I am pleased to present the online version of the second issue of Africa Nebula. Dr Ogen and the editorial team for African Nebula bring us this potpourri of rich scholarship on and around Africa, bringing together scholars from around the world and the interdisciplines of Humanities and Social Sciences.

SAMAR HABIB
Publisher

EMILY MEIERDING
IR Theory as Politics, International Politics as Theory
Page 1

ADESINA, OLUWAKEMI ABIODUN
Women, Shari'ah, and Zina in Northern Nigeria
Page 43

VINCENT HIRIBARREN
The Boundaries of Borno in the Nineteenth Century
Page 57

ISSN 1837-7963
African Nebula Editorial Board
Professor Siyan Oyeweso - Chairman, Editorial Board
Dr. Ameh Dennis Akoh - Editor
Dr. Olaoluwa Senayon - Editor
Dr. Rotimi Fasan - Editor
Dr. Tunde Decker - Editor
Professor Olukoya Ogen - Editor in Chief

Editorial Interns
Olawale Farawe Idowu
Waidi Akanji
Yemi Balogun

International Editorial Advisors
Dr. Samar Habib, Editor in Chief, Nebula
Dr Chris Fleming, University of Western Sydney, Australia
Dr Joseph Benjamin Afful, University of Cape Coast, Ghana
Dr Isaac Kamola, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire, USA
Dr Michael Angelo Tata, Creative Director, New York & Los Angeles, USA

Opinions expressed in articles published in African Nebula reflect those of their respective authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the journal or its editorial or advisory board members.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>IR Theory as Politics, International Politics as Theory: a Nigerian Case Study</td>
<td>Emily Meierding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Borders and Borderlands Identities: A Comparative Perspective of Cross-border Governance in the Neighbourhoods of Senegal, the Gambia and Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>Aboubakr Tandia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Women, Shari’ah, and Zina in Northern Nigeria</td>
<td>Oluwakemi Adesina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>The Boundaries of Borno in the Nineteenth Century: The Perception of Travellers</td>
<td>Vincent Hiribarren</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>Science and Technology as Site for Language Contact: Experience from the Linguistic Style of the Non-Formal Motor Mechanics in the South-western Nigeria</td>
<td>Waheed A. Bamigbade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>The Antinomy of Exile: Ambivalence and Transnational Discontents in Tanure Ojaide’s <em>When It No Longer Matters Where You Live</em></td>
<td>Uzoechi Nwagbara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107</td>
<td>Nigeria and Japan: A Historical Analysis of Forty-Six Years of Peaceful Relations, 1960-2006</td>
<td>Adewole Ayodeji Adeleke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127</td>
<td>Victims and Couriers: Females and Hard Drugs Trafficking Business in Nigeria, 1980-2008</td>
<td>Omon Merry Osiki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>138</td>
<td>Witchcraft, Culture, and Theology in African Development</td>
<td>Jim Harries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>153</td>
<td>Linguistic Representations of HIV/AIDS: The Yoruba Example</td>
<td>Olusanya E. Komolafe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IR Theory as Politics, International Politics as Theory: a Nigerian Case Study

Emily Meierding
University of Chicago

Abstract
This paper assesses mainstream IR theory’s utility outside the realm of Great Power politics by examining the international activities of one developing middle power: Nigeria. Admittedly, this West African state is not a global hegemon. And it suffers from many structural weaknesses associated with less developed countries, including internal political divisions and a highly primary commodity dependent economy. Yet, Nigeria also exercises considerable influence in a sub-region that, due to its oil resources, is becoming increasingly important to advanced industrialized, Great Power states. Thus, the paper analyzes the applicability of International Relations theories to the Nigerian situation by highlighting the increasing importance of local hegemons in international politics.

Introduction
International Relations theory has conventionally told a story of Great Power politics. Authors justify this orientation by arguing that, in order to understand the rules of the game, it is necessary to focus on key players. As a result, the international behaviors of the United States, the former Soviet Union, and Western European states are relatively well researched. However, countries falling outside of the Great Power orbit have been largely ignored in mainstream International Relations (IR) research. This approach is increasingly inadequate for a globalizing world, in which security threats transcend state boundaries and emerging powers such as India and China play increasingly important economic and political roles. Yet, efforts to identify IR’s shortcomings and extend the discipline’s geographic applicability have been limited, in both ambition and effect. Consequently, the international relations of ninety five percent of the world’s states are under-examined.

For practical and normative reasons, IR practitioners and policymakers should know more about Nigeria. But, how much can IR theory tell them? To answer the question, this paper begins by reviewing previous critiques of mainstream IR theory. In addition to outlining authors’ arguments, it notes their tendency to inadvertently repeat the same error for which they lambast their objects of criticism: namely, negatively essentializing developing countries. The paper argues that, to overcome this tendency, authors need to move beyond critique and engage in more theory building exercises, using empirical observations from semiperipheral states to identify common patterns of international behavior. The paper’s third section provides greater detail on why Nigeria is a suitable subject for the broader application of International Relations theory, highlighting the increasing importance of local hegemons in international politics. The fourth section presents a brief history of Nigeria’s half century of independent foreign policy. The fifth identifies key trends in this political history and discusses how such observations inform broader IR theory.

IR Theory in the “Third World”
Kenneth Waltz (1979), the progenitor of neorealist IR theory, stated that “A general theory of international politics is necessarily based on the great powers.” In the thirty years since the
Meierding, IR Theory as Politics

publication of *Theory of International Politics*, mainstream theorists have rarely challenged this assertion. The international relations of states outside of Western Europe, the United States, Russia and Japan have been largely ignored. Nowhere is this omission more stark than for Africa, the region most likely to be omitted from supposedly global IR studies (Lemke, 2003). Within the discipline, Africa has primarily served as a source of cautionary tales. Africa contains “weak” states, “collapsing” states, or “failed” states (Dunn, 2001). Various explanations have been proffered for African countries’ institutional shortcomings, including geography—Jeffrey Herbst (2000) argues that low population density impeded the development of strong, centralized states—and history: the colonial creation of irrational state boundaries compromised later effort to develop national identities (Touval, 1972). Some authors have resorted to culturalist accounts; Robert Kaplan’s “The Coming Anarchy” (1994) presents an African landscape redolent of Joseph Conrad: a dark continent of lawlessness, disease, and violence.

Kaplan’s radical portrayal is an outlier in international studies. However, the tendency to perceive Africa as somehow “different” is commonplace. There is a general consensus amongst IR scholars that conventional theories cannot be applied straightforwardly to the African continent. The rationale for this assertion rests on an observed lack of internal cohesion in African states (Buzan, 1988). One of the foundational assumptions of Neorealist IR is state-centrism: the idea that the primary actors in the international system are unitary states. If leaders’ freedom of foreign policy action is compromised by a lack of national unity, the appropriateness of this assumption is called into question. If there are multiple sources of authority in one state—as is commonly the case in Africa—the assumption collapses.

When domestic groups are actively competing, they also compromise a second foundational principle of Neorealist IR: the distinction between the anarchy of the international system and the hierarchy of domestic affairs. Numerous authors have asserted that, in the African case, the conventional formula is inverted; third world relations are characterized by international hierarchy and domestic anarchy (Neuman, 1998). As a result of these diametrically opposed security environments, developed and developing states should behave in strikingly different ways. The critics assert that this division undermines mainstream IR’s universalist pretensions; Neorealism’s parsimonious theory cannot account for all states’ international behaviors (Holsti, 1998).

In order to extend IR theory’s explanatory value, critics have offered a number of modifications. Some challenge Neorealist IR’s assumption that all states are functionally similar, suggesting that developing states constitute an alternative type of political actor. Robert Jackson (1990) asserts that, in place of conventional sovereignty based on domestic authority and national capabilities, developing nations possess “negative sovereignty”; they survive due to the normative imperatives against international aggression and intervention which have emerged since World War II. These “quasi-states” should not be expected to adhere to the same patterns of behavior exhibited by the conventional, positively sovereign states of Western Europe.

Most proposed modifications to IR theory identify domestic instability as the primary driver of third world states’ divergent foreign policy behavior. Mohammed Ayoob (1998), one of the foremost advocates of IR theory’s extension to the developing world, proposes a “subaltern realism,” which calls into question the clear distinction between domestic and interstate conflict.
Ayoob notes that much of what is now labeled “internal conflict” was historically categorized as “state-making.” By acknowledging the similarities between the two processes, parallels can be drawn between the European experience and current relations within and between developing countries. These commonalities can then be used to explain less developed states’ conflict patterns, including their heightened propensity towards internal conflict and less frequent engagement in international wars.

Stephen David (1991) also examines how internal contention influences developing states’ foreign policy behavior. His theory focuses on the Realist concept of balancing. David argues that, rather than adopting the conventional Realist strategy of balancing against foreign threats, the beleaguered leaders of developing states balance against internal challengers. They accomplish this by allying themselves with foreign governments, even to the point of compromising national sovereign authority. Like Ayoob’s subaltern realism, David’s theoretical intervention explains third world states’ propensity to avoid international conflict, while recognizing and exploring their tendency towards domestic instability.

These modified IR theories provide some explanation for observed variation in developing states’ international behaviors. Yet, the cognitive pathways by which authors arrive at their new theoretical postulates are problematic, methodologically and normatively. Jackson, Ayoob and David claim to be extending IR. But where to, precisely? All authors indicate that their theoretical interventions apply to the “third world.” Yet, this Cold War terminological holdover is never clearly defined. Consequently, their objects of analysis remain opaque. Do authors’ theories apply to all states that are not Great Powers? Or do they concern all countries lacking advanced industrialized economies? On a theoretical level, all three authors’ explanatory claims emphasize the importance of limited governing capacity and domestic discord, which suggests that the scope of their analysis should be limited to divided states or, at a maximum, to countries with weak governance infrastructure, rather than to all developing countries. Without clearly stating their theories’ scope conditions, the authors imply that all third world states share these same negative characteristics. The “third world” becomes synonymous with weak infrastructure and internal conflict; all developing countries are apparently disorderly and dangerous.

While these modified Neorealisms may help explain the international behaviors of some developing states, the new frameworks do not facilitate the integration of the developing world into IR studies. Rather, they reify existing analytic cleavages between third and first world states. Authors claim that the developing world cannot be analyzed using conventional IR theories and, one presumes, these modified, subaltern IRs have limited utility outside of the third world context. This separate but unequal system consigns developing countries to a permanently peripheral status in international studies.

This inadvertent essentialism is also evident in the pure critiques of mainstream IR, which elaborate on the discipline’s limited utility in the developing world, while making little effort to promote an alternative or modified theory. The critics may be correct; mainstream IR does not explain all interstate alignments equally well and ignores many issues that are more significant to developing nations, such as dependency, hierarchy, liberation, and the critical importance of non-state actors (Dunn, 2001; Puchala, 1998). However, in implying that IR has nothing to say about developing states and emphasizing the distinctions between “the west and the rest,” third world
countries inevitably appear to be inferior. They are unexplainable, inconsequential, and weak: unmapped and, perhaps, unmappable. This portrayal reinforces the position of developing states at the margins of the international system and international studies (Brown, 2006).

To raise the profile of developing states’ international relations, critics have advocated the inclusion of more third world voices in IR theory (Smith, 2009; Tickner, 2003). Greater inclusivity is certainly desirable, especially given the historical domination of the discipline by Western European and, particularly, North American practitioners (Aydlini & Matthews, 2000). However, the calls for disciplinary diversity are often vague. And ill-formulated efforts to create a new discourse again run the risk of reinforcing disciplinary boundaries. Third world scholars who are presented as “third world scholars” are unlikely to be taken seriously by mainstream IR theorists. At best, they will be pigeonholed as area studies specialists: “Africanists” or “South Asianists.” At worst, they will simply be ignored. In attempting to introduce a new language, they may speak past their mainstream colleagues, rather than to or with them.

In order to broaden the discourse, contributors from the developing world need to be figuratively bilingual. They must be well versed in the conventional IR discourse, while also advancing their own perspectives. From a theoretical perspective, it is necessary to cease viewing the developing world as a deviation and as a completely separate and internally homogenous area of study. This requires recognition of the variation amongst developing states and a clearer articulation of the aspects of these states’ domestic political structures and international relations that require further study. In the process, we may find that mainstream IR theory is not as useless as previously imagined. We may also discover that “deviations” that were supposedly unique to the third world are also present amongst highly politically and economically developed states (Brown, 2006).

This kind of theory building cannot occur exclusively from the top down, through modifications of mainstream IR theory (Smith, 2009). It must proceed from the ground up, through local knowledge of the international behaviors of developing states. These new empirical stories will be more or less consistent with conventional IR frameworks. The process of telling them will provide a clearer assessment of where IR theory goes astray. It will also allow for more nuanced comparative foreign policy analysis and more ambitious and effective means of moving beyond the conventional study of Great Power politics to a more global IR. The next section of the paper accomplishes this analytic move by examining Nigerian foreign policy. It will explain why IR scholars should be attentive to Nigerian foreign policy and why we should expect IR theory to be quite relevant in the Nigerian context, given the country’s status as a sub-regional hegemon with a coherent foreign policy apparatus.

The Leader of West Africa

One in five Africans is Nigerian. The state is the undisputed political leader of its sub-region. Nigeria was the founding force for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and supplies over one third of the organization’s budget. In the 1990s, Nigeria initiated multilateral militarized peacekeeping operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. State leaders aspire to a permanent seat on a reconfigured United Nations Security Council. And, the country sits on sizeable oil and natural gas reserves; it vies with Angola for the title of sub-
Saharan Africa’s largest petroleum producer. For all these reasons, Nigeria should attract significant international analysis. Yet, within the IR community, Nigerian foreign policy has garnered limited attention.

IR critics might ascribe this lack of analysis to Nigeria’s status as a developing country; it may be an inappropriate object for the application of mainstream IR theory. Like the developing countries described by Ayoob and David, Nigeria is internally divided. The federal state consists of a Muslim north and Christian south. Religious and regional tensions are high; cities such as Kano and Jos have experienced repeated rounds of inter-communal violence. The Delta region has also been a perennial source of instability. In the late 1960s, Biafran efforts to secure greater regional autonomy escalated to a three-year civil war in the southeastern area of the country (1967-70). More recently, oil exploitation in the Delta has prompted local opposition to central government authority. Although the current federal administration has successfully negotiated a ceasefire, it is uncertain how long it will hold. International observers have also expressed concerns over the resilience of the country’s relatively new democratic institutions; the most recent transition from authoritarian rule occurred in 1999.

Given this instability and uncertainty, it would seem that Nigeria is a poor fit with conventional IR’s unitary, internally hierarchic and orderly state. Yet, since independence in 1960, the state has possessed a competent foreign affairs apparatus, which has consistently remained under the exclusive control of the ruling central authority, in spite of several irregular government and regime transitions. While leaders’ foreign policy choices are conditioned by the domestic environment, this constraint is not unique to Nigeria. All governments, including those of developed states, are impacted by domestic political preferences and capabilities. Leaders must be conscious of the domestic consequences of their foreign activities (Fearon, 1994). Although varying in intensity, audience costs are universal, as are considerations of national security priorities and “guns versus butter” tradeoffs. The distinction between Nigeria’s capacity to develop and implement foreign policies and the competencies of more “advanced” states is a difference of degree, not kind. The country’s federal structure has not significantly constrained leaders’ foreign policy actions (Akindele & Oyediran, 1985).

Nigerian attitudes towards international relations are also not widely divergent from those postulated for the traditional Great Powers. The state’s leaders have consistently exhibited a Neorealist perception of the international system. They are concerned with personally remaining in power and with national survival: two foundational assumptions of IR analysis. Although Nigeria faces no security threats from its immediate neighbors, apartheid South Africa and France have historically been perceived as causes for concern. Unlike Jackson’s quasi-states, Nigeria does not rely solely on negative sovereignty for its survival. Nigerian leaders view international relations as a self-help system. Since the end of the civil war, they have consciously cultivated the state’s position as the dominant power in West Africa. Foreign policies are aimed at defending the state against potential international challengers, with limited external assistance.

Nigerians possess a rationalist view of the international system and the capabilities of their foreign policy apparatus differ only quantitatively, not qualitatively, from those of more economically developed and politically consolidated states. Thus, if mainstream IR theories are useful approximations of reality, we should expect them to have explanatory value in the
Nigerian case. Even Neorealism, the object of the most strident third world IR critiques, may be relevant to Nigerian international relations, given the state’s status as a sub-regional power. Although Nigeria can never aspire to globally hegemonic status, in West Africa, and perhaps on the continent as a whole, the state has a latent capacity for dominance. For these reasons, Nigeria is a good test case of mainstream IR theory’s broader applicability. It enables us to assess whether Great Power IR can scale down. Do regional or sub-regional hegemons behave like superpowers, within their more geographically constrained sphere of influence? And what does hegemonic behavior really look like?

Local hegemons have attracted little attention within IR theory. Their international position and foreign policy preferences render them analytically distinct from traditional “middle powers,” a category that usually includes states such as Canada or Sweden: advanced industrialized countries with moderate political clout, which are most prominent internationally on “soft” issues like the environment and human rights. Eduard Jordaan (2003) attempts to distinguish between those middle powers and states like Nigeria, South Africa and Brazil by identifying the latter as “emerging middle powers.” In the 1970s, dependency theorists described the same group as “semiperipheral” states (Wallerstein, 1979). Adebajo and Landsberg (2003) call them “aspiring” or “potential” hegemons, while Shaw (1983) labels them “intermediate” states. In a more critical mode, DeLancy (1983) describes some Nigerian foreign behaviors as “sub-imperial.”

Regardless of the label, these developing middle powers have become increasingly prominent international actors over the last decade, initially in economic affairs and, increasingly, in political negotiations on issues such as climate change. Understanding their foreign policy preferences and behaviors is vital. In recognition of this fact, the particular political positions of states such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa have begun to attract greater academic attention. Nigeria, in contrast, is under-researched. The state’s foreign activities were the subject of considerable analysis in the 1970s and 1980s. However, since the oil glut of the mid 1980s and the end of the Cold War, local and international analyses have dropped off. The next section of the paper will review Nigerian foreign policy in the half century since the state’s independence, laying the groundwork for an assessment of its fit with mainstream IR theory.

A Brief History of Nigerian Foreign Policy

In the initial years after independence, the Nigerian government pursued modest foreign policy aims. Leaders were primarily concerned with internal consolidation of the new federal state. Prime Minister Balewa’s foreign policy was limited to upholding the principles inscribed in the Organization of African Unity’s (OAU) 1963 Charter: non-interference, the legal equality of states, and boundary inviolability (Ogunbadejo, 1979/80). All of these interests were encompassed by the broader Nigerian policy preference for “good-neighborliness.” Regionally, the country was overshadowed by Ghana, governed by the charismatic president, Kwame Nkrumah (Ihonvbere, 1991). Nigeria was also resisting French encirclement; all of Nigeria’s geographic neighbors are francophone states, which were strongly influenced by their former metropole, even after they achieved formal independence. Nigeria’s efforts to secure local influence were limited to the creation of cooperative multilateral governing bodies, such as the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the River Niger Commission (Aluko, 1973).
Increased efforts to achieve a more prominent regional leadership role foundered during the civil war (1967-70). In addition to being challenged by violent domestic separatists, the Nigerian state was actively opposed by France, the Côte d’Ivoire, Portugal and South Africa. The civil war revealed the dangers of continued European involvement on the continent, as well as the importance of securing sub-regional allies. The Federal Government, which, in spite of Nigeria’s nominally non-aligned status, had previously demonstrated a solidly pro-western orientation, now began to court more active engagement with the USSR and China (Gambari, 1975). Post-war leaders also went to greater lengths to reduce France’s local influence and to reconcile with other states in the sub-region, including civil war enemies, such as Côte d’Ivoire, and earlier rivals, like Ghana (Ihonvbere, 1991). Nigeria needed to be less isolated. Good neighborliness had become a security concern, as well as a normative principle (Aluko, 1981).

Efforts to reconcile with geographic neighbors and achieve a sub-regional leadership role were facilitated by Nigeria’s oil boom. The state had struck oil in 1956, near the inland city of Oloibiri. This discovery was soon augmented by large finds in the Delta region. By 1973, Nigeria was the world’s ninth largest oil exporter (Aluko, 1973) and the United States’ second largest international oil supplier (Gambari, 1975). The petroleum price increases of the early 1970s and the Arab energy embargo of 1973 generated an enormous rise in Nigerian state revenue. At the same time, Nigeria was attracting increased foreign direct investment. The Federal Government used this new income to pursue a more ambitious sub-regional foreign policy. Nigeria provided financial assistance to its neighbors, with the aim of weaning them off dependence on France. In 1974, the state announced that it would sell oil at concessionary prices to its energy-poor neighbors (Aluko, 1981).

Nigeria also used regional economic integration as a means of advancing its leadership and reducing local French influence. The Head of State, General Gowon (1967-75) promoted bilateral trading pacts, the Organization of African Unity’s (OAU) economic bodies, and the establishment of a new international institution for regional integration: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Local francophone states initially hesitated to participate in a Nigerian-led organization. However, Gowon decided to move forward with the scheme by starting with Anglophone states like Togo. He gained greater francophone confidence by leading negotiations for the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries to gain observer status with the European Economic Community (EEC) (Abegunrin, 2003; DeLancy, 1983). The resultant Lomé Convention was signed on February 28, 1975. ECOWAS came into existence three months later.

On July 29, 1975, General Gowon was overthrown in a military coup. His two successors, Murtala Mohammed (1975-76) and Olusegun Obasanjo (1976-79) advanced a more assertive, activist foreign policy. They were less concerned with Nigeria’s immediate geographic neighbors. ECOWAS languished, as did Nigerian commitments to the OAU. Instead, Murtala and Obasanjo implemented a more militant pan-African foreign policy that, in particular, aimed to challenge the minority rule regimes of Southern Africa (Aluko, 1976). The new leaders were more verbally anti-Western than their predecessor and more prone to dramatic gestures. Nigeria intervened in the Angolan civil war, supporting the MPLA against the US-supported FNLA and UNITA (Abegunrin, 2003). In 1976, leaders encouraged other African states to boycott the Montreal Olympic games, in order to protest New Zealand’s interactions with apartheid South
Africa (DeLancy, 1983). In 1978, the state gained a rotating seat in the United Nations Security Council, giving it another platform for its anti-apartheid sentiment (Bach, 1983). In contrast to Gowon’s modest international ambitions, Murtala and Obasanjo wanted Nigeria to obtain a higher profile on the continent, more befitting to the state’s new economic power.

Yet, the “golden age” of Nigerian foreign policy was short-lived. Under the democratically elected president, Shagari (1979-83), oil revenue peaked, then dramatically declined (Shaw, 1987). Like Gowon, Shagari pursued a modest foreign policy. Activist aims were abandoned and ECOWAS continued to stumble (Shaw, 1983). In 1980 and 1982, the northern cities of Kano and Kaduna witnessed religious riots. In January 1983, the Nigerian government responded to the economic downturn by expelling illegal immigrants. This was the state’s “worst international crisis since the civil war” (Abegunrin, 2003). It antagonized Nigeria’s neighbors and further undermined sub-regional integration (Gambari, 1989).

The same malaise continued under Shagari’s successor, Buhari (1983-85). He began his military rule with overtures to Nigeria’s neighbors. However, after further religious riots in Yola in 1984, he closed the state’s boundaries as a means of containing international migration (Gambari, 1989). The protectionist move was lambasted within the sub-region. At an April 1986 All-Nigeria Conference on Foreign Policy (the Kuru Conference), participants averred that they wished to maintain a sub-regional leadership role by promoting development and economic integration, supporting the OAU, and continuing to reduce France’s local influence (Akindele & Ate, 1986). However, given the state’s dependence on petroleum revenue, as oil prices continued to decline, Nigerian leaders possessed limited means of achieving these foreign policy goals. From 1986-88, Babangida’s new government was forced to respond to the economic crisis by implementing a structural adjustment program (Sesay & Ukeje, 1997).

By the end of the 1980s, retrenchment enabled Nigeria to regain a bit of its prior regional standing. In 1990, Nigeria led West Africa’s Anglophone states in establishing ECOMOG (the ECOWAS Monitoring Group), which intervened in Liberia following the overthrow of leader Samuel Doe. The move was partly personal—Doe and Babangida were friends—but was also aimed at preventing outside military forces from intervening in the region (Abegunrin, 2003; Yoroms, 1993). This effort was facilitated by a secular decline in French engagement in the area that had occurred by 1990 (Adebajo, 2000). Nonetheless, sub-regional concerns arose over Nigeria’s apparent willingness to violate its longstanding principle of non-interference in other African states’ internal affairs. Some West African countries suspected that Nigeria was taking advantage of the Liberian conflict to advance a local “Pax Nigeriana” (Saliiu, 2000; Yoroms, 1993). Mistrust was exacerbated by Babangida’s domestic political ruthlessness and the repeated postponements of Nigeria’s transition back to civilian rule (Sesay & Ukeje, 1997).

Nigeria’s international reputation degraded further following a major electoral controversy in 1993. After the June 12th victory of popular presidential candidate Moshood Abiola, Babangida annulled the national election results. Nigerians erupted in protest and the EU and US threatened sanctions. These responses were only partially effective. Although Babangida was removed from office, democracy was not restored. Following a brief period of interim governance by Ernest Shonekan, Sani Abacha seized power in another military coup. A month after the regime change, Abacha rattled the region by invading the Bakassi Peninsula, a purportedly oil-rich territory
disputed with Cameroon. In March 1995, Abacha accused a large swath of the policy elite of a coup plot. The courts handed down over thirty death sentences. Following international condemnation and threats of increased sanctions, these were reduced to prison terms (Mahmud, 2001). However, Abacha’s clemency was short-lived. In November 1995, he executed nine leaders of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), including Ken Saro-Wiwa.

The US and EU responded to the new provocation by imposing broad sanctions. However, US sanctions did not include oil (Abegunrin, 2003; Mahmud, 2001). This omission weakened the effectiveness of external calls for democratization (Sesay & Ukeje, 1997). In addition, Abacha was somewhat successful in spinning the sanctions locally as an anti-imperial struggle (Mahmud, 2001). Internationally, Nigeria’s reputation was marginally rehabilitated in 1998, when Abacha initiated an ECOMOG intervention to restore democracy in Sierra Leone. The Great Powers’ failure to intervene effectively in Somalia and Rwanda in the early 1990s had increased the attraction of regional peacekeeping efforts, particular since, after the end of the Cold War, there was little strategic reason for superpower engagement in the region (Adebajo & Landsberg, 2003). Domestically, however, Abacha’s democratizing intervention was condemned for its hypocrisy and expense (Adebajo, 2000).

Nigeria’s return to democratic rule was finally facilitated by Abacha’s death in office in 1998. His successor, Abubakar, oversaw a transitional government before former military leader, Obasanjo again assumed political leadership: this time, through a popular election. Obasanjo’s top foreign policy priority was to restore Nigeria’s international reputation. Soon after he took power, Nigeria was readmitted to the Commonwealth of Nations. Sanctions were lifted. In 1999, Nigeria began pulling out of Sierra Leone, to cut costs and redirect resources to the Niger Delta, where the local security situation had deteriorated (Adebajo, 2000). In the West African sub-region, Obasanjo presented himself as a peacekeeper. When the International Court of Justice ruled in 2002 that the contested Bakassi Peninsula belonged to Cameroon, Obasanjo contained intense Nigerian opposition to the verdict and initiated implementation efforts (Meierding, 2010). Obasanjo also reiterated Nigeria’s support for ECOWAS and his desire to pursue more extensive regional integration (S. Kaplan, 2006).

Obasanjo’s affection for economic integration and international institutions attracted some domestic criticism (Adebajo & Landsberg, 2003). His continued engagement of Nigerian troops in multilateral peacekeeping operations in areas such as the Sudan also generated internal resistance. The record of his successor, Yar’Adua, has been mixed. Nigeria continues to rank high on international corruption indexes. A cease-fire has been brokered with the Delta insurgents, but inter-confessional instability had increased in the north. Most recently, Nigeria has appeared on international terrorists watch lists, in the wake of the thwarted 2009 “Christmas Day bombing” in Detroit. Nonetheless, the state’s international reputation has improved significantly since the 1990s, in part because of the successful democratic power transition in 2007. The next section of the paper analyzes these five decades of Nigerian foreign policy, identifying recurrent themes and assessing their implications for mainstream IR theory.
A Dependent Hegemon

Nigeria occupies an odd position in the international system. Through most of its independent political history, it has been the leading state in its sub-region and aspired to continental hegemony. Yet, Nigeria is also an economically less developed state, dependent on primary commodity production for the majority of its domestic revenue and almost all of its foreign exchange earnings. Nigeria is not a Great Power, but nor is it precisely a dependent state, especially since the primary commodity it produces, petroleum, is so strongly desired by the developed world and highly geographically concentrated. The United State’s demand for Nigerian oil precluded tough sanctioning of the Abacha regime. Yet, Nigeria is also constrained by its petroleum industry. The need for foreign markets limits leaders’ ability to wield oil as a political weapon (Ihonvbere, 1991). Nigeria is neither entirely dependent nor entirely autonomous (Shaw, 1983).

Similarly, the state is both empowered and constrained by its military capabilities. Nigeria’s population dwarfs that of its immediate neighbors. Its armed forces are also unrivaled; in sub-Saharan Africa, only South Africa stands as a potential challenger to Nigerian military hegemony. Yet, throughout the state’s post-independence history, Nigerian leaders have refrained from using the military as a major instrument of foreign policy (Wright, 1983). Nigeria has participated in sub-regional and distant peacekeeping operations. However, with the exception of Abacha’s 1993 attack on the Bakassi Peninsula, the Nigerian military has not been engaged in bilateral conflicts. Even the Bakassi dispute failed to spread geographically or develop into an interstate war. Moreover, the aggression was not motivated by expansionist interests; Abacha’s primary reason for launching the assault was to divert domestic opposition from his recent coup and the June 1993 election debacle (Meierding, 2010).

Nigeria has exhibited little ability to employ its sizeable latent military capacity to influence neighboring states’ domestic politics (Wright, 1983). Nigeria’s physical might has also failed to deter boundary violations by its much weaker neighbors. On various occasions, Chad, Benin, and Cameroon have perpetrated minor territorial incursions. Nigeria’s failure to respond assertively to these provocations arises partly from France’s regional presence; the metropolitan power has defense agreements with many of its former colonies and Nigerian leaders are loath to initiate any action that might encourage European intervention on the continent (Aluko, 1977; Yoroms, 1993). However, the French factor should not be overstated (Garba, 1987). Although the European power possessed historical ties to francophone West African states, it also developed strong economic ties to Nigeria (Ogunbadejo, 1976). France has no wish to endanger its oil companies’ access to the region’s extensive petroleum reserves.

