, *et al*, 2007). Most of these people occupied and still occupy land in dangerous locations such as unstable hillsides or flood-plains, because this is the only undeveloped land within the reach of low income-earning population. The price(s) they have to pay for plots or for housing is/are much increased by the absence of any land policy that supports this poor segment of the population.

Obviously, facilitating access to land and securing the means of paying for it is one of the most important prerequisites for the development of sustainable human settlement policy. Providing affordable and easily accessible land to the urban population requires modifying the Nigerian Land Use Act of 1978, to make it very effective, in achieving easier access to developable land to all, including the urban poor (Agbola, T. and Alabi, M., 2000).

Essentially, the land Use Act of 1978 should be modified to empower the town planning authorities in urban centres to acquire reasonable expanse of land for allocation, to all deserving urban dwellers, with all basic infrastructural facilities; such as drainage system, good road network, potable water, etc. provided.

Also, very important to home ownership issue is the access of the urban poor to the housing finance market. As noted by Sheuya, (2007), adequate housing finance is considered the most important factor of housing production, because it can help to produce the essential components of housing namely: land, on-site and off-site infrastructure, building materials, as well as offsetting construction costs. Unfortunately in Nigeria, housing finance market has remained very difficult for the urban poor to access. Although, the emergence of modern housing finance mechanism can be traced to the United States of America, it has contributed immensely to the economic development of many developed countries all over the world. It is pathetic to note that while mortgage assets constituted as much as 87% of Gross Domestic Products (GDP) in Denmark as at 2005, it contributed less than 0.5% to the Nigerian Gross Domestic Product (GDP), as at the same time under review (See Table 1).

Table 1: Residential Mortgages as Percentage of GDP.

Rank	Country	%
1	Denmark	87.5
2	U.S.A.	71.0
3	UK	70.4
4	Germany	54.3
5	Portugal	50.6
6	Sweden	50.0
7	Ireland	45.0
8	Spain	42.1
9	Finland	35.6
10	Hong Kong	31.0
11	Nigeria	0.38

Source: HABITAT 2005 Report on Financing Urban Shelter, p.29.

It is therefore argued that the extent to which a nation is transiting from the status of 'developing to developed,' also depends on efforts put in place to develop its housing finance infrastructure especially as it affects its legal, physical and economic environments.

The evolution of formal mortgage finance market in Nigeria can be traced to the establishment of Nigerian Building Society in 1956. The institution was transformed to the Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria in 1977. Following the inability of the housing finance market in Nigeria to perform as expected, the Federal Government had to embark on various reform measures which were described by Agbola and Olatubara (2007) as the most momentous restructuring in recent years. It was however noted that government intervention in the housing finance industry has not been sufficient to attract and sustain significant private sector involvement in large scale housing development. Major areas of concern, include the sourcing of loanable funds for the sector as well as the disbursement and overall structural management of funds. All these still need to be addressed (Agbola and Olatubara, 2007). Also, Abiodun (1999) and Okupe (2000) wondered why formal mortgage finance schemes that are working perfectly in both developed and some developing countries are not meeting the needs and aspirations of Nigerians.

Over the years, the Nigerian housing finance market has failed to meet the substantial loan applications of Nigerians. As a matter of fact, Nubi (2007) avers that at no time was the mortgage finance industry able to meet up with the pressure of loan demands. In 1979, the value of all outstanding loan applications of Nigerians was put at ₦223.8million and available funds equaled to ₦127.0 million; meaning that demand and supply were in the ratio of 2:1. This degenerated to ratio 4:1 in 1986 when the value of outstanding loans applications increased to ₦465.8 million and only ₦105.3 was available (Onabule, 1990).

Having taken into consideration the abysmal performance of the Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria in meeting the housing needs of the average Nigerian, the government decided to formulate the first ever National Housing Policy in 1991 and introduced the National Housing Fund in 1992, ostensibly to strengthen the development of a viable housing finance industry in Nigeria. Surprisingly, the National Housing Fund Scheme was able to realize only ₦19.9 million as at 1992, and this increased to only ₦5.26 billion in year 2000 and to ₦24 billion in 2007 (Atagher, 2007). This amount represented deductions from the salaries of government workers and very few employees in the private sector. The amount collected was less than 10% at its projection. Accessing funds under the scheme has been a bigger problem. Certainly, the urban poor have not been able to have access to the funds, because of bureaucratic bottlenecks and limited loanable funds under the scheme.

What is Co-operative Housing?

Fasakin (1998) defines co-operative housing as a society that co-operatively owns a group of houses or flats in which each member participates actively in all matters of decision-making on the estate. In a similar vein, Sazama (2000) defines a housing co-operative as a co-operative in which member-residents jointly own their buildings, democratically control them and receive the social and economic benefits from living in, and owning the houses. Also, National Co-operative Housing Association of America (2001) describes it as a form of multi-family ownership venture between co-operative corporations and the corporative owners, called tenant-stockholders.

International Donor Agencies and Co-operative Housing

In most cities in low-and middle-income nations, between one-quarter and one-half of the population live in informal or illegal settlements, many of which are under threat of eviction and most of which are denied investment infrastructure and services (Mitlin and Satterthwaite, 2007).

This paper describes an initiative meant to overcome these constraints by recommending funds to support grassroots initiatives managed by Transitional Network of Slum/Shack/Homeless People's Federations and their support NGOs. In 15 nations, grassroots savings groups and the larger Slum/Shack/ Homeless People's Federations are found engaged in many community-driven initiatives to upgrade slum and squatter settlements, and to secure land tenure, to develop new housing that low-income households can afford, and improve provision for infrastructure and services (including water, sanitation and drainage). In 1996, six of these federations formed Shack/Slum Dwellers' International (SDI) as a network through which they could learn from each other and find ways to collaborate to make their work more effective. A small secretariat based in Cape Town, South-Africa, helps to support other nations. The activities of SDI are summarized in Table II, which highlights the centrality of savings and tenure-related activities. Savings, as elaborated below is the core organizing process to build strong local organizations. Savings groups, composed mostly of women, federate at the city and national levels to provide

institutions that can share assets and resources (mainly, knowledge and finance), and thereby strengthen and extend the activities of local savings groups. These city and national federations also have a significant role in negotiating with state agencies to secure policy improvements and additional resources.

This arrangement has worked tremendously to alleviate the housing problems of the poor in the benefiting countries. Appadurai, Arjun (2007), declares that “without poor women joining together, there can be no savings, without savings there can be no federating, without federating, there is no way for the poor themselves to enact changes in the arrangements that disempowered them”. The predominance of women as participants in this process has resulted in a strong concentration on shelter-related activities, in large part, because women take on most domestic and child-rearing responsibilities and often have income-earning activities at home. Groups have developed a number of strategies based on the opportunities within their particular context to improve shelter for low-income groups. City-level strategies demonstrate how city redevelopment can avoid evictions and minimize relocations. This combination of activities has resulted in the various ways in which federations develop their own urban poor funds, which provide capital for community investments. Each of these federations works very closely with a support NGO, staffed by professionals, who assist in a range of task-related activities and to provide management-related functions, technical development services and documentation for a professional audience. As the process has grown in significance, city governments and some national governments have become interested in supporting these community-driven approaches, recognizing their potential contributions to poverty reduction and urban development.

Table II: Summary of the National Federations that are SDI Affiliates

Name of Country	A. Date	B. No of Settlements where there is a process	C. Active Saver	D. Savings	E Houses Built	Tenure Secured (number of families)
India	1986	5,000	100,000	US\$1.2m	6,000	80,000
South Africa	1991	750	30,000	US\$1.2m	15,800	23,000
Thailand	1992	42,700	5 Million	US\$ 206m	30,000	30,000
Namibia	1992	60	15,000	US\$ 0.6m	1,200	3,700
Cambodia	1993	288	11,300	US\$ 145,000	3,300	800
Philippines	1994	148	42,727	US\$631,830	13,388	18,191
Zimbabwe	1995	62	45,000	Z\$ 280m	750	3,500
Nepal	1998	396	3,147	US\$173,402	50	85
Sri-Lanka	1998	130	21, 506	US\$ 29,469	100	2,000
Colombia	1999	1	60	US\$ 10,000	----	60
Kenya	2000	50	20,000	US\$ 50,000	110	5,600
Zambia	2002	45	14,000	US\$ 18,000	-----	138
Ghana	2003	15	12,000	-----	-----	----
Uganda	2003	4	500	US\$ 2,000	-----	150
Malawi	2004	100	20,000	US\$ 50,000	660	1,260
Brazil	2005	5	100	US\$ 4,000	----	7,000
Tanzania	2004	16	1,000	US\$ 2,000	-----	-----

Source: Diana Mitlin and David Satterthwaite, 2007.

The International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) of the United Kingdom also works with Shack/Slum Dwellers International (SDI) in documenting the Federation's initiatives and presenting these to professionals and institutions working in international development. In addition to the vertical relations embedded within the funding process, there are more complementary activities in which both IIED and SDI are engaged.

Between 2002 and 2006, these two institutions have supported the understated development projects in various locations across the world:

- Savings groups in Cambodia, Colombia, India, Kenya, Malawi, Nepal, Philippines, South-Africa, and Zimbabwe to obtain land for shelter development.
- Slum/Squatter upgrading and successful negotiations for land tenure in Cambodia, India, and Brazil,
- Bridge financing for federation initiatives in India, Philippines and South Africa (where government support was promised but slow to be made available);
- Improved provision for water and sanitation in Cambodia, Sri-Lanka, Uganda and Zimbabwe (usually accompanied by improved land tenure);
- Settlement enumeration in Brazil, Ghana, Namibia, Sri-Lanka, South-Africa and Zambia (providing the information base for upgrading and for new land tenure initiatives);
- Exchange visits by established federations to urban poor groups in Angola, East-Timor, Tanzania and Zambia;
- Community-managed shelter reconstruction after the Tsunami in India and Sri-Lanka; and Federation partnerships with local governments in shelter initiatives in India, Malawi, South-Africa and Zimbabwe.

In terms of the outcomes from these processes, of particular note is the first land development program in Lilongwe, Malawi, where women using a low-cost adobe brick technology, constructed 200 houses in two months (Mitlin and Satterthwaite, 2007).

Interestingly, the major thrust of Nigeria's National Housing Policy of 1991 and its subsequent amendment in 2006 was the development of a housing finance system geared towards the provision of an enabling environment for the generation of housing finance; with the private sector as the main source (Olotuah, 2009). Unfortunately, this has not been able to meet the housing needs of the Nigerian urban poor. Thus, having taken due cognizance of the short-comings of the various housing programmes in meeting the housing needs of the urban poor and given the modest achievements of cooperative housing schemes in the aforementioned countries, this paper advocates the formation of housing co-operative unions as a strategy for the provision and maintenance of low-income housing for the urban poor in Nigeria.

Conclusion / Recommendations

Apart from the fact that communal and co-operative values are inherent in most Nigerian cultures, co-operative housing has proved to be a pragmatic and cost-effective means for home-ownership for the urban poor. The principle has been encouraged and endorsed by several international organizations, such as the United Nations Centre for Human Settlement, the International Institute for Environment and Development, the

Shack/Slum Dwellers International Organisation, etc. Furthermore, co-operative housing has been tested in many nations all over the world and has proved to be the best way of addressing the housing problems of the urban poor at least in four major ways:

First, the effectiveness of funding goes directly to grassroots organizations formed by urban poor groups for savings and loans. This means that these organizations have a central role to play in project development and management, and they make sure that funding goes as far as possible by pushing down unit costs, and by adding their own contributions, using the funds to leverage additional support.

Second, the fund is very flexible, in that, it supports what it is meant to do. This means that it can respond to opportunities and priorities identified by local groups. It responds to what grassroots organizations, their federations and local support NGOs adjudged to be the most effective way to secure land or housing tenure and basic services.

Third, decision making about the allocation of the fund is embedded within Slum/Shack Dwellers International (SDI). So, all the federations support the local activities that are funded, because they set the priorities. The process through which the different federations support each other in development activities helps to strengthen the confidence of the urban poor and ensures their ownership of the development process.

Finally, as elaborated above, the nature of the relations within this group, and between the donors that support it, IIED and SDI, who help to manage it, and the groups that receive support allows for more constructive support for grassroots communities both within and between each agency. It is not simply that the funds are delivered to local groups in a useful way, rather, the institutions designed to support this process play effective roles in their execution. In this mobilization and federating strategy, women play a vital role in view of the significance of their percentage in the country. Therefore, adopting this concept in meeting the housing needs of the urban poor would be a veritable way of addressing the enormous housing problems confronting this country.

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Conflict Resolution in Project Location Decision-Making: The Case of Old Ibadan Airport Commercialisation Project

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Abstract

This paper presents a case of how the exercise of state power can spell doom for an otherwise economically profitable, environment friendly and socio-culturally desirable large-scale real estate project. It is the case of the Old Ibadan Airport commercialisation project, aborted by a counter-claim of ownership of the project site by the Nigerian Air Force. The issue at stake presents an interesting example of locational conflict in the urban arena. Based on a model of locational conflict and conflict resolution as the conceptual framework, the paper presents some methods and strategies by which the commercialisation of Old Ibadan Airport was professionally evaluated at inception and later subjected to legal action by some of the aggrieved land allottees following a perceived breach of contract by the project's owners. After presenting some possible options that policy makers and key stakeholders could have considered and adopted in resolving the impasse facing the implementation of the project, the author concludes that locational conflicts can always be resolved if opposing parties are willing, able and ready to invest in cooperative dialogue based on mutual respect, rather than resorting to the force of arms in the interest of local, regional and national sustainability. Recommendations are put forward for avoiding similar conflicts in the future.

Key Words:

Conflict Resolution, Project Viability, Locational Conflict, Relocation, Decision-making.

Introduction

Economically profitable, environment friendly and socio-culturally desirable private-sector real estate projects are usually regarded as vehicles for sustainable national development. The commercialisation of the Old Ibadan Airport in Nigeria provides an interesting case study. Following the federal government's resolve of the early 1990's to privatise and commercialise a number of federal parastatals in the country, with a view to giving room for the injection of private capital into the investment market for national development in an era of structural adjustment, the Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria (FAAN) decided to promote and implement a tripartite commercial real estate project agreement for the virtually abandoned Old Ibadan Airport in the northern part of Ibadan metropolis, a city widely reputed to be the third largest in Africa.

Consequently, a firm of registered estate surveyors and valuers (Jare Babarinde & Co, 1996) was commissioned for feasibility and viability study of the project by Tarmac Estates Limited after preliminary investigations had revealed that planning permission would be granted by the relevant local planning authority. Following the successful completion and acceptance of the feasibility report, the implementation of the project seemed to be getting on

well as planned until one day, when the unexpected suddenly happened – an *army occupation* of the project site was discovered during a visit to the site. This marked the beginning of a protracted conflict between two principal players in the implementation of a major project that was supposed to attract a lot of benefits to the residents of Ibadan and improve the tax base of the municipality and other stakeholders.

The purpose of this paper is two-fold: first, to demonstrate how the exercise of state powers can mean a big blow to what otherwise could be a very successful real estate project that could assist a metropolitan government ameliorate the housing and commercial accommodation shortages facing its residents and improve its property tax base. Second, the paper is intended to generate honest arguments among practitioners, policy makers and intellectuals for possible resolution of potential locational conflicts in the built environment in the interest of local, regional and national sustainability.

Nature of the Problem

Two opposing claims brought about a locational conflict at the Old Ibadan Airport. In the first instance, Tamac Estates Limited would like to see that its goal of developing a housing/commercial estate on the site of the Old Ibadan Airport was pursued to a logical conclusion and, in fact, the client had put in place all necessary measures for achieving that goal. A tripartite agreement had been signed by the collaborating developers and financiers, including the Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria. The Airports Authority was expected to have straightened its own records with the Nigerian Air Force authorities because both of them were supposed to be friendly autonomous parastatals under the same federal government's control. Furthermore, application forms had been sold to a good number of members of the public for land allocation. The Old Airport premises had been cleared and refurbished to pave way for the integration of the existing old buildings on the site into the proposed estate; work had started on the opening up of streets on the site to allow individual allottees take possession of their plots and negotiations with financial institutions had reached an advanced stage for project funding. Simply put, too much preparation had gone into this project which rendered its likely nullification at this stage a big blow to private investment initiative and an unwarranted colossal waste of human, material and financial resources that Nigeria or any other developing nation could ill afford.

Secondly, the Nigerian Air Force Authorities could be said to have acted rationally by forming an *army of occupation* on Old Ibadan Airport site because they always have a duty of care to guarantee the security of the nation. According to their own story, one way of achieving this goal was through the continued use of the Air Force Base building located somewhere on the Old Airport premises. The issue at stake, then, was that private financial objectives were at loggerheads with national security objectives. Both sets of objectives are required for the survival and economic sustainability of the nation. The consultants to the proposed project held the opinion that the proposed estate should be a top priority to the government because it sought to ameliorate the housing problems of the residents of one of the country's largest cities. On the other hand, every sovereign country desires to own a well-equipped and effective Air Force of its own, particularly in contemporary times when all nations should be able to defend themselves against local, regional or foreign aggressions. The question then was: What was the way forward?

Conceptual Framework

Locational conflict arises when individuals or groups believing themselves to be negatively affected express opposition to a locational or siting decision made by others (Lake, 1996). While effectively managed conflicts can have positive outcomes, unresolved conflict undermines projects and relationships, as well as the morale and reputations of stakeholders. The behaviour of one party to a conflict may be destructive particularly if a military response is used by one party to retaliate a provocation caused by another party to the conflict (Zeitsoff, 2011). Conversely, the response may be conciliatory, constructive or friendly but, regardless of its tone, the objective in both cases is to express the conflict and attempt to persuade the other party to meet one's needs' (Mayer, 2000).

By definition, conflict resolution means the termination of manifest conflict between individuals or groups (Filley, 1975: 21). In certain cases, such as compromise, the termination may leave both sides only partially committed to the resulting agreement. In other cases, the termination may provide high commitment to the resulting agreement. As revealed by some activities of NIMBY groups worldwide (an acronym for the phrase "not in my back yard"), locational conflict is neither a uniquely recent phenomenon nor one exclusively associated with highly industrialised societies. For example, analysis of newspaper accounts of locational conflicts in Worcester and Massachusetts in the USA (Meyer and Brown, 1989) had found that the frequency of reported conflicts on a per capita basis was essentially the same in Columbus, Ohio (Cox and McCarthy 1980). NIMBY further argues that the location of rendering plants, slaughter houses, and saloons generated protest in the nineteenth century, while waste incinerators, homeless shelters, and low-cost housing frequently motivated opposition in the late twentieth century. Today, 'a vexing new problem for local officials' in many Western countries 'is the location of cellular telephone towers, which are sometimes disguised inside church steeples or building cupolas to avoid protests over visual blight'. In general, therefore, while the targets of conflict have changed to reflect changes in technology, economic activity, and society at large, the intensity of conflict was no less virulent a hundred years ago than it is today.

Three concepts of space/location are pertinent: group territory; individual territory, and personal territory/space. According to Filley (1975: 81), the first two refer to fixed areas over which a group or an individual takes a proprietary interest. On the other hand, personal space has to do with the self-established areas of privacy and control which surrounds a person. As a result, we can have three kinds of locational conflict: person-to-person locational conflicts, intra-group locational conflicts, and inter-group locational conflicts. The last two are in the realm of group territoriality. Of the three, the focus of this paper is on inter-group locational conflicts and, eventually, on group territoriality (Tarmac Estates Limited Versus Nigerian Air Force authorities). Groups may establish boundaries around the territory which they seek to protect against intruders, and certain groups define their territory and defend it with violence (e.g. tribal or ethnic groups asserting their rights over landed property). In this regard, the conceptual framework adopted for this paper is provided by the model of Locational Conflict and Conflict Resolution (Cox. 1979; Cox and Johnston, 1982). According to these authors, locations are more the outcome of a political process than of adjustments at the margin by private decision-makers in the context of market-determined prices. As a result of the failure

of the spatial equilibrium models and market mechanism to satisfactorily handle locational analysis, in the land market, it has become necessary for us to retain the theoretical framework of the neo-classical economic theory for explanations of conflicts in terms of real world inadequacies. These inadequacies include externalities (positive and negative), immobility, and the monopoly effects of space (Cox and Johnston 1982: 11). These, in turn, have led to a focus upon the role of institutions (including local, state and federal governments, and the judiciary) as well as interest groups, in conflict resolution over location.

In adopting this theoretical construct, we can safely assume decision-making units at any number of geographical scales. On a micro-scale, these units could be households and firms, such as developers and allottees on an estate. On a macro-scale, the units could be jurisdictions, such as the local, state and federal governments of a country where a project is to be located. Each decision-making unit has a number of resources which are allocated to activities that maximize the owner's utility, such as housing or shopping. According to Cox, allocation is governed by a set of property rights which specify the uses to which the different resources can be put. From these private allocations, externalities can be anticipated which create localized stress and locational conflict. The conflict arises between decision-making units at the same geographical scale (such as between household or tenant and the municipality, state or federal government).

Resolution of locational conflicts may be achieved by either private locational strategies or private bargaining. The individual household or developer may relocate within the same metropolitan area, just as the individual jurisdiction can effect that relocation. It is possible to anticipate a variety of inter-jurisdictional or inter-household (inter-developer) bargaining procedures. However, private solutions to locational conflicts are sub-optimal. This is because externalities will remain in the form of residual localized stress. Furthermore, co-ordination by collective control of some of the individual decision-making units' property rights could make at least one unit better off without making any other one worse off. According to Cox, individual households or developers at the micro-level, therefore, cede some sovereignty over the use of their property to a superordinate authority. Co-ordination is then achieved by a modification of the property rights of individual households or developers. At the macro-level, individual jurisdictions can grant some of their sovereignty over the property rights of their constituent decision-making units to a super-ordinate jurisdiction, such as a local government within a metropolis, thereby creating new decision-making units on a new and wider geographical scale. These new units in turn create externalities for other units at the same or smaller geographical scale; consequently, a new cycle of locational conflict and conflict resolution is generated.

The role of institutions in modifying the intensity of externalities and the scope for the extraction of rents has also been highlighted by Cox and Johnston (1982: 7). Of particular interest is the central role of the juridical context of the state as a constraint to individual and corporate behaviour and as a matrix within which locational analysis should be set, Cox observed. Unfortunately, the role of the judiciary in many developing countries is questionable, particularly under dictatorial and totalitarian governments. In ideal situations, the judiciary should always be an impartial arbiter in conflict resolution.

As aptly argued by Takahashi (1998) and DeVercuil (2000), methods of resolving conflicts often revolve around community-centred, user-centred and state-centred approaches. The Canadian Institute for Conflict Resolution (CICR-<http://www.cicr-icrc.ca/en/about/our-approach>, 10/29/2012), adopts the community-based conflict resolution approach for its projects spread across the world. In this approach, “community” is regarded as a place ‘where we live, where we work, or where we share activities. A community is like a well that gathers people, brings them into regular interaction to fulfill certain psychological, emotional, relational and material needs. We can also imagine a global village, since communities are linked and interact with larger ones. They can also divide into smaller communities’. In short, a community-based conflict resolution approach, according to the CICR, moves communities towards healthy responses to conflict. From this perspective, ‘conflict is seen as normal and as an opportunity for growth and creativity enabling communities and their members become competent in resolving their own differences without resorting to violence, while pursuing a peace making process.’

However, community-centred approaches generally focus on community opposition to a proposed facility siting, which did not happen in our case under investigation. The user-centred approach usually applies to conflict over social service facility location, particularly from the perspective of facility users who often experience extreme poverty and/or physical, social, or mental disability as a barrier to access to needed services (Takahashi, 1998). Lastly, the state-centred approach (Lake and Disch, 1992) seeks to legitimise assumptions shared by community- and user-centred approaches, that facilities are needed by society. In the present case study, we believe that any solution to the challenge faced by the commercialisation of Old Ibadan Airport lie somewhere between user-centred and state-centred approaches.

Methodology Adopted for Old Ibadan Airport Commercialisation

The firm of Jare Babarinde and Co was commissioned in 1996 by Tarmac Estates Limited to submit a feasibility and viability report on the commercialisation of *Tarmac Estate*. Summarised below are some of the findings in the report.

(i) Location: The proposed “Tarmac Estate”, jointly owned by the Federal Aviation Authority of Nigeria (FAAN) and two indigenous firms of property developers, was to be located at the Old Ibadan Airport in the northern part of the sprawling Ibadan metropolis. The site is adjacent to the world-class Trans-Amusement Park, and is opposite Oyo State Government Permanent Trade Fair Complex. The oldest and most famous government residential estate in the city – Bodija Estate – lies immediately towards the eastern end of the proposed estate, being separated by a railway linking the Western part of Nigeria with the Northern part. The proposed estate could be reached easily from Lagos, the commercial and industrial nerve centre of Nigeria, through the Lagos-Ibadan Expressway and the Ibadan-Oyo Expressway, through the University of Ibadan Main Gate, which is less than one kilometer away from the site. In short, the project’s location, to the best of the consultants’ knowledge, was regarded as an ideal one.

(ii) Site and Tenure: The proposed site at that time (Old Ibadan Airport) measured approximately 44.43 hectares, as evidenced by a Survey Plan which was sighted by the consultants for verification purposes. The site was generally well-drained and firm, having served as the Tarmac of the Old Ibadan Airport that had existed before Nigeria’s independence in 1960. Presently, a new airport is in operation at another location in the city,

several kilometres away from the Old Airport. Title to land is clean and marketable by way of Freehold Absolute in Possession, held by the Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria (FAAN).

(iii) Accommodation Description: The approved estate's master plan comprised a mixture of residential, commercial (shops and offices), institutional and recreational land uses. The following is a list of the facilities that were scheduled to be incorporated in the development:

- 15 Nos 3-Bedroom Bungalows on plots of 930m² each
- 15 Nos 4-Bedroom Bungalows on plots of 930m² each
- A hostel on a plot of 15,000m²
- A five-star hotel complex on a plot of 2 hectares
- A shopping complex on a plot of 1,400m² (3½ acres)
- A water park on a plot of 1,000m² (¼ acres)
- A Museum of Civil Aviation (to be developed by FAAN)

The above listed facilities were to be provided by Tarmac Estates Limited (TEL), in addition to other facilities like petrol filling stations, restaurants, offices, banks and housing units, which would be owned by private land allottees on standard leasehold basis.

(iv) Services and Facilities: Electricity, pipe-borne water, and telephone mains had already been connected to the site, but these facilities were to be expanded as construction works progressed. In addition to the public mains, proposals were in top gear for the installation of two powerful electricity generators, while two boreholes were to be sunk to supplement public supplies. Extensive car parking lots had been incorporated at strategic points on the estate for the smooth ingress and egress of vehicular traffic. Refuse was to be collected and managed by our client, based on a private refuse disposal agreement to be entered into with each allottee. No thoroughfare traffic was to be allowed on the estate. In short, the estate was designed to be a self-contained and compact community.

(v) Project Derivatives: The following derivatives strongly justified the need to implement the proposed Tarmac Estate on the site of the Old Ibadan Airport:

- Easily accessible, highly functional and efficient community
- The analysed positive environmental and social impacts of the project far outweighed the negative impacts
- The possibility of incorporating a Water Park for recreational purposes, using the existing valley on the site, meant that revenue generation would be enhanced through visitors
- Plots of land on comparable estates at first-class locations in the city had already been fully allocated and tenancies over-subscribed
- Many compatible and complementary land uses were located around the project site, including Oyo State Government Secretariat, University of Ibadan, the Polytechnic, Ibadan, and Bodija Estate
- Shop and office accommodation, and high-class residential apartments were already in high demand within the locality of the proposed project site
- The project was to usher in two new petrol filling stations, hostel accommodation which was already in short supply for students of the nearby university and

polytechnic campuses, conference halls, a five-star hotel, a museum of civil aviation and restaurants, for the residents of Ibadan metropolis. Essentially, therefore, the project could most likely become a tourist attraction that could go a long way in improving the revenue base of the local, state and federal governments

- Private investors could lease land for their own projects within the complex, thereby making the project an avenue for attracting foreign capital into the country
- The existing old buildings on the site were still structurally sound and could easily be refurbished and adapted to suit the objectives of the proposed estate
- No heavy manufacturing industry was to be established within the estate, hence the issue of environmental pollution in the largely residential/commercial estate would hopefully not arise
- The abundance of land to be made available for the project in a suburban area of the city was to enhance the provision of adequate parking spaces for commuters visiting the site
- In addition to housing and commercial accommodation, the project was to provide short, medium and long-term job opportunities for the local population.
- In view of the above listed benefits achievable from the implementation of the project, in addition to its economic viability, it was generally agreed that the proposed commercialisation project should go ahead.

(vi) Feasibility and Viability Parameters - A combination of private sector and public sector appraisal techniques were used to determine whether or not the commercialisation project was physically feasible and economically viable. However, space constraints will only permit us to highlight only a few of the feasibility parameters adopted by the project's consultants:

Private Sector Techniques:

- Net Present Value (NPV), which was positive
- Internal Rate of Return (IRR), which was higher than the cost of borrowing
- Rate of Return on Capital invested, which was reasonably high
- Payback Period, which when compared with those of alternative investments, was very short
- Excess of Value over Cost (Profit), which also was very high and positive
- Sensitivity Analysis, which was satisfactory.

Public Sector Techniques:

Our Cost Benefit Analysis (Abouchar, 1985) revealed that the anticipated benefits of the project far exceeded the costs, including social costs, both to the client and to the community; and our Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) showed that the positive impacts of the project on both the micro- and macro-environments far exceeded the negative impacts. The impact assessment result enhanced the chances of our client in securing the local planning authority's consent for implementation of construction works on the project site.

Results of Investigations

Long before the initiation of the proposed Tarmac Estate project, the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) had been in total control of one office building located right inside the then functioning Old Ibadan Airport. This building had been strategically used as the Air Force

Base for Ibadan City. Subsequently, following a government policy that brought the control of all federal airports in the country under the umbrella of the Nigerian Airports Authority (FAAN), the Old Ibadan Airport became a property of the Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria (FAAN). Unfortunately, even after the acquisition of the Airport by FAAN, three major activities continued to be performed on the site of the Old Airport unabated, namely:

- The unnoticed use of the Air Force Base by the Nigerian Air Force
- The Federal Meteorological Station for Ibadan City was located within the premises, and
- The residential quarters of the staff of the Meteorological Station were also located right inside the Old Airport premises.

Unknown to Tarmac Estates Limited, the Air Force Base building within the airport premises was very much in the “current assets” books of the Nigerian Air Force. Thus, when it dawned on the Air Force authorities that the Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria (FAAN) had “colluded” with some private developers to turn the Old Airport into a private estate, the *inactive* Air Force Base building had to be promptly taken over by the Air Force authorities, “for strategic national security reasons”. According to reliable sources, there was no going back on this reversal to the status quo, as the whole site had already been taken over by men in uniforms before the fateful day when Tarmac Estates Limited paid a visit to the site.

Consequently, all construction works on site had to be stopped, while the whole site was declared a no-go-area to Tarmac Estates Limited, its agents, and all prospective allottees of the proposed estate, regardless of the fact that a substantial amount of money had already been sunk into the project. In fact, many prospective land allottees had hoped that within a relatively short period of time they would be able to take possession of their land and become property owners. Unfortunately, this was not to be.

Discussion

Against all expectations, hopes on the successful take-off of Tarmac Estate eventually began to dim when on 30th June, 2009, in the Court of Appeal, Ibadan Judicial Division, Oyo State of Nigeria, an appeal was held to lack merit and was dismissed in favour of the respondent in a suit between Professor Olajide Ogunbiyi and three appellants - Dr. S. Ayo Dada, Dada Estates Company and Tarmac Estates Limited (2009). The appeal, case suit No. LPELR-CA/1/77/2005, arose from a decision of the High Court of Oyo State, earlier delivered by I.S. Yerima, J. on 6th June, 2003.