The primary reason for Nigeria’s regional reticence is concern about intimidating weaker West African states. Since the early 1970s, when oil wealth began to elevate Nigeria’s continental profile, leaders have recognized that their state’s overwhelming economic and military strength might frighten its neighbors (Sesay & Ukeje, 1997). Local fear would undermine Nigeria’s sub-regional leadership aspirations. It would provoke resistance to Nigerian-initiated economic or political projects. These concerns were particularly pronounced for the sub-region’s francophone states. Different colonial experiences, combined with widely divergent contemporary political systems increased the potential for suspicion, hostility and conflict. Nigeria needed to reassure its neighbors. It had to lead through “quiet diplomacy,” rather than military force (Garba, 1987). As
Clement Isong, the governor of Cross River state, asserted in 1981, when Nigeria refrained from responding militarily to a Cameroonian boundary violation: “Nigeria should not be a bully, but a cautious older brother” (Okolo, 1988).

This attitude was both pragmatic and normative. Nigeria’s initial commitment to good-neighborliness, a stance that included respecting the sovereignty independence of all states, emerged from the shared experience of colonization. Nigeria’s post-colonial leaders were determined to avoid the accusation that they were using their power to implement a neo-imperial order in West Africa. Although they wanted to lead, they did not want to dominate. As former Nigerian Foreign Minister Sule Lamindo stated: “It is important that while you are playing Big Brother, you have to recognize that the countries you are dealing with are sovereign nations. You have to know this and recognize this psychological feeling of independence” (Adebajo, 2000). If Nigeria fails to respect other states sovereignty and territorial integrity, “she may scare away other African countries which are smaller, weaker, and poorer in human and natural resources” (Aluko, 1973).

Although aspiring to regional hegemony, Nigeria has historically eschewed territorial expansion as a means of increasing national power. Instead, Nigerian leaders have extended their influence through international institutions. The Lake Chad Basin Commission and River Niger Commission were reactivated in 1972, as Nigeria’s economic power was expanding. Associate status with the EEC held little economic appeal for Nigeria but, as former foreign minister Joseph Garba (1987) observed: “We are told that our participation reassures our Francophone partners in the Economic Community of West African States; if that is true, it may be a worthwhile sacrifice.” ECOWAS itself was aimed at increasing Nigeria’s regional influence in a manner that would not threaten other local states. Most observers agree that Nigeria had little to gain economically from integration (Aluko, 1981; Ojo, 1980). The state’s GNP was greater than those of all other member states combined and regional economies were competitive, not complementary. Nigeria established the organization to consolidate its leadership in a way that reassured neighbors of its benign—or even positive—intentions (Wright, 1983).

In the military realm, Nigeria has endeavored to portray its regional military interventions as multilateral actions: again, to diminish perceptions of regional dominance and aggression (Adebajo & Landsberg, 2003; Salihu, 2000). Multiple Nigerian leaders have proposed the establishment of an OAU dispute settlement mechanism to respond to regional insecurity and violence (Garba, 1987). During his second turn as president, Obasanjo advocated strengthening security partnerships between ECOWAS and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (S. Kaplan, 2006). These framings have not been entirely effective in swaying regional public opinion; local leaders still suspect that Nigeria possesses hegemonic ambitions. However, they are indicative of Nigeria’s continuing concern with its international reputation and of its preference for leading through persuasion, rather than intimidation.

These foreign policy behaviors are highly consistent with one branch of mainstream IR theory: Liberal Institutionalism. Nigeria’s efforts to reassure neighbors of its benign intentions while maintaining a leadership role parallel John Ikenberry’s (2001) description of American behavior following World War II. In that case, the system hegemon was faced with the conundrum of how to maintain its power following a period of international upheaval. The United States could
choose to “dominate” the system, “abandon” its leadership role, or “transform” the old order, using a system of “strategic restraint.” This last and most effective option involved “self-binding” through international institutions. Although the hegemon might not maximize its power in the short run, the order created through this practice would be much more durable in the long run than any system that emerged from the two other approaches; international institutions inspire limited interstate resistance and are difficult to overturn.

Since the end of the civil war, Nigeria has pursued a regional self-binding strategy. Rather than maximizing national power through traditional means, such as greater physical control of territory or material capabilities (Mearsheimer, 2001; Morgenthau, 1967[1948]), leaders have restrained their local ambitions and used international institutions to achieve and reinforce the state’s sub-regional preeminence. This foreign policy strategy has persisted across regime types. It has also prevailed in widely varying domestic conditions. Nigerian leaders have practiced strategic restraint in periods of relative economic weakness and economic strength and during periods of greater and lesser internal cohesion. Although the ambitiousness and intensity of foreign activities decline when the state is economically weak or internally unstable (Shaw, 1987), the overall character has remained a constant.

The significance of domestic factors as a determinant of foreign activity levels suggests an additional affinity between Nigerian international relations and Liberal IR theory. Liberalism ascribes great importance to domestic conditions as causes of international behaviors (Moravcsik, 1997). In the Nigerian case, understanding foreign policy requires consideration of prevailing economic conditions. The state has pursued a far more active foreign policy in periods of prosperity, such as the 1970s, than during recessions, such as in the 1980s (Ogunbadejo, 1979/80). To a lesser degree, IR analysts should also consider the personal preferences of the leader in power. Murtala adopted a far more aggressive approach to international relations than did his predecessor, General Gowon, in spite of both regimes possessing similar economic and governance capacities. Explaining policy variation requires consideration of leaders’ individual characters.

In addition to being conditioned by leaders’ personal preferences and by domestic political circumstances, Nigerian foreign policy has also been consistently influenced by prevailing dynamics in the international system. While Nigeria possesses greater power than its sub-regional peers, it lacks the military might to guarantee deterrence of Great Power aggression. The state’s economic dependence also renders it vulnerable to international punishment. These constraints impact foreign policy decision making. Contrary to the predictions of Neorealism, however, structural imperatives have been limited. Nigeria’s foreign policy was not impacted significantly by the existence and collapse of the US-Soviet superpower rivalry; it has looked similar in bilateral, unilateral, and multilateral systems. Instead, the state’s international activities are more consistent with the theoretical precepts of Constructivism. Nigerian foreign policy has been highly attentive to international norms.

The state’s post-colonial commitment to good-neighborliness is consistent with the internationally recognized “territorial integrity norm,” which discourages infringements on the sovereignty and physical boundaries of independent states (Zacher, 2001). Nigeria’s longstanding reluctance to employ unilateral military force to achieve foreign policy goals aligns
with prevailing norms against international aggression. More recently, the state’s willingness to participate in the international judicial process and implement the ICJ’s unpopular ruling on the Bakassi Peninsula demonstrates a commitment to international law and peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms. It is difficult to determine whether Nigeria’s foreign behaviors reflect internalization and acceptance of these systemic norms or if they are merely a pragmatic performance of the modern, liberal state, aimed at improving Nigeria’s reputation and securing international diplomatic and economic support. However, regardless of the causal mechanism at work, norms are influencing Nigerian foreign policy.

Nigerian leaders’ possess a Neorealist, rational choice view of the international system. The world is anarchic and states survive through self-help. Countries aspire to hegemonic status, at the global or regional level. Yet Neorealism cannot explain how Nigeria has pursued these goals. To be fair, Waltz (1979) acknowledged that Neorealism does not offer a theory of foreign policy. And Neorealists have suggested amendments that would make their theory more consistent with observed Nigerian foreign policy. Some have recognized that rational states will refrain from aggressive international action when the costs are too high (Glaser, 1994/95). Others are willing to accept that states adhere to international norms and legal commitments when it is in their pragmatic interest to do so (Downs, Rocke, & Barsoom, 1996). Realists have even acknowledged the centrality of domestic politics as a determinant of international behavior (Snyder, 1991). If all of these adjustments are made, Nigerian foreign policy is not incompatible with Neorealism. However, given that Liberalism and Constructivism explain Nigeria’s behaviors equally well, with fewer caveats, one is forced to ask: what is Neorealism’ additional, independent explanatory value?

This theoretical critique is not limited to the particular case of Nigeria. Rather than being a third world anomaly, Nigeria is representative of broader problems with Neorealism. The theory has limited utility in the current international system. The world currently looks more Liberal and Constructivist. States rarely attack their neighbors. They care about norms. They are constrained by domestic conditions and international opinion. Consequently, while states may think like Neorealists, they rarely act like them. This observation holds in the developing and developed worlds. The problems with IR theory are not exclusively its applicability in developing states (Brown, 2006).

In the particular realm of foreign policy, Nigeria, as an interdependent, sub-regional hegemon, is not as different from the Great Powers as previously assumed. Some IR theories’ explain the state’s foreign behaviors quite effectively. The fact that Neorealism is not among them should not lead us to throw out mainstream IR theory entirely. Rather, future reimagining of IR should learn from these observations. We should acknowledge that all states with coherent foreign policy apparatuses are likely to share certain common concerns, while, at the same time, we put greater effort into identifying the specific factors that inspire behavioral variation. Instead of constructing a new and separate theory of third world IR, we should consider how the experiences of emerging middle powers like Nigeria can inform existing theoretical debates and suggest more broadly helpful theoretical amendments. Through this process, IR theory will become a more global discipline and a more effective analytic tool.
References


Borders and Borderlands Identities: A Comparative Perspective of Cross-border Governance in the Neighbourhoods of Senegal, the Gambia and Guinea Bissau

Aboubakr Tandia
Groupe d’Etudes et de Recherches sur les Migrations
Gaston Berger University of Saint-Louis, Senegal

Abstract
Borders in Africa unfold in diverse appearances besides their being markers of national identity. Added to their being important realms of migration flows, cross-border areas are nests of growing multifaceted insecurity problems among which organized transnational crime is the most topical. While States paradoxically hang on to criticized regional intergovernmentalism, local public authorities, though not necessarily autonomous, engage in local initiatives or modes of “borderland governmentalities”. In the borderlands of Senegal, Guinea Bissau and The Gambia, preceding research reveals how borders appear as spheres of material and symbolic stakes (Tandia 2007, Sindjoun 2002). A sort of “homeland nationalism” stems from identity narratives of the borderlands, a “localism” that yields a “local system of governance” between cross-border State and non-State agents and services in order to supplement the countryside from inter-State anomic diploma. Among other questions, we ask to what extent and how local representation of identities and territories produce new meaning/s or perceptions of borders? To what extent and how production of border meaning/s springs from (is linked to, produces and is produced by) cross-border governance? Theoretical analysis of the literature will be leveled with empirical accounts of cross-border governance and community building, through qualitative empirical data (interviews, focus groups and life stories) processed in a socio-anthropological perspective.

Keywords: Border – Borderland – Cross border governance – Borderland identity – Border meaning.

Introduction
Encompassing Senegal, The Gambia and Guinea Bissau, the term Western Senegambia is particularly referred to here as the western part of Senegambia (Barry 1981, 1988, Sall 1992). This usage of the term is not as arbitrary as it seems. It alludes in fact to the multiple and overlapping spaces and dynamics of the global Senegambian social space identifiable through historical, geographical and social variables; it alludes also to the social space of the specific communities interrelated by networks of clientelism, religious and economic solidarities, configurations which produce conflicting dynamics that can either strengthen national unity or, in the contrary, increase interdependency among the States and their peoples (Sall 1992). As the most integrated sub-regional space of West Africa, its national boundaries dividing peoples seem rather senseless. And yet they are enduring. This is one of the important issues raised in border studies which this paper also tries to contribute to within the thematic of governance.

This reality of national borders as constantly challenged by cross-cutting socio-cultural dynamics is now a common argument, or else a largely documented paradigm in Africa (Bach 1998). Both scholars and policy-makers paradigmatically agree that borders are spaces in which national boundary-lines are diluted by other territorial and identitary dynamics produced out of popular strategies (Unesco 2005). Indeed, this paradigm reconciles the material factors such as economic
and trade patterns and symbolic ones such as political and cultural elements of border life. Identitary logics constitute the common realm of political and cultural dynamics that combine with and reshape territorial or spatial appearances of borders.

In many recent studies of borders as borderlands or regions, identity and territory are the two ingredients of the same process (Wilson and Donnan 1998, Donnan and Wilson 1999, Nyambara 2009, Martineau 2009, Cisse 2007, Tandia 2007). They help redefine borders as borderlands, that is, as spaces of symbolic and material stakes. In a seminal work edited by the Cameroonian scholar Luc Sindjou (Sindjou 2004), contributors globally conclude that migrants are particular negotiators of a multiple political identity (Meye 2004, Chouala 2004, Yinda-Yinda 2004), a multinational transnational identity that renders borders porous to them but not meaningless. Even though borders are subject to permanent (re)interpretation in daily practices and discourses, they are not contested or skirted in these transnational territorial and identitary dynamics (Bennafla 1999). The process instead is comparable to a game in which national identity is constantly used in relations of negotiation with other social identifications, ethnic or community. This negotiation process is not only conflictual as Duschenes and Scherrer (2003) state, but also cooperative according to situations and stakes in play. If cross-border or borderland life implies identity negotiation for migrant individuals or communities, the question remains to be asked for sedentary communities. In this vein, Pierre Cisse investigated how socio-cultural solidarities in the sedentary Bobofing community between Mali and Burkina Faso challenged frontier lines through an intense process of identity negotiation in which “ethnic differentiation is more important than national differentiation” (Cisse 2007:31, Asiwaju 1984).

If these works demonstrate the possibility of constructing a communitarian and cosmopolitan collective identity out of multiple identifications, they reveal little of the complex processes of this negotiation. For instance, they remain silent on how these practices could in return (re)produce, reshape and perpetuate those identities. Furthermore, these studies seem to miss the point that socio-cultural and regional solidarities that back those ethno-regional identities cannot be isolated in the construction of collective identities. How they interact, through absorption or rejection, with other forms of belongingness such as national and ethnic identities is not really demonstrated. Moreover, as has been illustrated from cross-border migration (Sindjou 2004, Meye 2004, Mimche 2007, Ouedraogo, 2007, Oshineye 2009), identity construction entails material concerns borderland actors have to cope with in their border strategies. This issue of the utility of identity construction in borderlands seems to suggest that borderland identity consists also of symbolic foundations and aspirations. A last point to consider from the preceding is to what extent transnational community identities make sense for such collective actions as cross-border governance, and what this could reveal in terms of border meaning.

It would be argued in this paper that, in the considered settings of the Western Senegambia neighbourhoods, ethnic and cultural identities mostly help (re)define borders, throughout cross-border-governance as a collective action for border regulation and cooperation. Most importantly, this trans-boundary governmentality lies more on local identitary constructions and practices of border spaces than on formal legitimacies of local government or else on intergovernmental cooperation. We reach the important point we want to make in this paper, which is that where the failure of national governments to address border issues and borderland daily challenges is acknowledged, identitary constructions processed in the longue durée provide the ordinary frames for cross-border governance as a collective action. However, the obviousness
attached to the form and functionality of this socio-historical invention is relativised by differences in terms of local histories, of socio-political trajectories of State formation, of socio-economic societal contingences, both at national and regional levels. The consistency of both the communitarian identity and the collective action it helps to legitimise depend on how these variables behave separately or not. The following questions will be answered: to what extent does the production of cross-border communitarian identities ascribe a particular meaning to borders? To what extent and how do they constitute the legitimising framework for collective actions such as cross-border governance? How do these community identities process with other forms of belongingness such as national and ethnic identities?

The approach here is multi-disciplinary, based on a great deal of theoretical and empirical corpus available in the historiography and anthropology of borders on the one hand, and the sociology and political economy of State formation in Africa on the other hand. This empiricism draws from a mixed epistemology, realist and constructivist at the same time, to interpret actions through their representational frames and their pragmatic assignments in social encounters.

**Border territories, borderland identity and cross-border governance: theoretical considerations**

The physical or geographical border, or the frontier, which is our concern, here refers to the juridical boundary, a barrier by which criteria of nationality are defined. Thus borders appear as identitary markers, exclusive and inclusive at the same time, but also lines of demarcation that sanction the State’s sovereignty and authority. Such a schema is not always easily devisable in Africa given the anachronism between the colonial heritage and the dynamics of African societies (Asiwaju 1985). Cultural boundaries of peoples do not tally with conventional political borders of Nation States, and national identities hardly match up with cultural identities (Asiwaju 1984, Unesco 2005). This reality of borders brings us to the issue of borderlands or “border areas” as referred to in the current discourse of African regional integration. This notion is preferred to the extent that it highlights how boundary-lines are subsumed in societal practices of borders. It also enables us to approach borders as territories and spaces of political significance.

Borders are political territories in the sense that they are appropriated spaces, whether by State or by society and its in-groups. In the perspective of cross-border governance they can work as political territories since this peripheral inter-local governmentality contextualises some peculiar constraints and dynamics of the border areas which are “geographical spaces straddling the national territories of two or more countries, where peoples are closely tied up together by socio-economic ties” (Sikasso Seminary 2002). However, the political nature of borderlands on which cross-border governance is based can be revealed in more precise terms. First, cross-border areas are in our settings sub-national territories formed by administrative regions and districts. Second, they are transnational territories cross-cutting State territories. In this case, they appear more as socio-cultural territories, that is the ethno-regional spaces drawn by linguistic and religious boundaries, and homogenous areas in terms of level of development, criteria that altogether bear political significance (Rosière 2007:25). Third, as such, cross-border areas or borderlands harbour decision-making centers such as administrative decentralized authorities and local governments. They imply many decision centers among which are civil society and non-State charismatic decision-makers constituted by traditional and religious nobilities. Beyond their administrative pertinence, therefore, decision centers take part in the structuring and government
of political spaces which borderlands are (Rosière ibid.). In this sense, the analysis of borderland identity can proceed from an articulation of notions of territory and identity.

With insights gained from sociological and anthropological theories, political science has shown that territory plays an important role in identitary differentiation (Braud 2006:124). It can be inversely assumed that identity is important in the construction and transformation of territories, and even, in their control. For example, it is in the name of ethnic affinities expressed through legends and myths of kinship and alliances that borderlanders convene meetings and demand collective efforts for local initiatives. In these situations, collective action is always assumed to serve the immemorial ties that bound borderlanders and legitimize mobilization. In other words, identities import much in cross-border governance given that collective action and political mobilization aim at inter-local government or management of borderlands as spatial frames and stakes of power and authority. It is in this sense that we would like to treat borderland collective identities as political identities. This line of reasoning can be better understood if it is agreed that socio-political ascription of identities is to differentiate in an exclusive manner or to build a ‘we’ against ‘them’ identity. Identity as a notion, different from identities as forms of belongingness, can be heuristically envisioned as a “force of conflictualisation, or of construction of cleavages” (Duschenes and Scherrer 2003). This definition like those of borders as political territories and borderland identities as political identities means by ‘political’ not something related only to the exertion of power – a traditional angle in political science from which national identity and State territory were strictly and exclusively political, but something relating to conflict. By conflict is meant the Simmelian idea of conflict as the foundation of social order and polity. Cross-border governance is also defined in reference to this conception of what is political, in the sense that governance refers to the conflictual balances of State-Society relations.

These cleavages make the individual in a group to which they claim to belong represent this group as opposed to other identitary groups they belong to. They do this through a hierarchisation of the multiple forms of belongingness they identify with (Duschenes and Scherrer 2003). If we follow this reasoning, borderland identity as a communitarian identity proceeds from other identities in a critical context where the necessity is to face contradictions common to territories constituted by borderlands. In this vein, a quite convincing application of this definition of political identity to borderland identity would hold on the following premises.

First, the meaning of this identitary production in cross-border governance is to define two kinds of relationships: one between the borderland territories and the global national entity through an enunciation of a politics of autonomy (autonomy of representation and autonomy of action) towards central governments; another one between the two borderland communities and spaces. Second, a consequence of what precedes, the local communitarian identity, or localism, is not only the vehicle of a feeling of common belongingness, but also functions as an inter-local imaginary which territorialises those constraints and dynamics of interdependency known in the cross-border areas in view of their collective appropriation. Thus, this identitary idiom of ‘local citizenship’ constitutes the matrix for action in cross-border governance. It is the publicised representation and experience of border peoples, of the social ties that bind them and of their different roles in the borderland (Adejumobi 2005:22-23). Third, this collective ‘floor taking’ in which particular identities (national, ethnic, confessional, class, etc.) are concealed, is also a collective ‘power taking’ through which cross-border governance is legitimised and worked out as a form of public action, a realm of publicisation of social relationships (Surel and Muller
Behind the ‘logics of meaning’ stemming from borderland identity and cross-border governance lie ‘logics of power’ which principle is to provoke a unitary dynamic of action. We can therefore infer that the political nature of borderland identity and management lies in the fact that cross-border governance, to a great extent, turns borderlands into public and governance realms.

This is the reason why, as a third step in this theoretical preliminary, the premise that cross-border governance is a political enterprise in both its forms and meanings would be departed from. One obvious reason for that is that, on the one hand, governance as a holistic concept relates to “issues that are necessary to the achievement and reproduction of balanced State-society relations” (Olukoshi, 2006:6), and, on the other hand, borderlands are spaces where those questions are mostly raging, if the problematic of grassroots integration and border management is to be seriously considered in current national and regional policies (Cedeao 2005, UA 2007). In the face of various problems, borderlands cannot but device inner machineries of government or self-reliance strategies.

In the Western Senegambia neighbourhoods that were investigated, strong interdependences have grown up to be genuinely endangered by cross-border problems. Besides erratic intergovernmental relations, borderlands are challenged by the continuous weakening of the security sector, the proliferation of roadblocks, environmental erosion, weakness of local institutions and inaccessibility of central government structures, as well as cross-border trade and its daily share of criminality and insecurity (Tandia 2007, Fall 2003). This is without mentioning the impact of all of this on the social fabric and order of these territories. That is why Cross-border initiatives of the Ecowas and the African Union pledge for a border oriented regional integration and security by making the concept of border region their own. The ECOWAS collaborates with the Club Sahel Afrique de l’Ouest and other NGOs since 2002 to hold seminars and conferences that allow the organization to work out a Cross-border Initiative Program. It follows that the empirical situation of Western Senegambia borderlands calls for a theoretical approach to governance and cross-border governance.

As regards governance, it will also be conceived as a heuristic concept to say that it conveys an epistemological concern which is to understand the alternative forms of regulation that have emerged in a context of social complexity and / or political disillusionment marked by critical transformations of the nation-State. The permanent crisis of the State at all levels, from the local to the global, has diminished the readability of public action (Nabudere 2000, Fawole and Ukeje 2005). Due to crises of legitimacy, efficacy and territoriality (Igue 1995, Sindjoun 2002), in the wake of the crisis of national identity and citizenship (Igue 1995, Bach 1998, Adejumobi 2005), the multiplicity of actors, with growing divergent and almost unmatchable interests, engage in a regime of governability at the edges of the State. The notion of governance appears therefore as a conceptual designation of this new regime of representation and reproduction of the State, or more exactly of the public realm, through the social practices and within the framework of collective action. In other words, it refers to a new governmentality of the State defined as a specific mode of exerting power” (Lascoumes 2004). We used the concept of governance in this way because it helps preclude the ideological significations that sometimes pollute it. More interestingly, it is more useful than government (as in local government) and leadership in recent civil society myths of popular or elite salvaging rule. However, as Goran Hyden observed, the concept should not always and mistakenly stigmatise the imbalance of State-Society relations.
We agree with Hyden when he argues that, “First, the State is rarely the sole harbinger of political power and, second, it is often the public realm, not just the State, that is weak” (Hyden 1995:6). The concept of governance here makes possible the suspension of judgment about the exact relationship between political authority and formal institutions in society. No presupposition is allowable as regards the holder of authority or the possession of political control by any given actor in cross-border governance processes. Concerned in effect with “struggles for the expansion of citizenship, [and therefore with the nature and character of the public realm]” (Olukoshi 2008:6), governance raises the questions of new systems of checks-and-balances between public and private actors, state and societal institutions, the articulation of the rights and responsibilities of citizens individually and collectively taken, the definition and operationalisation of rules of political regulation (Olukoshi 2006). Governance therefore works here as an instrument to apprehend the current transformations in the modes of management of public affairs (Hermet 2003:13, Hermet an Kazancigil 2003:1-14).

In the context of border regions, governance is relevant in a geographical and anthropological perspective. In effect, it makes it possible for them to be viewed as territories on the one hand – what we did earlier – that is scales of action, socio-spatial areas where governmentality is re-invented, and on the other hand, to consider them as symbolic sites and identify centers. Consequently, the concept of cross-border governance is helpful when one wants to pay attention to the symbolic or cognitive dimension of the production of the borderland governmentalties through an analysis of identitary constructions that are their legitimising frames. That is why we envisaged cross-border governance as a collective action to be closely related to borderland identities and territories.

In this sense, cross-border governance will be considered as a collective regime by which inter-local problems of border areas are managed and borderlands regulated within and in ambiguous relation to the respective national frames. Used in this sense, its empirical dimensions need to be clearly identified so that the implications in terms of border meaning and transformation can be grasped.

Reference is again made to Hyden whose analytical framework (Hyden 1995) seems to correspond to our treatment of cross-border governance as a political enterprise putting together identity, territories and governance. Hyden theorised some basic dimensions of governance that seem useful to grasp the empirical logics of cross-border governance in the Western Senegambia settings. His schema of the ‘governance realm’ tallies with our view of borders as public realms since cross-border governance and borderland identity aim at a publicisation of social relationships and problem-solving initiatives and possibilities. There are three dimensions for an optimal analysis of governance.

First, he considered the actor dimension of governance in which the nature and character of relationships between actors tell something about the degree of publicity in collective actions implied by governmentalties. According to Hyden, two types of relationships need to be considered between actors. On the one hand, relationships of authority – authority meaning not that governance relationships are based on domination or subjugation over any one, but on “legitimate power, that is the voluntary acceptance of asymmetrical relationship” (Hyden 1995:10). In this sense, it comes close to a reciprocal relationship. Both imply an underlying normative consensus on rules for the exercise of power” (Hyden 1995:10). On the other hand,
having the advantage of being less discrete, therefore more publicising unlike exchange, reciprocity requires “each to contribute to the welfare of the others with an expectation that they will do likewise” (Hyden 1995:9). A reciprocal relationship requires then “broader agreement and consensus on the basic norms of social action” (ibid.). And the condition for this consensual processing is the implementation of an ethic of discussion in deliberative encounters, which therefore stresses the role of borderland management discourses.

Second, it is clear that this jurisdiction of palaver as the jurisdiction of speech (Bidima 1997) and consensus has to fit in a precise governance structure. This is the structural dimension of governance relating to the type of political structure implied by governance politics, or else, “the normative institutions created by human beings to pursue social, economic and political ends” (Hyden 1995:10). At this level governance structures are said to be of a mixed patterning. Governance stands on the middle ground that every society is made up of both man-made and institutionalized structures. To put it simply, structures of governance are formal and informal, spontaneous organisations and institutions. In the case of cross-border governance, it will be seen that this hybrid character of governance structures is observable through the presence of social forums monitored by civil society NGO’s or associations, or else deliberative encounters gathering (local)State authorities and traditional powers. It is in this sense that governance structures flourish in a communitarian context, meaning that they could well be found in borderlands where collectivism still dominates patterns of social life which are however not so harmonious as this Tonniesian image of the community may suggest.

Third, Hyden deduces from this a frame of three main component variables from which to read empirical working of a governance regime. Citizen influence and oversight, responsive leadership and social reciprocities should be observable components of what might be termed as the regime dimension of governance situations. Citizen influence and oversight refers to “the means by which individual citizens can participate in the political process and thereby express their preferences about public policy; how well these preferences are aggregated for effective policymaking; and what means exist of holding governors accountable for their decisions and actions” (Hyden 1995:15). While this rather large frame could be a little bit tight for cross-border settings often marked by State absence, looking at the presence and activity of civil society structures next to local administrative and political powers would be suggested. It should be added that Hyden’s frame was originally drawn for the level of State politics where he proposes governance as better than democracy as a concept to apprehend the changes in the public realm of the contemporary State. In his point of view, therefore, it is still about governors and the governed, while in our sense it is about the looseness or inexistence of a particular holder or central authority, but about a deliberate search for many contributing or decision-making centers, that is what we referred to as legitimacies. In this case of blurred lines between society and leadership, what is important then is legitimisation of this collectivism more than legitimacy of any power-center.

In addition, peoples’ inclusion and reference on behalf of these governors and other actors should tell us more about citizen participation and oversight. Responsive and responsible leadership refers to “the attitudes of political leaders toward their role as public trustees. In particular, it covers their orientation toward the sanctity of the civic public realm; their readiness to share information with citizens; and their adherence to the rule of law” (Hyden 1995:15). At
this point also it is important to simplify by contextualization. We will rather be looking at to
what extent leaders or legitimacies involved in cross-border governance pay attention to the
stability and openness of the public realm, how they are open and sensitive to popular
solicitations and grievances, and in what terms they abide by the rules of consensus and
accountability that govern governance situations. This equates for instance to looking at the
degree to which they remain concerned with destabilizing issues such as security, crime and
trade in borderlands. Last but not least, social reciprocities refer to “the extent to which citizens
or groups of citizens treat each other in an equal fashion; how far such groups demonstrate
tolerance of each other in the pursuit of politics; and how far voluntary associations are capable
of transcending the boundaries of such primary social organisations as kinship, ethnicity or race”
(Hyden 1995:16). While this last component may refer to modalities of equality, tolerance and
inclusiveness between groups in governance situations, we will consider it in the case of cross-
border governance to imply the degree of social integration according to which equality,
tolerance, and inclusiveness may well be measured. As concerns the issue of voluntary and
spontaneous associations, it takes us back to the idea of civil society presence and activity.
Nevertheless, a good point to add is that since cross-border governance unfolds in identitary
guises, matters of transcending socio-cultural boundaries should be envisaged in terms of how
governance demands with regards to policymaking are negotiated without exclusionist recourse
to these forms of belonging. In other words, it is about how far these identities are tolerated or
usefully resorted to in governance politics. In this sense, cross-border governance could be an
interesting platform from which governance as a concept of new politics and policymaking could
be deemed feasible or not in African (border) contexts.
As far as we are concerned in this study, the dimensions of governance and cross-border
governance as delineated above can be traced through a three stage approach. First, we will
highlight the modes and the logics of action in cross-border governance, its actors and their
legitimacies. Second, we will look at the factors of legitimisation from which derive the meaning
of cross-border governance, with a focus on the part played by borderland identity. Third, since it
could be part of its meaning, what could be the potential of cross-border governance is a concern
we have tried to cope with, which leads us to consider the efficiency of cross-border governance
as a regulatory regime of borderlands. An important issue raised here relates to the lessons that
can be learnt from the experience of cross-border governance in the context of a double-dynamic
of the African State – decentralization on the one hand and regionalization on the other. It will,
from the onset, be appropriate to have a short picture of the two main settings that were
investigated in the Western Senegambian Space.
Peopling and spatial dynamics of Western Senegambia borderlands

Actually we have investigated two places (see map), one in the Senegal-Gambia northern frontier, and another in the Senegal-Guinea Bissau border. The first place is the borderland straddling the North Bank Division of Gambia which is the location of the village of Keur Aly (purple color) and the Communauté Rurale of Madina Sabakh in the Nioro department of Senegal where the village of Keur Ayip is located (green color). The second is the trans-boundary space straddling the four Communautés Rurales of the Kolda (degraded green colors) department and the neighbouring Bissau-Guinean area of Citato-Cuntima and Contuboel in the Regulado of Gabu region. Though both areas boom with cross-border governance dynamics, and relatively share the same spatial characteristics and socio-cultural patterns, the two settings are different in many respects, notably in terms of peopling and cross-border social mobility, migration patterns, local histories, social structuring and integration, political control and stability, and leadership regimes.