Facts of the Case

The Respondent (Professor Olajide) as plaintiff originally commenced the suit against the 1st and 2nd Appellants as Defendants jointly and severally under the undefended list procedure of the High Court of Oyo State pursuant to the order of Court of 8th November, 2001. At the hearing, the Appellants then Defendants mentioned the 3rd Appellant (Tarmac Estates Limited) as their principal. The trial court thereafter ordered that pleadings be filed. The third Appellant was later joined as 3rd Defendant by the Order of the Court dated 21st March, 2002, on application by the Respondent.

The Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendants jointly and severally before the lower Court is as follows:

“The Plaintiff claims against the Defendants jointly and severally the sum of N1,792,218.00 (One million, seven hundred and ninety two thousand, two hundred and eighteen Naira) being money paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendants for the lease of 2 (two) plots of land at one Tarmac Estates, Samanda, Ibadan, which consideration has totally failed and which the Defendants have refused to refund despite repeated demand.”

The particulars of the decided case are as follows:

- Money paid for 2 (two) Residential Plots = N1,631,800.00
- Agency fee = N81,590.00
- Ground Rent, Survey and Legal fees for 2 (two)
- Residential Plots = N78,828.00
- **Total claim = N1,792,218.00**

“In addition to the above, the Plaintiff also claims 21% interest on the sum paid (total above) from the 1st day of January, 1997, until judgment and 10% thereafter until the Defendants pay the money. The bone of contention in the decided case was that at the conclusion of the transaction, and armed with the land allocation letter and survey plans delineating the two plots, the Respondent could not take possession of the plots and discovered that Tarmac Estate was a sham and that contrary to the representations made by the Appellants, the land purportedly allocated to him belonged to the Federal Government of Nigeria. The Respondent demanded for the refund of his money but the Appellants refused to refund the money which necessitated the Respondent commencing the proceedings at the trial Court but contended that the 1st and 2nd Appellants were agents of the 3rd Appellant and that 1st and 2nd Appellants are only liable to refund the agency fees received, the money for the survey having been expended. There was no Statement of Defence filed on behalf of the 3rd Appellant being put forward as the only party liable to refund the Respondent’s money. In course of trial the Respondent led evidence in proof of his case while the Appellants did not lead evidence in support of their pleadings.” The Judge granted the prayer of the Respondent and, dissatisfied with the judgment, the Defendants appealed to the Court of Appeal. In the end, the appeal failed.

We can see from the above decided case that the parties involved in any conflict have to realise that in solving one problem, many policies could generate, accelerate or in fact aggravate other problems. Perhaps an amicable solution could have been found to resolve the locational conflict if both parties had soft-pedalled and explored a non-legal settlement. In systems terminology, as Johnston (1979) observed, political responses to environmental issues have feedback effects, producing new environmental demands and requiring further responses. A solution ought to have been found, which could guarantee equal treatment of all the parties involved in the locational conflict in the interest of equity, peace and city sustainability.

Based on Johnston's theoretical proposition, three options could possibly have been considered by Tarmac Estates Limited for a peaceful resolution of the locational conflict surrounding the use and redevelopment of the Old Ibadan Airport in Nigeria. The way forward was for the two parties to the conflict to make a wise choice out of the following options, *inter alia*:

The Private Bargaining Option

This conflict involved an interest group at the federal level (Nigerian Air Force), and an interest group at the private sector level (Tarmac Estates Limited), with both parties attempting to achieve leverage with respect to each other by exploiting any particular bargaining resources at their disposal. In fact, to complicate matters, the local and state governments (Ibadan North Local Government and Oyo State Government respectively), in whose jurisdictional areas the project site was located, would like the proposed estate project to see the light of the day, particularly because of the tax advantages which the project could have in their favour. On the other hand, the Air Force authorities would want to put pressure on the federal government to apply its power of eminent domain in forcefully retaining its ownership of the Air Force Base building on the disputed project site. In this way, the conflict was between two spatially based conflicting interest groups to attract onto their turfs those activities providing positive externalities and enhancing rents on the one hand, and national security (territorial defence) on the other hand. In one breadth, conflicts between nations and within nations can make the possession of a sophisticated Air Force very compelling for national and territorial self-defense, and for regional and international peace keeping operations, in another breadth. Examples are the Nigerian military inputs in the West African Peace Keeping Operations (ECOMOG) in Liberia and Sierra Leone, as well as in the UN Peace Keeping Missions worldwide. At the same time, the individual citizen's business rights must be protected by the state, although the latter stance can only be possible when a nation is at peace and where the system of governance tends towards democracy.

The Relocation Option

Alternatively, relocation might be a way out of the dilemma. If either of the two parties was agreeable to relocation, then an alternative site could be secured for resettling the party that agreed to move to a suitable alternative site within the metropolis. To ease the implementation of this second option, however, the federal government had to be prepared to use its power of eminent domain to compulsorily acquire an alternative site and pay adequate compensation to the land allottees/owners that might be displaced in the process. This would be possible through the government's exercise of its powers as enunciated in the Constitution and land law of the nation. In this regard, the Land Use Act of 1978 and the Public Lands Acquisition (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of 1976 are the two statutory instruments by which land could be acquired compulsorily in Nigeria in the public interest. Compensation, in respect of the former, was payable on the unexhausted improvements over land and in respect of any economic trees thereon. Since land has been nationalised in Nigeria, compensation in respect of land itself is nevertheless a peanut which is just the ground rent that is payable in respect of acquired land in the year of acquisition. Elsewhere, the recommendations put forward for the establishment of a Nigerian Employee Relocation Council (NERC) could also be helpful in ameliorating emerging relocation problems in a project's locality (Babarinde, 1995).

The Joint Agenda Option

Under ideal situations, it has been argued that feuding groups should meet together to develop a joint agenda of problems to be discussed, rather than meeting separately to prepare separate agenda. In joint meetings, members of both groups indicate that problems of one group are worth serious attention by the other, and that successful problem solving will take place only if all group members attack the problem together (Filley, 1975).

On this basis of co-operation, the Federal Government of Nigeria acting through its four relevant departments, namely: the Ministries of Defence, Commerce and Industry, Works and Housing, and Aviation and Transport, could constitute a panel to look into this locational conflict and seek ways of resolving it amicably. The Oyo State Government, in whose jurisdictional area the project site was lying, and the two stakeholder parties (Nigerian Air Force and Tarmac Estates Limited) would need to fully co-operate with the panel in this task of conciliation for the sake of the overall sustainable development and security of the nation.

However, the success of any joint agenda rests on the assumption of the principles of co-operation and trust that must be affirmatively pursued by both parties to the conflict. These principles include belief in the availability and desirability of a mutually acceptable solution, belief in cooperation rather than competition, belief that everyone is of equal value, and belief in the views of others as legitimate statements of their position. The other principles are belief that differences of opinion are helpful, belief in the trustworthiness of the other party, and belief that the other party can compete but chooses to cooperate.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

Prevention is always better than cure. Effective solutions to potential conflicts require that problems are nipped in the bud before they erupt and deteriorate into confrontations. On the other hand, if resolution efforts have to commence after conflicts have erupted, then care must be exercised in all cases to ensure that problems are always tackled peacefully and sustainably. In both cases, co-operative dialogue is to be preferred to the force of arms (Zeitsoft, 2011; Commonwealth Currents, 2000:3, 16; United Nations, 1998). For example, in respect of the Israeli settlements in the West Bank, 'a weakening trend in Palestinian violence was observed in 2010, coupled with growing economic and security cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, when the Israeli military removed over 120 check points and planned on disengaging from major Palestinian population' (Wikipedia, 2012). According to the IDF, terrorist activity in the West Bank at that time decreased by 97% compared to violence in 2002. Similar solutions to locational conflicts will be enhanced by the adoption of an integrative decision-making approach (IDM), information technology, as well as principles of accountability and transparency in decision-making for project selection and implementation. There can be no shorter and more sustainable approach to the amicable resolution of conflicts arising from project location/relocation decision-making in any contemporary urban setting that is already bedeviled with many externalities.

Furthermore, it is recommended that prospective project developers should always be sure that they are in full possession of registered land title deeds before embarking on site development. Where such developers are quasi-public authorities, such as Tarmac Estates Limited (partly owned by the Federal Airports Authority) which failed to pursue the legalisation of its acquisition of the Old Ibadan Airport from the erstwhile Nigerian Airports Authority, they should ensure that their acquisition is fully documented through a government gazette and that fair amounts of compensation are paid to all dispossessed property owners. In the case of private developers who buy land in the open market, no efforts should be spared to get the land title documents registered in the Lands Registry. To underrate these procedures is to leave room for possible future locational conflicts and even

loss of title to both the land and the project on the land, because, in legal parlance, “he who owns the land owns everything on it”.

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Settlements Relocation in Northern Nigeria: A Historical Analysis of the Colonial Resettlement Scheme in Yagbaland, 1900-1950

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Abstract

For the most part of the nineteenth century, Yagbaland was in the throes of events and developments the origins of which lay outside its borders. The invasion and domination by the Nupe, a neighbouring state, and the attendant insecurity led to the abandonment of many old and revered settlements and the erection of defensive structures around vulnerable settlements. The Nupe raids thus produced a traumatic effect which was most noticeable in the demographic dislocations that it engendered. The end of Nupe imperialism and the commencement of British colonialism witnessed the beginning of a series of appeals to Yagba people to move from the hill-tops. This paper therefore deals with the historical evolution of the current pattern of settlement in Yagbaland. Also discussed is the coming of British rule and the various attempts and strategies adopted to get the people resettled. Equally highlighted is the role of Christian missionaries in the relocation exercise and the impact of the exercise on the new settlements that emerged.

Introduction

The Yagba people are one of the Yoruba groups that inhabit the most northeastern part of Yoruba land. They are found mainly in the Yagba West, Yagba East and Mopa/Amuro Local Government Areas of Kogi State. To the North-east of Yagba land are found Egbe, Eri, Ere, Ogga, Ejiba and Okoloke. Others are Isanlu, Amuro and Mopa. To the south east of the territory are the Yagba of Ejuku, Ife – Olokotun, Ponyan, Alu, Igbagun and Jega. In the south west portion of the land are to be found the Yagba of Ogbe, Irele, Oke-Ako, Ipao, Iye, Itapaji and Aiyede.

Unlike some of their counterparts in other parts of Yoruba land, the Yagba had no centralized administration. Robin Horton classified them as stateless societies. According to him, the basic peculiarities of such states include the absence of centralization of authority or the wielding of political power by an individual¹ However, P.E. Mitchel has presented a very interesting counter argument saying, “every group of people must possess some form of national authority symbolized in the person of some individual or individuals.”² So whether characterized as stateless or centralized, a people is bound to possess a system of government. This is true of Yagba people, who in spite of the absence of political centralization, found a workable administration in the village organization. All members of the community participated in the government either directly or through their leaders or representatives.

There are varying concepts of resettlement and it is difficult to give a universally acceptable definition. Sutton attributed this difficulty to the bewildering varieties of origins, sizes and objectives of settlement or resettlements.”³ He notes further that resettlement schemes generally display two diagnostic features: a movement of population (voluntary or involuntary) and, an

element of planning and control. Palmer views resettlement as partly an exercise “designed to relocate people displaced by wars,”⁴ as was the experience of the Yagba. He goes further to argue that whatever the original motive, resettlement schemes are designed to contribute to development by encouraging agricultural production. In discussing settlement relocation, it is important to distinguish between those that were voluntary and those that were compelled. This distinction is necessary for our own discussion.

T. Scudder is of the opinion that most resettlement schemes are rarely initiated from within the group involved. The impetus according to him comes often from outside, and during resettlement “the external influences impose their values on a traditional society, usually without really understanding the internal complexity.”⁵ This was so in Yagbaland, at least initially when the people yielded to the appeals of the colonial masters. But towards the end, socio-economic prospects associated with the development of roads and transportation made the initiatives internal rather than external. Another analyst, R. Chambers is of the opinion that it is more profitable to have a classificatory emphasis based on the function rather than on the origin of the schemes.⁶ But in the case of relocations in Yagbaland, this writer wishes to emphasize both the origin and the function; the relocations were both voluntary and compelled. The concept of resettlement also carries with it the idea of the number of people to be resettled. But according to Abumere, “no man has been able to specify what the optimal spatial distribution of population is.”⁷ This would imply that in discussing resettlement issues, it will be difficult to establish optimal resettlement site sizes. So the whole question of what size of population to be assigned to a settlement site in order to make the provision of amenities and infrastructure economical is difficult to set out. In view of the fact that the relocation exercise in Yagbaland was not for the most part the result of a conscious governmental effort for specific purposes other than for a more effective colonial administration, the above issue does not pose a serious problem for our study. It is also important to note that no single approach has been adopted in the study of resettlement or relocation exercise. Thus, sociologists may tend to emphasize sociological factors; geographers might look at the spatial factors, while historians, apart from considering the factors above, would have a long-term historical perspective of the scheme. These considerations guide my approach in this study.

Settlement Patterns

Patterns of settlement deals with the spatial relations between one dwelling and another, that is, whether they are close together as in a village or town, or whether they are further apart as in a hamlet or in single, more isolated homesteads. Patterns of settlement therefore must not be confused with the distribution of settlements which is concerned with the spread of settlements. In his discussion on rural settlement, Hudson identified two major patterns. These are (i) the nucleated pattern which is composed of villages, each more or less compact and (ii) the dispersed pattern consisting of single homesteads of some distance from each other.⁸ Hudson’s classification seems to agree with that of Robin Horton, who in his study of segmentary societies established dispersed and nucleated settlements as the patterns among segmentary societies.⁹

Settlement Pattern in Pre-Nupe Yagba

The basic principle that guided settlement patterns in Pre-Nupe Yagbaland was kinship ties. People settled on their family lands, as such the settlement was dispersed though tending towards compact in the nineteenth century as a result of external aggression. The head of each clan

apportioned land to different family units and held land in trust for its members. Because the kinship factor made families to build their houses as close together as possible, the pattern of settlement in Yagbaland though dispersed in essence, tended towards the compact or nucleated type. Other factors that influenced settlement were availability of water and fertility of the soil. Strangers farmed on family or clan lands upon request, accompanied by presents. The local “settlement patterns” at its most rudimentary level could be no more than a hut-*aghere* or a more elaborate form of it – *ile*, which is the smallest unit of a regular settlement. One, two or more of the regular houses could be joined together by roofed or un-covered lines of walling, to form the extended family.

Thus “settlement patterns” in Pre-Nupe Yagbaland ranged from an *aghere*, a house, to a group of *agheres* making up a small settlement. This largely explains the dispersed settlement pattern mentioned above. These mini-states as Obayemi¹⁰ called them, upheld, well-defined territorial boundaries with each lineage (*ebi*) in each polity having well-defined territorial boundaries. He also identified the following eight different ‘patterns of settlement’ in Pre-Nupe Yagbaland: (a) caves, rock-shelter and rock overhangs; (b) hill-top habitation sites- some early (late stone age) inhabited by the nineteenth-early twentieth centuries; (c) level ground sites of the earliest historical period; (d) level ground sites of the earliest historical period- but not associated with the earliest ancestors but evacuated in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; (e) later historical sites (occupied at least during the nineteenth century –some with defensive walls; (f) Factory sites including quarries for stones and potters, clay, iron – smelting and smithing sites; (g) miscellaneous –market sites, shrines etc; (h) river-side settlement.