The twin villages of Madina Sabakh ancestral brothers on the Senegal-Gambia frontier

The Gambia-Senegal borderland is made up of the Wolof communities of the villages of Keur Aly (Farafegni North Bank Division of Gambia) and Keur Ayip (Sous-prefecture of Madina Sabakh of Senegal). Formerly compounds, these two villages are like twins for the following reasons. Firstly, they were founded by Aly and Ayip, two brothers whose descent constitute the whole trans-boundary community. This ancestral brotherhood ties justifies the sharing of one cemetery located on the Gambian side, sanitary districts, one market and a coach station on the
Senegalese side. Secondly, as in the Bobofing community studied by Cisse (Cisse 2007), the border as a socio-cultural space is netted with festivals, initiatory, customary and land rituals, confessional events, matrimonial and lineage exchanges, and christening. These practices are instances of the dynamic social mobility and integration of the borderland community. The ethnic homogeneity they mirror is not disrupted by circular or nomad migration flows in the wake of cross-border trade. This integration is reinforced by the common economic activities (farming, trade and cattle-raising), which bring local authorities and notabilities to loosen political control by means of a regime of tolerance. Thirdly, the economic dynamism of the border area, thanks to trade in natural resources, weekly markets, the Gambian ferry of Farafegni, and first stuff facilities in circulation, the borderland is more or less firmly rooted in the national territories. As far as the leadership is concerned, the various authorities enter into close relationships: vertical civilities among traditional nobilities and administrators and local councillors have established a cross-border cooperation in all sectors since the early 1980’s (Tandia 2007). According to the Sous-prefet of Nioro interviewed in August 2007, cross-border cooperation on this northern part of the Senegal-Gambia border has been initiated by one of his (Senegalese) predecessors whose name was Korka Diallo in 1982, which is not contradicted by his Gambian counterpart of the North Bank Division in Farafegni (Tandia 2007).

Another element that characterises this Senegal-Gambia borderland is that the frequent implication of national authorities to a certain extent in local matters shows the existence of a higher degree of an acceptance of national belongingness among borderlanders.

The warring and poverty-stricken local communities of ancient Gabu alliances
The situation is rather different in many respects on the Senegal-Guinea Bissau borderland of Kolda (Senegal) and Sitato-Cuntima and Cambaju (Guinea Bissau). This area is the political territory of ancient Gabu kingdom which reached the republic of Guinea and the Futa Jallon. On the Senegalese side the Fula territory is called the Fouladou, while on the Bissau-Guinean side it is called Gabu. It stretches toward the central part of Guinea Bissau, which relativises the ethnic homogeneity of the community formed by the Fula people, called the Fulas of Gabu (Borshik 2008). Indeed, the ethnic homogeneity is disrupted by the sedentary type of migration flows of central Senegalese farmers, western and central Bissau Guinean Balanta people fleeing political instability and poverty and retrain from fishing Guinean Mandingos and Fulas. This territory is still marked by the liberation wars in Guinea Bissau, the long Casamance ‘forgotten civil war’ (Sonko 2004, Faye 2005) and the current political instability of the Bissau Guinean State. Poverty and insecurity are concealed in the insecurity system of land mines, cattle rustling, fraudulent trading and growing armed robbery. This situation has severely affected social integration, political control and leadership. First, the state of extreme poverty aggravated by the drying up of the shallows for farming and loss of land – because of land mines –, erosion and criminality, tends to establish a territorial system of wariness and scarcity. The border people are complaining about migrants who make an intensive use of land and forestry, and therefore destroy the fertile wetlands. Fleeing insecurity and/or poverty, these established migrants come from central and western Guinea Bissau and central or northern Senegal, mainly from the ancient Senegalese peanut basin in the Saloum area.

Second, a regime of laisser-aller in the development activities such as farming and cattle-rustling, which are the main ones, affects the cultural and socioeconomic solidarities. For
instance, tension and conflict is growing among communities who often resort to violence in fights caused by disagreements over cattle rustling, the drawing of pasture itineraries, or else in land distribution and exploitation. The worsening of the socioeconomic fabric has nurtured a generation gap. Youngsters who have for their great many left school are accused of being irreverent toward traditions as far as cattle raising and farming are concerned. At the same time, they are accused of banditry as they are cited as being in league with cattle rustlers. They in turn accuse adults and old traditional chiefs of being acolytes of the politicians embodied by local councillors and religious chiefs. According to them, States are to be blamed in so far as they remain unconcerned about their situation and the raging insecurity which profits cattle rustlers. Some of them blame poverty and unemployment as being responsible for the suspicions hanging over them. This is mainly the picture in the Senegalese communautés rurales of Madina El Hadj and Takanto Escale.

Third, the complicity of security and administrative officials with the trustees of local migrants and religious chiefs – in trade and land management for example – is also a factor in the conflictual climate (Fanchette 2002). While people do not trust official institutions and reject their counseling, the youth questions the gerontocracy of adults who accuse them of laziness and criminality. In this context, the absence of States on both sides, largely exemplified by the weak integration of the Casamance region in Senegal, and the long history of war of the Bissau Guinean failed State favours civil society and traditional leadership. This situation becomes at the same time the main ingredient that nurtures and reinforces a ‘we feeling’ that strongly questions and seems to reject national belongingness among borderlanders. Among the Senegalese Fulas of the Fouladou or High Casamance, a commonplace phrase is the following: “They [the northerners] are taking away our resources”. A farmer complaining about migrants and local politics said this to us: “We happen to ask ourselves whether we should not have done like our Diola brothers in Low Casamance”, referring to the current irredentism against the Senegalese State. This feeling of being abandoned or underestimated is made worse by lack of infrastructure, and the numerous differentials between countries (currency, political systems, prices and products availability and periodicity) stretches the lines of this territoriality of enclavement, scarcity and wariness.

**Cross-border governance as a transnational governmentality**

Cross-border governance engages a plurality of actors operating at times in tandem at times separately. Indeed, institutional pluralism set up in the wake of decentralization processes in different countries does not result necessarily in an ideal participation of all actors (Faye 2006:11-12). Depending on contexts, this dimension of governance as a collective action and a regulatory regime will be unequally distributed. The analysis of discourses and practices of the latter will help distinguish between administrative coordination, security cooperation and cultural diplomacy as various and overlapping modalities of cross-border governance.

**A local system of administrative coordination**

This first regime is exerted by territorial administration authorities and local councillors, who are assisted sometimes by administrative services and grassroots organisations. It proceeds with a hierarchisation of political actors (local councillors) and administrative agents. This hierarchisation tells a lot about the power authorities implied by governance. On the Senegal-Gambia borderland “besides security services, technical civil servants, local councillors are at the
forefront, but under the close control of territorial administration commissioners”, says a Senegalese sous-prefet. On the Guinea-Senegal borderland local councilors are nearly overshadowed by regulos, the local commissioners. But the structural weakness of these local administrations, notably on the Guinean side, worse than in the Gambian divisions of the North Bank, opens the door for civil society commitment in the management of border problems. This is revealed in the domains covered by this local coordinative regime.

Except the civil society associations fill the gap in the Senegal-Guinea borderland, domains covered by the coordination activities are those in which concerned actors are allowed competence in national armistices. In farming technical services are mobilised by cross-border administrative authorities in the management of land, crops, and their convoying. The difference between the two borderlands should be noted. While on the Senegal-Gambia borderland local councillors are particularly solicited, the Guinea-Senegal borderland is characterised by a loose regulation in this domain. The same is true for cattle-breeding. On the Guinean borderland things are a bit too easy going. As one cattle rearer says, the prevalence of cheaper traditional techniques of animal feeding and branding and the impracticability of a good deal of pasture lands, because of mine bombing, adds to the extreme poverty of border populations so that modern or official devices are overlooked (Arragain and Saillot 2005). As regards forest management, the Gambia-Senegal border is also better regulated. Unlike the relative lack of capacity among their Gambian neighbour, the Senegalese forest division has a special role in this matter. Added to the expertise demanded by the Gambian side, surveillance logistics, and anti-arcadia fight programs are extended to them.

The picture is quite the same between the Senegalese border division and their Guinean neighbours. Instead of administrative and political authorities, popular initiatives are legion and are hardly headed by local councilors who most often get engaged in security issues and farming because of land stakes (Arragain and Saillot 2005:20). Because of the tensions and conflict risks that are lying in wait, security forces are sometimes invited on both borderlands to join in these civil activities even if they are domains from which traditionally they are excluded. However, the particularity of these actors is both their strong presence and their relative autonomy related to the fact that in all three countries their hierarchical authorities are the ministries of defense and security or armed forces. That is why relationships between these architects of cross-border governance form an autonomous framework.

A cooperative security framework
As already underlined, the two borderlands hold salient differences as far as their political stability and security climates are concerned. But as a whole, their challenges are the same, comprising cattle rustling, drug trafficking, illegal exploitation and trafficking of forest products and most importantly fraudulent trades. Hence cooperation between security forces is an obligation that must be met in order to secure the privileged evacuation-corridors constituted by border areas. As a commander of the Senegalese Gendarmerie puts it, they “cooperate on law and order, keeping trade and traffic control, criminality, and judiciary coordination of some investigations across borders, and most of the time we meet our ends”. Even though they form an inter-local insecurity system, the Guinea-Senegal communities are obliged to resort to vigilante committees or else to popular justice or crime repression (Arragain and Saillot 2005) against criminality and insecurity problems such as nightmarish cattle rustling. This pattern of popular
responsibility in local justice or crime repression has been studied by Saibou (2007) among the Chad-Cameroon border communities against cross-border banditry. He termed them as grassroots modes of policing.

Fortunately, the dynamism of civil society throughout the Mouvement des Jeunes pour la Paix et l’intégration (MJPI) alleviates the effects of such challenges as cattle rustling, land and pasture conflicts, mine bombing, fraudulent trading (Chroniques frontalières 2005:7). Thanks to the forums organized by the association around cross-border management, notably security issues that are the core worries, the police sometimes agree to collaborate with others. For instance, for a fee of 500 Cfa the police systematically control the livestock that cross the border in tandem with the vigilante committee. Following the involvement of the youths, many cattle rustlers and forest plunderers have been tracked down and arrested in the Bissau-Guinean villages of Bonco and Fajonquito.

Regulating borderlands as trading spaces is also an arduous task for security cooperation. In the words of a policeman at a checkpoint in Keur Ayip, on the Gambia-Senegal frontier, “Sometimes in between armed forces, the police, the customs, the gendarmerie, Gambians and Senegalese, we are obliged to join forces to face quarrels between policemen and drivers or passengers trailing offenders and so on”. Security officers also intervene in conflicts among competing economic actors (merchants and nomad traders called bana bana). While on the Senegal-Gambia borderland quarrels among cross border transporters are often settled by security forces, cattle raisers and farmers are frequently reconciled by the MJPI (Arragain and Salliot 2005:11-15). For example when Senegalese transporters erected blockades in 2003 and 2005 to protest against a price increase on Gambian ferry, security forces and local administrators came together as a body of peace makers to resolve minor problems among neighbours that appeared as border disputes between States (Tandia 2007).

The rise in security problems over the years on the Guinea-Senegal border and the growing interdependences on the economically dynamic Senegal-Gambia borderland has brought public approval of cross-border security cooperation. That is why like the administrative coordination regime, security cooperation attracts other types of actors, from civil and military sectors. But this is truer of the Gambia-Senegal border where, except for the Senegalese customs division who are accused of acting in offhand manner, border police, administrative authorities, local councillors and traditional nobilities on both sides partake in the management of forest and natural resources.

A cultural diplomacy of neighbourliness and trans-boundary integration
Other studies have reported forms of negotiation of peace and arbitration of disputes among contemporary societies, notably on border areas. Following studies by Anderson, O’Dowd and Wilson on European Borderlands (Anderson, O’Dowd and Wilson 2001, 2003), recent studies in West Africa include the works of Saibou and Cisse, respectively about the Fulani Communities straddling the Chad-Cameroon border and the Bobofing lineage communities on the Mali-Burkina Faso Sikasso area (Saibou 2007, Cisse 2007). These studies highlight the mobilisation

---

1 As was the case during the blockades in 2003 and 2005 by Senegalese transporters who protested against a price increase on the Gambian ferry (Tandia 2007).
of traditional techniques of peace making and socio-cultural solidarities in the reinforcement of social bonds and border integration. They reveal the close relationship between the functioning of these practices and the efficient management of border areas.

The role of traditional nobilities, meaning customary chiefs and religious authorities and other patriarchal bodies, has gained recognition in peace studies even when this has not been demonstrated in practice. At play is the laborious but stifling diffusion of the unitary State model and decentralisation. Constrained by their ignorance of the linguistic and technical rudiments of modern institutions and local politics (Blundo 1998), these agents (Bidima 1997) partake in a ‘local diplomacy’ (Tandia 2007) that verges on concurrence with official structures. They rarely share initiatives with local administrators and their activities remain impervious to any formal coordination. The style of leadership is not monolithic in this case of cross-border governance in the sense that it embraces traditional forms of conflict prevention and management (Saibou 2007, Cisse 2007, Tandia 2007). Limiting themselves to the representational role of the chief local councillor on the Gambia-Senegal borderland, they exert a rather important influence on the local diplomatic activities. Borderlands being spaces of socio-cultural intermixing, dynamic markets around the "loumò" and transportation, traditional nobilities are regularly engaged to solve disputes where formal settlements are inefficient and their procedures are undesirable (Arragain and Saillot 2005:16). This “catalysis diplomacy” (Ramel 204:879) also ensures peace keeping and peaceful coexistence among cross-border communities.

On the Guinea-Senegale border where it is by default the archetypal governance regime, bringing together civil society, MJPI, the youth, butchers and local chiefs, a "diure" or ‘mirador of peace’, as it has been named, has become a deliberation spot besides palaver trees. By means of meetings and palavers, cultural diplomacy operates in market places, mosques and coach stations. It should be noted that local chiefs have been the first actors of cross-border governance on the Gambia-Senegal border, and the most solicited ones on the Guinea Bissau border. Local councillors assist just as mediators or facilitators by allocating logistic while civil society coordinates meetings, as it is on the Guinea Bissau border. Since the intervention of local chiefs during the last blockade of April 2005 in Farafegni, authoritarian regulation is less used to manage transportation problems. Administrators and local councillors are not as much depreciated or else opposed as they prevent fastidious procedures, which is an instance of reciprocity as well as of supplementation of the State through cross-border governance.

Only used heuristically and for the demands of methodology, these typologies have all the same been useful to read out in a conciliating manner the diversity of actors and their legitimacies

---

2 A Fulani word meaning the weekly cross-border markets organised in Farafegni (Gambia) on Sundays and twice a week or more in the department of Kolda for the Senegal-Guinea border. They drain huge crowds of merchants and traders in the Western Senegambia Space. All in all, from Dakar to Bissau, actors come as traders, craftsmen, farmers, cattle raisers, and other peoples attracted by cheap and rare goods, notably staple foods.

3 Given that cattle rustlers sell the livestock to butchers, the vigilante committees collaborate with them for better oversight.

4 Another Fula word meaning a mirador which is made of bamboo laths among the Fula communities in the Senegal-Guinea Bissau Borderland or wood posts in the Wolof communities of the Gambia-Senegal borderland. It is the symbolic place for “arbitration and settlement of disputes” and can reach a height of 10 to 15 meters.

5 The Senegalese village of Coumbacara in Kolda and its Bissau-Guinean neighbourhoods, the Guinea Bissau village of Cambaju and the rural councils of Kolda in Senegal are the lieu par excellence of the implementation of cultural diplomacy. Coumbacara and surrounding villages in Guinea-Bissau harbour more than 10 miradors of peace.
which are not always conflicting. Instances of overlapping roles among governance actors and the interdependences between cross-border governance sectors, reveal the existence and dynamism of governance realms on borderlands. This has underpinned the way in which the challenges caused by the absence of the State ought to be alleviated by collective border initiatives. This is shown by the fact that the more the State was absent or lacking, as is the case on the Guinea-Bissau-Senegal border, the more civil society commitment was effective. The perceptions and the expectations of one another are indicative of the significance cross-border actors bestow on their collective action which seems to determine the implementation of this (inter)local governance regime.

**Legitimising Cross-border Governance: between the local and the national**

Given that diverse legitimacies are operating, that their actions and perceptions do not always match up even though they all gain recognition and acceptance, we opt for a consideration of the springs of this recognition, of how they justify their activity, individually and collectively. This is what we mean by legitimisation: the meaning ascribed to their collective action irrespective of their national or local institutional memberships. Given the interpretation of representations, local time and space, in terms African social philosophy (Bidima 1997, Yinda-Yinda 2004), we have identified structuring patterns by which cross-border governance gains legitimacy for plural actors and by which this legitimacy is distributed between them. We insisted on the role of identities, beliefs and expectations (Sindjoun 2004) as well as on the resources by which the role of different actors is constructed. As it seemed important to address the question of whether decentralisation mattered in cross-border governance, we also looked at how it can or cannot appear to actors as a source of legitimisation of this collective action. But more than decentralisation, it is the local trans-boundary identities and histories that form the genuine referential by which cross-border governance is defined. Finally, although to a lesser extent than borderland identity, the local-national dialectics stand out as determinants of the social construction of the role of cross-border governance.

**Beyond decentralisation: the effects of local institutional pluralism**

Even though decentralisation as a process of State repositioning did not honour the many expectations it had crystallised, mainly in Gambia and Guinea-Bissau where we even doubt its juridical elaboration, it has had the unexpected effect of sensitising on power and authority stakes that were dormant in peripheral territories. Though often awkwardly and incompletely conducted, the transfer of some competences have converted the traditional uneven power relations into interdependent and loose balances of legitimacies, each claiming social acceptance and utility. The coherence of cross-border governance seems to lie on this pooling of traditional and legal-rational “forms of legitimacies” in the sub-national ponds (Lagroye 1985). In this sense, cross-border governance lies more on this pluralistic regime than on decentralisation which refers to the reign of administrators and local councillors who are a type of actor among others in the local scene. If governance regimes on local and/or border contexts owe much to decentralisation, all legitimacies are valorized. On the Senegal-Guinea Bissau border, where the territoriality of wariness and enclavement impedes decentralisation, the absence and deprivation of local institutions, and the friendships between religious and local councillors and administrators (Fanchette 2002) has crowned civil society actors whose legitimacy is rather functional than nominal. In fact, legitimacy counts less than the contribution each actor is able to make in collective action. Realities of poverty and insecurity on the Senegal-Guinea Bissau...
border, as well as economic imports of trade on the Senegal-Gambia border unevenly command this state of affairs. Another viewpoint that undermines decentralisation as a robust basis for cross-border governance is the belief among actors on the Senegal-Gambia borderland, that decentralised cooperation has less impact on their problems than cross-border governance (Tandia 2007).

**Localism or the communitarian identity of Cross-border Governance**

The legitimisation of cross-border governance appears in fact as a semiotics of borderland challenges, a gauge of an inter-local order which interdependences – complementarities and differentials/discontinuities – must be managed beyond intergovernmentalism. Thus, by localism is first meant the rhetoric of an identity construction stemming from the relational situation of actors (Braspenning 2002:321), given a commonly shared “grammar of signs and symbols” (Yinda-Yinda 2004:324). Second, it is based on the representation, also inter-local, of the border space in a mood of autochthony. Third, it is related to local time, that is, a conception of events both in the inter-local and national contexts. The local discourse patterns disclose the representation of a communitarian transnationalism (Sindjoun 2002:55-69) that professes the transcending of the juridical boundaries by means of an ethic of tolerance that works as the code of social relations. At the same time, such an ethos represents a pragmatics of the ‘local foreign policy’ as a contextualization of national foreign policies, in due proportion with challenges of the inter-local, which thus becomes a relevant scale where foreign policies can be displayed. Given that “any identity has a territorial expression” (Mbembe 2000:38), this localizing rhetoric of the extra-territorial collective action expresses a conception of the border space as a “symbolic and material resource” (Wondji 2005:17) that makes possible the justification of a collective action beneficial to one and the same community.

On the one hand, the borderland is a social space of secular bonds that have resisted statonational authorship of political identity. The discourse about the brotherhood of the twin villages of the Gambia-Senegal border constructs the socio-cultural space that exports cross-border governance beyond boundary-lines (Tandia 2007). Likewise, the miradors of peace and the cultural celebrations on the Senegal-Bissau borderland aims at “bringing the road”, to borrow a local parlance, drawing a symbolic bridge between the cross-border communities (Chroniques frontalieres 2005:10). Identity being a relational material, cross-border governance, which is at the same time a product and an instrument of grassroots integration, articulates an inclusive ‘local citizenship’. First the tradition of brotherhood sanctified in the imaginaries of neighbourliness erases foreignness in favour of a kind of ‘borderland nationalism’. Such a feeling is enforced on the Guinea Bissau-Senegal Fula communities who seem to rebel against a deliberate governmental strategy of enclosure of the High Casamance region (Fanchette 2002). Second, ordinary discourses designate the stranger as a *doomu ndey* ⁶, invoking immemorial African maternity (Yinda-Yinda 2004:341) to nullify difference, a nationally endowed otherness. The Wolof community of the Gambia-Senegal borderland opposed to the stato-national image of Gambia as an “annoying peanut in the belly of Senegal” ⁷ that of the “milk and couscous” mixture that cannot be parted but only drunk naturally. Likewise, the Fula community of the Guinea Bissau-Senegal borderland presents cross-border governance “as a federating sphere that transcends all political, religious or national identities” (Chroniques Frontalieres 2005:10). Third,

---

⁶ Wolof word used in Gambia-Senegal borderland communities that means a brother of the same mother who is different from the half-brother, that is in traditional maternity, the brother with whom we share a father.

⁷ A phrase attributed to former President Abdou Diouf of Senegal by Ebrima Sall (Sall 1991)
the duty of solidarity constructed out of local syncretism that is open to Islamic revelation results in an ethos of palaver and tolerance. In this vein, as noted by the Sous-prefet of Madina Sabakh, “the legitimacy of cross-border governance rests upon the common will of border peoples to live together”. Nevertheless, if localism is the unique coherent legitimating pedestal of cross-border governance, it does not entail a rejection of the persistent figures of State and national identity (Sindjoun 2002, 2004).

Cross-border governance as a response to the borderland interdependencies and State want
The intergovernmental relationships between Senegal and its Western Senegambia neighbours are also a pretext for a realist consideration of cross-border governance and its identitary foundations. This stance is particularly necessary as this local collective action aims at negotiating a cross-border cohabitation which is not always easy. The attitude borderland communities have toward events between national States reveals a divide of local histories following the lines drawn by intergovernmental relationships and local interdependences.

In the face of cross-border complex interdependencies, the social representation of frontiers as material resources provokes a utilitarian behaviour among actors to their conscious interests. If borderlands are “scenes of international relations, this owes much to their being spaces of important stakes for sub-national actors” (Sindjoun 2002:72), notably economic ones. The tension between local and national temporalities reveals actors that, in addition to the communitarian transnationalism, obey an “identitary fluidity” (Sindjoun 2004:12) which enunciates the national, beyond or along with the inter-local. It is clear that differentials in terms of material facilities explain the proneness of Gambian and Bissau-Guinean communities to seek schooling and sanitation in Senegalese local territories or else benefit from inoculation campaigns.

Cross-border governance is undeniably a governmentality that supplements differentials of State want and redistributes complementarities. Nevertheless, it is from another point of view a realm for the reproduction of the State. The escorts of Senegalese supporters after football matches in Gambia as well as the football games and celebrations (festivals, marriage, funerals, initiatory rites) on borderlands are occasions on which the intervention of administrative, political and security agents expresses a “culture of the State” (Meye 2004:183). Likewise, the checkpoint rituals are accepted even if identity papers are not always presented, which is an expression of the idea of national rights and duties and international sovereignty. It appears from what precedes that the ethos of tolerance and solidarity instilled by localism as a transnational legitimating identity is closely linked to the necessity to assume border constraints collectively. Moreover, the enunciation of the inter-State code in cross-border governance proceeds also with a critic of intergovernmental relations as they impinge on border problems when they do not overemphasize them.

Intergovernmental diplomacy is often responsible for some misunderstandings while at the same time inappropriate in its centralism. Consequently, cross-border governance appears as an incomparable mechanism of inter-national regulation to this Senegalese sous-prefet: “Here we want to go fast, by means of facilitation, mediation, and so on. Because when it comes to diplomatic formulas there are things that drag on. Let us take the example of a blockade on the border because a Senegalese passenger has abused a Gambian policeman. Do we have to wait for
the ministry of foreign affairs of Senegal to be informed and that in his turn he refers to the President who calls his Gambian counterpart? That’s a bit long and fastidious procedure people could not wait for to attend to their business”. What is deducible here is not a negation of the State, but an empirical illustration of governance as a recreation of the public realm and (inter)State governmentality, which thus implies to look at the functional legitimacy or utility of cross-border governance.

Cross-border governance as an instrument for trans-boundary cooperation and grass-roots integration

The preceding analysis on the meaning actors give to their collective action on the one hand and the interest they attach to it on the other, reveals a certain number of expectations they place on cross-border governance. On the satisfaction of these expectations depends what might be termed the social utility of cross-border governance. The analysis of this functional legitimacy through the means, procedures and goals of cross-border governance results in the identification of three types of functions that render it effective. However, there are undeniable shortcomings that relativise cross-border governance in its international and national pretences.

An effective system of social integration and political regulation

Added to the temporal criteria of longevity of cross-border governance on the Senegal-Gambia borderland, the routinisation of reciprocal exchanges of civilities among actors on both sides and of all legitimacies refers to Hyden’s reciprocal relationships as markers of a working governance realm. The functioning of cross-border governance in peacetime and wartime altogether refers back to the idea of responsiveness of leadership. Inversely, their responsibility is doubtful, notably at the Senegal-Guinea Bissau border where political and administrative authorities, and to a less extent security forces, are overshadowed by civil society. The friendship of administrators and religious notabilities on both borderlands in local electoral politics (Sall 1991) also adds doubt to this responsibility. On the contrary, and consequently, citizen oversight is a lifeline for Senegal-Guinea border peoples, while on the Gambia-Senegal communities of Farafegni and Madina Sabakh, where there is a relative State presence by way of the effectiveness of political and administrative institutions, citizen oversight and influence stays at the stage of approval of cross-border governance. Even though these observations are a basis for empirical validation of the theoretical and comparative approach of cross-border governance, they say little about the practical effectiveness of cross-border governance in its political aspirations. On this question, the analysis has yielded instances where cross-border governance presents virtues in border management, social integration and conflict prevention.

Border management as an effective modality of cross-border governance can be illustrated at two levels. First, the administrative coordination between all civil and military institutions and political councils, very mostly on the Senegal-Gambia border, covers achievements such as facilitation and negotiation of borderland activities and events across constituencies. A Senegalese sous-prefet coined the expression ‘cross-border inter-institutional cooperation’ to name this dynamic of pooling of structures. “Common sector-based committees” including all types of actors on the Senegal-Gambia borders, and to a less extent traditional nobilities, deliberate on domains ranging from security, decentralized cooperation and environment. Less polyvalent are the vigilante committees and miradors of peace and palaver trees between the Senegal constituencies of Kolda and Sitato-Cuntima or Contuboel in Guinea Bissau. Second, the
control of commercial flows spreading out from the borders is the field of security forces and customs. On both borders, petty annoyance and occasional quarrels between economic operators and the police are reduced to the minimum, while joint operations and forestry guards save the green reserves.

Indirectly accomplished, the social integration function of cross-border governance corresponds to the promotion of neighbourliness and peaceful coexistence in borderlands. Given that it alleviates the differentials in play imposed by interdependencies, cross-border governance permanently prevents any disruption of local peace and neighbourliness. The use of socio-cultural solidarities and geographic and economic complementarities minimizes the effects of differentials and low intensity criminality. With the benefit of this integrative property, scarcity stricken and wariness Bissau-Guinean communities are progressively relieved of political instability and poverty at home. It follows that the combined effects of border management and social integration result in the curbing of tensions and conflicts that could rise or get poisoned. Concretely, as a cultural diplomacy of neighbourliness and a cooperative security system, cross-border governance operates as a ‘preventive diplomacy’ that implicates either administrators or local customary and religious chiefs. At another level, structural or permanent prevention of conflict derives from the influence of the promotion of neighbourliness among borderland communities. Effective through its patterns of cooperation, peace, neighbourliness and social integration, cross-border governance presents also some limits it would be inappropriate to lose sight of.

A perfectible governmentality

As we have already noted, the institutional framework or structure dimension of cross-border governance is man-made to some extent, or else ‘informal’, and institutionalized to another, that is ‘formal’. This equates in its actor dimension to the pluralistic regime of its rule making, deliberative and functioning modalities. Therefore, while institutional shortcomings undoubtedly characterise such a regime of public policy or collective action (Braud 2006), they might result in operational defects.

As concerns institutional weaknesses a first one is related to the absence of a juridical framework (Faye 2006) given that actors do not think they are acting on the basis of decentralisation codes or decentralised institutions, which cannot be denied in the scarcity and wariness Senegal-Guinea Bissau borderland of State want. Even though cross-border governance owes much to local administrators, far more than local councillors, it cannot be implied that it evolves in the realm of the limping decentralisation process, and this is probably the reason why it works. This latter, it has to be remembered, is on the one hand contrary to any legal-rational legitimacy authoritatively overshadowing other legitimacies, and remains on the other an incomplete process (Gellar 1995, Fanchette 2002, Faye 2006). Consequently, a second institutional weakness is the lack of juridical capacity and financial and logistical means. For instance, since domains such as peace, defense and security are not transferred competences in local territories, it follows that no means are planned for them. That is why actors on the Senegal-Gambia borderland admit that they restrain cross-border governance to basic domains such as peace, security, forestry and commercial flows. Other domains such as schooling, sanitation and environmental issues most of the time fall at the discretion of populations and civil servants. On the Guinea Bissau-Senegal borderland, cattle rustling, farming, and markets are the basic
domains that attract much attention. This institutional weakness yields operational hindrances for cross-border governance.

These operational obstacles are of two types. First, the pluralistic regime nature of cross-border governance mingles with the vertical inequalities between actors. As a consequence, some of them are confined or restricted in their contribution. This is the case of traditional chiefs on the Senegal-Gambia borderland whose importance in local politics is at any rate understated (Tandia 2007). This factional participation is inverted on the Guinea Bissau-Border where civil society overshadows official authorities enmeshed in their friendship politics of survival. Second, the weak capacities of local structures, notably on the Guinea-Bissau Senegal border, mingle with the monopoly of rudiments of local government by political and administrative authorities.

Conclusion
This paper examined the meaning of borders through the nature and potential of trans-boundary communitarian initiatives, and consequently through the grassroots’ regional or inter-national dynamics of self-government. This potential bore interest only when related to national and regional challenges of cross-border and grassroots governance. Given that these dynamics embrace the contours of collective action and implied looking at politics of decentralisation and State transformation, we resorted to governance as a theoretical framework. At another level, in a context where regional integration discourse and politics are oriented toward ‘border areas’ as a new site of political and institutional renewal of (inter)State dynamics, we thought it appropriate to build on an empirical corpus and attempt a comparative analysis so as interrogate this paradigm that is almost established.

As a first step, this study identified cross-border governance as a new governmentality of inter-local management of borders which stand as political territories and identitary scenes of much significance to State dynamics. The three modalities of cross-border action – administrative coordination, security cooperation and cultural diplomacy – engendered the discovery of the pluralistic actor dimension, the public realm and service, and the communitarian structural dimension. This latter opened the gate to the relationship between border space and identity as a framework within which the legitimacy and efficiency of cross-border governance could be appreciated.

It was shown that the legitimacy of cross-border governance stems from the meaning of borderlands, which in turn is given by localism as an identitary construct that re-appropriates cross-border complementarities and differential constraints as well as intergovernmental relations of Western Senegambian States. In this respect, the extent to which cross-border governance was not a subversive governmentality opposed to States, neither in its identitary nor territorial manifestations, has been analysed. On the contrary, we would like to ask if its relatively important effectiveness does not present is as an identitary bridge between orphaned border communities and “weak” States, which would bring borderlands or border areas to stand as territorial girders for intergovernmentalism.

---

Tandia, Borders and Borderlands Identities

A few lessons emanate from the comparative analysis of this study while raising a few questions. First, if national differences in terms of institutional tradition and structural capacity constitute obstacles to cross-border governance as revealed on the Senegal-Guinea Bissau borderland – allusion made to the effects of political instability and lack of national integration – to what extent could cross-border governance be hindered as a potential paradigm for cross-border initiatives on regional integration? One question this throws up is to what extent decentralisation could help bridge the gap and prevent this weakening of cross-border governance by reinforcing its pluralistic regime. This leads to the second set of issues that with relevance at the level of regional politics.

The ECOWAS and the African Union have launched border initiatives in their post Cold War or post-transition renaissance agendas. While the former has opted in its 2006 memorandum for an “institutionalisation” of cross-border governmentalities, the latter is still refining its border program which is not really different from that of West Africa. It was considered that if cross-border governance is successful in diluting national identities and connect national territories and ethnic groups, attention should be given to overcoming the institutional and operational shortcomings that hamper it and yet come from State crisis. In other words, the issue is not that of revising the (inter)governmental reified centering of the State toward an (inter)Society re-centering of governance. Does this not equate to adjusting State transformation or (re)construction to cross-border governance through its two micro and macro dynamics that are decentralisation and regionalism? Will national States make room for the local covenants arrived at on border areas in West Africa? As far as the ECOWAS is concerned, will member States ratify and implement cooperatively and harmoniously the regional covenant on cross-border cooperation?

References


Women, Shari’ah, and Zina in Northern Nigeria

Oluwakemi Adesina
Osun State University
Osogbo

Abstract

In 2000 and 2002, two women – Safiya Hussein and Amina Lawal – were tried and convicted for Zina in Northern Nigeria. The verdicts handed down was death by stoning; the punishment for adultery (zina) by Islamic law. Zina is considered one of the greatest sins in Islam. Thus, Islamic law prescribes stoning as the penalty for a married person, while the punishment for an unmarried male adulterer is one hundred lashes or being exiled for twelve months. The basis for the chastisement is the Qur’an, while the source for the punishment is found in the Hadith. The immediate reaction of the people of Northern Nigeria was that of happiness. Several reasons have been adduced for this feeling. According to Ogbu Kalu, the sentences were considered “a mark of identity, a measure of mobilization of the Islamic ummah, hope for greater social security, employment for shari’ah enforcers, belief that it would engender development and true religious commitment”. (Kalu, O.:2004)

Meanwhile, Section 1 of the Nigerian Constitution avers that “the Constitution is supreme and its provision shall have binding force on all authorities and persons throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria,” (including all its 36 States in Nigeria as well as the Federal Capital Territory ). Section 1(3) further states “If any other law is inconsistent with the provision of this Constitution, this Constitution shall prevail, and that other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistence, be void.” Thus, this paper investigates the reactions of the civil society, particularly Muslim women of southwestern Nigeria to the issue of “stoning”, bearing in mind that the men who impregnated these women were set free by the same law that sentenced these two women to death by stoning.
In the Name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful! This is a sura which We have revealed and sanctioned, proclaiming in it clear revelations so that you may take heed. The adulterer and the adulteress shall each be given a hundred lashes. Let no pity for them detain you from obedience to Allah, if you truly believe in Allah and the last day; and let their punishment be witnessed by a number of believers. The adulterer may marry only an adulterer or an idolater; and the adulteress may marry only an adulterer or an idolater. True believers are forbidden such (marriages). Those that defame honourable women and cannot produce four witnesses shall be given eighty lashes. And do not accept their testimony ever after, for they are great transgressors – except those among them that afterwards repent and mend their ways. Allah is forgiving, Merciful.

And those who accuse their wives and have no witnesses except themselves, let each of them testify by swearing four times by Allah that his charge is true, calling down in the fifth time upon himself the curse of Allah if he is lying. But they shall spare her the punishment if she swears four times by Allah that his charge is false and calls down Allah’s wrath upon herself if it be true. If it were not for Allah’s grace and mercy on you and that He is forgiving and Wise, (He would immediately uncover your sins and hasten your punishment).1

Introduction

The question of whether to follow established rules (fiqh) or derive new rules from principles (usul) of Islamic law has been one of the major controversies in Islamic discourses of modernity, women’s rights and gender equality.2 This is relevant to the cases of the two Northern Nigerian women tried for zina because of the gender bias exhibited in the court convictions. Recent developments in the study of women in Muslim societies have emphasized gender equality and Islam’s compatibility with women’s emancipation and social justice as mandated in the Qur’an.3 Badran contends that:

The basic argument of Islamic feminism is that the Qur’an affirms the principle of equality of all human beings but that the practice of equality of women and men (and other categories of people) has been impeded or subverted by patriarchal ideas (ideology) and practices. Islamic jurisprudence, fiqh, consolidated in its classical form in the 9th century, was itself heavily saturated with the patriarchal thinking and behaviors of the day.4

The sources for this view continue to be the Qur’an, the Hadith and the lives of prominent women in early Islam. In Nigeria, for example, the stories of Aisha; the Prophet’s wife and Nana Asmau; a daughter of the early nineteenth century religious, intellectual and political leader, Uthman Dan Fodio, have become popular models of such knowledgeable Muslim women. Thus, Northern Nigerian Muslims still justify male dominance and female subordination based on texts from the Qur’an.

The purpose of this paper is to explore how Northern and Southern Nigerian Muslims’ interpretations of Islamic practices affect Muslim women at different levels of society, and how this relate to the widespread debate over the fate of the two Northern Nigerian women under

---

1 The Holy Qur’an; Sura al-Nur 24:1-10.
4 Badran, “Islamic feminism”, p.4.
study. Fundamental differences between the two regions emerged in the public debate over the court decisions that sentenced these Muslim women to death by stoning after their convictions for adultery in 2001 and 2002. Whereas many Northern Nigerian Muslims supported these sentences, Southern Nigerian Muslims generally regarded them as unfair, unequal, and a violation of their basic constitutional rights. Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, a Kano prince, who has written many articles about Shari’ah, maintains that there is substantial disagreement among Muslim scholars concerning the treatment of women and Islamic jurisprudence. He asserts that:

…even a cursory student of Islamic history knows that all the trappings of gender inequality present in Muslim Society have socio-economic as opposed to religious roots. The excessive restriction of women and other manifestations of male domination are no more an integral part of Islam as a religion than, say, the sanctification of the Arabic language and the tendency towards institutionalized racism which appear in some literatures of those days. Muslim men, like men everywhere, are the last to accept that gender inequality is a social contraption rather than a religious imperative. This is natural not only because men are the ultimate beneficiaries of this inequality but also only those who are victims of injustice tend to see it and appreciate the absurdity of attributing it to God.  

Here I will examine two cases that have received a great deal of attention in the Nigerian and international press in my consideration of the disadvantaged status of northern Nigerian Muslim women. The first is that of Safiya Hussein of Tungar-Tudu. She was convicted of adultery by an upper Shari’ah court seating in Gwadabawa, Sokoto State, on 9 October 2001. The second is that of Amina Lawal of Funtua. The same type of court convicted her on the same charge in Bakori, Katsina State on 22 March 2002. Both were sentenced to death by stoning -- the hadd (punishment) for zina. The men with whom they committed adultery, however, went unpunished. Indeed, the traditional requirement of the Shari’ah law of four truthful eyewitnesses to the act of sexual intercourse was demanded, but in neither case did such eyewitnesses contest successfully the claims of the women. Thus, it seems that the opinion of the court was gender-biased. As far as the judges were concerned, the condition of pregnancy was enough basis for their conviction.

Safiya Hussein and Amina Lawal

Safiya Hussein was a thirty-five year old mother-of-five when she became the first woman to be sentenced to death by stoning in Nigeria. The fifth of twelve children, she grew up in the remote poverty-stricken village of Tungar Tudu, in Chimola district of Gwadabawa Local Government Area of Sokoto State. Her first marriage took place when she was twelve years old, but it did not last very long. As is common in Hausaland, she married two more times, but unfortunately, both marriages ended in divorce. After her third divorce in 1998, she began receiving the attention of another man, Yakubu, whom she alleged, raped her. Safiya’s troubles began on 23 December 2000. Her younger brother reported her to the Hizbah group, the local Shari’ah implementation

---

8 Lamido, ‘The real crime’.
committee.9 Safiya was arrested and detained at Gwadabawa police station. Thereafter, she appeared before the lower Shari’ah court, which transferred the case to the upper Shari’ah court in Gwadabawa.10 After an arduous court process she was condemned to death by stoning.11 Safiya accused her neighbor, Yakubu, of rape. In her words, she explained what transpired between her and Yakubu:

He met me in the bush, the whole thing turned to madness. He subdued me with his power and assaulted me. There was also a time I went to a nearby village. He subdued me again and had carnal knowledge of me. It happened three times. There is no King like Allah. I told him this thing you’ve done to me, I leave you in the hands of Allah, because I did not willingly give myself to you … For months, I did not tell anyone for shame.12

The date of Safiya’s conception became an important part of the appeal against her conviction. As her lawyers pointed out, she had actually conceived her baby a month before the implementation of Shari’ah in Sokoto State in June 2000.13 Thus, no crime had been committed. According to her accusers, Safiya’s pregnancy itself bore witness to her “crime”, arguing that according to the Maliki School of jurisprudence, pregnancy is prima facie, evidence of zina.14 She was to be stoned after weaning her baby.15

Throughout Nigeria, Safiya Hussein conviction mobilized human rights groups and women’s groups to organize an appeal against her conviction because it was a gross violation of her constitutional rights and gender inequality. More so, since Yakubu was not convicted. Meanwhile, Pro-Shari’ah forces marshaled public opinion in support of Safiya’s sentence. The Grand khadi and the other judges of the Shari’ah court of appeal argued that:

It is not allowed for a person to beg for another who has been brought before a court for the offence of theft or zina punishment. It is compulsory to punish them with Hadd punishment if they are found guilty. Even if they swear not to do it again; and they change into good people. Because the issue of the Hadd, if it is before an Imam and the suspect is found guilty, this is Allah’s right; it is not proper for a person to save another from Hadd punishment.16

In response, Safiya’s supporters claimed that she had been accused of an offence about which she was ignorant. After her sentence, she expressed her surprise at such harsh treatment:

I felt like dying that day [of the sentence] because of the injustice. I never thought there would be such a penalty. It is because I am poor, my family is poor, and I am a woman [translation from Hausa as in the original].17

9 Kalu, ‘Safiyya and Adamah’, p. 394
10 Kalu, ‘Safiyya and Adamah’, p. 394
14 Kalu, ‘Safiyya and Adamah’, p.396
15 Kalu, ‘Safiyya and Adamah’, p. 394
Altogether twenty human and women’s rights groups came together in the ‘Safiya Must Not Die Campaign’ (SMND) to organize her appeal. These activist groups were Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) like BAOBAB, Civil Liberties Organization, Access to Justice, the Campaign for Democracy, Women’s Rights Advancement and Protection Alternative, the National Coalition on Violence against Women, Women’s Defence Project, the International Federation of Women’s lawyers, the National Council of Women’s Societies and Women Advocates’ Research and Documentation Centre, and others. All these groups opposed Safiya’s sentence of death by stoning. They articulated a variety of concerns in Safiya’s case. They hoped to fight against the execution and sentences, particularly to prevent a reoccurrence. In defending Safiya’s case, some supporters drew attention to Safiya’s daughter, Adamah, who would be deprived of a mother. Others emphasized that the law was biased along gender and class lines for only women and the poor bore the brunt of the Shari’ah law.

The second case involving a sentence of stoning to death was that of Amina Lawal, who had given birth to a child, Wassila, outside of marriage. She was thirty years old, uneducated, and lived in her father’s polygamous household with his two wives and numerous children in Kurami, Katsina State. On 22 March 2002, a Shari’ah court in Bakori, Katsina State had sentenced Amina to death by stoning. Like Safiya, she was a poor woman who had been seduced and abandoned by her lover. She insisted the man responsible for her pregnancy, Yahaya Muhammad, had promised to marry her. However, he denied paternity of her child and produced four witnesses who testified he did not have a sexual relationship with Amina. As with Safiya’s case, the man involved in the case went free.

As in the case of Safiya, human rights and women’s groups organized the campaign to free Amina. As a result, her case became an international cause célèbre. Amnesty International and other groups launched a campaign of letter writing and petitions calling for the release of Amina. The details of this case are well known, and I need not describe them here. After many months, the Nigerian-based women’s rights group in customary, secular and religious laws; BAOBAB, complained that well-meaning women’s and human rights groups hindered their efforts in organizing an appeal case based on local understanding of diplomacy and law. BAOBAB officials argued that they had a better local understanding of diplomacy and law, and had already achieved some success because of the strategy they had developed. Together with the lawyers, BAOBAB succeeded in getting the conviction overturned. Safiya was freed in March 2002 and Amina; September 2003. Amina Lawal, on the other hand has since remarried on 2 April 2004.

The Nigerian Press

The international media and western scholars have addressed many aspects of the Shari’ah case, ignoring the opinions of Nigerians. This paper seeks to shed light on the opinions of the Nigerian people as promoted in some of the newspapers. It examines press reports and a limited number of interviews with residents of Ibadan, the second largest city in Nigeria. Its population is roughly fifty percent Christian and fifty percent Muslim. It looks at such issues like the position of Muslim women in the southwest, reactions of Muslim women to the two cases of zina, and reactions of some Christians and other persons in southwestern Nigeria.

While the cases of Safiya Hussein and Amina Lawal prompted a nation-wide debate about the status of women under Shari’ah, southwestern Nigerian Muslims and Christians departed radically from Northern Nigerian Muslim opinion. The print media became a major vehicle in the development of public opinion. Since the mid-nineteenth century there has been a strong Nigerian press operated by an articulate indigenous intelligentsia that has deployed newspapers as an important vehicle to mobilize public opinion.24 However, from the 1970s, the press has taken part in the dialogue about women’s participation in public life and Shari’ah. The largest number of newspapers and news magazines are based in Lagos but important newspapers are also published in Ibadan, Ilorin, Abia and Onitsha.25 Their coverage reflects the fact that their readers are both Muslims and Christians.

The southern Nigerian press therefore provides important material for understanding the perceptions of Southern Nigerians regarding the cases of Safiya Hussein and Amina Lawal. Historically, there has been an easy tolerance between Muslims and Christians in this region. Among the Yoruba, it is common to find Muslim and Christian members of the same family happily co-existing with one another. Intermarriage between the two faiths is also common. Southern Nigerian newspaper editorials and articles have reflected the opinions and fears of all sectors of the community, both Christians and Muslims. They have commented on the constitutional interpretation of the practice of Shari’ah and as practiced in the twelve Shari’ah states.26 Considered together, this public discourse was geared towards the realization of national unity in the multi-ethnic and multi-religious society like Nigeria. In this section of the paper, I shall be examining the reactions of a Muslim, a Christian, and a Lawyer. I will also analyze the editorial reaction of The Guardian, one of the most widely read newspaper published in Lagos. Barrister Bashir Hammed Folorunsho is a Yoruba Muslim lawyer in Ilorin, Kwara State (northern Nigeria). Ilorin is solely a Muslim society.27 Ilorin is an important Muslim town and its importance dated back to not later than 1817, when it became a jihadist center for the expansion of revivalist Islam into southwestern Nigeria.28 He holds the view that Shari’ah as practiced in


25 The Guardian Newspapers (Lagos), The Daily Sun (Lagos), The Comet (Lagos), The Vanguard (Lagos), The Punch (Lagos), The Nigerian Tribune (Ibadan), THISDAY (Lagos), and The Monitor (Ibadan).

26 Twelve States that instituted the Shari’ah in Nigeria are: Zamfara, Niger, and Gombe States (January 2000); Kano, Sokoto, Katsina, Bauchi, Borno, Jigawa, Kebbi, Kaduna, and Yobe States (June 2000).


the twelve Northern states of Nigeria was unconstitutional. He said that Shari’ah law exists in Ilorin, being a purely Islamic society, but the Shari’ah practiced in Ilorin is different from what obtains in the north. Barrister Folorunsho stated that:

Sharia has been the core centre of Islam in Nigeria since the Jihad of Usman Dan Fodio in 1804. And apart from a few cities like Zaria, Kano, Sokoto, you cannot see elsewhere the type of what is happening in Ilorin. Virtually all Ilorin people are Muslims. You don’t have anybody from Ilorin that can tell you he’s a Christian. He must have come from a neighboring town. So, Sharia has been our system from the beginning. We don’t believe in that (Shari’ah) of Zamfara. Do you know why? Sharia has been there for a very long time, and you know we have Sharia court of Appeal all over the northern part of the country. And if you look at the constitution, it allows this. Any state that wants can have the Sharia court of appeal. And our legal system there has been entrenched in it. Even if you go to the penal code, you now have two codes in Nigeria. The other one is the criminal code. The penal code of the north has already taken care of so many things concerning Sharia. … The one you see in Zamfara is purely the criminal aspect of it, which the constitution did not allow from the beginning. It’s the one they are now hammering on, that somebody commits adultery, and you should stone him etc. The only difference is that we don’t do that in Ilorin. You know the constitution does not allow it.

The Deputy Secretary General of the Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria (CSN), Reverend Father George Ehusani also responded to the Shari’ah debate, putting a Christian view forward. He contended that Shari’ah is capable of dividing the country:

Reacting at the weekend in Lagos to the amputation carried out in Zamfara State, Ehusani said the development had made it more urgent for a serious discussion on the need for the corporate existence of Nigeria. We want a new constitution for this country and if that is going to be brought through a serious National conference; through a constitutional review or whatever form, all that we are calling for is a new constitution for this country that will guarantee freedom of religion, where the state will have nothing to do with the prescription of any religion.

These two commentaries centered on the practice of Shari’ah and its implications to the unity of the Nigerian state. Olusegun Adeniyi, of This Day devoted his article, to the issue of the two women accused of zina. In his word:

These stories (the two women accused of zina) have become rather instructive because in his sermon in our Church last Sunday, Brother Lamere Ajanaku, a young man with pastoral calling who is still marking time in the banking hall, raised one interesting poser, “What about the man who was committing adultery with the woman, what happened to him?” … The message in there is that women have always been victims in this game and now we can understand why Amina (and Safiya) has to bear the brunt alone for an act committed by two people.


29 Barrister B. Folorunso, ‘The Constitution…’.
Adesina, Women, Shariah and Zina

…the Islamic code under which Amina (and Safiya) were convicted was introduced after the act, not before, which means it would be retroactive, if carried out.

I have said it before and I want to repeat it again that the sad thing about the nature of Sharia being implemented in the North today is that it seems to be targeted at poor people and especially against women. It is indeed increasingly becoming a class thing.

And on the issue of adultery, we know the way many of our big people in Nigeria are with women. Majority of them, whether in the North or South, have no moral scruples. Yet it is this same set of people who would preach piety, who would order that a woman be stoned to death for having a child out of wedlock.31

From Olusegun Adeniyi’s article, I have observed that not only did the issues relating to Shari’ah appealed to journalists, they also became subjects of sermons in Churches. This shows the level of concern generated by the convictions of the two women tried for zina. The Guardian newspaper of 28 February 2000 provides an excellent summary of Southern Nigerian views published in its editorial:

Two issues are immediately fore grounded for consideration by the riots in Kaduna over the introduction of the Sharia in that state. First, is the reaction of the Christian community to what they consider a deliberate infringement on their rights as citizens within a secular state. Second, is the nature and form of the introduction of the Sharia itself. Following the nature and the adoption of Sharia in Zamfara state, … This has caused considerable tension between Christians and Moslems, and that is perhaps an understatement. …Close to 600 persons have lost their lives. A strange, macabre orgy of killing and deaths has overtaken that otherwise multi-ethnic and diverse state. What we faced with is religious intolerance.

We recognize the right of Muslims to fulfil the tenets of Islam to the letter, but the carnage that Sharia has brought is indefensible. Now Christians in Kaduna state are demanding their own portion of the state, a free and safe haven where they can be Christians. The Sharia issue is turning out to be extremely explosive. What economic advantages do its promoters seek? What is their interest in the Nigerian nation? What they want is really indeterminable. That is why the Federal Government must rise up today to halt the descent into this clearly avoidable abyss.32

Men wrote all these newspaper articles. Both Muslim and Christian women in Southern Nigeria hesitated to enter into the press debate, but they were more forthcoming in the personal interviews I had with them. I conducted fourteen interviews; seven men and seven women in Ibadan. There were more Muslims than there were Christians. Most Christians whom I approached said they were not familiar with Shari’ah and so could not comment on the issue. It proved to be difficult to get Muslims to talk. Public sensitivity to the Shari’ah debate in Nigeria is responsible for people’s reluctance to discuss the issue. Most of the women insisted on remaining anonymous. The people I interviewed had a variety of responses to issues surrounding the two accused of zina. Their perspectives were informed mainly by the fact that Yoruba land ‘was proverbial for its religious tolerance.’33

Southwestern Nigerian Muslim women belong to a variety of women Islamic organizations. They have established these organizations mostly for promoting the learning of the precepts of the Qur’an, encouraging the development of good Muslim homes. Women believe that they are the major instrument through which this dream can be realized.34 According to Alhaja Lateefah

32 “Sharia and the Kaduna riots” The Guardian newspaper (Lagos), February 28, 2000, p. 20.
34 Interview with Mrs. Nike Ishola, Feb. 27, 2004, Ibadan.
Okunnu, a Lagos politician and the first woman to hold office as a deputy governor, Muslim women organizations were:

…established to meet the dual purpose of informing their members on the religion of Islam and propagating the faith. Among their common objectives are the creation of avenues for proper understanding of the religion of Islam and propagating the faith. Among their common objectives are the creation of avenues for proper understanding of the religion, identification of the problems of Muslim women and helping to solve them, and proper education and up-bringing of children according to the tenets of Islam, as well as efforts to help the less fortunate members of the society. As a result of these activities, we now have many Qur’anic schools for children, nursery schools with Islamic bias and adult literacy classes. The effects of these efforts are visible. Muslim women are becoming articulate on matters of religion and Islamic education is within the reach of many Muslim children.35

From this statement and the objectives of the Federation of Muslim Women’s Association of Nigeria (FOMWAN), it is clear that Muslim women in Southwestern Nigeria do not view gender-equality as the most important objective for improving their lives. Instead, they are more inclined towards promoting the spiritual and physical welfare of their members.36 Mrs. Ishola, a member of the Badirudeen Asalat Circle, contends that:

All the activities of our organizations are carried out in accordance with the precept of the Holy Qur’an. Apart from the reading of the Qur’an, which is normally done at the beginning of every meeting, the other important program is prayer. Any activity or activities, which are contrary to the teaching of the Qur’an are not carried out. The position of women in the Qur’an does not give room for parity between women and men. Women as a result of the fact that they are either wives in their husbands’ homes or daughters in their fathers’ homes are to respect and obey their husbands and fathers. These orders are Islamically guided. To engage in hermeneutics towards enhancing gender equality and justice is to commit a grievous sin.37

However, both Okunnu and Ishola hold the view that, though the Qur’an spelt out in details the relationship between husbands and wives, the position of women is not geared towards making women occupy any subservient role. They believe that those provisions in the Qur’an that restrict women’s movement, exposure, dressing, and their general way of life are meant to protect them from harassment.38 This they say does not imply they should not work. As far as they are concerned, the Qur’an permits them to work and acquire some education. Alhaja Bilikisu Raji, a prominent member of the NASFAT Islamic Society -- though a trader and not educated, says she values education. She says all her children, both male and female, are graduates. She said in Yoruba: tori omo ni mo se n sise – this literally means I am working because of my children.39 There is no bias against the education of the girl-child in the Muslim societies of Southern Nigeria. Alhaja Raji corroborates her standpoint with some Hadith verses:

Acquisition of knowledge is a duty bound on every male and female Muslim. Knowledge is also property of every Muslim. He has a right to it wherever he finds it. Seek knowledge even if it is available in so

36 Alhaja Lateefah Okunnu ‘Women, Secularism and Democracy .... See also http://www.ifh.org.uk/fomwan.html . FOMWAN is a federation of over 150 Muslim associations spread across Nigeria.
37 Interview with Mrs. Nike Ishola, Feb. 27, 2004, Ibadan.
Adesina, Women, Shariah and Zina

distant a land as China. The virtues of a learned believer is like the virtues of the moon over the rest of the stars.  

When Shari’ah was newly introduced in the North, Mrs. Ishola’s group (the Badirudeen Asalat Circle) enquired from their Imam if it was right to have Shari’ah in multi-ethnic and multi-religious States of Nigeria. They were told by their Imam that Shari’ah as introduced in Northern Nigeria was right, because it should be the law for all Muslims but that Nigeria was not at the stage where Shari’ah could be practiced. Their Imam shared Asad’s view:

The Islamic state must be so constituted that every individual, man and woman, may enjoy that minimum material well-being … for there can be no real happiness and security and strength in a society that permits some of its members to suffer undeserved want while others have more than they need. Where the state does not fulfill its duties with regard to every one of its members, it has no right to invoke the full sanction of criminal law (hadd) against the individual transgressor, but must confine itself to milder forms of administrative punishment.

On the women accused of zina:

When the first one happened (Safiya Hussein) we were not too interested because we knew it would not happen in here and because we believed that since it was so decreed in the Koran, the punishment as prescribed must be carried out. But when the second sentence (Amina Lawal) was pronounced on that woman who was pregnant out of wedlock there was a serious outcry centered not on the need to carry out the injunctions of the Koran on such sins but on why the men concerned in both cases were freed. We took the case to our religious leaders who had serious talks with us. They said that though the women were guilty and had to be punished, they wished such executions should not be carried out so as to preserve the image of Nigeria. But for us women we did not want the sentence to be carried out as long as the women were going to suffer the punishments alone.

The Muslim women I interviewed were distinctly disinterested in the two cases of zina addressed by this paper. They were not particularly interested in the court proceedings, but they agreed that Safiya Hussein and Amina Lawal had been treated unfairly. They agreed that the women should be released since the men had been released. They hesitated to air their opinions for fear by rebuke their religious leaders. One informant, Alhaja Bilikisu Raji [a pseudonym], said:

I am not aware of the proceedings of the case and how the Ulamas arrived at the conclusion that the women are guilty. I am not in support of the introduction of Sharia Law in any part of the country. This is not because the law is not good. It is because of the fact that it was a politically motivated one. Nigeria as a country cannot practice the law like several countries in the Middle East, which has been used to it for several centuries. Also, the nature of the administration of justice can easily be twisted by any category of learned Islamic Scholar because of the need to achieve some set of chauvinistic purposes. The Amina’s case is a disgrace to the position of Nigeria in the comity of states. I am not happy with the judgment because of the fact that Sharia law and its administration in the Northern part of the country was an aberration. I am not very versed in the provisions of the Sharia Law. This is based on the fact that is not practiced in this part of the country. Generally, several Islamic organizations, which I know, were not happy about the judgment at all. The only impediment is that one will look very crazy by trying to publicly denounce the judgment of the

---

40 Hadith of the Holy Prophet Verses 50 – 52.
41 Interview with Mrs. Nike Ishola, Feb. 27, 2004, Ibadan.
43 Interview with Mrs. Nike Ishola, Feb. 27, 2004, Ibadan.
Ulamas in the North. Religion is a very volatile thing. Ones argument can easily be misinterpreted or misunderstood. That is why several Muslim women or women organizations during that period were not obliged to make public their disposition to the issue. A lot of us are not well versed in the teachings of the Qur’an. It will be very crazy for us to therefore argue for or against the provision of the Sharia Law.44

Apart from fear of rebuke by religious leaders, the limited knowledge of the provisions of the Shari’ah law by southwestern Nigerian women was responsible for their silence on the issue, which affected their counterparts in the North. The Muslim women I interviewed were distinctly disinterested in the two cases of zina addressed by this paper. They were not particularly interested in the court proceedings, but they agreed that Safiya Hussein and Amina Lawal had been treated unfairly. One informant, Alhaja Amoke Kadiri [a pseudonym], said:

Here in Yoruba land, we do not practice Shari’ah. Islamic women are enjoined to follow all the commands of Allah in their relations to either their husband or their father. I do not know if Islamic Feminism is practiced in the northern part of the country where Shari’ah Law is practiced. There is nothing wrong with Shari’ah Legal System. The administration of justice is the problem. The fact that the Nigerian Shari’ah was politically motivated gives room for suspecting the verdicts of the Ulamas in the Amina’s case. Several Muslim women in the South could not make any public condemnation on the Amina’s case because of what some advocates of Shari’ah are capable of saying or doing. Currently, we are interested in making sure that our daughters are well educated because it is only through proper education and teaching of the words of God that people can be able to differentiate between what is right and wrong. The provisions of the Holy book and the ways they are used are based on several factors, which include cultural background. Muslim women organizations join hands with several other women organizations which are non-religious to agitate for some important problems, which affect the status of women.45

Two of my informants were Hausa women who lived in Sabo, the main Hausa Muslim area of Ibadan. Although they defended Shari’ah law, they did not agree with the sentences imposed on Safiya and Amina. One of them said:

As a woman, I rejoiced with Amina Lawal and Safiya Hussein. I would not have been happy if they were stoned to death. Those who advocated stoning were only interpreting the Quoran to suit themselves. Sharia is part of Islam, and it is meant to bring us closer to Allah. But politicians have hijacked it to suit their own purpose. If politics can be divorced from sharia it will be better.46

The other Hausa woman asserted that:

Sharia is good. But women should not be the only victims when it comes to adultery. Both men and women, we are all subject to the laws of Allah. As to Amina Lawal and Safiya Hussein, I rejoice with them because they would just have been sacrificial lambs.47

Of the Christians interviewed, agreed to comment on Shari’ah. The woman responded to the issue based on her understanding of Christian precepts of justice, and its implication for a multi-religious society like Nigeria. She is not familiar with the basic tenets of Islam despite the fact that her family included Muslim members. According to her:

44 Interview with Alhaja Bilikisu Raji, Feb. 24, 2004, Ibadan.
The Catechism of the Catholic Church teaches that "peace is the work of justice and effect of charity." The primary tenet is the assumption of "the transcendent dignity of man." Upon this foundation rests the principle of justice, a virtue that means "to preserve our neighbour’s rights and render him what is his due." The preservation of these rights entails all forms of development, ensuring that the person has sufficient means at his disposal to flourish. It is "injustice, excessive economic or social inequalities, envy, distrust, and pride raging among men and nations that constantly threatens peace and causes wars".