However, these ‘settlement patterns’ identified by Obayemi in Pre-Nupe era were disrupted as a result of the Nupe raids which forced people to abandon these settlements for defensible hill-top areas. Thus on the eve of colonial rule in Yagbaland settlements were on hill-tops and other hide-outs such as forest patches. Walled settlements were also noticeable as in the case of Ife-Olukotun and Egbe. This is probably the reason why Obayemi concluded that “no consistent pattern could be inferred for the pre-colonial history of settlement in the area.”¹¹

Impact of Nupe Wars and Settlement Shift

“Every situation” says I. F. Nicolsin, “has its roots in the past. The past survives into the present. The present is indeed the past undergoing modification.”¹² The above statement is applicable to the relocation exercise in Yagbaland. According to F.S. Hudson, even in considering settlements or towns, it is found that the past is usually the key to the present and a geographical as well as a purely historical perspective is needed.¹³ From the mid 19th century, till about 1894-7 (reign of Abubakar), the unified kingdom of Nupe became the prime mover of events concerning the surrounding peoples of which Yagbaland is a part. As they expanded, they exploited the surrounding peoples in their drive for economic prosperity and local military supremacy.

The Nupe wars came upon the decentralized and fragmented Yagbaland, and subjected it to a period of exploitation. At first Nupe demanded tribute which was paid in cash. After sometime, cowries (the common currency of the time), was exhausted and slaves were demanded. The period 1882 to 1897 (the reigns of Maliki and Abubakar), was characterized by violence, burdensome taxation and mass movement of people. The Yagba country was despoiled with Ife, Ejuku, Takete and smaller villages reduced to pathetic sizes. It is recorded that Mopa for instance

was reduced in a day and Ife was left with only eight old men and a dog after a resistance lasting three days.¹⁴

Options in the face of an increasing frequency of the attacks and in the face of mounted raids were fairly clear. One easy reaction to this was that the people evacuated their exposed homes for more defensible and inaccessible locations. Withdrawals were in the direction of inaccessible places like hill-tops, caves and rock shelters as well as in the patches of rain forest where visibility was limited and deployment of cavalry difficult. Thus, the process of the exploitation of the economic and human resources which degenerated into naked hunt for slaves had left visible impact on the numerous settlements. Some of the settlements lay totally or partially in ruins, some new settlements with proximity to the hills emerged, defensive settlement such as Egbe and refugee settlement such as Igbagun are pointers to the degree of social dislocation involved.

Defence was a major consideration for the retirement of people into inaccessible places or hill top settlements. At the hill-top, the Yagbas were better able to deal with the Nupes who were fighting on horses. Towards the end of the nineteenth century therefore, nearly all the villages in Yagbaland had moved their settlements to the hilly or heavily forested areas. For example, settlements such as Mopa, Ejuku, Ilae moved to the hill-tops, while Ponyan moved to the thickly forested zone. A few others especially Egbe decided to erect defensive walls and structures. This action and reaction explains the nature of the settlement shift in Yagbaland towards the late 19th and early 20th century. Thus the originally dispersed village settlements emerged into something resembling compact communities and strongly fortified because of the need to establish effective defence and to provide better security for the members of the community.

The Coming of Colonial Rule

In the face of continued threat to their existence and survival, it is on record ¹⁵ that the Yagba people and the Okun in general openly solicited the intervention of the white man; they reportedly requested the British to come and shield them from the Nupe. For African scholars that are familiar with several instances of 'resistance' to colonial rule, the case of Yagbaland might sound as an antithesis. But it should be understood that theirs was a response dictated by local historical circumstances. In the light of the circumstances under which the British agents came to Yagbaland, they had no difficulty in incorporating the area into the colonial system. Like the Idoma, Tiv, and the Jos Plateau peoples, all of the Northern administration, the Yagbas were not Islamized and operated the mini-state form of political organization.

The forces of the Royal Niger Company (R.N.C.) terminated Nupe imperialism in 1897. The termination of Nupe imperialism was received with jubilation that cut across the entire North-east Yorubaland. Yagbaland became regularly administered in 1903 as part of the Northern Region. Yagbaland and other parts north-east Yoruba, the Tiv, the Idoma, Ebira etc which later became generally known as the Middle Belt never practiced the Emirate system of administration. But unfortunately, the British administration assumed that the whole North could be administered with slight modifications along the lines adopted for the classical emirates. However, the situation in Yagba was vastly different. The British found a segmentary society in which each group jealously maintained and guarded its autonomy. The British administrators were, however, so much impressed by the Emirate system to the extent that in derision, they labelled Yagbaland and the Middle Belt in general as "Pagan Belt."¹⁶

British Attitude towards the Scattered Settlements

For the purpose of satisfactory assessment and collection of taxes (introduced in the Northern Provinces in 1904), and the maintenance of peace, there was need, because of the segmented nature of the societies, to introduce a clearly defined hierarchical territorial administration. This in turn called for the appointment of some categories of colonial functionaries over and above the clan and family systems in operation. The Lugardian proposal then was to:

Endeavour to find a man of influence as chief and to group under him as many villages or districts as possible, to teach him to delegate powers, and to take an interest in his Native Treasury, to support his authority, and to inculcate a sense of responsibility.¹⁷

The above proposal, apart from being a general colonial policy aimed at solving immediate administrative problems in the Middle Belt in general, was of particular significance in Yagbaland. It would be recalled that the Nupe wars had forced Yagba people to inaccessible places. Thus colonial administration found Yagba villages on hill-tops and in hide-outs ungovernable. Therefore, apart from the absence of centralized administration which generally characterized the Middle Belt region, problems of administration, maintenance of law and order, collection of taxes, became more acute in Yagbaland because of the inaccessible nature of the settlements. Thus village grouping or re-organization became a general colonial policy strategy in Yagbaland, aimed at encouraging the inaccessible settlements to move closer to central locations.

Administrative Re-organization of Yagbaland

Effective administration based on the principle of “finding” a chief emerged in 1903. The administrative arrangements that emerged placed Yagba “district” under two different administrations. The Yagba of Egbe, Ejiba, Okoloke area (later known as West Yagba), came under the provincial administration of Ilorin, as a sub-district of Lafiagi-Pategi. Their counterparts in Isanlu, Mopa and Ife-Ejuku areas (collectively known as East Yagba), were administered as a district of Kabba province. For West Yagba which came under Lafiagi-Pategi division, tax assessment and collection was systematized under a Nupe district head. The appointment of an alien district head was justified on the ground that it made for consistency and “provided ordered administration where before there had been inertia or chaos.”¹⁸

Villages in East Yagba were re-grouped and several villages were put under a chief. By this re-organization, East Yagba was divided into three village-groups or sub-districts: the village – group of Isanlu comprising Isanlu-Makutu, Idofin, Ilafin, Irunda and Amuro Odo; the village – group of Mopa made up of Mopa, Orokere, Aiyeteju, Oke-Agi, and Ilai; and the village – group of Ife-Ejuku comprising Ife-Olukotun, Alu, Jege, Ogbom, Ponyan, Ejuku and Igbagun. The chiefs of Isanlu, Mopa and Ife thus became the village heads and spokesmen for their respective village groups. By this appointment, the British administrators made these chiefs (the Olukotun of Ife – Chief Ajibola, the Agbana of Isanlu and the Aloko of Mopa), superior and far more important than the other clan chiefs. The appointed chief was no longer the first among equals (*primus inter pares*). As it would be expected the path to political centralization was very rough. The other clan chiefs found it difficult to understand why they should surrender their authorities

and become the subordinates of a former colleague, hence social antagonism and resentment resulted. The idea of village-groupings was arbitrary, innovative and represented revolutionary tendency in Yagbaland. Therefore, Nockler-Ferryman was not far from being correct when he said that “the British colonial officials failed to grasp the organizational contrast existing between the Muslim emirates in the north and the so called “Pagan” of the Middle Belt.”¹⁹

Desperate in search of a workable administrative formula for the scattered settlements in hide-outs, the colonial authorities on the spot moved from one administrative experiment to the other in Yagbaland. Still in keeping with the process of creating a wider political orbit and finding an equivalent to the emir, another major administrative re-organization took place in Kabba province in 1918. In this new arrangement, attempt was made at creating an “Emirate system”, fashioned along the Emirate system of the north. Hence the position of Obaro of Kabba was transformed to that of an Emir over the enlarged Emirate (the enlarged Kabba Division). By this re-organization, the four hitherto independent administrative Districts in Kabba Division were placed under the Obaro of Kabba (who was merely the spokesman for the Owe people). The newly constituted ‘Emirate’ was made up of Kabba District under the District Headship of Balogun of Kabba town; Yagba District under the Olukotun of Ife; Bunu District under the Olu of Kiri; and Gbedde District was headed by Olu of Otun – Gbedde.²⁰ By incorporating these other three Districts – Gbedde, Bunu and Yagba into the Kabba Emirate, they now shared a court (referred to as a pagan court) and a federated Native Treasury at Kabba. However, even in Kabba his home base, the Obaro was regarded as *primus inter pares* among the senior chiefs of Kabba. This arrangement definitely ignored local peculiarities and could not but engender resentment. Complaints got to the colonial Governor from the various district heads and clan chiefs. It was subsequently realized by the colonial officials that “the Obaro was maintaining his position by virtue of British influence”. The un-workability of the arrangement unfolded and led to its final collapse in October 1922, when the Governor recommended that the various chiefs should be independent.²¹

The administrative re-organizations which were conceived as strategies for relocating the scattered settlements and for bringing the populations out of their hide-outs and closer to the administrative headquarters rather alienated them the more. Emigration became rampant because of the artificial creation of village heads without any traditional base. Although by the 1918 re-organization the ‘Emirate’ now shared a court and a Federated Native Treasury at Kabba (located in easily accessible area to which other settlements in the hide-outs had to travel), this strategy equally failed for the common court and the common Treasury were also dismantled in 1922 when the ‘Emirates’ collapsed. With the failure of the administrative re-organizations, official colonial policy towards the scattered settlements became that of support and encouragement given to the chiefs and the people concerned to effect demographic changes. Where appeals failed, movements to the plains were in many settlements made compulsory by the British administrators as was the case in Mopa in 1918. On the whole, the people appeared to have responded to certain incentives that accompanied colonial rule in this demographic relocation. For instance, by 1913, the construction of Kabba-Isanlu Makutu road had started which facilitated communication and stimulated economic activities. Therefore a few communities or populations in their embattled settlements, which had not been eager to move, responded to these new developments. Most of these settlements finally decided to move in the 1930s to take advantage of the motorable roads constructed.

In furtherance of its efforts to encourage the growth of settlements in the plains, the colonial administrators adopted the colonial policy of government / mission cooperation. As captain E.J. Douglas stressed in 1914; “every effort should be made to maintain friendly relation between the Native Administration and the various missions.”²² The missions were encouraged and financially supported in the building of their churches. Most of the churches (or the missions houses as they were popularly known) were to serve as educational and health centres. In this regard, the Sudan Interior Mission (S.I.M) was well noted for its remarkable achievements and contributions in Yagbaland.²³ For instance, the S.I.M’s modern medical services helped to attract people by organizing modern medical care which was non-existent in Yagbaland before. Thomas Titcombe’s wife, the first white woman to settle among the Yagba started a maternity clinic immediately she arrived in Egbe in 1914, the first of its kind in Yagbaland. The mission also ran a small school under Rev. and Mrs. Craig at Isanlu and by 1928 the S.I.M had started a school for girls at Mopa under the supervision of Miss Kruse. After the usual initial reluctance, the hut in which the daily medical care was administered was flocked by eager mothers and others with all sorts of ailments. These institutions were neither located on the hill-tops nor in hide-outs, but on the plains. Hence the people who had accepted the new religion and needed to worship in the churches, or those who desired the new education offered by the missions as well as the accompanying health services, were gradually persuaded to come down from the hill-tops to take advantage of these services. Therefore, unlike most colonial policies and methods which engendered rebellion (i.e. the imposition of the emirate model), Yagba people seemed to have responded favourably to colonial appeals to come out of their hide-outs. It is true that people were encouraged to come down from the hill-tops in their own economic interest, but more for colonial administrative convenience. The colonial social and economic developments like roads, western education and health services thus served as stimulants for the people’s resettlement.

The Process of Population Relocation

Stories of migrations from one settlement to the other are a common feature of both oral traditions of many societies as well as in the available written literature for several reasons such as defence, transportation facilities, natural disasters, opportunity for spatial expansion, social security and deliberate government policy. Defence was the main reason why the Yagbas moved to the hill-tops as indicated earlier on. The villages of Mopa, Amuro, Isanlu and Ponyan are chosen for closer study amidst the numerous Yagba villages because Mopa, Isanlu and Amuro illustrate movement from the hills to the lowland areas while Ponyan presents the case of a settlement in thickly forested hide-outs.

The Resettlement of Isanlu People

In Isanlu different families such as *Adi*, *Odi*, *Ajigba*, *Oterelu*, etc. settled separately on family lands. The Pre-Nupe settlement setting was on clan basis. These clan settlements were disorganized and dislodged as a result of Nupe raids. Although Isanlu succeeded in establishing some measure of security for the people by diplomatic means, and the town became a Nupe base (Nupe got all they needed by way of shelter and victuals) for raids into some other Yagba towns, this however was not until most of the people had been forced to the hill-tops by Nupe marauders. This first shift in settlement particularly involved Makutu and Ijowa which moved a distance of 4 kilometers and 7 kilometers respectively from their original sites²⁴ to the hill-tops, while settlements like Isanlu Mopo, Bagido, Odogbe, etc found abode in the valleys. The people

were forced to settle in clusters on the hill-tops though not far from one another. The kinship organization which was typical at the original site was still maintained. With the opportunity offered by the relative peace which accompanied British administration, and the advantages of the new roads, there was a relocation of population from the hill-tops to the road side. Isanlu like other Yagba villages at the turn of the twentieth century was not connected to other towns by motorable roads but by mere foot-paths. The Kabba-Isanlu road started in 1913 was completed in 1926 and was opened on 15th March, 1926.²⁵ This road development cut off some villages situated in physically disadvantaged areas, and caused the inhabitants of such areas to move. The expansion of Isanlu Mopo along the main motor way is a typical example. The movement of Isanlu-Makutu to what is now known as Itedo-Makutu began in the 1940s. Unlike the shift to the hill-top which was hurriedly and collectively made, this movement had been slow and uncoordinated. What has emerged from that process is a daughter settlement that has resulted in the gradual disintegration of the parent settlements.

The movement to Itedo-Ijowa located in the same extended plain seems to represent a deliberate attempt to bring the various segments of Isanlu together. These movements had continued and in 1951 it was reported that:

In Kabba Division, the town of Isanlu has began to move to the new site that has been prepared for it, and at the end of the year, 180 houses has (sic) been started or completed.²⁶

The involvement of the colonial government in the exercise and their alleged “preparation” of the new site need to be clarified. In actual sense the new site was not chosen for the people by the government and their preparation could be explained only in terms of the fact that, in the site chosen by the people themselves, the areas for the location of the churches, schools, hospitals, markets (all of which were additional incentives), were marked out. Each group of settlers named their new quarters after the mother settlements, thus we have Itedo-Makutu. The qualification “Itedo” denotes a place settled by people from some old site. The structure of the new site, shows a linear settlement pattern in place of the isolated clusters of the old. The shifts have been gradual and on individual basis; however, a few old people could only not be persuaded to move. These people were reluctant to move either because of their farming activities as in the case of Irunda or of cultural / sentimental attachment to the old sites.

The Resettlement of Mopa People

Mopa people responded rather slowly and cautiously to colonial appeals even though they had to come down from the hills to participate in the construction of the roads (Kabba – Isanlu roads being constructed by 1913). Although the S.I.M had begun their enterprising, educational, medical and evangelistic activities, Mopa people were reluctant to move. They behaved differently from their counterparts at Isanlu and Amuro who responded enthusiastically to these incentives. In view of the expected economic benefit that such a move could generate, one might be surprised at the adamant attitude of Mopa people. They had their reasons. While it is true that colonial rule put an end to Nupe raids and heralded an era of peace, but the fear of the unknown and the memories of the harrowing Nupe experience might have been responsible for such an attitude. As an informant remarked, “We refused to come down from the hills for fear of further

war and slavery”.²⁷ In fact, the relocation in Mopa had to be enforced. It was said that a colonial official set fire to the houses on the hill-top in the year 1917.²⁸ *Agiri* compound was completely burnt down. This burning forced Mopa people to move from the hill-top down to the lowlands. Unlike population shift in Isanlu area which was gradual in nature and carried out on individual basis, Mopa’s relocation was the direct handiwork of the colonial government, a reaction to the high-handedness of the British officials. Thus, they were forced to settle in their present location named *Odole* and *Ileteju* Mopa. The qualification “Odole” and “Ileteju” are indicative of the low-lying and flatness of the new settlement as compared to the hill-top settlement. The new settlement was located along the motor roads, thus producing a linear settlement pattern.