The mode of operation of the sharia brand of justice seems to me to have assimilationist tendencies. There seems to be a craving for a jihad on the part of young, misguided Islamic militants. This attitude is bound to be violently resisted by members of the other religions as is already occurring in some parts of Nigeria.

The one-sidedness of sharia law, especially in issues that have to do with adultery/fornication is nauseating. Men can have their way, while women have their lives endangered. This may see some women changing from Islam to other religions - and this may also be resisted by male Muslim zealots. I may also add, as more Muslim women become better educated and consequently economically empowered, they may find a more liberal religion tempting, rather than a stifling and gender-biased one.

To what degree does this view represent Christian opinion in Southern Nigeria? More research is needed for an understanding of this aspect of interfaith understanding. However, Dr. Ogunbunmi’s statements reveal some fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of Islam, as is common with most Christians. It is obvious that she blames most inter-ethnic strife in Nigeria on the newly implemented Shari’ah. She could not be far from the truth because most of these clashes were religious in nature. The? male Christian is a Henry Winters Luce Professor of World Christianity and Mission, McCormick Theological Seminary, McCormick University, who happened to be present at the court proceedings and was with Safiya when she was in Rome to ‘receive the key to the city of Rome’. He gives an eyewitness account of the Safiya Hussein’s case:

As for popular reaction to Sharia, I was surprised that the people were happy about it for several reasons-mark of identity, a measure of mobilization of Islamic Ummah, hope of greater social security, employment for Sharia enforcers, belief that it would engender development, and a true religious commitment. It was interesting that it was Safiya's brother who reported her pregnancy to the Sharia enforcers. Later, he was running around to get money from reporters and rights' workers who came to their village! A Federal Government Information Officer told me that many people watched with dismay as their children became morally debauched and believed that Sharia would bring back moral discipline. There is little doubt that politicians read their people rightly and exploited the mass support. Recall how pilgrims in Saudi booed Atiku when he visited the Nigerian camp and cheered the Zamfara governor. Indeed, even the Governor of Sokoto did not want the Sharia but feared the consequences. The last people who wanted the Sharia were the governors of Niger and Kaduna. It was so popular that the governors gave the Mallams a large space in designing the codes. This partially explains the flaws in the designs. A lawyer complained bitterly that the Mallams would not even permit trained professionals to advise them; that the governors were powerless to intervene; that he has lost government business because he warned the governors against the activities of Mallams and incurred the latter's wrath. It was as if they created a Frankenstein monster that they could no longer control. The class dimension to Sharia has become glaring: who is dragged to the court? But that has not brought the disillusion predicted. However, leaders realize that only social reforms could preserve the popularity and are trying to make noises in that direction. The decision to free Safiyya did not raise a fanfare of happy supporters. Rather, the state government made efforts to image it as a FG interference with a deliberate intention to abuse Islam. This explains all the wild rumours that the Italians loaded Safiyya with

48 Interview with Dr. (Mrs.) ‘Lanre Ogunbunmi, Mar. 28, 2004, Ibadan.
money and built her a house; that the Pope instigated her visit to Rome. I was in Rome with her and knew all about the arrangements! The judges made the pointed remark that it was not allowed for anyone to prevent the *hudd* from being applied. This opened the door to two interpretations: public and international outcry saved her; the justice within the Sharia laws saved her. 50

Prof. Ogbu Kalu claims that ‘the justice within the Shari’ah laws saved her’, might not be unconnected with verses from the Qur’an and the Hadith. Some of these hadith outline capital punishment as a penalty for adultery. Two of these are particularly instructive to this discourse and they are as follows:

Imran b. Hussain reported that a woman from Juhaina came to Muhammad and she had become pregnant because of adultery. She said: I am pregnant as a result of Zina. Muhammad said: “Go back, and come to me after the birth of the child.” After giving birth, the woman came back to Muhammad, saying: “please purify me now”. Next Muhammad said, “Go and suckle your child, and come after the period of suckling is over.” She came after the period of weaning and brought a piece of bread with her. She fed the child the piece of bread and said, “Oh Allah’s Apostle, the child has been weaned.” At that Muhammad pronounced judgment about her and she was stoned to death.

The second hadith reads thus:

Ma’iz went before Muhammad in the Mosque and said, “I have committed adultery, please purify me. Muhammad turned his face away from him and said “Woe to you, go back and pray to Allah for forgiveness.” But the boy again came in front of Muhammad and repeated his desire for purification. The act was repeated three times, until Abu Bakr, sitting close by, told the Ma’iz to leave, as the fourth repetition of the plea would get him stoned….. Muhammad then said, “had you kept it a secret, it would have been better for you.” Muhammad then ordered Ma’iz to be stoned to death. During the stoning, Ma’iz cried out, “O people, take me back to the Holy Prophet, the people of my clan deluded me”. When this was reported to Muhammad, he replied “Why did you not let him off, he might have repented, and Allah may have accepted it.”

It is worth noting that in all these, stoning occurred after one of the adulterers voluntarily went to Prophet Muhammad and bore witness against himself. In these two illustrations, the prophet asked those involved to go back severally and have a rethink before they were finally stoned to death. For these two women – Safiya and Amina – at no time were they convinced that they were guilty such that they will deem it fit to report themselves to the hizbah groups or any of the Islamic clerics. Neither did they admit to their sins. Hence, the verdicts were based on false premises. The judgments were biased.

**Conclusion**

From the foregoing, the reactions of the Nigerian civil society reveal the following:

1. The implementation of Shari’ah is political and not religious
2. Shari’ah as practised in the North is unconstitutional
3. It violates freedom of religious practice
4. It is targeted at the poor
5. It is gender-biased
6. It is capable of undermining the unity of the Nigerian nation

---

So much has been said in the international community about Shari’ah in Nigeria and in particular, about Safiya and Amina. It is common in the international media to use words like barbarism, but the Nigerian Muslims have said it is not the law that is barbaric but the way it has been executed. The legal process has even showed itself to be fair, thus, the release of the two women accused of zina. It is in this light that it should be understood that since Shari’ah was not implemented for religious reasons but political reasons that it has been badly implemented.

The state governments that established this law in their various communities did not bother to educate the people on its implication for their lives. In addition, the governments did not put in place the infrastructure required for the implementation of Shari’ah towards improving the socio-economic lives of the people of Northern Nigeria. The civil society has no objection to the implementation of Shari’ah provided it does not infringe on other peoples’ rights and abide by the provisions of the Nigerian constitution. In keeping with the provisions of the constitution, the rights of men, women and children should be guaranteed. It is worth noting that Southern Nigerian Muslim women have not responded to the zina cases the way their counterparts around the world would have done – perhaps out of the ignorance of feminist hermeneutics. Instead, they engage in the reading of the Qur’an, with the aim to build good Muslim homes and inculcate in their children Islamic values. They are not involved in the drive towards the realization of gender-equality like other Muslim women in the world; even when they believed the judgments were gender-biased. This is because they believe their men are liberal enough and are supportive of their life ambitions. This could be a function of the patriarchal society in which they have found themselves.
The Boundaries of Borno in the Nineteenth Century:
The Perception of Travellers*

Vincent Hiribarren
University of Leeds

Abstract
This article deals with the boundaries of Borno as perceived by nineteenth century travellers. Indeed, numerous European travellers such as Denham, Barth or Nachtigal tried to reach the central African kingdom for three main reasons: commerce, diplomacy and science. In addition, the Bornuese perception of the boundaries is also studied through the testimony of Aden Mahamma, a pilgrim from Borno. Using published narratives, reports, articles and maps, this article argues that conceptions of boundaries existed in the travellers’ narratives as well as in the Bornuese mentalities. Admittedly, the different travellers had a Eurocentric perception of Bornu and conceived Bornuese boundaries as a mixture between lines and undefined zones; however, the Bornuese seem to have conceived their own territory clearly and had a sense of belonging to a specific territory demarcated by boundaries.

Keywords: Borno, Bornu, nineteenth century, boundaries, territory, travellers, explorers, Denham, Barth, Nachtigal, Adem Mahamma.

Introduction
In the nineteenth century, many European expeditions aimed at discovering Bornu for three main reasons. Firstly, the Europeans wanted to visit the kingdom of Borno to establish diplomatic and commercial ties with its ruler, the Shehu. Secondly, the Lake Chad area was arousing interest among geographers and explorers willing to reach and “discover” the lake’s shores. Finally, the Europeans intended to obtain scientific information about the fauna, flora and mineral resources of the region.

This interest in the kingdom of Borno comes from the Arabic oral and written sources which depict the kingdom of Kanem-Borno as a rich and influential central African kingdom. Indeed, since its conversion to Islam in the eleventh century, the kingdom of Kanem-Borno has been linked to the Islamic world through trade, pilgrimage and diplomatic correspondence as stressed by Palmer (1936). In 1850, the British explorer, James Richardson rejoiced when he reached Borno:

When we reached the camping-ground a pleasant announcement was made. We were at length upon Bornou soil! I could hardly believe my ears. Oh, marvel, after all our dangers and misgivings! Thanks to Almighty God for deliverance from the hands of lawless tribes! I shall never forget the sensation with which I learned that I was at length really in Bornou, and that the robber Tuarick was in very truth definitively left behind.
(Richardson, 1853, p.153)

Thus, Bornu was in the main objective of a consequent number of expeditions which were funded by the European governments and in particular by the British government. One of the objectives of these expeditions was the publication of a narrative, usually, in the form of a diary.
Thus, from 1798-1799, a German explorer, Hornemann probably journeyed to Borno. When explorers visited the country during the nineteenth century, they discovered a new dynasty ruling over a diminished kingdom of Borno. Indeed, Denham, Clapperton, Oudney, Tyrwhitt and Toole travelled to Borno in 1822-1824, Overweg and Richardson in 1850-1851, Barth in 1850-1855, da Segni in 1850, Vogel in 1854-1855, Beurmann in 1862-1863, Rohlfs in 1865-1867, Nachtigal in 1870-1871, Matteucci and Massari in 1880, Monteil in 1890 and finally Macintosh in 1891.

Among them, only Hornemann, Denham, Clapperton, Richardson, Barth, da Segni, Rohlfs, Nachtigal and Massari left narratives whereas Vogel only wrote letters to the Times’s editor. Exploring the Sahara and the “Sudan” was dangerous as only half of the explorers survived (Denham, Barth, da Segni, Nachtigal and Monteil). However, the remaining narratives contain precious information about the state of Bornu during the nineteenth century as they precisely describe its political and economic situation. Thus, their interest is threefold. Firstly, it is possible to grasp in these narratives, the explorers’ conception of the Bornuese boundaries. Secondly, this conception, even if Eurocentric, reveals the Bornuese perception of their own boundaries. Finally, this conception of limits leads to the idea of a Bornuese territory.

The most important authors for the nineteenth century are Denham, Barth and Nachtigal. Indeed, these three explorers visited Bornu respectively in 1822-24, 1850-1855 and 1870-1871 as the kingdom was one of the main aims of their expedition. Wilhelm II, the Prussian king even sent Nachtigal to offer presents to the Sultan of Bornu. Thus, their observations cover a span of fifty years in the nineteenth century. Their own perception of the boundaries was that of a traveller.

As they were journeying through these regions with caravans, they conceptualised the boundaries in terms of barriers and checkpoints:

*On the 10th we reached the komadugu; and after some lively negotiation with the governor or shitima, who resides in the town of Yo, I and my companion were allowed to cross the river the same afternoon; for it has become the custom with the rulers of Bornu to use the river as a sort of political quarantine, a proceeding which of course they can only adopt as long as the river is full. During the greater part of the year everybody can pass at pleasure. Even after we had crossed, we were not allowed to continue our journey to the capital, before the messenger, who had been sent there to announce our arrival, had returned with the express permission that we might go on. (Barth, 1960, p.542)*

It is important to notice the fact that this “quarantine” barrier was not permanent throughout the year, which means that the boundary was totally porous when the streambed is dry. The river, whether it be dry or not, represents Bornuese authority, therefore Barth acknowledges the existence of boundaries-lines for Bornu and the need to “knock” on Bornu’s door.

The European explorers made enquiries about their itineraries as to which would be the rapidest and safest way to reach their destination. Thus, their own knowledge was limited to their guides’ experience but also to their predecessors’ narratives. Indeed, Barth frequently referred to Denham’s narrative, whereas Nachtigal referred to both Denham’s and Barth’s narratives. The empirical knowledge of the Bornuese territory and its limits is built by every explorer who provides in his narrative and map his own perception of the Bornuese territory.
Denham in his map, among other topographic and ethnographic information, reveals the existence in Bornu of two boundaries. The eastern border of the kingdom of Bornu goes from the shores of Lake Chad to the river Chari, spelt as ‘Shary’ on the map. The western border is supposed to separate Bornu from the Bedde, “accounted non-Muslims”. This first attempt to localise Bornu kingdom gives an approximate idea of the position of Bornu on the African map.

The European explorers made enquiries about their itineraries as to which would be the rapidest and safest way to reach their destination. Thus, their own knowledge was limited to their guides’ experience but also to their predecessors’ narratives. Indeed, Barth frequently referred to Denham’s narrative whereas Nachtigal referred to both Denham’s and Barth’s narratives. The empirical knowledge of the Bornuese territory and its limits is built by every explorer who provides in his narrative and map his own perception of the Bornuese territory.

The explorer perceived these two boundaries and a cartographer, John Arrowsmith in 1834 schematised his ideas:

Figure 1: Extract from Clapperton's map of Bornu (Denham et al., 1828, end of volume)
The main idea present in both maps is that the Bornuese territory is located between these two lines. However, this conception of the boundaries by Denham and Clapperton reveals his Eurocentric perception of the Lake Chad area. Looking for boundaries as lines, he mapped the kingdom of Bornu as any other European kingdom. Moreover, the cartographer, John Arrowsmith used different colours to emphasise this aspect in his map published in a world atlas. In addition, the passage from the explorers’ map to the commercial map published in London illustrates how the geographical knowledge is transmitted from the field to the map in Europe. It only takes a few years to publish the result of their exploration. To what extent is it possible to say that such maps could influence the following explorers’ representation of Borno?

Moreover, are these truncated boundaries a consequence of the travellers’ ignorance? This question is relevant as Denham could not explore the whole region and therefore reveals his extrapolation of the Bornuese boundaries. The following explorers “filled” the map and were able to determine more precisely the localisation of different Bornuese boundaries. One of the main aims of the explorers was to establish ties with African rulers and to produce a geopolitical map of the visited territories. For example, Denham gathered geographical information about Bornu in his “Supplemental chapter about Bornou”.

Figure 2: Africa (Arrowsmith,1834)
Source: http://www.davidrumsey.com/luna/servlet/detail/RUMSEY~8~1~33870~1170022:Africa,-by-J--Arrowsmith--London,-p?trs=65&mi=1&qvq=q%3Aafrica+1834%3Blic%3ARUMSEY%7E8%7E1, David Rumsey maps, Creative Commons Licence (accessed 13 January 2010)
“BORNOU, a kingdom of Central Africa, is comprehended, in its present state, between the 15th and 10th parallel northern latitude, and the 12th and 18th of east longitude. It is bounded on the north by part of Kanem and the desert; on the east by the Lake Tchad, which covers several thousand miles of country, and contains many inhabited islands; on the south-east by the kingdom of Loggun and the river Shary, which divides Bornou from the kingdom of Begharmi, and loses itself in the waters of the Tchad; on the south by Mandara, an independent kingdom, situated at the foot of an extensive range of primitive mountains; and on the west by Soudan.”

(Denham et al., 1828, p.155)

This description of Borno reveals the names of the neighbouring states. Thus, Denham provides his reader with a geographical description of an area in a style typical of the nineteenth century. Indeed, this geographic introduction to his chapter reveals as much about Borno as about Denham’s perception of this African territory. His vision of Africa divided into neatly bounded kingdoms reveals his European perception of the continent. Thus, as there are clear boundaries in Europe, there are clear boundaries in Africa. As there are kingdoms in Europe, there are kingdoms in Africa.

It also reveals the progress of geography as a science in the nineteenth century (Surun, 1998). Denham as an educated officer tries to introduce the results of his discoveries in a suitable scientific way. Thus, Borno is presented as any other European kingdom would be portrayed. Although the boundaries are described in a European manner, Denham unveils geographical data unknown in Europe until then. Richardson also added:

“I have obtained a list of the names of the principal sultans in this part of Africa:
Bornou—The Sheikh Omer, the son of the sheikh who reigned in the time of the first expedition. He has now reigned fourteen years. He has a good character.
Sakkatou—Sultan of the Fellatahs, Ali. He is not so great as his father Bello, celebrated in the time of the first expedition.
Asben, or Aheer—Abd-el-Kader.
Maradee—Binono.
Gouber—Aliou (Ali)... (Richardson, 1853, p.189)”

This is the reason for which they wanted to discover the different routes possible for their journey. For example, Richardson in his diary took notes of the route from Kuka, then capital of Bornu to Mandara.

“TERRITORY OF BORNOU.

From Kuka, south-east, to

- Gornu, half a-day; a walled town, larger than Zinder.
- Gulum, three hours; small village. Here is a river.
• Yaidi, four hours; large walled town.
• Martai, four hours; large walled town.
• Ala, three hours; large walled town.
• Diwa, eight hours; large walled town, and residence of a sultan. Here is a river.
• Abagai, two hours; small village.
• Kuddaigai, one hour; small village.
• Sokoma, one hour; a large walled town.
• Millehai, two hours; a small place.
• Magarta, three hours; a large walled town.
• Dellehai, half a day; a large place.

TERRITORY OF MANDARA.

• Muddebai, a long day; a large walled town.
• Dulo, eight hours; a large walled town.
• Mandara, three hours; a city about the size of Mourzuk.

A day's journey from Mandara is sufficient to make a razzia of slaves. Muzgu, a great Kerdi country, is three days' journey from Mandara (Richardson, 1853, p.342).”

According to Richardson, the town of Dellehai is situated on the Bornuese side of the border within the kingdom of Mandara. Richardson certainly asked about this route to an unknown informant who had a clear idea of the journey and who was familiar with both territories of Borno and Mandara. The border here clearly lies between the two cities of Dellehai and Muddebai but this description fails to be more precise. However, this route reveals the conception of the territory as a network of cities and roads but also as a territory where the time of travel is as important as space, an aspect that Ivor Wilks (1992) already noticed for the Asante kingdom in the nineteenth century. However, is it possible to apply this theory to Borno?

In the nineteenth century, the aim of the expeditions was to open trade routes and establish diplomatic ties with African rulers. This is the reason for which, Heinrich Barth signed a treaty with the Shehu of Bornu in 1851. This treaty which was studied by Kirk-Greene (1959) and underlined the importance of establishing links between European powers and African kingdoms. The bilingual 1852 treaty states:

"The Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, being desirous of forming amicable relations with the Chiefs of the Interior of Africa, for the purpose of interchanging reciprocally the merchandise of Africa with that of Europe, has empowered Doctor Henry Barth to make Treaties in her name, and on her behalf, for the purpose above expressed; and the Sovereign of the Kingdom of Bornoo being also desirous of cooperating with Her Majesty the Queen of England, with the view of establishing and effecting what is proposed; Her Majesty has, therefore, named the said Doctor Henry Barth, as her Agent, to conclude the following Treaty, on behalf of Her Majesty, her heirs and successors” (FO 97/13/2, National Archives, Kew Gardens, United Kingdom)

The third article of the treaty states clearly:
“The communications between the country of Bornoo and other places shall be safe, so that English merchants may, without obstacle, import their merchandise of lawful commerce, of whatever kind, and bring them for sale in Bornoo and elsewhere; and it shall be equally free for them to export from Bornoo such merchandise of lawful commerce” (FO 97/13/2, National Archives, Kew Gardens, United Kingdom)

Thus, commercial interests between the United Kingdom and Borno were in the centre of the travellers’ interests as both treaties were signed between “sovereign” rulers of their own kingdom. The 1851 Borno treaty underlines the fact that Bornu is an “empire”, a “country”, a “State” which possesses its own “territory”. Would it be possible to understand Borno as a clearly bounded territory according to this document? Au contraire, the translator only over-translated the same Arabic word bilâd for “empire”, “country”, “State” and “territory”. Thus, European conceptions of statehood were applied to Borno even though most explorers were aware of its political situation.

Furthermore, the boundary can also be considered as a buffer zone as in the case of the Bedites, an ethnic group living on the borderland between Kano and Bornu. When the ruler of Sokoto, Bello and the ruler of Borno, El Kanemi signed a peace treaty in 1820, they recognised this territory as being an open source of slaves, and money. Bello writes in one of his letters

“We profess the same religion, and it is not fitting that our subjects should make war on each other. Between our kingdoms are the pagan Bedde tribes, on whom it is permissible to levy contribution: let us respect this limit: what lies to the east of their country shall be ours: what lies to the west shall be yours. As for Muniyo, Damagaram and Daura, they will continue to be vassals of the Sultan of Bornu, who in return will surrender to you all his claims to Gobir and Katsina” (Palmer, 1936, p.269)

A few years later, Denham describes this area:

“As before observed, the Bedites have never received the doctrines of Mahomet; and, although speaking the language of Bornou, and acknowledging a kind of nominal sovereignty of the Bornouese sultan, they are everywhere regarded as a race of outlaws, whom it is incumbent on every good Mussulman, Bornouese, or Felatah, to enslave or murder [...]. Their country is of small extent, defended by impenetrable morasses and forests, by which alone they preserve a precarious and dangerous independence.” (Denham et al., 1828, pp.229-230)

Thus, this natural region constitutes, according to Clapperton, the borderland between Kano and Bornu. For him, even nature separates it from the Hausa/Fulani and the Kanuri. It is possible to recognise the theory of the natural boundaries supposed to neatly enclose the Bedites’ territory. In addition, the image of the wild and barbarian Bedites is omnipresent in every traveller’s description. Sokoto’s or Bornu’s influence in their vision must be preponderant. Indeed, according to the different explorers, the Bedites’ territory is Bornu’s “wild west”. This case corresponds to the boundaries of Asante described by Wilks (1992). Indeed, the further from the
capital the territory was, the less authority the king of Asante had. Thus, distant regions were not as integrated to the kingdom as the core provinces were. The Bedites’ territory could be an example of this kind of territory where the central authority has faded.

Moreover, from the Bornuese viewpoint, as this territory is not Muslim, it becomes a religious frontier. This conception relates to the Islamic perception of the world as separated between the *ummah* and the unbelievers. Thus, the western boundary is a military boundary between Sokoto and Bornu but is also a religious boundary between *Dar Al-Islam* and *Dar-Al-Garb*. The description of the world in religious terms is a common practice among Muslim scholars since the spread of Islam in Africa. This common view in the Muslim world (Brauer, 1992) leads Bello and El Kanemi to the recognition of the Bedites’ territory as a march between their two countries. Therefore, this boundary is a cultural and religious one.

The map inserted at the end of Clapperton and Denham’s book, reveals the position of the Bedites between Sokoto and Bornu.

![Figure 3: Extract from Clapperton's map of Borno (Denham et al., 1828, end of volume)](image)

These two clearly delimited boundaries isolate the “Bedee Territory” revealing that they are not Muslims “*(Kafirs)*”. The boundaries present on the map, as in the narrative, do not delimitate precisely the territory. However, this map reveals that they can be perceived by an outsider as Clapperton. Indeed, even if the Bedites’ territory was nominally Bornuese, its eastern limit
became on this map the Bornuese western boundary. The perception of the limits between these territories is typically European as these limits are only lines drawn around the towns belonging to the Bedites. As Clapperton and Oudney travel to Kano, they have to cross this territory and determine which town belongs to Bornu. Thus, the map is a simple topographic map trying to represent the different political powers. However, without totally dismissing the representation of the boundaries, Clapperton tries to give an account of the regional political stage.

For example, Barth describes the northern border of Bornu as being dangerous because of the Tuareg incursions. Therefore, he estimates he can advise the “vizier” of Bornu:

_I pressed upon the vizier the necessity of defending the northern frontier of Bornu against the Tuarek by more effectual measures than had been then adopted, and thus retrieving, for cultivation and the peaceable abode of his fellow-subjects, the fine borders of the komadugu, and restoring security to the road to Fezzan. Just about this time the Tuarek had made another expedition into the border-districts on a large scale, so that Kashella Belal, the first of the war chiefs, was obliged to march against them “._ (Barth, 1960, p.403)

The case of the northern boundary as perceived by Barth is emblematic. The Europeans defined the boundaries as lines which can be closed if needed. They apply their own vision of the boundaries to the kingdom of Bornu. Barth by this comment revealed his own pre-conception of the boundaries but also patronised the “vizier” of Bornu who, according to Barth, cannot properly manage the northern boundary. Nachtigal, himself a few years later judges the African boundaries as such:

_Where there is no sharply defined natural frontier, such as the Chad and Shari, these boundaries are indeterminate, as towards the desert, or arbitrary and fluctuating, as in the regions of Pagan and semi-Pagan tribes who have not been brought completely under control. Where the Muhammadan inhabitants of two such comparatively well-ordered states as Bornu and the Hausa country are adjacent, the boundary can be fixed fairly exactly, though encroachments on either side and boundary disputes are not lacking. Where, however, between the two lie more or less independent regions, as along a great pan of the western and southern frontier of Bornu, the contours of the empire fluctuate according to the measure of military success against tribes which are kept in subjection only by force- This is the situation especially with the regions of the Bedde, Ngizzem, Kerikerri, Babir and Musgo, while the position in the Margin country, where the proximity of Adamawa to the south has a decisive influence, is somewhat more stable. Because of their more solid state organisation, Mandara and Logon are also in a more regular relationship of dependence upon Bornu._ (Nachtigal, 1980, p.123)

This extensive comment about the boundaries of Bornu uncovers different aspects of Nachtigal’s perception of Bornu. Firstly, Nachtigal, as Rohlfs (1873, p.36) before him, subscribes to the idea of the natural boundaries being determinate whereas the remaining boundaries are indeterminate.
The theory of the natural boundaries which emerged mainly in France at the end of the seventeenth century was widely spread throughout the nineteenth century:

*The limits of empires are controlled by two causes: the physical geography of the soil and the power of man. The first is durable; the last is variable and thus in examining history we find that the first produces the most permanent effect* (Finch, 1844, p.2)

The explorers are eager to find which boundaries are natural, in other words “durable”. The others only depend on the “power of man”. This is the reason for which Nachtigal underlines the fluctuation of the other boundaries which are not permanent. As a German from Saxony, he may have been aware of the efforts of Emperor Wilhelm II to expand the Prussian boundaries in the 1860s and 1870s. The boundaries made by the “power of man” are more recent and have a less permanent effect according to him. However, Nachtigal neglects the fact that the so-called “natural boundaries” are only the result of a choice by the different political powers. For example, in the case of the kingdom of Bornu, the Chari river boundary is the result of the competition between Bornu and its neighbour Berghami. Far from being only natural, the boundary is as much the result of man’s actions. This deterministic view of the boundaries prevents Nachtigal and the other explorers from giving a detailed account of the Bornuese boundaries.

In addition, Nachtigal stresses the fact that the boundaries between Muslim states can be “fixed fairly exactly”. For every explorer, the Muslim states are “comparatively well-ordered states” whereas pagan states are disorganised. Most of them subscribe to the theory of the Nilo-Hamitic origin of the State in Africa. In other words, concepts of “State” and “boundaries” do not origin from sub-Saharan Africa but from Northern Africa (Lange, 1984). Black countries can be “well-ordered” only if they adopt Islam.

This is the reason for which an area can be considered a buffer zone. The example of the northern boundary of Bornu is:

“Our encampment was near a little village of twenty huts, called Daazzenai, placed under a rock of red stone. The country of Damerghou, in this direction, is separated from Bornou by about eleven hours of forest, or some thirty miles English—a sufficient distance to divide two countries, especially in Africa.” (Richardson, 1853, pp.175-176)

Thus the author recognises the forest as being the boundary between “Damerghou” and “Bornou”. His comments about the distance separating the two countries reveal his conception of African territories divided by uninhabited areas. The image of Western Africa as an under-populated area was frequent in the nineteenth century. (van Beusekom, 1999)

Moreover, the author underlines the length – eleven hours – to travel thirty miles. The boundary is based on an uninhabited area and communication is harder through the thick of the forest. Therefore, the networked territory is interrupted by this empty forest which consequently constitutes the boundary. Far from being a natural boundary, the forest is only the limit of the powers of “Damerghou” and “Bornou”. Indeed, their rulers control populations not territories.
As the populations of Damerghou are not submitted to the Shehu of Bornu, the boundary lies in the space before the first cities of Damerghou.

Thus, the power of Borno does not seem to fade around its borderland with Damerghou. Wilks’ theory (1992) does not apply to this part of the Bornuese boundary. Rohlfs evokes the same buffer boundaries in Southern Borno:

_Between Bama and the Wandala boundary, man has to go through a forest, in which pagan Gamergu often rob the passers-by, and take revenge for the razzias lead against them by their enemies, the Mohammedan Bornuese. Under the same conditions, furthermore, insecurity is wide-spread in all the frontier zones in black countries, which explains why they are hardly or not inhabited._ (Rohlfs, 1834, p.35)

Hence, the assumption that Borno only exercised power over populations and not its territory is merely hypothetical. The Bornuese territory seems to be bounded by buffer areas defined by treaties or by a _status quo_. Is it possible to evoke a strong Bornuese authority over its territory as in pre-colonial Buganda? (Reid, 2002). Thus, the European travellers’ narratives take partially into account the fact that boundaries were known to the local people. However, as soon as 1798 Hornemann (1802, p.116) mentioned:

_As to what the inhabitants themselves call Haussa, I had, as I think, very certain information. One of them, a Marabut, gave me a drawing of the situation of the different regions bordering on each other, which I here give as I received it. The land within the strong line is Haussa; my black friend had omitted Asben._

_These regions are governed by Sultans, of whom those of Kashna and Kano are the most powerful; but they all, (either by constraint or policy) pay tribute to Burnu except Kabi or Nyffé, their districts being at too great a distance. Guber pays, moreover, a tribute to Asben; Zamfara is united with Guber; the Sultan of the latter having taken possession of it, killed the Sultan, and sold all the prisoners he could take._
This sketch map is clearly a Hausa representation of space as it is centred on the Hausa cities. However, the kingdom of Bornu is clearly depicted as a dominating eastern power encompassing within its grasp the different territories on the map. On the one hand, this sketch map does not reveal the precise location of boundaries or rivers, but on the other hand, the marabout conceptualised the boundaries and territory of Bornu. Far from showing any geographical reality, this map reveals the geopolitical situation of this part of Africa. Notions of “space” and “limits” are therefore present in Bornu and Hausaland as much as in Europe in the nineteenth century. Thus, even if the explorers had a Eurocentric vision of the African continent, the Bornuese boundaries could have been very much similar to some European ones. Indeed, the whole kingdom of Bornu was a territory imagined not only by its inhabitants but also by the European travellers. Nachtigal (1980, p.124) mentioned:

*The approximate boundaries indicated give the Bornu empire an area of around 150,000 square kilometers (about 58,000 square miles).*

As mentioned earlier, the kingdom of Bornu inherited a millenary statist tradition from its predecessor the kingdom of Kanem-Bornu. Even its size shrunk at the start of the nineteenth century, the Shehus of Bornu adopted but also reformed some of its older institutions. (Brenner, 1973) The explorers depicted the landscape of Bornu with its different historical layers.
But at present all this district, the finest land of Bornu in the proper sense of the word, which once resounded with the voices and bustle of hundreds of towns and villages, has become one impenetrable jungle, the domain of the elephant and the lion, and with no human inhabitants except a few scattered herdsmen or cattle-breeders, who are exposed every moment to the predatory inroads of the Tuarek. (Barth, 1960, p.345)

This nostalgic tone reminds the readers the splendour of ancient Bornu which is comparable, in this era of literary romanticism, to the splendour of classical European civilisations. Indeed, most explorers tried to give a historical perspective to their “discoveries”. Thus, Barth himself brought back to Europe the Girgam, a list of kings who reigned in Kanem-Bornu from the eleventh century on. The nineteenth century territory of Bornu is perceived as a historical space. Therefore, it is possible to speak of an existence of a Bornuese territory at this time. For example, Barth and Nachtigal refer to the tombs of the ancient kings that they have visited. In a sense, these explorers consider Bornu as a nation under construction. The core province of the kingdom known as “Bornu proper” reinforces this idea.

I had now entered Bornu proper, the nucleus of that great Central African empire in its second stage, after Kanem had been given up. It is bordered towards the east by the great sea-like komadugu the Tsad or Tsade, and towards the west and north-west by the little komadugu which by the members of the last expedition had been called Yeou, from the town of that name, or rather Yo, near which they first made its acquaintance on their way from Fezzan. I had now left behind me those loosely attached principalities which still preserve some sort of independence, and henceforth had only to do with Bornu officers. (Barth, 1960, p.360)

Thus, Borno proper would be the heart of this “empire”. This last statement shows the conception of Borno as a territory and not as a collection of different ethnic groups. The territory itself is compared to medieval European kingdoms which would have vassals (Chrétien, 1980 quoted by Lefebvre, 2008, p.131). Principalities had therefore to pay tribute to the Sultan of Bornu. The question of tributes is an important question as it may be misleading. Some regions had to pay a tribute because Bornu dominated them economically or militarily, such as Zinder. Some other regions paid tribute to obtain a certain kind of autonomy from Bornu such as the Hausa cities at the start of the nineteenth century (Hornemann, 1802).

This last point leads to the reflection of the meaning of tributary states. Little is known about the true nature of the relationship between different buffer-states and Borno. It seems that the states situated at the periphery of Borno could be divided into two different categories: the satellite-states only orbiting around “Borno proper” and the other states oscillating between Borno and its powerful neighbours. The first category of satellite-states depending only on Borno could include Logone or Manga whereas the second category could include Matsina or Baghirmi. Indeed, depending on the geopolitical situation, the presence of states as Wadai or Sokoto would prevent Borno from exerting its influence over its tributaries. Therefore, the notion of “tributary” can be considered as double-edged because it could entail a concept of dependence but also of autonomy according to the evolving political situation. Without more precise documentation on a certain buffer-state, no generalisation would be feasible in the nineteenth century. Cohen
Hiribarren, Boundaries of Bornu

illustrates this last point while describing the fate of Matsina in the nineteenth century. Formerly a Borno tributary state, Matsina came under the influence of Sokoto because of internal rivalries while eventually reverting to Borno. (Cohen, 1970, p.158)

Indeed, according to Barth, a constellation of states orbits around Borno. Therefore, it is possible to suggest that the buffer-states were coherently organised by Borno. On the one hand, they would furnish tribute and taxes; on the other hand, they would be a military frontier. This constitutes only a generalisation of the status of the buffer-states as Baghirmi and Logone differently depended on Borno. For instance, the map quotes “Marghi (claimed both by Bornu and Adamaua)”, “Loggene (tributary to Bornu)”, Daura across the border with Katsina (“Katshna”) “consisting of about 1000 towns & villages, 400 of which belong to the Fulahs and 600 to Bornu”.

Moreover, galadimas (literally “gate-keepers”) were in charge of the territories on the fringe of the Bornu kingdom (Bala and Alkali, 1983). These officers administered these provinces from the capital, Kuka, and were responsible for levying taxes and for ensuring that the border province would stay loyal to the Shehu. Their presence in the capital was the guarantee that they would not develop a form of autonomy whilst in charge. These galadimas are the proof of the importance of these border provinces to the central power. In addition, kachellas, military leaders of servile origin, were posted along the boundaries to assure the security of Borno. For instance, in 1835, El-Kanemi posted three kachellas to the western provinces to Gujba, Biriri and Borsari (Brenner, 1973, p.72). Hence, the Shehu of Bornu managed his boundaries through galadimas and kachellas from the capital.

Thus, the capital played a very important role in the rather centralised kingdom of Bornu. Kuka or Kukawa was the place where the Shehu was living and where the galadimas were working. The state of Bornu was exerting power from Kuka. Taxes were levied in different provinces under modalities defined by the Shari’a. In addition, Rohlfs mentions import taxes levied upon goods when he crosses the boundary between Bornu and Gongola:

“At the same time, a small caravan under our armed protection had crossed the boundary because they needed to sell salt and cattle. They were staying close to us so that people could believe they belonged to my followers in order not to pay import taxes for their goods. Usually imported Bornuese products were taxed, 20 cowries for a horse or a piece of cattle, 10 cowries for a sheep or a goat, a certain amount of salt for each sold measure” (Rohlfs, 1874, p.126)

These import taxes were highly regulated as the precise figures given by Rohlfs reveal. Even if they were not decided by Bornu but by Gongola, the import taxes reveal the conception of a recognised commercial Bornu territory by the borderland dwellers. If Bornu exports goods, it means that is possible to conceive the existence of a Bornuese territory. In consequence, this article argues that Bornuese administration exerted its power over a territory as much as people. Indeed, the explorers revealed the importance of the Bornuese space during the nineteenth century. Bornu was territorially organised in the nineteenth century and boundaries were recognised at a local level but also by the Ottoman Empire, the Sokoto Caliphate and other states of the Chad basin (Barkindo, 1999). This last point differs from the traditional viewpoint of
African polities being ill-defined and being only constructed on personal relations. In the case of Borno, Urvoy (1949), Cohen (1967), Brenner (1973) have underlined the importance of the personal relations in the territorial organisation of the kingdom. According to Brenner (1973, p.19), territory was only

“one basis for administrative relationship; very often ethnic and personal relationships were more important.”

The different sources allege the fact that ethnic and personal relationships were fundamental. However, were they more important than the Bornuese territory? Palmer, a former Borno resident, even if criticised for his Eurocentric perception of Borno, already evoked the division of Borno in quadrants at the cardinal points. (Brenner, 1973, p.10) This article argues that the Bornuese territory played a very important role in the organisation of the kingdom. Indeed as mentioned above, the representation of a Bornuese space, especially in the inter-statist relations, was largely influenced by Islam as Nachtigal put it. Furthermore, Borno in the nineteenth century inherited from the kingdom of Kanem-Borno a strong administrative and territorial organisation which recognised a Bornuese territory and acknowledged the existence of Bornuese boundaries. Thus, far from being vague, Borno’s boundaries were known to its inhabitants with all their fluctuations during the nineteenth century.

In addition, the British, French and Ottomans were interested in the political situation in Central Sudan and were gathering reports from travellers and pilgrims in order to assess the geopolitical status of the region. These reports obtained through Bornuese travellers are invaluable sources for the history of the boundaries of Borno from 1890 to 1900. In 1997, Kanya-Forstner and Lovejoy published French intelligence reports which dealt with Sokoto and Borno (Kanya-Forstner and Lovejoy, 1997). Indeed, in 1892, the French interrogated in Tunis, Adem Mahanna a Bornuese travelling back to Kukawa after his pilgrimage to Mecca. On his way to Mecca, he had already been interrogated by the British in Suakin. His interrogation in Tunis lasted twelve hours and revealed two conceptions of Borno in the nineteenth century. Firstly, according to Adem Mahamma, Borno proper is the core province of the kingdom “immediately to the west of the lake”.

“The name of Borno was extended to the whole Empire of the Dunama which consisted for the rest, in separated states, governed by vassal dynasties; the vassality link becoming looser when these states were situated far from the centre of the Empire.” (Kanya-Forstner and Lovejoy, 1997, p.102)

Thus, it is possible to argue that the Bornuese, such as Adem Mahanna, had a territorial conception of Borno as a province and as an Empire. In addition, the Bornuese pilgrim evokes the boundary of Borno with the Mahdist state founded by Hayatu ibn Sa’id in Adamawa (Kanya-Forstner and Lovejoy, 1997, p.111 and Warburg, 2003). Thus, Adem Mahamma may have had a concept of a neat boundary between Borno and its neighbours.

However, Adem Mahamma’s report was translated from Arabic and written down by a French officer, Major Francis Rebillet. His own perception of Borno is deeply influenced by his own education. For example, Major Rebillet constantly uses European medieval concepts to refer to
Borno. Borno is the core-province which gave its name to the whole “Empire of Borno”. The same phenomenon happened in France as the region around Paris was called France because it constituted the personal domains of the Frankish king. Subsequently, the name France was extended to the whole kingdom. Major Rebillet mentioned as well Borno vassals and its suzerainty over them and compared the last kings of the Sayfawa dynasty to the last kings of the Merovingian dynasty. Indeed, Major Rebillet evoked their role as “do-nothing kings” a phrase used by nineteenth and early twentieth century French historians to describe the late Merovingian kings (Kanya-Forstner and Lovejoy, 1997, p.102). He even compares the Kanemi dynasty to the Carolingian dynasty when he qualifies El-Kanemi as “mayor of the palace”. Thus, Major Rebillet’s historical reminiscences give a European biased account of the boundaries and territory of Borno and it can be argued that Adem Mahamma’s account of Borno is perceived along European concepts.

This illustrates the French perception of Borno as being in a medieval stage of development. The description of Borno provided by Adem Mahamma through Major Rebillet is a blatant example of social Darwinism applied to Borno. Triaud (2000) showed how this perception was common among French colonial agents when considering Muslim societies in the nineteenth century. Chrétien (1980) stressed the same perception of colonial Eastern Africa as medieval Europe as well. Thus, how to apprehend Borno’s relationship with its satellite-states? Were they vassals or simple tributaries? To what extent does this tribute mean that the tributary state is autonomous or even independent? The French authorities had a map traced according to the different testimonies in order to obtain a better understanding of the geopolitical status of the region.
As the maps were created by the previous nineteenth century explorers, it is mainly a localisation map. The caption provides an explanation of its creation as a mix between Captain Régnauld de Lannoy’s map and the information brought by the explorers and intelligence reports by Adem Mahamma. The boundaries of Borno are stressed by the “+++” used by the cartographer who gave the maximum extent of the “empire of Borno” in the nineteenth century. However, this extent is only nominal as the provinces of “Kanem” and “Tebous” around Lake Chad were not part of the empire of Borno anymore.
Does this exaggeration come from the image of Borno conveyed by the European explorers? Or does it come from the information provided by Adem Mahamma? The boundaries of Borno traced on this map are an idealised image of Borno in the nineteenth century. This representation is the result of the cartographic representation of Borno in the nineteenth century and does not take into account the evolution of the boundaries after the Fulani jihad. Adem Mahamma, coming from Borno himself, furnishes a biased image of his own country and shows its supposed strength to his interrogators. Thus, this cartographic representation of the boundaries of Borno is the melange of two biased representations of Central Sudan. However, the most striking elements of the maps are the bold lines representing the communication axis between the different cities of Borno and Kano, the entrepot of Central Sudan and through the Sahara. In addition, the route to Mecca at the east of Lake Chad shows the importance of the east-west axis. This emphasis on the travelling conditions of the region is understandable as the sources for this map are the explorers and travellers whether they be Europeans or Bornuese

**Conclusion**

This representation of space and territoriality in nineteenth century Bornu is a hypothesis. Indeed, this article argued that conceptions of boundaries existed in the travellers’ narratives as well as in the Bornuese mentalities. Admittedly, the different travellers had a Eurocentric perception of Bornu and conceived Bornuese boundaries as a mixture between lines and undefined zones; however, the Bornuese seem to have conceived their own territory clearly and had a sense of belonging to a specific territory demarcated by boundaries. The territorial organisation of Borno proper and its satellites states on the one hand, and the management of the borders through agents as the galadimas and the kachellas on the other hand, clearly indicate that Borno can be defined as a territory. Ronald Cohen himself described nineteenth century Borno as “not only a sovereign state, but an imperial expansionist one as well”. (Cohen, 1970, p.154)

Thus, in the nineteenth century, is it possible to argue that the European conception of boundaries is not far from the Bornuese conception? This last argument leads to the debate between time and distance in pre-colonial Africa. Did Africans have a representation of their own political space according to time as in Wilks’ Asante (1992) or according to their territory as in Reid’s Buganda (2002)? As an ancient state, Borno seems to be highly structured and could be seen as a model of State in central and western Africa. However, in the absence of more Bornuese sources, Borno as a territory entirely defined by boundaries remains a hypothesis.
* I would like to thank Dr. Shane Doyle, Dr. Chris Prior and Prof. Ian Wood for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I also want to thank Robin Seignobos for the piece of information on Bilâd which is difficult to translate into English for it has different meanings.

**References**


Barth, H. (1890). *Travels and discoveries in North and Central Africa: including accounts of Tripoli, the Sahara, the remarkable kingdom of Bornu, and the countries around Lake Chad*. London: Ward, Lock.


Hornemann, F. C. (1802). *The journal of Frederick Horneman's travels, from Cairo to Mourzouk, the capital of the Kingdom of Fezzan, in Africa. In the years 1797-8*. London:
Abstract
This paper explores literacy issues and lexical development arising from the contact between English as Second Language (ESL/L2) and Yoruba as Mother Tongue (YMT/L1) in the non-formal setting of science and technology (ST) in the south-western part of Nigeria. The paper conducts a study of the language of parts of automobile as they are known by the road-side motor mechanics, the literacy level of the mechanics, and the relationship between these two and their technical skills. By administering questionnaires to thirty-eight (38) auto-technicians, the paper further explores the linguistic and technological implications of all these to improved professional performance by these mechanics on the one hand, and the development of indigenous science and technology on the other. This paper concludes that rather than neglecting them they may well represent a significant instrument of attaining self-reliance in indigenous ST development in Nigeria.

Keywords: English as Second Language (ESL/L2), Yoruba as Mother Tongue (YMT/L1), Stylistics, Language contact, science and technology (ST), phonological interference.

Introduction
In the quest towards scientific and technological development in Nigeria, there is the need to incorporate all such individuals and group of individuals who may have one or two crucial contributions to make to the overall fruitfulness of the endeavour. One of such groups of people is the technicians, the road-side technician who, for one reason or the other, did not have the opportunity to attend to have tertiary education. We need technicians to take care our technology. But they appear to be constrained by one difficulty or the other which might not allow them to perform optimally as they would have loved to. More often than not, technicians or mechanics give reliable advice on when best to change the engine oil of vehicles, why tyres need to be deflated or inflated, advantage of automatic gear or engine over manual or vice versa, or that of front wheel vehicle over that with back axle, etc. According to Aliu (2008), ‘scheduled or routine maintenance and repairs are required for optimal performance (of engineering equipment or infrastructures) and for adequate life span. Any time these are disregarded or substandard materials are used, low performance or breakdown results’ (2008:2). He further argues: ‘lack of adequate maintenance leads to faulty operation and indeed breakdowns of systems. For example, if a person does not service his or her car as recommended by the manufacturer, then he or she cannot expect optimal performance. The results are huge economic losses and loss of lives due to accidents’ (2008:3).

Nigeria’s engineering equipment and Infrastructural technology cannot run without the input of these technicians. This is because both the engineer and the technologist do not maintain, neither do they repair engines. The technicians do. As it is today, what is the level of their (technicians) input to technological development? What is their level of educational and professional preparedness in order to be useful in, and equally support this quest for technological self-reliance? Where they are found wanting, in what ways can we equip them to enhance their knowledge base, professional confidence, and innovative skills?
There can be no space in this single paper to provide answers to all of these very crucial questions, but they form the bulk of the questions that this paper is prepared to critically address, with special reference to the road-side motor mechanics, and to the linguistic outcome of the contact that ensues between Yoruba as the L1 of the mechanics, and English, an L2, which is the language in which science and technology was received.

In these days of globalization, the major indicator of development of a country, proclaims (Adeniyi, 2006:3), is no longer based on its endowment with material and human resources, but is rather based on ‘the available pool of knowledge and its application for deliverables in terms of goods, packages, processes or services’ be it in the economic, social or political domain. This is because it is mostly with the aid of such knowledge that jobs and wealth can be created, poverty can be reduced, and global competitiveness can be enhanced (2006, p.4).

In another document, Adeniyi and Aletor (2005:4) emphasize that ‘rapid advances in economic and over-all Human Development Index (HD1) have become knowledge-based, private-sector-led, science and technology-driven and mainly government facilitated via appropriate policy instruments.’ In the more advanced countries, according to Adeniyi (2006),

\[ \text{Industrial innovations at their tertiary institutions are accorded as much importance as teaching, research and community service.} \]

There is an acute awareness among higher education institution (including polytechnics) in these countries of the needs to be more responsive to the increasing pressures of economic globalization as well as needs of industry and commerce (emphasis mine) (Adeniyi, 2006:5).

These responses, which according to him ‘have worked and are still working for the attainment of technological self-sufficiency for the societies that have adopted them for their higher educational system’ are according to Mangvwat (2005), in form of the following: (a.) training more graduates to support the development of an increasing knowledge-based economy, both in organization and as entrepreneurs; (b) a higher and further education system that is fashioned towards life-long learning such that the workforce skills can meet the changing demands of globalization; (c) the pursuit of cutting-edge or top-flight research which target commercial applications; and (d) an expanding pool of educated people who can participate creatively in policy discourses and respond to pressing socio-economic and political challenges such as prevalent in developing countries including Nigeria (emphasis mine).

In Nigeria’s search for technological advancement, we must ask relevant questions about this important segment of ST development. What is the role of the road-side technicians in our society? How are they trained? Have they any significant role to play in our quest for indigenous ST development? If they have, how well are they playing such roles? If yes, how can they be assisted? What is their literacy level, and how can such be enhanced if found low? Do they have access to modern sources of technical information? Do they have access to new methods of automobile maintenance and repairs? If no, why?

**The Engineer, the Technologist and the Technician**

To most academic minds, the relationship between an engineer, a technologist and a technician is all about the certificate each of them holds (university degree especially Bsc, Higher National Diploma, Ordinary National Diploma), which makes one the boss of the other, and not really about the place and the crucial and critical role each plays in the industrial and production cycle. The 7th edition of the Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of
Current English (2005) defines ‘Engineering’ as ‘the activity of applying scientific knowledge to the design, building and control of machines, roads, bridges, electrical equipment, etc.’; it defines ‘technology’ as ‘scientific knowledge used in practical ways in industry, for example in designing new machines’ and a technologist simply as ‘an expert in technology’. It defines the term ‘technical’ as ‘connected with the practical use of machinery, methods, etc., in science and industry; while a ‘technician’ is described as ‘a person whose job is keeping a particular type of equipment or machinery in good condition; a person who is very skilled at the technical aspects of an art, a sport, etc.’

The Pearson’s Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English (Updated Edition) (2005) defines ‘Engineering’ as ‘the work involved in designing and building roads, bridges, machines etc; it defines ‘technology’ as ‘new machines, equipment, and ways of doing things that are based on modern knowledge about science and computer’; while it defines a ‘technician’ as ‘someone whose job is to check equipment or machines and make sure that they are working properly’ and the term ‘technical’ as ‘connected with knowledge of how machines work’.

The Pearson’s Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English (Updated edition) (2005) defines ‘a mechanic’ as ‘someone who is skilled at repairing motor vehicles and machinery’, while the Pocket Oxford Dictionary (1994) defines it as ‘person skilled in using or repairing machinery’. A road-side mechanic is therefore a skilled technician, OND or no OND.

In sum, the role relationship of one to the other is that while the engineer designs, the technologist applies and implements, and the technician maintains and repairs, each to his/her own crucial task. In other words, one needs the other to perform. They are thus woven together in a crucial ball of complementarity: one supports the other to function effectively and to have a final product. But do they see one another in this light in Nigeria? What do we then think of the road-side technicians who maintain our motor vehicles, repair our electronics, electrical appliances, etc.? Can we do what they do, that is, repair our vehicles ourselves? If the answer is ‘no’, then, we must direct our research searchlight on them, analyse their situation, see if they have any role to play in the society, see how they can play it better, and then equip them to do it better. This is what this paper sets out to do from the linguistic point of view of their situation.

English for Science and Technology (EST)

English for Science and Technology (EST) is an aspect of English for Specific Purposes (ESP). Louis Trimble, the father of EST, used it initially to mean ‘the written discourse of scientific and technical English’; but was later broadened in scope to refer to ‘the field of science and technology’ including ‘oral as well as written discourse’ (Trimble, 1990:2). Trimble describes beautifully the distinction and relationship between the two subsidiaries of ESP, namely, English for academic purposes (EAP) and English for Occupational Purposes (EOP) as follows:

An electronics engineer and skilled electronics technician, for example, have a good deal of the same technical language in common and may rely on the same service manuals for much of their work in the laboratory. At the same time there will be many discourse units they do not share—the engineer will make use of theoretically-oriented texts often heavily laced with quite abstruse mathematics, while the technician will have no reason to consult these types of texts. Further, the engineer will read journals that are of interest to him but would not be to most technicians.
Similarly, the technician will often deal with manual of little interest or use to the engineer. Whatever the differences between those operating at either end of the spectrum, neither end is ‘better’; each simply represent written EST discourse with some (but hardly a!!!) different characteristics. Such differences exist in most scientific and technical fields…. In sum, EST covers the areas of English written for academic and professional purposes and of English written for occupational (and vocational) purposes, including the often informally written discourse found in trade journals and in scientific and technical materials written for the layman (Trimble, 1990: 5-7).

It is therefore the job of a linguist in this language area to study the language of science and technology (ST) practitioners so as to analyze, understand and describe their language use for the purpose of identifying features and peculiarities, language difficulties, and with a view to suggesting solutions to such where available.

**Language and Stylistics**

In simple terms, style is conceived to refer to some or all of the language habits of one person or a group of persons. Further simply, stylistics, or register analysis, is the deliberate investigation of language according to use, and not according to user (Hudson, 1996:45), which may examine appropriateness of usage in relation to situation of use. Lawal (2003) posits that stylistics as a branch of linguistics derives largely from a sociolinguistic interest in the treatment of variables in entire texts that are viewed as communicative events (2003:26). Thus, stylistics is mainly concerned with ‘language variation and the distinctiveness of features within and across texts as occasioned by situational factors’. He identifies six distinctive levels of linguistic analysis in stylistic studies, namely the graphological, the phonological and phonetic, the lexico-semantic, the morphological, the syntactic and then the discoursal levels (Lawal, 2003: 29).

Aside from this, another approach in stylistic study which according to Lawal (2003) ‘aims at a more objective description of the relative frequencies of stylistic features in a text or a group of related texts’ is the approach that investigates the idiosyncratic form or style of language use, itself an aspect of sociolinguistics, a branch of linguistics which studies language use in the society. An aspect of this approach is forensic stylistics which tends to involve a more or less quantitative determination of the distinctive style of a writer or a group of writers. According to Dare (1991), this approach, which has been commonly used to determine authorship, is based on the realization that no conscious writer uses a significant linguistic item, or portrays a linguistic feature, repeatedly, without a reason. Lawal (2003:33) thus argues that ‘the frequency of occurrence of each stylistics feature can be computed to make more reliable descriptive and explanatory statement of a more general nature’.

The aim of stylistics therefore is the establishment of norms and degree of probability of occurrence of linguistic features (Goatly, 1993), thus equating stylistics with such discourse studies as description of varieties or register analysis (Olajide, 2003: 94). In sum, it is possible to investigate the style of a single text or a combination of texts or language samples having certain level of contextual, periodic, cultural, historical, or authorial relatedness in language use. Finally, according to Olajide (2003):

> the highest goal of the stylistician should be to move from formal description of styles to a rhetorical interpretation of texts. The movement is possible because the written
text has a linguistic and social status which can allow the stylistician (to) investigate the text at the intended level (2003:94).

Continuing Engineering Education

Continuing Engineering Education (CEE) as practised in advanced countries in Europe, Britain, Japan and USA, is a means of:

improving the engineering knowledge of those in the engineering profession for higher performance. Updating the engineering knowledge... not only helps in the production of well trained engineering personnel but also helps in the individual so affected to attain full personal development’ (Iwuoha, 1998:391).

This kind of a programme is meant to address the identified shortcomings in engineering education such as ‘insufficient teaching of students in synthesis of technology’ as well as ‘inadequate encouragement to the development of wider skills and outlet required of engineers within the engineering dimensions’ (Iwuoha, 1998:392).

The CEE programme involves the engineers, the technologists and the technicians in addition to the engineering managers, who may never have had any engineering training, as the CEE would afford participants ‘the opportunity to correct the deficiencies inherent in their initial professional training (Iwuoha, 1998:392). Apart from institutions and professional societies, this programme is also conducted by industries (e.g. UAC) and government agencies or parastatals as in-house and out-house on the job training programmes for their personnel. Limitations to this in-house training is that it is meant only for their own personnel and one set of people in the establishment, and does not usually address the general technological development of the country (Iwuoha, 1998:393). The CEE programme can effectively take care of the training needs of all manners of engineers, technologists, and technicians, road-side automobile mechanics inclusive.

Method of Data Collection

A short questionnaire was prepared to elicit specific piece of information from road-side mechanics in South-western Nigeria. Although at the end, copies of the questionnaire only reached most cities in Osun State, two cities in Oyo State and only one respondent in Lagos State, these three states out of the five states of the south-western part of Nigeria are representative of what obtains in most parts of the region. At the end, thirty-eight (38) copies of the questionnaire were returned completed.