The Resettlement of Amuro People

In Amuro, families such as *Ajigba*, *Eseyin*, *Iyaloko*, *Anugabo*, *Anulase*, *Omokore*, *Oterelu*, settled separately on clan land in pre-Nupe era. As Yagba communities reacted differently to the Nupe raids of the late nineteenth century depending on the options opened to them, Amuro people were forced under that socio-political upheaval to move to the hill-top. They were scattered to *Oriokes*, with some at *Oroke Obasoro*, some at *Oroke Iwo*, *Oroke Ijiran* and others at *Eherin* hills. These hills were between the distances of 10-40 km from the original site. Though life was difficult at the hill-tops, it was preferred to the lowland because of the security it offered. With the proclamation of peace by the British officials in 1897 came the usual appeals to the people to come out of their hide-outs. Responding to the appeal, Amuro people began to move in the 1920s. Unlike their counterparts in Isanlu and Mopa whose direction of movement was determined by the factor of new roads, Amuro people moved in groups in various directions because the motor-road was far from them. On leaving their *Oriokes*, they settled in new places which they named *Araromi* and *Aiyedayo*, meaning “life has become better for me” and “the world has become peaceful”, respectively. These new names indicated their relief from the hardship that accompanied Nupe imperialism. *Takete-Ide* people left *Eherin* hills to settle at the present *Takete Ide* - a distance of 3 km from the hill-top. *Aiyedayo* people moved from *Oroke-Ijiran*, a distance of 5km. Others left their hill-tops to settle at *Iloke*, *Otafun*, *Agbajogun*, *Aiyede*, *Aiyedayo*, *Okagi*, *Orokere*- the seven villages now collectively known as Amuro. These shifts began in 1924 and were completed between 1927 and 1928. Amuro people remained at these sites (*Araromi*, *Aiyede*, *Takete-Ide*, *Agbajogun*, *Okagi* and *Otafun*), until the 1940s when yet another population relocation (voluntary) in the area occurred.

The British officials’ efforts at relocating people were supplemented by those of the missionary organizations and even those of some indigenes who appealed to their own people and encouraged them to move. For instance, Late Rev. K.P. Titus who was an indigene, a convert of and an ardent supporter of the Apostolic Church in Yagba land, made series of appeal to Amuro people to come down to the road side. By 1937, he was said to have initiated the building of a church and a primary school at the present Amuro site.²⁹ This exercise encouraged the gradual movement of the other members of the church and others who wished to take advantage of the school. Essentially, however, the shift to the present site of Amuro was a product of transportation incentives. As early as 1913, Amuro people had on request “most willingly taken part in the construction of the Kabba-Isanlu road”.³⁰ Although they lived not less than 27 km away from the road side, they all came to work until the 1940s when according to an informant, the people felt that it was ridiculous for them to continue to travel all that distance to help construct and repair roads and yet be denied the benefits that accompanied the opening of such

roads.³¹ Thus while security was mainly responsible for the movements to the hill-tops, reasons ranging from religion, expansion, accessibility (this being the major determinant), etc. were responsible for the shifts in settlement to the road side. Since the 1940s, Amuro people have gradually shifted to the new site along the road. While this process is still on some people have vowed never to move to the present site. For instance, some Takete-Ide people have considered where they are currently (a distance of about 25km to the new site), as their father land. According to them, they cannot live and farm on “borrowed land.”³² The present Amuro site which is regarded by some as ‘borrowed’ land was fully and formally negotiated for (backed up by a certificate of occupancy) from Mopa people.³³ So it is not in any sense a “borrowed land.” Others are reluctant to move because of farming activities and as such many people are still to be found at the old sites. At the new site, settlements cluster around the road producing a linear settlements pattern as in Isanlu and Mopa. The people built their houses where they could get land, because here there is no family land to cling to. Quarters in the new town are also named after the mother settlements such as Orokere-Amuro, Aiyedayo-Amuro and so on.

The Resettlement of Ponyan People

The Isanlu, Amuro and Mopa settlement shifts discussed earlier showed the movement of people from the hill-tops to the road side. Ponyan’s example on the other hand illustrates the movement of people away from their hide-outs in the thickly forested areas to open lowland areas. These four major families – *Oketan*, *Abido*, *Ogba-Ogun* and *Ijowa* were settled at different places on their family lands in Ponyan area. Nupe wars however disrupted these settlements in the 1890s and forced the people to seek hide-outs in the forests. Unlike their counterparts at Isanlu, Amuro and Mopa, whose response to intensive Nupe raids was their movement up the hills, Ponyan people had no hills to run to. The thick forest of South-East Yagba provided an abode for them until the coming of British rule in the area proclaimed peace and freedom of movement. Responding to colonial appeals, Ponyan people began in the 1930s to leave the forests to their present site in the open grass land, a distance of about 3km from the forest region.³⁴ At the new site (Oke- Ponyan and Odo-Ponyan), the families are now mixed up because individuals settled where they could get land to build. The settlement pattern at the new site is not a linearly integrated one as is the case of Mopa and Isanlu. Rather the new site is gradually taking up the settlement pattern of a city.

Problems Occasioned by Population Relocation Exercise

The methods adopted by colonial authorities of grouping villages under village heads led to resentment. The method adopted in Mopa of setting the houses on fire led to the migration of some people to other areas in anger. However, irrespective of the method that was adopted, there were still some general problems that arose from the population relocation in Yagbaland. It is observed that there was and is a general reluctance on the part of people to move. This reluctance is not unconnected with the fact that, the Nupe raids had made many to abandon their old clan settlements in the original site. Moreover, the fear of coming back to open land vulnerable to external attack was still uppermost in the mind of the people. Others demonstrate reluctance because of their long association with their divinities (*orishas*), the seat of which they felt must not be moved. This is why some villages when they moved, still remained very close to their mother settlements.

If resettlement exercise is to be meaningful and viable, there is the need for the provision of essential services which are in many respects essential for the functioning and viability of a new settlement. Hence there was the problem of supporting services which should go with any resettlement exercise. Since the settlement shifts in Yagba was partly a deliberate government venture and largely due to the people's wish, the problem of providing these services therefore, fell on the people. This probably explains in part why the people in Yagbaland have become used to self-help development programmes right from the beginning. As an informant remarked:

every utilities you see in Mopa is due to our own communal efforts, most of the projects like the hospital, the secondary schools, post office, water project and so on were started and completed before the government took over.³⁵

The same is true of Isanlu and Amuro.

The problem of finance has also been identified. On the part of the individual, there was the problem of getting money to build new houses, clear new farm lands, and cost of transporting themselves and belongings to the new site. This had posed problems either because the transport facilities were lacking at the initial stage of resettlement or the cost of resettlement too high and the people or the individual could not afford them. For instance, in Amuro, the distance from the old site to the new settlement ranges between 5 and 40km, a distance difficult to trek carrying belongings without any form of transportation. The problem of acquiring land might not have posed much problem since most of the villages descended just to the feet of their hills like Mopa and Isanlu. However, when viewed from the possibility of expansion at the new sites, land acquisition became a problem. While movement to the road side solved the problem of inaccessibility for most of the villages, it did not solve that of expansion. Since most of the villages such as Isanlu and Mopa are surrounded by hills, expansion therefore has to be linear. The quest for accessibility and desire to take advantage of the roads led to the shift in settlement in Amuro. This made her to negotiate for land from Mopa which was granted in 1943 backed up legally by a certificate of occupancy. When Mopa was undertaking the deal she probably did not realize then or envisage that her physical expansion might be handicapped. Mopa people have now begun to encroach on Amuro land, a situation that has not been taken kindly to by Amuro people. Thus the problem of land acquisition and or expansion has generated conflict between the two towns concerned, resulting in strained inter-group relations.

A very fundamental problem at the initial stage of the resettlement exercise in Yagba was the economic issues. These have to do with the difficulties of clearing new farm lands and market centers at the new site. The pioneering years of resettlement thus witnessed farming at the old site by most people until new areas were gradually cleared at the new site. Social problems were also identified because, cultural/sentimental attachment to the cults made it very difficult to move these cults to the new sites. This attachment has been very difficult if not impossible to break in some areas such as in Ogbe, thus rendering the settlement shift incomplete. The colonial arrangements that emerged at the new sites (the grouping of villages under village heads) presented administrative problems, engendered strife and resentment from villages that had been subordinated to other villages. The situation has marred the relationship between the various villages i.e Egbe and Ere. The administrative problem is still clearly noticeable in the areas of

unresolved district headship particularly in East Yagba today. In spite of these problems, the locational shifts in settlements have had lasting impact on the villages and indeed Yagbaland.

Impact of the Population Relocations

The impact of the shift in settlement in Yagbaland could best be examined or assessed by imagining what the socio-economic conditions would have been today in the absence of the shift. By comparing the socio-economic status of the people at the original sites with those at the new sites, one would probably have come to the conclusion that shifts in settlements have had lasting impact on the communities involved. As mentioned earlier, the kinship tie was an essential sinew of the social system and if determined or influenced to a great extent the pattern of settlement in the area. This is because families settled together on their family lands. The movement to the hill-tops humped the people together but it was still possible for members of the same family to settle as close together as possible. However, with the colonial inspired shift, the system began to break down. As an informant remarked, “this bond of closeness (the family tie) is no more, as different members of families built their houses where-ever they could get land.”³⁶ The situation became even more confused with the rise of a literate class. The new elite seem not to be strongly attached to the old sentiments as their parents. The result is that of a greater inter-ethnic and inter-family fusion which constitute a healthy development in the communities. The breakdown of this social bond however, does not imply an extinction of clan identity. The family ties remain strong. Moreover the development of roads and modern transportation has increased inter-community contacts and exchanges. The ability to move easily from place to place tends to change the mentality of the people in the sense that it reduces traditional isolationism.

The exposure of the people to the outside world through improved communication systems could not but affect the physical structure of the towns. H.B. James, the District Officer for Kabba Division in 1913 reported: “the compounds are found huddled together in a more or less insanitary and congested state, and in case of epidemic or fire, the consequences are disastrous.”³⁷ James’ assessment report demonstrated his ignorance of the traditional system which allows family closeness. He probably viewed the structure of the house and the village in general vis-à-vis what obtained in the Western World. This notwithstanding, the point being emphasized is that by 1913, the villages did not take on a ‘modern’ look. By the 1950s, however, it was an entirely different story as the Annual Report for the year had it:

The development along the roads witnessed newly built villages of much desirable residence of bricks, timber and galvanized irons unlike the old type of leaky barracks.³⁸

This spread of new standard of domestic architecture has continued. In the new site there are regular lay-outs. The houses are more spacious, cleaner and generally healthier than those in which people had lived on. The spatial effect of the new developments could be seen in the linearly integrated settlement pattern characteristics of a few Yagba towns today. The integration facilitated the provision of amenities which are of benefit to all sections of the communities.

Attempt at examining the impact of locational shifts in Yagbaland will not be complete without mentioning the Missionaries who pioneered the development of Western education in the area.

The Missionaries were faced with difficulties such as hostile climatic conditions, and mosquitoes. Their precarious condition was best summed up by Mrs. J. C. Bulifant, one of the early Missionaries in Yagbaland, in the following words: "There were times of testing and danger, loneliness beyond description, hunger, disease and persecution, nothing around to elevate nothing, except degradation and sin."³⁹ Bulifant's statement probably had some touch of exaggeration. However, the Missionaries defied whatever problems they encountered, and laboured for the development of Western education in the area, as education was a major instrument of evangelization. They sowed the seed of change in the period between 1908 and 1930, and the fruition of the seed came in the period between 1930 and 1950(s). A report in 1940 stated: Some excellent schools and dispensaries were being operated by missionary societies, consequently raising the standard of health, life and education of the people."⁴⁰ Encouraged by the Native Administration to build their churches, schools, and hospitals at the plains, the missionaries became part and parcel of the colonial strategies in encouraging settlement shift in Yagba Land. The missionaries were thus very much instrumental in encouraging movements from the hill-tops to the plains. The 1940 report went further to say, the S.I.M. schools at Mopa, Egbe and Isanlu were of particularly good standards. Egbe was doing particularly good work and was already well on the way of becoming a central school for the West Yagba area.⁴¹

Egbe and Mopa had their first S.I.M. Primary schools in 1930/31 and 1936 respectively. The first generation of Yagba intelligentsia emerging from these schools (politically conscious and socially alert), was to play an important role both in the re-organized "Native Administration after 1934 and in the general progress of the area. The Yagba progressive Union (Y. P.U) inaugurated in December 1936, the first of its kind in Yagba land was the brain child of the S. I. M. educated elite. The president – Mr. J.P. Koledade was from Ejiba, the Assistant Secretary – T.B. Olorunishola from Mopa, the Treasurer – S. Adesina from Egbe, and the vice President – G.S. Afolabi from Mopa. These men were mostly from Egbe and Mopa which had relatively early advantage of missionary education. This is not to say however that if the people had remained in their hideouts and on the hill-tops, the advantages of western education would have entirely eluded them. But the point being made here is that the rate of development would definitely have been slower. Because the physical obstacles (such as inaccessibility), associated with hide-outs settlements would have militated against early contact with the missionaries. This is evident from the fact that the settlements that shifted to the roadside in the 1930s were well ahead (in socio-economic development) of those settlements at the original sites. For instance, Takete-Ide in the Amuro group of villages, located 25 km from road side had her first secondary school only in 1981 (though some of her sons and daughters are found in other schools) while Mopa turned out her first graduates (of the E.C.W.A. secondary school established in 1964) in 1968. While Egbe had her first primary school established in 1930/31, and Titcombe College in 1951, Otafun had her first primary school in 1952. The educational gap between these towns, and what the general socio-economic development of Yagba land would have been in the absence of the population relocation could best be imagined.

Perhaps a fundamental impact of the shifts could be seen in terms of more efficient operation of activities associated with transportation developments. The efficient control of the British over the districts undoubtedly demanded good transport system. This is because, the movements of the administrative officers up and down the country, and the regularity of effective communication between administrative centers and the respective local administrative stations,

were indispensable to any good government. Hence the British interest in changing the transportation outlook of the country. What was happening in Yagbaland, therefore, was merely an aspect of the transport revolution that was taking place generally in the country in the early twentieth century. In addition to the major road which ran from Kabba to Ilorin, new ones were constructed connecting inland villages with the main road. Ife road was extended to Ogga across Oyi River right to Egbe. A motorable road connected Ife-Ejuku with Kabba via Omuo-Oke which soon became for its vital economic and administrative importance. In 1937/38 a dry season road was extended to Luke in Bunu district.⁴² This transportation development, as mentioned earlier, was the prime mover in the direction of settlement shifts in Yagbaland. According to R.O. Ekundare, "improved transportations and communications are fundamental to all other types of development."⁴³ A statement on the economic programme of the Government of the Federation of Nigeria says: "A cheap and extensive system of communications is the greatest blessing which any country can have from the economic point of view."⁴⁴

These views are true of Yagbaland, for the growth of cash crops like cocoa, and coffee were in response to the presence of roads. These cash crops supplemented the indigenous crops such as yam, corn, cassava, cotton, etc. Villages in the southern fringes of Yagabland such as Igbagun particularly became important in the production of cash crops. Igbagun initially was a refugee settlement of all Yagba people during the Nupe raids because its thick forest provided a hiding place for the people. After the war, Igbagun came to take the lead in the production of cash crop because of the highly fertile soil. The enthusiasm for cocoa production in this town led to an important step in the direction of improvement in the plantation started by the Igbagun Co-operative Marketing Society in 1955. This body sold most of the crop through the Kabba Union of Co-operative Marketing Society.⁴⁵ Since these new products are not used locally, the development of roads made their transportation and marketing faster and easier.

Closely linked with the increase in agricultural activities was the enlarged markets brought about by the advantage of concentration of population along the roads. According to Niara Sudarkasa, "when villages are located along major roads, one of the first characteristics of a town which they assume is the daily trading site."⁴⁶ This is particularly true if the settlement is the point of convergence for unpaved roads connecting the interior settlements with the major roads such as Isanlu and Efo-Amuro. Trading and marketing have become an important aspect of the people's life. Commenting on the state of trade in Yagbaland in 1948, the acting divisional agents of Messrs. John Holt and Company said:

Comparatively, the trade of this period shows a good improvement on that of the same period for the preceding year, the improvement of roads has no doubt been an important factor. Given a reasonable home markets and continued improvement in roads to important trading centres, we see no reason why the next few years should not see a vast improvement in Yagba's trade.⁴⁷

As the agent of messrs. John Holt envisaged, continued improvements in road to important trading centres such as Akure, Ilorin, Lokoja, etc. expanded Yagba's external markets and brought in traders to Yagbaland such that by the 1950s:

buyers are placed at important centres and the man who, six years ago had to travel fifty miles or more to sell his kernel (if he found it worthwhile to sell them at all), can now dispense them literally at his door steps.⁴⁸

Today, Ejuku, Egbe, Isanlu and Mopa stand out as important trading centres because of their earlier exposure to transport facilities and the network of roads that converge at Egbe in particular. Yagba people are no longer confined to their local markets as the case was in the old sites. Internally, the daily markets in most of the small towns in the area have declined in importance with the growth of periodic markets, markets which meet every five days or every nine days. Also the daily markets are equally being undermined by the existence of small shops and stores throughout Yagba towns.

In terms of occupational structure at the new sites, this has changed to include a variety of activities unlike at the old sites where farming was essentially the occupation. There has been a gradual rise in the proportion of people engaged in other occupation such as carpentry, bricklaying, trading and teaching. Road developments have also been responsible for the population hemorrhage of Yagbaland. There had been an increasing movement of Yagba sons and daughters particularly the young ones to other parts of the country (ie Southern parts), thus leaving a depopulated area behind. Equally important is the fact that road development has increased the capacity and ease of movement along the existing routes. Such a change in capacity may be seen to have a wide spread impact on the general growth and development of Yagbaland. Therefore, it can be asserted that settlement shifts in the area of study has left profound effects, accelerating the pace of development in the settlements concerned.

Conclusion

This paper has examined a historical discourse on settlement relocation in Yagbaland which as noted was a product of several years of change and development. The Nupe raids of the nineteenth century put Yagba land in a dilemma, from which they could not free themselves. Many inhabitants were forced to move to various hide-outs. Responding to the appeals to move down from the hills, Yagba people moved though cautiously. Some left the hills but did not settle far away for sentimental and economic reasons. This explains why today, settlements such as Ejuku, Isanlu, Mopa and others are located at the foot of hills. This nearness of settlement to the hills should be seen as a product of recent historical experience, with roots in the remote past. Their immediate ancestors dwelt on these lower and level grounds, though at different locations.

The population relocation exercise of the first half of the twentieth century, which was more of response essentially to improved communication facilities, played an important role in modifying the pattern of settlements in Yagbaland. It led to the disintegration of the dispersed settlement pattern. The tendencies to build as close as possible to the road resulted over the years in the emergence of linearly integrated settlements. The movement to the road side put the towns in the area of the path of modernization, the process has, however, heightened the problems of intra-group and inter-group relations in some cases. The incomplete nature of the relocation exercise in some places such as Amuro makes the location of projects always a source of intrigues and social antagonism amidst the different sections of the Amuro group of villages. The educated

elite have become an important force in completing the exercise, and are thus major contributors to improved relations and greater integration.

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Academic Competence and Linguistic Performance: A Study of English Intonation Tune Assignment by Some Nigerian English Language Postgraduate Students

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Abstract

It has been observed that being academically competent in Phonetics, English Phonology and Spoken English does not affect most Nigerians' performance in the appropriate use of English intonation tunes. This is probably due to the fact that, contrary to what obtains in its mother tongue context, English is often learnt in the classroom rather than acquired naturally in Nigeria. Therefore, this paper presents an investigation of the relevance of academic competence to linguistic performance in the use of English intonation tunes in Nigeria. Thirty subjects, who have been exposed to the basic knowledge of Phonetics, English Phonology and Spoken English, and have been considered academically competent enough to be awarded a first degree in the English language and admitted to a Master of Arts in the English language in University of Ibadan were randomly selected for this investigation. They were given some oral production tests on intonation tune assignment. The data was subjected to perceptual analysis by awarding scores for appropriate performance and statistically converting the scores to simple percentages. The acoustic analysis was done using Speech Filing System (SFS)/WASP version 1.3 computerized speech tools developed in University of London. The results revealed the subjects' performance as reflecting that academic competence has little or no effect on the appropriate assignment of intonation tunes in polite requests, complex sentences and attitudinal functions such as surprise, indifference and expression of doubts or uncertainty, and that the only appropriately used tune is the falling tune followed by the rising tune which has been fairly mastered for polar questions.

Introduction

It has been established that English as spoken and used in Nigeria differ remarkably from the Standard. The area where the differences are most noticed is the spoken form since it is basically performance. The native speaker of English acquires the spoken form naturally while the Nigerian speakers, as second language users, learn it. While the native speaker is expected to have intuition about what is right or wrong in English, his mother tongue, the Nigerian speaker has to learn its appropriate use. The question of linguistic competence therefore becomes irrelevant in the second language context where the speakers, rather than possess intuition have to learn the rules in the classroom.

The question to be addressed then is, even for those that have been accredited to possess some academic competence by the award of the first degree and the subsequent pursuit of a Master's degree in the English language, how well does their performance reflect there academic competence which secondarily translates to linguistic competence in the second language setting?

Competence and Performance

Noam Chomsky (1965) defines linguistic competence as the system of linguistic knowledge possessed by native speakers of a language which makes it possible for speakers to produce and understand an infinite number of sentences in their language and to distinguish grammatical sentences from ungrammatical sentences. He differentiates linguistic competence from linguistic performance, claiming that the latter has to do with the use of language. Linguistic competence is the speakers' unconscious knowledge of the grammar of his or her native language while linguistic performance has to do with the actual production and comprehension of utterances (Wales, 1987; de Valenzuela, 1998). Chomsky separates 'competence,' an idealized capacity, from the production of actual utterances, 'performance.'

Since, competence, being an ideal, is a psychological or mental property or function, it is obvious that the concept will not be appropriate in relation to English in Nigeria where it is a second language, often learnt in school and rarely acquired naturally. It is therefore paramount to redefine competence in relation to spoken English in the Nigerian context. Multilinguals rarely develop equal fluency in all the languages they know. Most Nigerians possess the competence described in generative grammar only in their mother tongues, not in English. This paper therefore addresses competence in Nigerian English from an academic point of view. A degree or higher degree in English language is assessed as a proof of competence, especially having been exposed to the basic knowledge of English phonetics, phonology and spoken English.

Intonation

Intonation is the aspect of speech melody which arises as words are put together into phrases (Pierrehumbert, 1992) and is associated with relative prominence and pitch modulation, the aspect of sound which we perceive in terms of high or 'low' (Quirk and Greenbaum, 1987). It has also been asserted that intonational languages employ the use of pitch distinctively since two sentences can be exactly the same phonetically except for the overall pitch contour which is called intonation which can be used to distinguish between two different meanings (Fromkin and Rodman, 1978).

There is relative agreement in the literature on the fact that all languages make use of intonation but that the difference between tonal and intonational languages is in the domain of use (Pierrehumbert 1992; Crutenden, 1986). An intonational language has the tone group (often a word group) as its domain while a tonal language has the word as its domain.

The intonation of English has been considerably studied when compared to other languages. However, a lot of controversy has been generated on its inventory as well as the phonological characterization of its different patterns. Many linguists identified two 'basic' tunes for English and other varied combinations of these two tunes have been discussed (Robin, 1971; Gimson, 1975; Roach, 1992). According to Robins, Tune I and Tune II, as termed by Jones, stand for the falling tune while Tune II stands for the rising tune. He went further to explain that these tunes (I and II) are not the only tunes in English but that they cover a good deal of ordinary speech. For example, wh-questions,

declarative statements, exclamations and orders are assigned the falling tune while polar questions and requests are assigned the rising tune.

Roach (1991) identifies three basic tunes: high, fall, level but went further to expand the three basic tunes to five by exploring how they are combined in speech, subsequently proposing the tunes: fall, rise, fall-rise, rise-fall and level. The fall tune is regarded as giving an impression of finality, the rise as conveying that something more is to follow; the fall-rise, which is used a lot in English, as conveying 'limited agreement' or 'response with reservations', the rise-fall a strong feeling of approval, disapproval or surprise', and the level, which is used in a rather restricted context in English, almost always convey (on single-syllable utterances), a feeling of saying something routine, uninteresting or boring. These set of tunes as expressed by Roach (1991) are rather odd-looking and might make the intonation of English seem rather too complex to understand to a second language user of English who uses intonation restrictively in his mothertongue.

The domain of intonation is the tone unit or group which has four components. These are the optional Pre-head, optional Head, obligatory Nucleus and optional Tail. The Nucleus (also called the tonic syllable) is usually but not necessarily the last stressed syllable in the tone group and it is usually on this syllable that the pitch direction is effected. Sommerstein (1977) also notes that a tonic syllable (i.e. nucleus) in a tone group does not only bear the tone but also a type of stress termed nuclear stress. The Head is from the first stressed syllable to the last syllable before the tonic syllable (or Nucleus), the Pre-Head- all unstressed syllables before the Head, while the Tail is every unstressed syllable after the Tonic syllable (Crutenden 1986; Roach, 1991).

Nigerian English Intonation

Intonation, a feature of many languages, has different presentations in different languages. In tonal languages such as most Nigerian languages, the variation in pitch is used to contrast the meaning of individual words while in intonational languages such as English, it is a feature of the word group. Cruz- Ferraire (1989) claims that intonation is the 'last stronghold of a foreign accent in speaking any L2' and intonation as used in Nigerian English has been observed to be peculiarly different from that of Standard English and it has been viewed as a difficult suprasegmental to master for Nigerian speakers of English. (Dunstan, 1969; Banjo, 1979; Eka, 1985; Atoye, 2005; Jowitt, 1991; Udofot, 1997; Akinjobi & Oladipupo, 2010)

Eka (1985) found that the distribution of simple tones were more than complex tones in Nigerian English as compared to higher complex tones in Standard English while Udofot's study revealed that both in read and spontaneous speeches, falling tunes were predominant in Nigerian English, rising tones relatively rare, fall-rise even rarer and rise-fall mainly by Variety II subjects. Still confirming the disparity between the uses of intonation tunes in Standard English and Nigerian English, Jowitt (1991) also observes that the rich intonational resources of Standard English are neglected by the majority of Nigerian users.

Atoye (2005) however observes that the problem is greater with interpretation than perception after investigating the perception and interpretation of a sub-class of sentence intonation by some Nigerian users of English. He discovered that 85.7% correctly perceived changes in intonation but obtained only 25.7% correct interpretation of the meanings normally associated with the intonation contours of the ten sentences played back to the subjects. He therefore recommends the teaching of the social meaning of intonation to non-native learners instead of the analysis of its phonological structure.

Akinjobi and Oladipupo's (2010) study further confirms that Nigerian users of English encounter difficulties in the appropriate use of Intonation tunes, especially for attitudinal functions.

Nigerian English

It has been established by various researches conducted on Nigerian English that it differs markedly from Standard English at every level of language, most especially, the spoken form. The various language groups even have their peculiar characteristics which mark the sub-varieties found within the variety – Nigerian English. Therefore it is possible to use terms such as Igbo English, Hausa English, Yoruba English, Ibibio English etc. (Jibril 1982; Eka, 1985; Jowitt, 1990; Udofot, 1997; Gut, 2001)

Nigerian English has also been classified using educational parameters. The classical Banjo (1971) 'points on a cline' categorization has been used by many as a yardstick to determine the standard in relation to Nigerian English. (Udofot, 1997, 2000; Eka 1985; Akinjobi, 2004, 2006). It has been observed however that variation is more noticeable in the spoken form and that it often transcends educational status.

This paper therefore investigates how some Nigerian postgraduate students of English (emphasizing language) who have acquired a degree in English language and are in pursuit of a master's degree utilize the knowledge they have acquired and whether or not their performance reflect their academic competence.

Methodology

Thirty postgraduate students of English who are emphasizing language (as opposed to Literature) and have all undergone undergraduate courses in English phonetics and phonology as well as completed an advance English phonology course were made to utter some English sentences into a computerized speech laboratory. The instrument covers grammatical functions such as tune assignment to simple statements, commands, wh-questions, exclamations, polar questions, polite requests, statements to be changed to questions; and attitudinal functions such as uttering surprises, showing indifference and expressing doubt and uncertainty.

The speech data were listened to and consequently sorted out into various items that were being tested. Appropriate and inappropriate uses were counted and converted statistically to percentages. This is with the aim of revealing the variants that are most frequent and determining whether they conform to standard forms or further corroborate findings from

earlier researches that Nigerian English intonation tune assignment differ markedly from the standard.

The acoustic analysis, aimed at corroborating the findings from perceptual analysis, was done with a PC based sound analysis system. The software consists of a suite of sound processing packages – the SFS/WASP version 1.3.

3.5 Research questions

The research questions are:

- Does the academic competence of the postgraduate students specializing in English with Language emphasis reflect in their linguistic performance in English Intonation tune assignment?
- Having been assumed to be academically competent, can the subjects' performance be assessed as debunking earlier claims that Nigerians do not assign intonation tunes appropriately?

ANALYSES

1. Test of Appropriate grammatical function

Utterance Type	Falling Tune		Rising Tune		Flat Tune.	
	No of instances	Percentage	No of instances	Percentage	No of instances	Percentage
Simple statements	24	80%	-	-	*6	20%
Simple Commands	23	77%	-	-	*7	23%
Wh-questions	24	80%	*3	10%	*3	10%
Exclamations	26	87%			*4	13%
Polar Questions	*6	20%	18	60%	*6	20%

* Inappropriate tune assignment

In the assignment of intonation tunes to simple statements, commands, wh-questions, and exclamations, the subjects assigned the appropriate falling tune 80%, 77%, 80% and 87% of the instances respectively. With polar questions where the rising tune is expected, 60% of the instances, the appropriate rising tune was assigned while a significant 40% of the instances has the falling and flat tunes inappropriately assigned. However, in the uttering of polite requests, only two instances, constituting 7% have the appropriate rising tune assigned while in a very significant 53% and 40% of the instances, the wrong falling and flat tunes were inappropriately assigned.

2. Test of Appropriate grammatical function

Utterance Type	Fall/Fall		Rise/fall		Flat/flat	
	No of instances	Percentage	No of instances	Percentage	No of instances	Percentage
Sentences with dependent and independent clauses	*18	60%	3	10%	*9	30%

* Inappropriate tune assignment

In the assignment of intonation tune to sentences with dependent and independent clauses, none of the subjects used the appropriate rise/fall tune, while a significant 60% and 40% respectively assigned the fall/fall and the flat tunes.

3. Test of Appropriate grammatical function

Utterance Type	Falling Tune		Rising Tune		Flat Tune.	
	No of instances	Percentage	No of instances	Percentage	No of instances	Percentage
Statements as statements	20	100%	-	-	-	-
Statements as questions	*7	35%	11	55%	*2	10%

* Inappropriate tune assignment

Regarding changing statements to questions, all the subjects (100%) appropriately used the falling tune for the statements but only 55% of the instances have the appropriate rising tune for changing statements to questions while 35% and 10% inappropriately used the falling and flat tunes respectively.