The questionnaire was accompanied by further oral discussions especially where the respondent was willing to talk. The questions cover such areas as academic qualification, age, why they did not go further in their academics or formal schools (not education which could be formal or otherwise), years of experience as mechanic, and whether they are willing to undergo trainings and workshops if such are organized for them. They were finally requested to write out some parts of motor vehicle as they know them, in their own handwriting, especially if they need to ‘re-born’ (i.e. make new) an aged engine. Of course the purpose of the questions was explained to them so as to secure their cooperation and support. This nature of the questionnaire, which requires respondents to write in their own handwriting under supervision, is another important factor why more respondents could not be reached across the region as this was time consuming and expensive. The responses were categorized and analysed as table 1, 2a to 2e, and 3, below. Further clarifications were sought from colleagues in the science and technology disciplines on aspects where such were needed.
TABLE 1: Respondents' data from across Osun, Oyo and Lagos States in South-western Nigeria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Workshop Location</th>
<th>Qualification</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Experience</th>
<th>Reason for Dropping out of School</th>
<th>Interested in training/workshop</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Ede</td>
<td>JSS 1</td>
<td>30yrs</td>
<td>5yrs</td>
<td>No Financial support</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Ede</td>
<td>JSS 2</td>
<td>25yrs</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>No Financial support</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Ede</td>
<td>JSS 2</td>
<td>44yrs</td>
<td>23yrs</td>
<td>No Financial support</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Ede</td>
<td>Pry 6</td>
<td>30yrs</td>
<td>13yrs</td>
<td>No Financial support</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Ede</td>
<td>Pry 6</td>
<td>50yrs</td>
<td>35yrs</td>
<td>No Financial support</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Ede</td>
<td>Pry 6</td>
<td>35yrs</td>
<td>17yrs</td>
<td>Low assimilation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Ede</td>
<td>Pry 6</td>
<td>54yrs</td>
<td>24yrs</td>
<td>Not disclosed</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Ede</td>
<td>Pry 6</td>
<td>35yrs</td>
<td>20yrs</td>
<td>No Financial support</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Ede</td>
<td>Pry 6</td>
<td>50yrs</td>
<td>31yrs</td>
<td>Interest in mechanic</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Ede</td>
<td>Pry 6</td>
<td>22yrs</td>
<td>12yrs</td>
<td>No Financial support</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Ede</td>
<td>Pry 6</td>
<td>32yrs</td>
<td>10yrs</td>
<td>No Financial support</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Ede</td>
<td>Pry 6</td>
<td>25yrs</td>
<td>10yrs</td>
<td>Interest in mechanic</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Ede</td>
<td>Pry 6</td>
<td>41yrs</td>
<td>13yrs</td>
<td>Interest in mechanic</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Ede</td>
<td>Pry 6</td>
<td>35yrs</td>
<td>8yrs</td>
<td>Low assimilation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Ede</td>
<td>Pry 6</td>
<td>47yrs</td>
<td>25yrs</td>
<td>Low assimilation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Ede</td>
<td>SSCE</td>
<td>42yrs</td>
<td>18yrs</td>
<td>No Financial support</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Ede</td>
<td>SSCE</td>
<td>29yrs</td>
<td>14yrs</td>
<td>No interest in School</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Ede</td>
<td>SSCE</td>
<td>37yrs</td>
<td>15yrs</td>
<td>No Financial support</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Ede</td>
<td>SSCE</td>
<td>35yrs</td>
<td>11yrs</td>
<td>Not disclosed</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Ede</td>
<td>SSCE</td>
<td>43yrs</td>
<td>27yrs</td>
<td>No Financial support</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>Ilogbo</td>
<td>Pry 6</td>
<td>35yrs</td>
<td>15yrs</td>
<td>Divination</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>Ibadan</td>
<td>OND</td>
<td>42yrs</td>
<td>15yrs</td>
<td>His father’s job</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>Ibadan</td>
<td>Pry 6</td>
<td>32yrs</td>
<td>15yrs</td>
<td>Personal choice</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>Ibadan</td>
<td>SSCE</td>
<td>22yrs</td>
<td>2yrs</td>
<td>No Financial support</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>Ibadan</td>
<td>SSS3 Drop out</td>
<td>17yrs</td>
<td>2yrs</td>
<td>No parents, no sponsor</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>Ikire</td>
<td>Pry 6</td>
<td>36yrs</td>
<td>25yrs</td>
<td>No Financial support</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>Ikirun</td>
<td>Pry 6</td>
<td>42yrs</td>
<td>20yrs</td>
<td>Interest in mechanic</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>Ile-Ife</td>
<td>Pry 6</td>
<td>35yrs</td>
<td>11yrs</td>
<td>Love for petrol smell</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>Ile-Ife</td>
<td>SSCE</td>
<td>38yrs</td>
<td>10yrs</td>
<td>Low assimilation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>Ilesha</td>
<td>JSS 3</td>
<td>27yrs</td>
<td>18yrs</td>
<td>Low assimilation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>Pry 6</td>
<td>40yrs</td>
<td>20yrs</td>
<td>No Financial support</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>Ogbomosoro</td>
<td>Pry 6</td>
<td>35yrs</td>
<td>13yrs</td>
<td>No Financial support</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.</td>
<td>Osogbo</td>
<td>JSS</td>
<td>33yrs</td>
<td>18yrs</td>
<td>Could not cope</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34.</td>
<td>Osogbo</td>
<td>JSS2</td>
<td>27yrs</td>
<td>8yrs</td>
<td>Could not cope</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35.</td>
<td>Osogbo</td>
<td>Pry 6</td>
<td>32yrs</td>
<td>15yrs</td>
<td>No Financial support</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36.</td>
<td>Osogbo</td>
<td>Pry 6</td>
<td>40yrs</td>
<td>20yrs</td>
<td>No Financial support</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.</td>
<td>Osogbo</td>
<td>SSCE</td>
<td>32yrs</td>
<td>10yrs</td>
<td>No Financial support</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38.</td>
<td>Osogbo</td>
<td>Standard 6</td>
<td>58yrs</td>
<td>35yrs</td>
<td>No Financial support</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 2: Summary of Data from the 38 Respondents in Table 1 above

Table 2A: LOCATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ede</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ejigbo</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibadan</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ikire</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ikirun</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ife</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilesha</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogbomoso</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osogbo</td>
<td>06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2B: REASONS FOR DROPPING OUT OF THE FORMAL SCHOOL SYSTEM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not Disclosed</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Financial Support</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in Mechanic</td>
<td>07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low assimilation</td>
<td>07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No interest in Schooling</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divination</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2C: ACADEMIC QUALIFICATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic Qualification</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary 6</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSS 1 – JSS 3</td>
<td>06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSS – SSCE</td>
<td>09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OND</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2D: AGE BRACKET

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Bracket</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 – 19yrs</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 – 29yrs</td>
<td>07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 – 39yrs</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 – 49yrs</td>
<td>09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50yrs &amp; above</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2E: TRAINING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 3: List of Automobile Parts Spellings collected from Road-Side Mechanics in South-western Nigeria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SN</th>
<th>MECHANICS’ SPELLINGS</th>
<th>STANDARD SPELLING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ajosita seni /Ajosita /Chain Arjoster /Ajota</td>
<td>Adjuster chain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Andi break</td>
<td>Hand break</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Asofa /ansofa</td>
<td>Shock absorber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Buloku ejin /biloku /bulok</td>
<td>Engine block</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Busin /busi /bus /pusin</td>
<td>Bushing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Bootu</td>
<td>Bolt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Bakasu /back asul</td>
<td>Back axle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Caprator /cabirato /kaperetor /capretor</td>
<td>Carburettor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Chine /sini /sheini /tamisene /timeing cani /time sane</td>
<td>Chain / Timing chain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Corodu /corondu /konrodu /conrod /korodu</td>
<td>Cone rod</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Danba /danpa /dapa /daunpa cani</td>
<td>Damper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Esust pipa</td>
<td>Exhaust pipe / silencer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Engen oil /ejin oil</td>
<td>Engine oil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Fue fita</td>
<td>Fuel filter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Ferbu /verb /fabu</td>
<td>Valve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Alternate Names</td>
<td>English Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Fue pompu /fuel pumpu /fueli popu</td>
<td>Fuel pump</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Fan beti</td>
<td>Fan belt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Firan wili /fira wili</td>
<td>Front wheel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Gomu /gom</td>
<td>Gum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Geji oil</td>
<td>Oil guage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Gudon pi</td>
<td>Gudgeon pin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Ignisan /igilision /igileson</td>
<td>Ignition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Jia siti /gia</td>
<td>Gear seat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Jasiketi</td>
<td>Gasket</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Kii saft</td>
<td>Key shaft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Kokodi</td>
<td>Back axle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Konu fafu</td>
<td>Cone valve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Komplit pakin /kopiliti pakni /kopiliti pakin</td>
<td>Complete packing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Ki wosa /kiros wosa /kii wosa</td>
<td>Key washer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Koneshon rodu /kollesan rodin /kolesan rodu /conleting rord</td>
<td>Connecting rod</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Koili</td>
<td>Coil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Kuli</td>
<td>Pulley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Kountaseti /contat sett /corter set /kotaseti</td>
<td>Contact set</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Kiransafuti /cran safti /safut /saft /kirahun shafti</td>
<td>Crank shaft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Kondensa</td>
<td>Condenser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Leda kilosi</td>
<td>Leather clutch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Misaft bus /mi saft</td>
<td>Mild shaft / bushing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Melifomu</td>
<td>Manifold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Metali /meta</td>
<td>Metal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Ornu</td>
<td>Horn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Oobu /obu</td>
<td>Hub</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Oil filter /oli fita /oili fita</td>
<td>Oil filter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Otanetto</td>
<td>Alternator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Oil pomp /oili pompu /oil popu</td>
<td>Oil pump</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Pulogi /pilog /plogi /pulog /plok</td>
<td>Plug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Pisitin /pinstin /pisting /pesitni</td>
<td>Piston</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Pakin ringi</td>
<td>Packing ring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Popeler/ popela/ puro pela</td>
<td>Propeller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Roka fafu/ fuku fabu /foka ferbu /roka fabu</td>
<td>Hook valve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Radileto /ragilato /ragleto</td>
<td>Radiator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Riten</td>
<td>Retainer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Ringi /ringin /rigi /rigni</td>
<td>Ring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Silinda /slinda /cilinda</td>
<td>Cylinder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Sok an sofa /asofa /ansofa</td>
<td>Shock absorber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>Salesa</td>
<td>Silencer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>Saunpepa</td>
<td>Sandpaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>Sari boks</td>
<td>Steering box</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>Safo</td>
<td>Servo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>Sakilipu (?)</td>
<td>Circlip (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>Turosi wosa</td>
<td>Thrust washer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>Tarodu</td>
<td>Tie/ radius rod</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>Totu /tortu caple</td>
<td>Throttle cable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>Tapet masin</td>
<td>Tappet machine</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Discussion of Findings

The data above show that the respondent mechanics present no knowledge of spelling of automobile lexical items nor can they pronounce correctly, due to their very low literacy level. Thus, it is their stylistic peculiarity to carry on the technician profession of automobile repairs by ‘Yorubalising’ the names of the parts of motor vehicles e.g rimu, bakasu, safo, kitena, sok an sofa, etc. However, they were able to identify these automobile parts and carry out efficient repairs on them. In other words, although their literacy level, especially English language reading and writing skills appear poor, they nevertheless have acquired a high level of automobile technical skills in a strictly informal setting devoid of formal examinations and certification. Although they pronounce and write badly, they recognize very well the names of the parts they pronounce or write. Thus, while the technology is here with us in English, the users and mechanics are Yoruba. Automobile engineering and repair is therefore a point of contact here between Yoruba language as L1 in the South-western Nigeria and English language as L2. The result is phonological and lexical interference as style.

From table 3, it is clear that the names of automobile (auto) parts, which are here regarded as auto technical terms (ATTs), are written by the mechanics the way they pronounce them as speakers of Yoruba (as) Mother Tongue (YMT). Since English letters such as C,V,X and Z are not available in the Yoruba alphabet, it may be difficult for them to pronounce such ATTs as cone rod, valve, axle, etc., especially given their literacy level. In other words, there is no one-to-one relationship between the English and Yoruba consonant and vowel sounds, as a result of which we record the following occurrence: the English Th (as in Thrust), ee (as in steering), C pronounced as K (as in carburetor), thr, ttl (as in throttle), i pronounced as /ai/ (as in pipe), oo pronounced as /u/ (hook), ey as /i/ (key), two or three consonant sounds without intervening vowels (crank shaft, bolt, gasket, plug, adjuster, pump, ignition, etc).

The English syllable structure is constructed as (CCC)V(CCCC) or (C^0-3) V (0-4); in other words, to have a single English syllable, there can only be a maximum of three optional consonant sounds before one obligatory vowel sound followed by a maximum of four optional consonant sounds (e.g spray /sprei/, glimpsed /glimpst/, asked /a:skt/ each word consisting of one syllable). The syllable structure of Yoruba, a tonal language, however, is (C)V; that is, a maximum of one optional consonant sound before one obligatory vowel sound (e.g. ‘ile’ meaning ‘house’, consists of two syllables; ‘ikilo’ meaning ‘warning’, consists of three syllables). There is therefore no one-to-one correspondence between the syllable structure of English and Yoruba languages. The interference between these two codes at the level of phonology is therefore unavoidable, even among educated English (L2)-Yoruba (L1) speakers, and is thus so much pronounced among the mechanics given their literacy level.

We have a completely different application of ATTs by the mechanics. For instance, the Longman Dictionary (2005) defines throttle (pronounced and known as ‘totu’ by the mechanics) as ‘a piece of equipment that controls the amount of fuel going into a vehicle’s engine’, but which is being used, by the mechanics, and in fact by most car users, in place of ‘pedal’ or ‘accelerator’ which the same dictionary defines as ‘a part in a car or in a machine that you press with your foot to control it’ or ‘…to make it go faster’. The same applies to
the use of the term ‘kokodi’ in place of ‘back axle’, perhaps because that part of the motor vehicle has the shape of a ‘pot’ known as ‘ikoko’ in Yoruba, and is found towards the back of the vehicle, simply known as ‘idi’ in yoruba. These two words thus combined give us ‘ikoko idi’ simply shortened to ‘i-kokodi’ or better still, ‘kokodi’.

Some of their writings are outright unintelligible, meaningless or unrelated to any automobile part, e.g. chine, cabet, danba, corodu, corondu pusin, F & B olisili, fabu olisili, fabonsic, ena sporket, king serfit, sakilipu, etc., but for the fact that they know and can identify what they mean or refer to. However, another Yoruba speaker and user of motor vehicle can as much as possible understand this language especially when pronounced by the mechanics. This is to the extent that these mechanics are almost succeeding in giving us a totally different idea of the correct nomenclature of these automobile parts such that most automobile users have imbibed these wrong pronunciations (e.g. salesa, verb, ragilator, contaset, kokodi, ansofa, etc), including engineers, if only for mutual comprehension.

The mechanics are certainly too far away from writings of any kind, and usually shy away from writing, and have thus developed poor writing skills of both the English and Yoruba languages. This must have affected their knowledge of spellings. They do not write proposals, reports, official letters, or bid for private or government contracts. It is either that they never saw any need for this, suffer inferiority complex or that they have believed in their lack of capacity to do so.

They also do not seem to see any need to read anything, including packages of automobile parts which normally contain the name of the items they hold, and which they buy and use everyday. This is why they usually never get the names (especially spellings) correct. Thus, along the line they have developed a very poor reading habit. Their very low level of literacy has conferred on them a compelling feeling of inferiority complex. This feeling is capable of making them see themselves as no-bodies, unsuccessful, while feeling envious and angry, and as dregs of the society who have next to nothing to contribute to the society let alone to the country’s technological development.

Against the impression of a low literacy level with which the respondents have been painted, stands out the high literacy level of one of the respondents with an OND qualification, and his ready capacity to flow in line with modern technological advancements regarding automobile repair and maintenance. However, he is alone, and could hardly reason beyond the level of the majority of the mechanics. Our findings reflect a positive attitude of the mechanics to all kinds of training meant to improve their situation as 97% of them (see Table 2e) are willing to undergo such trainings. With this training, their situation can gradually be improved, especially their literacy level, while their technical and professional potentials can be highly promoted to a very useful level. Our data (re-presented below) also show that only 20% of them left school because they did not understand what the teachers were teaching, yet they are at home with the complex system of an automobile.

Only 18% of them claim that they left school due to their interest in automobile repairs. More than half of our sample (53%) left school because of poverty or financial constraints. In other words, most of the mechanics left school not because they are not intelligent but because they found themselves in one problem or the other different from want of intelligence. For instance, one of the thirty-eight respondents (3%) says he became an automobile technician because it was divined that that was the job he was destined to do from heaven.
Implications of findings
The unacceptable implication of the automobile mechanics’ level of literacy is that it forecloses their capacity to improve technically and professionally through reading and studying technical materials, manuals, automobile operating instructions, automobile components and technical repair tools. Such acquired knowledge could help to enhance their skills for carrying out more intelligent, efficient and organized automobile repairs, and to vouchsafe sound and informed technical advice to vehicle owners/users on servicing, getting original/genuine engine parts, etc. It must be added that if these technical reading materials had been in Yoruba, the mechanics’ mother tongue (MT), they might be able to use them. English to them is therefore an impediment, and this has to be conquered one way or the other, which is the subject of a forthcoming research work.

Also due to their poor English literacy level, their ability to liaise and cooperate with non-Yoruba speaking colleagues in and outside Nigeria on new techniques, technologies, models, vehicle parts, tools, instrument, methods and other useful issues is constrained. Their inability to communicate in English limits their access to modern developments in the automobile repairs and industry; besides, they cannot source or access information materials prepared in English. For instance, that they cannot spell technical names correctly shows that in spite of the fact that they buy and use new spare parts with their (spare parts) names written on their packages, they still cannot, or do not, read them.

Furthermore, due to this poor literacy level, they are cut off forthwith from the use of the ICT/internet resources prepared in English for technical and professional improvements, sourcing better and modern methods and means of effecting vehicle repairs, maintenance, sourcing genuine spare engine parts, etc. These findings cast on us a bleak but redeemable picture of a set of mechanics whose technical skills are constrained by a debilitating level of illiteracy. While the engineers can design, technicians can implement, repair and maintain, of course without them, the automobile repair industry would have been a hard nut to crack. However, their poor literacy level has affected the capacity to achieve effective maintenance of Nigerian automobiles: most of them can hardly give reliable technical advice on motor vehicles in the country. Secondly, their level of technical innovation is equally limited.

Interestingly, the pedagogical implication of our findings is that we have a set of data that can serve as resource for teaching linguistic interference (see table 3 above) at the level of phonology (e.g. fabu, oobu, ritena), lexical (e.g bakasu, kokodi) and morphology (e.g. ansofa, sok an sofa, salesa).

Conclusion and Recommendations
It is clear from the above that the literacy level, especially the reading and writing skills, of our road-side mechanics in the south-western Nigeria is very poor; however, they have been able to serve the automobile technological needs of the country as far as repairs are concerned within the limits of their technical know-how. This shows that in spite of their literacy level, they still have very crucial roles to play in the technological development of the country. Improving their literacy level would open up a world of opportunities to them in terms of developing themselves professionally, carrying out more efficient technical repairs, vouchsafing more reliable technical advice to automobile users, interacting with colleagues within and beyond their shores, developing the skills for innovations, accessing useful technical information from technical materials prepared in English, accessing the internet, contributing to the country’s technological development, etc.
There is therefore the need to realize the significance of coming to the aid of these mechanics in a four-fold formula, namely language and communication skills improvement training, especially the writing and reading skills in English and Yoruba; professional technological orientation through workshops and seminars known as continuing engineering education; certificating them; and finally, providing financial support and empowerment to help them set up standard, modern workshops and acquire modern tools. Through them, Nigeria’s technological development can be fast-tracked.

Mechanics in south-western Nigeria are in need of serious professional programmes aimed at brushing away their inherent inferiority complex and making them realize that they have crucial roles to play, and that they need to make use of their skills and talents to support and develop the country’s technological development. They are also in need of regular professional workshops and trainings to challenge their intellectual curiosity and technical skill, and to show them modern trends in the world of automobile repairs and technology. This is part of what is known as continuing engineering education (CEE).

There is the need to improve their literacy level through special language workshops tailored to their level and needs. Such workshops should be tailored towards instructing them on correct pronunciation of automobile parts as a way of encouraging them to develop their language and communication skills. They can also be gradually sensitized on the potential roles of the ICT in automobile repairs, by introducing them to documentaries on how the computer and the internet can help them on areas such as troubleshooting, repairing, modelling, designing, modern tools and equipment, and generally make their tasks easy and alluring. This is also part of continuing engineering education (CEE). In recent times, we are beginning to have in our midst computerized, fully or partly automated motor vehicles, and this trend is still growing.

Furthermore, there is the need to get them certificated so as to make them see the importance of literacy for improved performance, for the purpose of regulating their activities and eliminating quacks. Government should work out modalities to give Nigeria’s auto-technician financial empowerment, such as helping them with soft loans to acquire modern tools and standard workshops. All government interventions mentioned above - language training, professional workshops and financial assistance - should not be limited to mechanics alone, but should be extended to automobile electrical repairers (a.k.a. re-wire), the battery chargers, the re-winders, electronics repairers, and the automobile body repairers or builders (a.k.a. panel beaters).

Relevant engineering and technology departments in higher institutions could work out how to bring these road-side mechanics in and make them conduct practical classes for students in their workshops. This partnership portends a lot of mutual benefits for the institution, the nation, and the road-side mechanics. For the institution, it would be able to turn out better trained, highly skilled, self-reliant graduates, develop indigenous technology through combined efforts, and thereby reducing poverty, and adding value to Nigeria’s tertiary education. For the road-side mechanics, they would be able to use their skills in a more organized setting, learn new things, acquire further experience, get exposed to modern methods of detecting errors, get exposed to modern repair and maintenance equipment and tools, and thereby contributing to the country’s indigenous technological development. The nation would then be on the road to technological emancipation.
References


Dare, S.A (1991) ‘Some approaches to the study of Style’. In Oyegoke, L. (ed.) Undergraduate Text in English Language and Literature (pp. 59 – 71).


The Antinomy of Exile: Ambivalence and Transnational Discontents in Tanure Ojaide’s *When It No Longer Matters Where You Live*

Uzoechi Nwagbara
Greenwich School of Management
United Kingdom

Abstract
About two decades before the end of the twentieth century, exile literature emerged as one of the paradigmatic, innovative and creative offerings of postcolonial Nigerian literature. The mainstay of this still emerging literary genre is its departure from the much-debated discourses on decolonisation, as well as excavation of Europe’s imperial expansion. Thus, the emphasis here is on critiquing elusive notions of home, exile and cultural identity, which are compounded by the blinding subjectivities of globalisation and transnationalism that occlude the true import of mass migration and global capitalist rhetoric. Consequently, Tanure Ojaide’s *When It No Longer Matters Where You Live* (1998) is steeped in delineating the architectonics of such inquiry, which is yet to be given critical attention in his art. So, the hypothesis of this paper is that the pressures of transnationalism emanating from the blundering promises of globalisation and Nigeria’s national dissonance are a correlative of cultural ambivalence and antinomy – both are a cardinal trope in the poetry collection. Exile, meaning the relocation, fleeing or movement of people from one social space to another either willingly or forcefully and transnationalism, a social movement in response to heightened interconnectivity amongst nations, are paradoxical as they both engender cultural ambivalence and discontent in the exile.

Keywords: Transnationalism, exile, antinomy, ambivalence, Tanure Ojaide; globalisation, Nigeria.

An exile may hanker after a sympathetic environment; one that trails an umbilical roots… In such an instance, the writer reflects present reality, but deflects its seductiveness through literary strategies of a markedly different temper from those that define or dominate the space that has given him shelter.

--- Wole Soyinka

Exile is a way of moving the writer from the territorial confinement, where his acts of resistance might ignite other fields into a global ‘exclusion’.

--- Ngugi wa Thiong’o.

Introduction
A major thematic preoccupation of contemporary Nigerian literature is the subject matter of exile and transnationalism. The response of Nigerian literature to this type of trope is in view of the trauma of surviving in foreign land that exiles consider their
new home as well as alienation following such transition. In postcolonial literature, the question of exile or transnationalism in the wake of globalisation and contemporary global politics is very central in understanding the realities of a nation’s political process, culture and governance. This is the case with Nigeria, where the pressures of living have forced people to seek greener pastures in foreign countries. The realities of globalisation, which have exile as their corollary, have enriched postcolonial Nigerian literature as well as contributed to the synergy of responses and attempts towards unearthing the ugly faces of globalisation and transnationalism.

The actualities and disequilibrium which literature of exile addresses animates the craft of *When It No Longer Matters Where You Live*, an ideo-aesthetic reconstruction of the tragedies of globalised capitalist system of postcolonial Nigeria and its attendant malaise, which are the canvas of exile and transnationalism in the collection. Accordingly,

> The feverish race towards planetisation or otherwise known as globalisation has generated and will continue to generate all manner of debates… these debates and arguments are bound to elicit responses across institutional strata. Tanure Ojaide’s *When It No Longer Matters Where You Live* is one of such responses. (Olaluwa 2007: 242)

One of the sinews of the craft of *When It No Longer Matters Where You Live* as an artistic reconstruction that traces the trajectory of transnationalism is the manner it relates the phenomena of exile and transnationalism to globalisation, a major bane of many developing nations, which finds articulation in the poetry of Ojaide from the angle of environmental, social, cultural and political contradictions (Olaluwa 2007: 242). Thus, in *When It No Longer Matters Where You Live*, Ojaide invites us to a debate on Nigeria’s socio-political and cultural discourse with Orientalist temper that awakens our collective social consciousness towards apprehending the backdrop of exile’s very personal concerns (Korte 2000: 144) which throw up the thorny questions of cultural politics and national identity. In addition, the poetry collection is a part of aesthetic ensemble on the African continent to offer an important opportunity for global activists to move beyond the confines of Eurocentric and authoritarian political theories as well as providing a point of departure for anti-authoritarian activists to develop broadened insights into community-based resistance to the predations of neo-liberal capitalist globalisation. (Shantz 2007: 122)

This is essentially why Ojaide asserts thus: “I believe in the artist’s activist role. Action counts to remedy a bad situation. Being passive or apolitical will not change things” (1994: 17). The “action” Ojaide’s comments foreshadow is that of possessing critical voice and creative vision capable of transcending the evils of globalisation and identity politics. It is on this score that Shantz sees Ojaide as probably “the finest of the post-Okigbo/post-Soyinka generation of Nigerian poets” (2007: 122).
Although Ojaide’s tenor of narration is symptomatic of the Niger delta ecological and environmental devastation, it also offers a panoptic view of the larger Nigerian society in relation to the need for cultural re-affirmation, national identity and environmental sustenance, as well as a protection of the nation from the ruse of globalisation, inept governance and transnational pressures. Jeffrey Shantz’s statement in his piece, “Beyond Socialist Realism: Glocal Concern and African Poetry”, is relevant here. As he argues, the recent works of African (Nigerian) poets challenge us “to accept the validity of non-Western perspective and way of making sense of life” (2009: 110). This is in consonance with Ojaide’s view about Africa losing its cultural soul in the wake of global identity politics, which blurs Africa’s local identity (1994: 21). Ojaide further buttresses this point: “the shift from a celebration of the environment to a lamentation for its demise reflects the reality of my experience” (1994: 16) concerning the perils of globalisation and identity politics.

In his stimulating piece titled, “Migration, Globalisation, and the Recent African Literature”, Tanure Ojaide brings to light the underlay of exile literature: “Migration, globalisation, and related phenomena of exile, transnationality, and multilocality have their bearing on the cultural identity, aesthetics, content and form of the literary production of Africans abroad” (2008: 1). In this connection, Ulrich Beck’s phraseology of “place polygamy” regarding Africans (Nigerians) living abroad and writing about Africa or African experience is not unfounded. The phrase resounds with the aesthetics of representing African diaspora, what Paul Gilroy calls “black Atlantic”; it is also an assessment of national drama unfolding in the exile’s motherland. In this vein, Tanure Ojaide is one of the African writers and scholars who have allowed exile phenomenon, globalisation and multiculturalism to find expression in their works. This method of representing contemporary African (Nigerian) experience beyond the frontiers of nation-state rhetoric in the wake of the realities of globalisation and transnationalism is the hallmark of When It No Longer Matters Where You Live. It is in this regard that Patterson and Kelley have remarked that

Notions of globalisation are everywhere. More and more we read or hear about efforts to think “transnationally”, to move beyond the limits of the nation-state, to think in terms of border lands and diasporas. Indeed … several scholars have contributed to a rebirth of African diaspora studies. (2000: 12)

Thus, When It No Longer Matters Where You Live is essentially one of such texts formulated as a refraction of African diaspora experience concerning the paradox and discontents inherent in global capitalism.

The consequences of homogenising world ideology, culture and political system so as to perpetually further underdevelopment project in the Saidian “Other” nations is behind the concept of globalisation and its ancillary systems. This is sadly implicated in exilic, transnational experience. The quest for homogeneity is what Onuka considers the “universalism of the world system” (2006: 2). The universalisation of global system is a ruse perpetrated by the West to drive political instability in the exiles’ homeland: one of the reasons for the social movement that whets the exiles’ appetite to seek alternative social space on the heels of the pressures of existence in their homeland. On this score,
In general globalisation involves a relativisation and destabilisation of old identities, whether of nation-states, communities or individuals … the creation of new hybrid entities, transnational phenomena like diasporic communities. (Albrow 1997: 93-4)

The above conjuncture resonates with what Olu Oguibe dubs the dialectic of “connectivity and the fate of the unconnected” (2002: 175).

Another source of exile representation is the *modus operandi* of governance in postcolonial Nigeria. A lot has been said, proposed, written and discussed regarding postcolonial Nigeria; attempt to delve into this subject matter will stifle the essence of this paper. However, Martin Albrow in his *The Global Age: State and Society Beyond Modernity* offers a telling silhouette of the *raison d'être* behind exile experience. According to him, the “inability of the state to shape the aspirations of individuals and to gather them into collective political aims” (1997: 76) is a cardinal source of transnationalism and exile. Apart from the harsh living conditions that Nigerians face in their homeland, which make exile irresistible, the urgency of transnationalism, a form of globalisation that blurs the congruence of geographic and social space as well as increases national interconnectivity amongst nations and people for enhanced production process and benefits, is vital in this consideration.

In refracting diasporic identity politics and the Du Boisian “double consciousness” (Leonard 2009: 76), that stem from this practice, Nigerian writers have illuminated our minds about the position of race relations and place-based aesthetics in the canonical global ethnic politics and “perceptions about the modern world” (Gilroy 1993: 111). They have equally articulated the dilemma exiles face in foreign environments. The poetry collections that foreshadow the antinomy of exile, as well as subterfuge of globalisation in Nigerian literature include Tanure Ojaide’s *When It No Longer Matters Where You Live* (1989), Chin Ce’s *Millennial* (2005), Toyin Adewale’s *Die Aromaforscherin* (1998), Joe Ushie’s *Hill Songs* (2004), Uche Nduka’s *Bremen Poems* (1995), Odia Ofeimun’s *London Letters & Other Poems* (2000), and Olu Oguibe’s *A Gathering of Fear* (1988) among others.

In contradiction to the aspirations of exiles, the new-found home, the transnational world, does not seem to offer succour or alleviate pains of social movement from the homeland to new environments, particularly the West. This motif suffuses the craft of *When It No Longer Matters Where You Live*. Apart from the environmental and social disequilibrium that are dissected in the collection, a major focus of the poetry is the paradox of exile experience. In his important book on the phenomena exile and transnationalism entitled *Reflections on Exile and Other Essays*, Edward Said acutely summarises the antinomy of exile experience through the manner in which the goals of leaving one’s home country have been damaged by “the loss of something left behind” (2001: 173). In “A Song of Exile”, which Okunoye Oyeniyi refers to in one of his writings makes the same point about the antinomy of exile and the quandary of the poet-persona:

```
I stand at the gates
stranger and outsider
I have journeyed away
from the sea into the desert
```
the charm has crossed rivers
the tongue is blunt
the songster has journeyed
without his voice. (59)

The contradictions correlative to exilic, transnational movement as well as antinomy of such act as painted in the above poem find continuation in “A Question of Wholeness”, a verse in When It No Longer Matters Where You Live, which shall be quoted at length here:

I am thirty percent Native American”.
I wonder what percentage
of yellow, black, or white
I carry in my brown face…

Taban says I have Meroitic draughts
drowned in my bloodstream.
I have for long lost my Bini relatives
to the Ethiope crossing
That contorted my family name.
The longer the distance here,
the more confused the blend;
black and white wear out.