4. Test of Attitudinal Function

Utterance Type	Falling Tune		Rising Tune		Flat Tune.	
	No of instances	Percentage	No of instances	Percentage	No of instances	Percentage
Surprise	*21	70%	-	0%	*9	30%
Indifference	*24	80%	-	0%	*6	20%
Uncertainty	*18	60%	-	0%	*12	40%

and doubt						
Polite Requests	*16	53%	2	7%	*12	40%

*** Inappropriate tune assignment**

In the test of the use of attitudinal function of intonation, in 70% of the instances, the falling tune is inappropriately used to express surprise, 80% to express indifference and 60% to express uncertainty or doubt while the flat tune constitutes 30%, 20% and 40% respectively. In none of the instances is the appropriate rising tune assigned.

5. Overall performance

Utterance type	Appropriate Intonation Tune	Percentage of Appropriate Tune Assignment	Percentage of Inappropriate tune Assignment
Simple statements	Falling	80%	20%
Simple Commands	Falling	77%	23%
Wh-questions	falling	80%	20%
Exclamations	Falling	87%	13%
Polar Questions	Rising	60%	40%
Complex sentences	Rise/fall	10%	90%
Statements as statements	Falling	100%	0%
Statements as questions	Rising	55%	45%
Surprise	Rising	0%	100%
Indifference	Rising	0%	100%
Uncertainty and doubt	Rising	0%	100%
Polite Requests	Rising	7%	93%

The table above is a summary of the overall performance of the subjects. It reveals good performance in the assignment of tunes to simple statements, commands, wh-questions, exclamations and a fairly good performance with regards to polar questions and changing statements to questions. However, with sentences with dependent and independent clauses, the subjects did not perform well.


In the test of the use of attitudinal function of intonation, all the subjects assigned the wrong tunes to express surprises, indifference as well as uncertainty and doubt. With polite requests, the inappropriate falling and flat tunes were used almost in all instances.

6. Acoustic Analysis

Are you the prince we're looking for? (Rising tune)

Subject 1:right

Subject 11: wrong




The pitch contour for Subject 1 glides up appropriately (rising tune) while that of Subject 11 glides down (falling tune) in the polar question ‘Are you the prince we’re looking for?’

In as much as you’re honest, you need not fear the panel (Rise/fall tune)

Subject 6: Right

Subject 4: wrong




For subject 6, the tune rises on honest and falls on panel but subject 4 has a flat tune running through the whole utterance.

Well, she could make it here in the morning (uncertainty and doubt- rising tune)

No subject produced the right tune

Subject 13 : wrong



To express uncertainty or doubt above, none of the subjects used the appropriate rising tune on the ‘mor-’ of ‘morning’ while Subject 13 wrongly assigned the falling tune to the utterance.

Results

- The academic competence of the Nigerian postgraduate students specializing in English with language emphasis does not reflect in their linguistic performance in English intonation tune assignment. Though they could assign intonation tunes appropriately where the falling tune is used such as with simple statements, commands, wh-questions, and exclamations, they could only fairly employ the rising tune with polar questions. In the use of the rising tune to express attitudinal functions such as surprise, indifference, polite requests and certainty or doubt, they employed the falling and flat tunes.
- Despite the fact that they have undergone training at undergraduate and postgraduate levels which qualify them to be academically competent, the subjects’ performance does not debunk earlier claims that Nigerians do not assign intonation tunes appropriately (Dunstan, 1969; Banjo, 1979; Cruz- Ferraire, 1989; Eka, 1985; Udofot, 2001; Atoye, 2005; Akinjobi & Oladipupo 2005, 2010).

Conclusion and Suggestions

This study concludes that academic competence may not influence English language experts in the use of English intonation though they have been exposed to intonation at undergraduate and postgraduate levels. Therefore, it agrees with Atoye’s recommendation that the social meaning of intonation rather than the analysis of its phonological structure should be taken more seriously in teaching intonation to non-native learners.

It is further recommended that non-enculturation sources such as electronic media, for instance, recorded voices of first language users and second language users who

pronounce well be employed to help learners attain a moderate level of proficiency in the use of intonation. Radio stations such as British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Cable News Network (CNN), SkyNews and other stations where first language English could be accessed are good learning sources for English intonation. Closely related to these are satellite television sources such as Cartoon Network (CN), Mnet Series, Mnet Action etc which have been observed to be effective in the learning and improvement of performance in the use of English suprasegmentals. It will be too high a goal to aspire a native-like proficiency level but determined learners could get close enough to attain international intelligibility.

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A Comparative Study of Xiang Yu and Hannibal's Strategic Thinking with that of Shaka the Zulu of South Africa

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Abstract

The name of Ji Xiang Yu occupies an important place in the history of strategic thinking in Chinese history. His rise into limelight was occasioned by the opportunity provided by the decline in the political fortunes of the Late Qin Dynasty. Like Xiang Yu, Hannibal Barca, the famous North African military strategist was brought up to accept strict and hard military discipline. He was excellent in military and diplomatic activities and helped to build a formidable force that could hold its own in the then Mediterranean World. Several centuries after the exploits of these two great strategists, Africa south of the Sahara produced a military strategist of world acclaim. Shaka the Zulu was as shrewd and militarily strategic as both Xiang Yu and Hannibal to merit a place in the annals of the “fathers of strategic thinking”. This work analyzes the historical forces that shaped the strategic thinking of these historical figures and discusses their tremendous contributions to the development of military science and history.

Keywords: Xiang Yu, Hannibal, Shaka, Strategic Thinking

Introduction

About the 3rd century BC, both the East (Asia) and West (Europe) were active on the stage of numerous wars that produced two outstanding heroes who changed the direction of warfare and strategic studies. The Chinese people are familiar with the king of Western Chu, Xiang Yu (BC 232 BC - 202 BC) who contributed to the military and political development of the area. In 208 BC, the anti-Qin rebellion led by Yijun gradually broke the defense of the Chu commander Xiang Liang, who died afterwards. Thereafter, the fortune of the Qin state hit the rocks. At this critical moment, Xiang Yu rose to the occasion and turned the tide of the Chu State. He led his troops in the Julu area and defeated the invaders of the Qin State in 207 BC. This act of bravery was the main indelible contribution of Xiang Yu to the evolution of the Chinese political system. At the same time in North Africa, ancient Carthage produced the famous military strategist, Hannibal, in about 247 BC. These two heroes not only lived in the same era, coincidentally, the fate of their history and the trajectory of the wars they fought were very similar in both the way they organized their armies and how they deployed them in battlefields. Thus, both men are sometimes referred to as “masters of strategic thinking” (Yan, 1992: 20).

But the third character in this analysis, Shaka the Zulu was successful all the way until his death caused by his bodyguard and his half brothers. Although there is no evidence to indicate that Shaka ever read the lessons of strategy from the examples of

Xiang Yu and Hannibal, his military innovations and tactics survived long after he left the scene. He is credited with creating the first professional standing army in southern Africa, because before him there was no strict division between those who fought in the wars and ordinary citizens. The military and strategic exploits of Shaka had some striking similarities and differences with those of Xiang Yu and Hannibal.

The Concept of Warfare

Although war may have been dreaded by many, the reality is that history is replete with numerous communal, national and international violent conflicts and confrontations, with a heavy toll on lives and material resources. In fact, warfare is an aspect of the evolution of settled communities and the history of the human struggle for control of resources in their environment (Goyne, 2002: 31). People and communities fight wars for numerous reasons, including economic, political, social, religious, cultural and strategic considerations, among other factors. Military historians and other analysts have opined that methods of war stand on a scale between maneuver warfare and attrition, both of which are essentially the focus on achieving victory through defeating, killing or capturing an adversary. Although there are technical differences between the two, in reality maneuver warfare involves both maneuver and attrition (Simpkin, 2000: 3-16, 139-186; Leonhard, 1991: 1-5; Lind, 1985: 3-7). However, a key requirement for success in maneuver warfare on the part of the country or group executing the war is accurate, up-to-date intelligence on the disposition of key command, support and combat units (Leonhard, 1991). War theorists and strategists such as Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz (1780-1831), Antoine-Henri, baron Jomini (1779-1869), Sun Wu or Sun Tzu (c. 544 B.C.-496 B.C.), Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821), Xiang Yu, Hannibal and Shaka, among others were aware of these facts (Gray, 1991: 85-91). The last three military strategists occupy a central position in this paper.

The Battle of Julu provides an insight into the strategic thinking of Xiang Yu, who was an ancient Chinese strategic thinker and military commander. In that battle, Xiang Yu's forces carried out unprecedented attacks against the forces of the Qin Dynasty Emperor (221 B.C.-207 B.C). For an extremely ambitious youth of barely 24 years old, that feat by Xiang Yu was unprecedented in the history of warfare in China. Along with his uncle, Xiang Liang, Xiang Yu commanded a number of peasant armies against the Qin Dynasty Emperor, Chen Sheng. He believed in accurate, up-to-date intelligence, reliance on and the mobilization of local peasants and adequate preparations, coupled with surprise attacks in defeating the adversary.

Like Xiang Yu, Hannibal understood the importance of accurate, up-to-date intelligence and surprise attacks on the adversary as indispensable parts of warfare. He demonstrated this in most of his battles, including the Battle of Cannae (Liddell Hart, 1967). Though, Shaka lived several centuries after both Hannibal and Xiang Yu, but his approach to warfare bore some similarities with the approaches of the former. He is perceived as a heroic and protean nation-builder, whose activities helped to shape the politico-military configuration of southern Africa in the nineteenth century

and thereafter (Chanaiwa, Dec. 1980: 1-20). The experience of growing up without a biological father and the humiliation and cruel treatment he received from his mates probably shaped the warlike character of Shaka. He believed in accurate, up-to-date intelligence, surprise attacks and total annihilation, which earned him the nickname *Nodumehlezi* ("the one who when seated causes the earth to rumble") (Chanaiwa, Dec. 1980: 1-20). Like both Hannibal and Xiang Yu, he emphasized merit over family background as the easiest way to motivate his soldiers, most of whom were recruited from among the peasants. His association with his military godfather, Dingiswayo under whose leadership he gained most of his military experience was instrumental to the formation of his military regiments. In fact, at the death of Shaka's father (c. 1816), Dingiswayo lent him the military support necessary to oust and assassinate his senior brother Sigujana, and make himself chieftain of the Zulu. At Dingiswayo's death in c.1818, Shaka immediately assumed leadership, added the forces to his own and conquered the surrounding chiefdoms, thus uniting more than a hundred chiefdoms in southern Africa.

Basic Strategic Maneuverings of Xiang Yu, Hannibal and Shaka

Xiang Yu's strategic maneuverings manifested during the conflict between the Han Chinese and the rulers of the Qin Dynasty. The Qin dynasty was mainly composed of a group of linguistically related ethnic minorities in southwest China. The Qin State became strong during the Warring States after it successfully implemented political and economic reforms that enabled it to dislodge the other states, including Han, Zhao, Wei, Yan, and Chu to form the first unified multi-ethnic China. In order to consolidate power, the Qin leaders carried out harsh political, economic and cultural reforms, which later provided the impetus for the challenge of the regime by the Han Chinese. For instance, the people resented the Qin's tyranny, endless military service, heavy hard labour and taxes such as the construction of many palaces, and severe punishment. This caused peasant uprising, but the most successful one was led by Xiang Yu.

After the initial success, Xiang Yu had to act decisively to establish the Han Dynasty. However, Xiang Yu faced all kinds of unfavorable conditions at the Battle of Julu. First, the opponent's strength was unusually strong. Indeed, Xiang Yu faced hundreds of thousands of elite regular army of the Qin Dynasty, as well as some of the most famous generals of the Qin. Second, the strength of Xiang Yu's own army was extremely weak. His army constituted a complex but weak force. Although his army numbered between 50,000 and 60,000, their combat effectiveness in general was difficult and poor to command. Third, the army faced fatigue due to the distance of the battle front. In essence, Xiang Yu was more or less fighting in a "foreign land". It took his army three months to reach Julu and so there was fatigue on the part of the army. Fourth, his allies were wary of war and marched cautiously in order to preserve their strength. The brightest of them, the prince of the army did not mobilize the full force of his army.

Faced with such a perilous situation, Xiang Yu had to act decisively to capture the weakness of the Qin and dislodge the Qin layout. He decided to implement the Black Tiger tactics by cutting off the contact lines of the two allies of the Qin. He concentrated on a possible win and advised the Po general to bring 20,000 troops to cross the river to attack the Qin corridor. The general lived up to his expectations and defeated the guard corridor of the Qin army. Xiang Yu then took advantage of the

situation, seized the opportunity and attacked the Qin army. Furthermore, he led his forces to cross the river and gave a speech to boost the morale of his troops. Chinese historians believe that Xiang Yu was very clever in the art of warfare. He wrecked all ships that approached him and burnt farmhouses (Si, 1959:307). In essence, he effectively combined the Black Tiger tactics with the scorched earth strategy, also used by Shaka several centuries later. That battle fully demonstrated the determination and indomitable spirit of Xiang Yu.

Thereafter, Xiang Yu was confident of victory, and how to attack the main corridor of the Qin Dynasty became his major focus. When Zhang of the Qin Dynasty heard the news, he immediately took his army to the corridor to wait for Xiang Yu at the entrance to the kingdom, but Zhang's army was defeated. Records of the historian, Zhang Er Chen reports that: "The army of Xiang Yu attacked Zhang's corridor. The king and the army lacked food, but Xiang Yu learned that the ability to lead his troops to cross the river would break Zhang" (Si, 1959:307). Indeed, Xiang Yu repelled Zhang's army and immediately killed them. He made the necessary tactical deployment, and interspersed with the scattered Qin army. The leaders of the other states earlier conquered by the Qin Dynasty immediately joined with Xiang Yu to build on this effort. In the end, Xiang Yu prevailed and won the war. He was later defeated and forced to commit suicide.

A different but related strategy was employed by Hannibal Barca in projecting and defending the military might of ancient Carthage. When Hasdrubal was assassinated in 221 BC by the Celts (Celts), Hannibal took over military power and was formally appointed to the government of Carthage. He sent troops to capture the Spanish city of Sagunto, thus marking the beginning of the Second Punic War. Although Hannibal used the scorched earth strategy to weaken the enemy, his most important strategic thinking was to dare external enemies of his territory by deploying the strategy of surprise attack (Ayrault-Dodge, 1995). With the help of infantry and cavalry, he often used the strategy of joint attacks made up of ambush and surprise attacks (Cottrell, 1965; Yang Jun-ming, 1993: 5). This clever use of cavalry to ambush opponents stood Hannibal out among ancient military strategists. At the Battle of Lake, Hannibal cleverly employed this strategy. He led his army to attack the Italian peninsula by taking the war to the enemy's territory. In order to avoid anti-Hannibal sentiments in his anticipated attack against the city of Rome, Hannibal tried not to attack the common people and unarmed peasants, but Rome sent the newly appointed consuls Gaius Flaminius to station their troops in the two war-fronts leading to the main city of Rome.

Hannibal encountered great difficulties crossing the Arno River because of swamp and other climatic and geographical problems. In spring the melting snow ensured that the Arno River flooded the path that Hannibal intended to take. Indeed, this was like a poisonous gas that filled the air, filling the dangerous road with death. Therefore, the shortest path, but also the most combat-prone path, was to face the Roman legion along their line of formation. This caused his army much fatigue owing to lack of sleep because they marched through the swamp and crossed it after four days and three nights. He also crossed the Apennines, but unlike in the case of the Arno River,

he encountered less difficulty. When he passed through the marshland, Gaius Flaminius was shocked because he had no idea that Hannibal could lead Carthaginian army along that path so soon in his left-wing.

When Hannibal had arrived Etruscans (Etruria), he decided to lure Gaius Flaminius in battle with him by deliberately wreaking havoc around the farmland estate. He opened his army to the left of the Roman army to cut off the road leading to the city of Rome. He also decided to march toward Apulia expecting Gaius Flaminius to come along. Thereafter he retreated to Lake Trasimeno where Gaius Flaminius sent troops to ambush him under the setting of the northern shore of Lake Trasimeno. Lake Trasimeno was surrounded by mountains and the landscape was a narrow path leading to the valley from west to east. By night, Hannibal used his cavalry formation to ambush Gaius Flaminius in the lane at the entrance to the mountain. The light infantry configuration was placed in the steep hill at the exit of the eastern end of the valley (De Beer, 1974).

Thereafter, Hannibal led the remaining troops to attack the Roman front. The next morning, the Roman army entered the narrow mountain pass. Gaius Flaminius led the Roman army to the column through the narrow channel of the lake. Hannibal immediately attacked and caught the Romans unaware. The Roman army was taken off guard and was suddenly in confusion. With the violent attacks carried out by the Carthaginians, Roman soldiers were killed, even though the fighting only lasted a few hours (Michael Grant, 1990: 99). Hannibal with his military genius and a flexible strategy and tactics brought victory to the Carthaginians. This campaign marked a turning point in the history of war and ambush strategy in the Western world (Ayrault-Dodge, 1995; Zhang Xiao-xiao, 1992, 5).

Hannibal's approach to the strategy of surprise and attack was slightly different from that of Shaka. Shaka demonstrated this strategy of surprise and attack during his first major battle with Zwide of the Ndwandwe after the death of Dingiswayo and his emergence as the leader of the combined forces of the Mthethwa and the Zulu clan. Zwide had plotted to defeat Shaka. He moved all his army into Zululand in April 1818. Shaka wore out the invaders by pretending he was retreating. He drew Zwide's forces deep into his own territory and successfully exhausted them. He then flung his own regiments on them and defeated them conclusively at the Mhlathuze River. In 1826, under Zwide's successor, Sikhunyane, the Ndwandwe again fought the Zulu, but were totally routed forcing the majority of them to submit to Shaka. Shaka was able to recruit additional warriors from among them and proceeded to train them in his own methods of close combat. During his brief reign, his regiments continuously went on campaign, steadily extending their assaults further afield (Omer-Cooper, 1965: 12–15).

Shaka introduced new military tactics, by arming his warriors with short-handled stabbing spears and trained them to move up to their opponents in a close formation with their body-length cowhide shields forming an almost impenetrable barrier to spears thrown at them. Although the throwing spear was not discarded, it only served as an initial missile weapon before close contacts with the enemy were made and the shorter stabbing spear was used in hand to hand combat (Hamilton, 1998: 5-34). The

crescent-shaped formation was highly favoured and a number of regiments extending several ranks deep formed a dense body known as the chest, while on each side a regiment moved forward forming the horns. The main purpose of the horns formation (or the bull horn formation) was to make it curve inward around the enemy so that the main body would advance killing all those who could not break through the encompassing lines.

The whole military arrangement was generally partitioned into three levels: regiments, corps of several regiments, and “armies” or bigger formations. With this tactics in place, Shaka’s war cry was “victory or death” (Guttman, 2008: 23). He taught the Zulus that the most effective way of becoming powerful quickly was by conquering and controlling other tribes. This motivated the social outlook of the Zulu people and helped to build a “warrior” mindset in them, which Shaka turned to his advantage.

Organization, Mobilization and Defence Plans

Efficient organization, mobilization and defence plans are essential in the success of armies and the three strategists examined in this work were aware and conscious of their importance in military strategies. When Xiang Yu was faced with a sinister political and military environment, he adopted the option of developing the idea of a bold strategic plan. He concluded that he needed large forces to fight the army of the Qin emperor. The commander of the army of the Qin, Liu Bang was encouraged by the mobility of his cavalry. He led thirty thousand (30,000) elite troops to reach Pengcheng southwest of Xiaoxian. At this point, most of his coalition was to attack Pengcheng by deploying defense systems in the north of the city. Xiang Yu chose the opportunity to launch a surprise attack in the morning during the cover of night. Xiang Yu was outstanding in this regard and his tactical early morning raids on the enemy fully demonstrated his superb strategy of mobilization and artistic prowess, although he faced some unprecedented crises.

First, Xiang Yu had to face two fronts. First, the Qin Dynasty was not yet put down. Second, there was a great disparity in forces between the two armies in favour of the Qin Dynasty, which had a total strength of about 16 million people, an unprecedented grand scale, while Xiang Yu’s full strength at this time was numbered far less than 560,000 (Zhang Xiao-xiao, 1992: 6-8). Third, the political foundation of the Chu state (which was part of the coalition led by Xiang Yu) was weak. The Qin’s coalition waited at the fortifications to resist the return of the Chu army. Fourth, Xiang Yu’s allies betrayed him and forced the political environment into the situation of extreme isolation.

It is instructive that Xiang Yu preferred to raid Liu Bang’s command center instead of the outposts, resulting in paralysis of Liu Bang’s coalition command system. The Pengcheng war became a one-sided situation (Si Ma-qian, 1959: 321). The death toll of Liu Bang’s soldiers far outweighed that of Xiang Yu (Li Wei-tai, 2011:312).

Hannibal experienced a similar victorious and well coordinated battle in 216 B.C. He led about 40,000 infantry and a thousand cavalry from northern Apulia, south to promote pre-emptive capture of the Romans' supply powerhouse, Cannae (Cannae) to cut off the food supply of Rome. The development forced the Roman Senate to elect two new consuls: Gaius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus with the express directives to mobilize the huge historical might of the Roman Republic in support of coalition forces in order to completely eliminate Hannibal. The two consuls marched immediately to Cannae to face the Carthaginian army. In August 2, 216 B.C., the battle in Cannae started. Rome put a full strength of infantry numbering about eighty thousand (80,000) and six thousand (6,000) cavalry to face the Carthaginian military, which had invested forty thousand (40,000) footmen and 14,000 cavalry. Hannibal himself commanded the center all the way, while his nephew, Hanno commanded the right-wing (Michael Grant, 1990: 88-99). Hannibal's brother, Mago commanded the left wing. Three thousand (3,000) cavalry of Hannibal's army was also selected as a reserve force. Hannibal also designed an arrangement to make five hundred (500) lightly armed soldiers carry spears, shield and dagger to carry out the task of fake surrender, a strategy also used by Shaka centuries later.

Moreover, in that war, Hannibal used his world-famous crescent tactics, which was like a convex toward the enemy. The infantry was deployed in the center to weaken the army of the opponent while the two wings were manned by powerful cavalry (Liddell, 1967: 12-34; Yu, 1988: 96). When the fighting began, the Roman army encountered a strong opposition from the Carthaginian side. They had to temporarily change strategy, narrowing the front, increasing depth, to strengthen the power of the central square, in an attempt to defeat Hannibal's central square in one fell swoop.

It was important for Hannibal to understand the weather of Cannae because it was a major factor in the battle. For instance, at noon a strong southeast wind was blowing and the south-east of the Roman infantry was blown by the wind with great consequences on their sight because they could not easily open their eyes. As a result of this, the wind greatly enhanced the killing effect. Suddenly, the Roman soldiers were faced with chaos. Hannibal's army attacked with various weapons such as spears, archery, slings and so on. Consequently, the Carthaginian army formation into a crescent depression surrounded by the Roman main force was impressive. Hannibal also ordered the left-right step, riding with the attack from both wings surrounded by enemies. Further, he quickly defeated the heavy cavalry of the left-wing right-wing cavalry of the Roman army, and then divided his own forces toward the lateral of the Roman army left wing cavalry. The Roman army's left wing cavalry stood up before and after the attack, and quickly fled. At the same time, five hundred (500) Carthaginian prisoners of war also took the opportunity to pull out their daggers to attack. The Romans were thrown into a battle chaos, while the Carthaginian cavalry fled in pursuit of the enemy cavalry and other troops with the infantry encircling the Roman infantry (Ayrault-Dodge, 1995; Ren, 1962: 94). This was to become the most painful defeat in Roman history. It is also one of history's most severe battle

casualties in a single battle. Thereafter, the Romans of the post-Cannae war worked hard to reintroduce the Fabian strategy in order to avoid a decisive battle of the magnitude of the Cannae Battle.

Most of Shaka's successes rested on the mobility of his army, his ability to organize the forces and to close in on the opponents when they were less prepared. By means of much drilling and discipline, he built up his forces, which soon became the terror of the land. For example, he is said to have prohibited the wearing of sandals, but toughened his warriors' feet by making them run barefoot over rough thorny ground and in so doing secured their greater mobility. Although this record may have been over exaggerated, it nevertheless indicates the level of discipline and training that Shaka subjected his army to. In this connection, unlike both Xiang Yu and Hannibal, Shaka ensured that the young men were taken away to be enrolled alongside others from all sections of the kingdom in an appropriate age-regiment. This strategy produced a sense of common identity among the fighters. Similarly, a female age-regiment was also organized. Members took part in ceremonial dancing and displays. They were given permission to marry members of the male regiments when it was necessary (Chanaiwa, Dec. 1980: 1-20). This combination of male and female regiments to balance the gender structure of his army separated Shaka from both Xiang Yu and Hannibal.

Moreover, Xiang Yu, Hannibal and Shaka developed a strong strategic decision-making structure and a high level of meticulous planning. They understood the techniques and flexibility in the use of military experience to bring about the fall of opponents. They all employed bold and surprise moves to achieve the desired strategic objectives. In addition, they took full account of the use of terrain and weather characteristics, although the later applied more to Xiang Yu and Hannibal. Specifically, both Xiang Yu and Shaka made use of early morning attacks against their adversaries, while Hannibal capitalized on the southeast strong winds to decimate the rank of the Roman army.

The Strategic Thinking of Xiang Yu, Hannibal and Shaka: Some Comparative Notes

From the various wars analyzed above, we can make the following observations: First, the Battle of Julu and the Battle of Lake Trasimeno were both successful warfare and attacking ventures because of the unique strategies and tactics deployed by both Xiang Yu and Hannibal. Specifically, Xiang Yu and Hannibal demonstrated extraordinary courage in their ability to plan surprise attacks against the enemy's hinterland. Secondly, the two battles revealed excellent use of raids, maneuvering and secret attacks beyond the enemy's imagination. Again, at the two battles, both Xiang Yu and Hannibal demonstrated superior battlefield commanding ability and were both good at capturing the insight and long-lasting endurance of the fighters. They both led the armored cavalry and motivated the infantry division to carry out their order and command successfully.

In the same vein, Shaka deployed unique strategies and tactics in the execution of his battles. Like both Xiang Yu and Hannibal, he made excellent use of raids, secret attacks and maneuvering. He also deployed the scorched earth policy to devastate the enemy camps, and his armies raided their targets in the process. In the course of time, raiding and collection of booties became part of the whole military arrangement of Shaka. He encouraged looting, which was part of his military victory and celebration. Like in ancient times, Shaka's spoils of war included the defeated populations, which were often enslaved, and the women and children, who were often absorbed into his army.

In another sense, both the Pengcheng Battle and the Battle of Cannae represented great moments in the history of world's military encirclement. They both destroyed the enemy's well-arranged plans and designs. The battlefield and the choice of tactics, the excellent riding techniques, the use of the infantry, and the collaborative combat and other aspects of the battles can be called the masterpiece of the history of warfare. These two battles show that Xiang Yu and Hannibal were excellent commanders of war and masters of the art of warfare and strategic thinking. At the Battle of Cannae, for instance, Hannibal used the "encirclement strategy" and wiped out the enemy. In contrast, Shaka developed a new strategy of military encirclement. He had seen that the traditional type of spear, a long-handled known as *assegai* thrown from a distance, was not the best for the regulated fighting in close formation he introduced and therefore replaced it with *iklwa*, a short stabbing spear with a long, sword-like spearhead. It is possible that Shaka inherited this idea from his mentor, Dingiswayo, but it was refined by him (Shaka) and developed into an enduring pre-colonial traditional military strategy. His army usually deployed the crescent tactics by gradually encircling the adversary. That way it was difficult for the enemy to escape.

In specific instances, we can argue that Shaka was closer to Hannibal than to Xiang Yu in the use of a combination of warfare and diplomacy. For instance, even though Shaka's hegemony was primarily based on military might, he supplemented this with a mixture of diplomacy and patronage. He incorporated friendly chieftains such as Jobe of the Sithole, Zihlandlo of the Mkhize, and Mathubane of the Thuli. He did not wage heavy war against them, but won them over by subtler tactics, such as patronage and reward. In the same vein, Hannibal employed diplomacy in his dealings with some powers in the Mediterranean world. He believed that commanders would do well to be shrewd in both war and politics as they must use diplomacy and cunning to appease and satisfy their political leaders. He demonstrated this during the Punic War when he cultivated key alliances with Gaul and Syracuse. In contrast, Xiang Yu relied on the peasants for his warfare, but in some instances, he needed to court the relationship of the other minor groups in China in his battles with the Qin rulers.

Both Shaka and Hannibal also shared the military ingenuity of deploying elephants at crucial moments of the campaigns. While Shaka was fighting Zwide of the Ndwandwe, at the Battle of Gqokli Hill, he sealed his victory by sending elephants in

a sweep around the hill to attack the enemy's rear. The same tactics was deployed by Hannibal in several of his battles, but there is no evidence that Xiang Yu made use of the same tactics. Instead, the latter used the impact of force of cavalry to break up the enemy's stronghold.

Conclusion

It is fascinating how Xiang Yu, Hannibal and Shaka shared remarkable military ingenuity in the prosecution of their respective battles, even though there is no evidence that they had any knowledge of one another. The three military strategists employed the strategy of fast-moving surprise attacks and ambushes, the use of crescent tactics to encircle the opponents, and use of knowledge of military planning and logistic. In this connection, Shaka turned warfare in the area of Southern Africa from a ritualized exercise into a true method of subjugation and wholesale slaughter. He also turned warfare into a professional endeavour. He shared this reputation with Hannibal, who lived all his life either fighting or thinking about how to fight and overrun the adversaries. In contrast, Xiang Yu simply reacted to the event of the moment. His mission was to overthrow the Qin Dynasty and replace it with the rule of Han Chinese.

Moreover, Shaka's "buffalo horns" attack formation that involved surrounding and annihilating enemy forces can be likened to that of Hannibal's crescent formation and the Roman legionaries' use of *gladius* and *scutum* (Guttman, 2008: 23), as well as the encirclement tactics used by Xiang Yu at the Pengcheng Battle. There is no evidence that Shaka copied the tactics from either the Romans, the Carthaginians or from Xiang Yu. What this implies is that the genius in the three leaders was obvious in the way they managed their forces into an organism to achieve victory for them. In that connection, Hannibal's genius is unanimously affirmed by both ancient and modern historians. The Greek historian Polybius paid him tribute saying:

Who can help admire this man's skillful generalship, his courage, his ability; ... he kept vast numbers under control like a good pilot, without any sign of dissatisfaction towards himself or friction amongst themselves. And the troops under his command, so far from being of the same tribe, were of many diverse races who had neither laws nor customs nor language in common (Howe and Howe, 1987: 219).

The same ability to mobilize people from different clans was exhibited by both Shaka and Xiang Yu in building their armies. Hannibal is also seen as setting a model of military art (Niu, 2003: 170; Ralph, 1987: 297), in the same way as both Shaka and Xiang Yu introduced unprecedented innovations in their military planning and executions. To this end, both Shaka and Xiang Yu have been called military geniuses for their reforms and innovations in military science and their understanding of a need for efficient organizational machineries in warfare (Omar-Cooper, 1965: 12-86; Wang

Zuan-zhong and Wang Min, 2009: 7-8).

Unfortunately, both Xiang Yu and Hannibal had a strikingly similar tragic fate. Both men were forced to commit suicide when they were defeated by their opponents. Hannibal committed suicide when the Roman authorities attempted to extradite him in 183 B.C. Similarly, Xiang Yu committed suicide to avoid being captured by enemy forces (Wang Zuan-zhong and Wang Min, 2009:9). On the other hand, Shaka was murdered by his half-brothers and body-guard for what they perceived as his high-handedness, brutality and cruelty. In a nutshell, the three men ended their military careers tragically, just as their contributions to strategic thinking and military science have been spectacular.

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