I am fifty percent oppressed,
sixty percent robbed of rights,
seventy percent hungry for love,
eighty percent a dog or drake.
I am ninety percent native American.

It’s a question of wholeness –. (101)

The antinomy expressed in the above lengthy lines, finds counterpart in another versification: “American Fred”, where Ojaide touches on this point with piquancy: “I will never escape Africa’s fate/from my American home” (102). The paradox intrinsic in mass migration is further given expression in another verse, “Caravanned”:

Dry or wet,
something is coming
to tear into shreds
our short expectations
of waiting.
We are still fugitives;
and here is neither home
nor the journey’s end…. (89)

The dangers of the paradox of exile sketched above are located within the confines of a weak Bhabhain “cultural hybridity”, which is neither an antidote to essentialism
nor a solution to “the belief in invariable and fixed properties which define the ‘whatness’ of a given entity” (Fuss 1991: xi). Moreover, the problematic of this antinomy makes the Bhabhain rhetoric of “third space” prostrate in the sense that it does not diminish the weight of jaded existence, which is the mental fixation of such exile for changing his social space; it rather heightens his trepidation and crisis. Thus, even though the “Third Space” is a site which does not pander to the whims of cultural fixity or monolithic origin, and which is “neither the One nor the Other but something else besides” (Bhabha 1994: 28), it does not still offer fulfilment to the exile as Ojaide illustrates in the collection. In his “The Paradox of Exile in Poetry: A Reading of Eight African Poets”, E. E Sule considers the antinomy imbedded in the poetics of exile poetry in Africa, particularly Nigeria:

[…] the images in these poems create a paradoxical discourse which is that somebody goes on exile to seek for comfort, to seek for rest of mind, or, even, to seek for security for his life, but paradoxically ends up not having it, but instead encounters something that may be worse than what he has escaped from in his homeland. (2006: 16)

Thus, the trope of exile touches off “the good we have lost” (Ojaide 1996: 133) following the aftermath of the twin evils of globalisation and national tyranny as well as serves as a mnemonic snapshots of the futility and travails of escaping the homeland in the Saidian “age of the refugee, the displaced person, mass immigration” (2001: 174) and Third World’s (Nigeria’s) frenzied bid to flee Oguibe’s “unconnectivity” rhetoric.

“Immigrant Voice”: Poetics of Antinomy and Culture Shock
The voice that pervades the universe of When It No Longer Matters Where you Live reverberates with culture shock, a process that measures exile-persona’s disappointment with his new environment. A consideration of the genesis and development of the concept of culture shock as it relates and forms a major facet of this study is vital. The phrase culture shock was first used by Cora Dubois in 1951 before it was systematically applied in anthropological studies in the 1960’s by Kalervo Oberg, the Finnish cultural anthropologist, who identified basic factors used in identifying culture shock. The stages or processes of culture shock are not discrete but rather overlapping (Irwin 2007: 6). In this study, the emphasis is on the three first stages of culture shock, which technically apply here. Thus, in Oberg’s view, culture shock is “precipitated by the anxiety that results from losing all our familiar signs and symbols of social intercourse” (Oberg 1960: 177). Basically culture shock entails the impact of moving from a familiar culture or environment to one which is relatively alien; it is the shock consequent upon new movement across disparate cultures or social spaces. Within Oberg’s paradigm, there are three phases of culture shock, which are the honeymoon phase (initial stage), negotiation phase (second stage), and adjustment phase (third stage). The antinomy that wrings wet in Oberg’s sequence is the natural corollary of disillusionment following spatial deracination: a transition from happiness to angst. The culture shock experienced by the poet-persona is piquantly surmised here:

Back home to here na long long way.
The picture of here from home is so different
from the wilderness I see night and day.
This na America with homeless for every corner
that I think I de a numberless world?
Where all the fine fine things in that picture:
Everybody dress kamkpe that I think
na angels, Hollywood Heaven they misspell?...

I come back from work so dead I can’t eat or sleep
and before dawn I don get up to begin another slave day.
when I reply their letters from home saying
here no be what they think they see for their minds,
ye no de gree with me and call me lie-lie man:…

America na big photo-trick for me. (105)

The stylistic felicity of the above extract echoes interior monologue or stream of
consciousness through which the exile’s state of mind is uncovered thereby
adumbrating his true condition. The exile-persona in the above instance uses a medley
of pidgin and Standard English to demonstrate clinically his state of mind, which
vacillates between optimism and despondency: a movement from joy to pain. The
poet narrator is shocked as he realised that what America, a symbol of one of the best
transnational traditions could offer, is not what he thought; America is rather a
“photo-trick”, a sheer illusion.

The honeymoon phase noticed in another poem “Safe Journey” as well as “Home
Songs: IV” morphs into discontent and total chagrin to the poet narrator in the wake
of global capitalism’s negation of positive values of humanity through “blundering
interference and cynical indifference” (Shantz 2007: 121) to the exile’s cultural
identity. Also in another poem, “Home Song: VI”, the “misery” and “gluttonous
appetites”(59) of the political class in the poet-persona’s homeland have rather been
exacerbated by his experience in the new-found world:

[…] Tayo, the world from here is unreal –
the suffering in a lost paradise can only be
to rebuild it out of rubbles of broken dreams!
In this season of seeing what cannot be reached,
hearing what cannot be confirmed,
and taunted by a mirage of treasures still there,
I am fuelled by double love to sing and dance. (63)

The above verse suggests a nostalgic feeling for the exile’s homeland: his paradoxical
acknowledgement of globalisation is largely within the remit of the universal
depiction of the condition of living of the Spivakian subaltern all over the world.
Thus, even though the exile has escaped “suffering” in his homeland, he is equally
going through mental and social atrophy as well as lack of self-fulfilment in his new
social space, the New World. The oxymoron of “insomniac dreams” is a rhetorical
device that resonates with the exile’s “broken dreams”. The sense of nostalgia
painted above reinforces the exile’s disappointment for leaving his motherland for
possible greener pastures in another country. This instance captures in a bold relief a
sense of antinomy informed by notions of risks and difficulty associated with adapting
to a new set of symbols and norms that constitute the cultural currency that is shared by everybody in the exile’s new environment (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982: xix).

The last segment of culture shock is the adjustment phase, which has to do with the exile’s acclimatisation to his new environment. In the poem ‘American Fred’, Ojaide’s poet-narrator’s sense of glee as he sits at table to feast dramatises his ability to get used to his new social ambience and by so doing begin to enjoy its largesse:

I will never escape Africa’s fate
from my American home.
When at table I didn’t stuff myself
to choking point or frittered away boiled potatoes,
grandma winced before me and the leftovers:
“Remember those starving Ethiopian children”.
I imagined multitude of rickety bones collapsing –

In the above poem, the poet-persona is rather enjoying the goodies of his new environment. This sense of satisfaction and adjustment to the exile’s new home finds a foil in another verse, “Grandmother Song”, where the he remembers his motherland with disdain and discontent:

In grandmotherly hands,
we spent all without bank
rupting our fortunes! (100)

The atmosphere captured in the above lines is that of disgruntlement and displeasure about the homeland; this is a sharp contrast to the exile’s new space, where he can afford to send money home. This is unavoidably the case with the exile’s adjustment phase irrespective of the trauma that beleaguered him in this new social space – the New World.

In addition, in her Nomadic Identities: The Performance of Citizenship (1999) May Joseph offers a telling portrait of migration, which is oftentimes caused by the pressures of living:

Migration has become a way of life in the latter part of the twentieth century. The large scale displacement of people from rural to the urban or across nations has heightened the precariousness of arbitrary boundaries while fuelling contemporary identifications with ossified national identities. (154)

Similarly in his piece, “From Multiculturalism to Immigration Shock”, Paul Lauter argues in the same vein regarding the global urgency of im/migration: “In fact, immigration is an international issue: three percent of the world’s population, 191,000, 000 people, now live in countries other than those in which they were born” (2009: 2). In the thinking of Toyin Falola et al, this process occurs in diverse patterns “including forced and voluntary paradigms” (xi). Be it forced or voluntary migration, the undercurrent of this nature of social movement is underpinned by removing the “catfish” (87) “… out of the Niger’s waters” (87), a metaphor for depriving the fauna, flora and man their rightful place in the Niger Delta, a microcosm of Nigeria.
It is worth noting that irrespective of argument in favour of the ideals of transnationalism, there is however serious contradictions inherent in it. This sort of antinomy – an aporia of a sort realised in a distant land is arguably what Lauter calls “immigration shock” (13). Ojaide captures graphically the unavoidable sense of paradox and social pariah that becomes the lot of his poet-persona in the poem “In Dirt and Pride”:

Now that rage begins to strangle me,
I hurl bolts from my guts –
I must recover hope from dire predictions.

I am branded on the forehead
with a painful scar by the country I love
for damming young and old alike…

The world suspects me from a distance,
but I do not blame my despisers. (75)

Ojaide has in the above poem delineated the contours of the paradox of exile as well as relayed the impacts of social exclusion. The imagery like “branded on the forehead” and “rage begins to strangle me” prefigures the harbinger of antinomy of exile; it also exemplifies the irony of leaving the homeland, which its realities inflicted “a painful scare” on the poet-narrator.

Furthermore, Ojaide is a realist, political writer, who channels his artistic dart towards engaging topical issues of the day bogging humanity. If there is any abiding message in the aesthetic and philosophical credo of Ojaide’s art, it is the ability to use his art to interrogate the zeitgeist – the spirit of the time. According to Tijan M. Sallah, the fervour of Ojaide’s art is anchored on the following lines:

If there is a persistent and unifying theme in most of his works, it is a single-minded detestation of tyrants combined with an obsessive commitment to social justice. (Sallah 1995: 20)

In Ojaide’s turn from depicting environmental tragedies in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, a crucial source of his poet-persona’s exilic experience - the helicon of *When It No Longer Matters Where You Live*, to his preoccupation with the ruse of globalisation, the bitter-sweet experience of exiles constitutes a sense of ambivalence, which shall be looked at presently. This is largely part of the mainstay of *When It No Longer Matters Where You Live*, an artistic response to the tyrants referred to in “Dateline: Abuja” as “…vultures that took over the airspace” (43) of Nigeria, a social space responsible for Ojaide’s poet-persona’s transnational movement. The poet-persona’s social space is Ojaide’s native country, the Niger Delta – a geographical space which delineates a penumbra of Nigeria’s inept mode of governance. The activities of the “vulture” (43) in “Dateline: Abuja” are further extended in “For Fela”, a poem in which Ojaide brings to the fore other reasons responsible for the death of Fela Anikulapo Kuti, the maverick Nigerian musician and activist. Firstly, the verse eulogises the political activities of Fela; and secondly, it is
more of a panegyric for political prisoners in Nigeria (including Ojaide himself), who through their works, voices, and activities unveiled and criticised the corporatist Nigerian political landscape for societal advancement:

Fela, I know the other diseases that killed you:  
the lethal poison of zombies and their retinue of civil dogs  
that you sang so loud to embarrass and drive from the landscape.  
You did not prostrate before their brass shoes  
you did not partake of their coveted bush meat,  
you did not shut your mouth to their naked dance.  
You invoked the people’s power to exorcise their evil…  
The corruption you fought so hard to cleanse infected you!  
disabled, you feared no foreign ambush  
to forewear your faith in the Afro spirit –  
[…] Fela, the Nigerian disease cannot kill your voice  
that still leads an ensemble chasing out the evil ones. (65-6)

The phrase “foreign ambush” brings to light global capitalist oppression; it is a sort of metonymy for global identity politics.

“‘When It No Longer Matters Where You Live’: A Silhouette of Cultural Ambivalence”

“‘When It No Longer Matters Where You Live’” is the title poem in the collection, When It No Longer Matters Where You Live. The poem inheres in the concept of ambivalence, which is a major sub-text of the collection. The trope of cultural ambivalence is richly incarnated in this poem; it also dramatises the intertextuality of Nigerian exile literature. The concept of intertextuality, which underscores the re-writing of consistent, identifiable literary trope (Eagleton 1983: 192), is depicted broadly in Olu Oguibe’s A Gathering Fear (1988) and A Song from Exile (1990); it is also made manifest in Uche Nduka’s The Bremen Poems (1995) and Odia Ofeimun’s London Letters and Other Poems (2000). These poetry collections buttress the same point that Ojaide’s When It No Longer Matters Where You Live intimates about cultural ambivalence.

This characterisation amounts to the Gatesian thesis of tropological revision in relation to West Indian Literature, which also gauges the rhythm of cultural deracination of West Indians as well as their exile experience as much as Nigerian exile literature does. For Gates, this is “‘the manner in which a specific trope is repeated with differences, between two or more texts’” (1988: xxv). The contradiction that Nigerian exiles face resonates with Ulli Beier “‘a disgust of reality’. This is the same with their Caribbean counterparts as well as other peoples with similar historical reality. As the Boisean “‘double consciousness’” was a canonical feature of African-American literature, Nigerian exile literature is steeped in cultural ambivalence, an antinomy of a sort. This ambivalence is what Soyinka sees as “‘… a state of tension where the mind simultaneously embraces an anchor in alien territory yet ensures that it stays at one removed from that alien milieu’” (2000: 63).

Even under the rubric of pain and continual yearning for one’s homeland, there is a tinge of rejection of assimilation and unbroken struggle for identity seen in the exile-
persona in the poetry. This portraiture in transnational movement however, inverts the exilic social/cultural relations of transnationalism and globalisation. This argument dovetails with Odile Ferly’s assertion that “exile necessarily brings about some cultural adjustment, an adaptation process that leads to a redefinition of identity” (Oha 2005: 14). Ojaide’s reaction to the question of ambiguity, ambivalence, duality and Manichaeism surrounding globalised spatial displacement finds ample expression in the title poem, “When It No Longer Matters Where You Live”. Ojaide adumbrates:

Wild fires have consumed barks and herbs –
What are the chances of catching the lion alive?

…
The rumours of war days blaze memory
with harmattan drought – always beware
of falling from the spider-web’s height.

Except in returning to libate the soil
with the Cock of Abuja’s blood,
for all its refuge, the foreign home
remains a night whose dawn
I wish arrives before its time.

There’s no such hurt at home
who forgets the pain outside –
That’s the persistent ache one carries
until home’s safe to return to,
when it no longer matters
where you choose to live!

I don’t want to go home
with hands over head. Nor
raised in supplication or surrender.

I will take a drum home –
I know what music and dance
we deserve after the ban.
I want a drum to banish fear.
I will take a drum home. (77-8)

The above versification is quoted at length to underwrite Ojaide’s response to the issue of exile and pressures of transnationalism, which are speckled with serious ambivalence that detonates through palpable imagery ensconced by ironic mindscape, atmosphere of trepidation and joy. The morbid vacillation from pain to joy by the exile-persona leaving his homeland is at the heart of the above poem.

In another poem, “In Dirt and Pride”, Ojaide brings to the fore the saliencies of exile experience and identity problem surrounding mass migration and exile:

Now that rage begins to strangle me,
I hurl out from my guts –
I must recover hope from dire predictions.

I am branded on the forehead
with a painful scar by the country I love
for damning young and old alike.
Lost in the labyrinths of self-indulgence,
‘‘where is the way out?’’ they ask,
who came to this depth with fanfare.

Hardship has smothered the firebrands
that once blazed a liberation trail.
The land smothers every flower…

Before the cockerel’s flung at the sacred crocodile,
let the rage smash the corrupt baron –

The world suspects me at a distance... (75)

The above lines are enmeshed in ambivalence; the title of the poem is rather ambivalent – a melange of Jane Austen’s pride and prejudice (good and bad). Here, the poet narrator is at the crossroads: his new found home ‘‘suspects’’ him; and there is ‘‘a painful scare’’ inflicted on him by the country he loves – his homeland. It could be gleaned that the exile is happy that he left his homeland, which ‘‘smothers every flower’’, but on the other hand, the rage which stems from lack of integration and recognition in foreign land puts him in a sort of identity crisis as well as makes him a social pariah.

The ambivalence twist to the discourse of exile and transnationalism is further given expression in another poem, ‘‘Deportations’’, where Ojaide illustrates pains and trauma of cultural deracination with poignancy:

From the way
these great-grandchildren of migrants
talk of deporting newly arrived immigrants,
calling them illegal and other stinking names,
you would think
they don’t know their family tree,
don’t know their fathers,
and where they came from.
They won’t accept they are bastards! (107)

The image painted above is that of intra-cultural crisis, a race fighting itself. Here the ‘‘great-grandchildren of migrants’’ see ‘‘newly arrived immigrants’’ as people without roots. This situation again engenders harrowing realities of social exclusion which Ojaide’s poet-narrator faces: he is not even accepted by people of his own colour, clime and origin in his new social space. Thus, the ‘‘peace’’ (92) of mind for leaving his homeland is truncated by mental, social and psychological torture stemming from the ill-treatment from the people the poet-persona thought would offer him solidarity and warm embrace. This is a clear case of ambivalence: a situation that
moves from joy to sadness. This oxymoronic scenario is further given resonance in these lines from the poem, “Pacific Love”:

I think of you Ocean as always full,  
your body forever saltsprayed fresh…
Before this daily visit to wash my feet,  
I have had my share of troubled waters.  
I seek pacific favours to douse home fires.

Even in your peace, thunder clashes –  
peace is not a still pose on canvas.  
life’s a struggle for you too, but more…. (92)

“Home fires” a metaphor for “the trouble with Nigeria”, to use the Achebean popular parlance, which the exile thought he could extinguish via moving from his home country on the heels of the promises of transnationalism do not seem feasible, hence, “thunder clashes” in the midst of this seeming “peace”, the ultimate rationale for his transnational movement.

In “Empress of Silence”, Ojaide hones in on the question of ambivalence with a sense of nostalgia and punishment, which the poet-persona experiences as a result of migration that he thought would be an escape route to better life. Thus, the “memories of flagellation” as well as “the flagellation of silence” (125) – both ambivalent conjunctures, bring him a sense of homesickness concerning his roots; it accentuates his serious longing not to allow his “…remembering to run/into ghosts of slaughtered wishes…” (125), suggesting his hunger for his homeland. On the other hand, the exile’s “memories of flagellation” cannot undermine the punishment “silence” and solitude have wrought on his psyche. Also, the exile’s “… sun/flower face” (125), an emblem for the reason for migration is being besmirched by punitive reminiscences. The poet-persona is in this instance locked in the grisly world of ambivalence, trauma and hunger for the “music” (125) of his homeland, a metaphor for Nigeria’s heydays before “her blow” (125), which Ojaide sees as “loss” (123) in another poem, “The Floods Ago”. The coexisting opposing stances that shape the exile’s mindscape as he left his motherland for better opportunities in a foreign land in the wake of transnational exigencies constitute another tinge of sense of ambivalence in the collection, When It No Longer Matters Where You Live.

Conclusion
To reformulate the essence of this paper, it has been argued that transnationalism, globalisation, migration, exile and related phenomena have a rectilinear relationship with the ideo-aesthetics, form and content of Tanure Ojaide’a When It No Longer Matters Where You Live, which questions the legitimacy of mutual sharing of global resources informed by global capitalist rhetoric. One of the major foci of this paper is that exile experience is basically a function of the paradox of transnationalism, one of the ugly faces of globalisation. Thus, mass migration on the heels of the promises of global capitalist system is full of ambivalence and antinomy; hence, exiles are locked within the politics of exclusion and identity crises in their new environments.

Therefore, the fate of the Saidian “Other” is the same irrespective of geographical space. Ojaide’s main concern in the collection as argued here is that beyond the
veneer of globalisation and ancillary practices, there are complex issues that confront exiles, particularly those from the Third World, who have gone on exile to better their lives following the realities of national politics, and more importantly given the urgency of global capitalism.

**Works Cited**


Nigeria and Japan: A Historical Analysis of Forty-Six Years of Peaceful Relations, 1960-2006

Adewole Ayodeji Adeleke
Osun State University
Osogbo

Abstract
Colonial Nigeria-Japan relations were essentially economic. This was unarguably designed to satisfy the economic well-being of the British colonial government. However after Nigeria’s independence other some cultural and political dimensions were added to Nigeria-Japan relations. This paper focuses on the historical development of Nigeria’s relations with Japan during the first forty-six years of Nigeria’s independence. The paper contends that Nigeria being a less-developed nation has a number of lessons to learn from Japan in her quest for development.

Introduction
International Relations is a ‘highly emotionalized form of diplomatic history’ (Leach and Abdul: 1970:1). It is an aspect of history that deals with the human activities in which persons from more than one nation, individually and in groups interact. It is concerned with the totality of relations among states, nations and nation states in the international system. It covers all aspects of life- cultural, economic and political. The importance of relations among nations has stimulated my interest in the study of relations between Nigeria, a developing nation and Japan, an industrialized country. A school of thought believes that Nigeria’s external relations tend to emphasize on politics to the neglect of the all important economic issues. This school of thought is of the view that the importance and the centrality of economic growth in national development cannot be ignored in Nigeria’s relations with other countries of the world (Olusanya and Akindele: 1986). As important as economy is in the relations among states, so also is culture and politics. For instance, cultural and political relations could bring about greater understanding among nations. Therefore this essay will look at the economic, cultural and political dimensions in the relations between the two nations.

It is also generally assumed that the relations between developed and underdeveloped countries are that of unequal partners. This argument has influenced scholars of the dependency school to claim that the study of international economic relations is a study of imperialism and unequal exchange (Nwoke: 1988:1-4). Despite the assumed inequality however, a developing country like Nigeria stands to gain from her relations with the advanced economies of the world. For example, Nigeria could gain a lot from the technological advancement of Japan; also Nigeria can gain by cultivating a good habit of viable economic planning from Japan. This is most essential now especially that Nigeria’s industrialization efforts have been import-oriented (Akindele: 1988:85). The writer has used purely historical method to analyze his arguments.

Both countries have distinct principles guiding their relations with foreign partners. Nigeria and Japan like any other country in the world seem to guide these operating principles jealously. There are five operating principles of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Like
any other country in the world, the first and foremost is the promotion and protection of the country’s national interest. The second operating principle is the legal equality of states. The third is the non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states. The fourth principle is that of membership in key international organizations at both the global and regional levels while the fifth is making Africa the cornerstone and nerve-centre of Nigeria’s foreign policy (Olusanya and Akindele, 1986).

Like Nigeria, the foreign policy objective of Japan is based on the fundamental principle of contributing to world peace and prosperity. At the same time Japan has always practiced the maintenance of its own security and well-being in manner consistent with its position as a member of the world and as a country of Asia-Pacific region as an operating principle of her foreign policy. In seeking to play an active role in the maintenance and development of the international order, the tasks for Japanese foreign policy are wide-ranging. Apart from ensuring its own peace and prosperity, Japan takes new initiatives to expand and enhance its official development assistance, and to do more in terms of international cultural exchange (The Japan of Today: 1989).

The Evolution of Nigeria-Japan Relations
Before independence in 1960, Nigeria’s contact with Japan was insignificant as it was hindered by geographical and political difficulties. Geographically, Japan is very far Nigeria. Politically, Japanese imperialistic quest did not extend to this part of the world. It was limited to countries in the neighbouring East Asia and the Pacific between 1930 and 1945 (Owoeye, 1986:319-20). During this period, Japan was preoccupied with the annexation of Korea (Mashide and Akio, 1989:29) while European colonial powers were in parts of Asia and Africa. Colonial African territories were in the hands of Germany, Britain, France, Portugal and Italy. Perhaps, the fear of competition with these powers discouraged Japan from Africa.

Due to the Great Depression of the 1930s Britain adopted a tariff policy and abandoned free trade. Subsequently, the British Colonies adopted the Imperial tariff preference code at a meeting in Ottawa, Canada in 1932. This code discriminated against Japanese goods within the British Commonwealth. There was also a British propaganda that Japanese goods were of inferior quality. Because of the British Imperial discriminations and jealousy, Japanese activities in parts of Africa, especially West Africa were greatly reduced. Notwithstanding, there were Japanese goods that found their way into the Nigerian market during this period as a result of some European trading companies. These European companies imported cheap Japanese goods to Nigeria and elsewhere where they sold them for huge profit (Owoeye: 1986).

The British colonial authorities attempted to ban Japan and her goods from entering British sphere of influence in West Africa. However, by the 1950s post war Japan began to operate an independent foreign policy. Thus by 1957, Japan had opened a formal diplomatic relations with Nigeria (Olukoju: 2007; 1999; 1996 and Owoeye: 1986). This was essentially necessary because Japan had to look beyond Asia in her efforts to search for new markets and sources of materials. It was also around this time that there was a
growing quest for Nigeria to diversify her sources of suppliers and markets away from
the United Kingdom. This came about because of Nigeria’s new political status towards
independence and immediately after independence. Japan increasingly began to pose
serious challenge to Nigeria’s traditional partners-the EEC (EU) and the USA –
especially in the export sector of Nigeria’s trade (Owoeye: 1986: 320). As a result of this
in 1964; Nigeria reciprocated Japan’s earlier gesture by opening diplomatic relations with

Nigerian-Japanese Trade Relations
The major aspect of Nigeria-Japan relations is commercial. This according to Bukar
Bukarambe (1986) has made the political element in the relations to be very low. In
essence, it has been assumed that Japan is not well represented politically in Nigeria and
that such smaller market-economy country like Israel and the Newly Industrializing
Countries (NICs) have greater political representation in Nigeria. This could however be
explained in terms of Japan’s perception of herself as a trading nation (Bukarambe:

The Nigerian-Japanese trade has always been in favour of Japan. This has caused trade
imbalance between the two countries over the years. In 1977 for example, with Japan’s
purchase of Nigerian crude oil reaching the lowest level, Japan recorded trade surplus
with Nigeria. This was ten times larger than that of 1976. (Japan and Africa, v.156 Nov-
Dec. 1979). While Japan’s purchase of Nigeria’s crude oil fell substantially, Nigeria’s
demand for Japanese cars, motorcycles and electric home appliances was on the increase.
For instance in 1978, “Japan’s exports were 127 times as much as imports. Year by year
gains were scored among exports like canned mackerel, industrial machinery, rolling
stock and heavy electrical machinery… Japan’s imports from Nigeria, declining since
1975, were small due to absence of crude oil since 1977, plus lower cocoa and vegetable

From 1960 to 1984, Nigeria only had trade balance with Japan once. This was during the
1973/74 trading year when Nigeria recorded a surplus of N124 million. The balance of
trade in favour of Nigeria was a result of the October 1973 Arab- Israeli War which
forced Japan to buy more oil from Nigeria. According to the then Federal Commissioner
for Trade, Mr. Wenike Briggs, the change in the bilateral trading position was attributable
to Nigeria’s newly instituted exports of crude oil. This accounted for 90 percent of
Nigeria’s total Japan-bound shipments over the first months. It was proposed that Japan
would increase her purchases of Nigerian traditional goods such as cocoa, cotton,
groundnut, palm oil, rubber, timber, tin ore and columbite (Japan and Africa, v. 103
October 1974:4). However, the proposal did not materialize as trade imbalance resumed
in subsequent years. At the height of the crisis in 1973, Japan secured 1.8 per cent of her
petroleum from Nigeria. By 1975, Japan had absorbed the shock of the crisis and later
resumed trade with her traditional suppliers. This resulted in the fall in importation from
Nigeria which declined to 1.2 per cent. (Owoeye, 1986:328). The trends in the trade
between the two countries since independence is shown in table 1 below.
Table 1: Nigeria’s Trade with Japan 1960 – 1984 (Figures in millions of U.S. Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>EXPORTS</th>
<th>IMPORTS</th>
<th>BALANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>-71.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>-75.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>-65.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>-68.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>86.3</td>
<td>-79.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>-62.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>-28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>-35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>-9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>-17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>111.6</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>-57.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>128.0</td>
<td>-103.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>149.0</td>
<td>-65.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>158.0</td>
<td>172.0</td>
<td>-14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>378.0</td>
<td>254.0</td>
<td>+124.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>280.0</td>
<td>595.0</td>
<td>-315.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>763.0</td>
<td>-711.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>1,172.0</td>
<td>-1,160.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>1,372.0</td>
<td>-1,366.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>1,109.0</td>
<td>-1,090.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>110.0</td>
<td>1,651.0</td>
<td>-1,541.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>309.0</td>
<td>2,368.0</td>
<td>-2,059.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>1,329.0</td>
<td>-1,322.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>626.0</td>
<td>-620.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>489.0</td>
<td>-483.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IMF, *Direction of Trade*, Various Years.

Various reasons have been put forward for the trade imbalance between Nigeria and Japan. The existence of alternative market in South-East Asia for goods required by Japan is one of the reasons. According to Ogunremi (*National Concord*, 27 July 1992), the problem of distance is another. The Asian countries could produce virtually all what Nigeria produced—crude oil, palm produce, etc. Also these countries are nearer to Japan than Nigeria. The don also suggested that the high cost of Nigerian goods has made it difficult for the products to penetrate the Japanese markets. Lack of awareness of the importers’ peculiar needs and the inability of Nigeria to meet the demand and deadline for delivery were some of the problems.

Another factor accounting for the trade imbalance was that Nigeria had little to sell to Japan while Japan had much for Nigerian market. This trend emanated from the high demand for Japanese products by Nigerian businessmen. Such products like electronics, textiles, automobile, bicycles, motorcycles and industrial machinery from Japan were of better quality, more durable and cheaper compared with similar products from other
countries. However, it has been argued that the inability of Nigeria to meet Japan’s demand in such items as cotton seeds, groundnuts and other pre-crude oil era products was because Nigeria had to share her exports among older customers in Europe and elsewhere (London Business Times, 8 January 1972 and Olukoju: 2007).

The resultant effect of the trade imbalance on Nigeria was adverse. Nigeria’s economy and her performance in relations to trade deficit with Japan and other countries gave rise to high indebtedness. It has also given rise to high budget deficits both at the national, state and local government levels. These have contributed to hikes in the rates of inflation and unemployment. Subsequently, Nigeria had experienced immense frustration in her trade with Japan. A good example of the expression of such frustration was the one made by the late sage, Chief Obafemi Awolowo (Daily Sketch, 16 December 1983).

“Unless the Asiatic countries undertake right now to buy from us equivalent value of goods in return for what we buy from them, our national interests dictates we should stop forthwith, buying from them. Over the years, our trade with Asia has been profitless adventure. It has now reached a disaster pit. The latest available figures show that in our trade with them in 1980 we had a deficit of N1.6 billion. Of all the Asiatic countries, Japan is the chief culprit in this matter. We cannot afford to go on year in year out to lose money to a very rich-almost over-rich county like Japan. We must insist on equitable trade with all our overseas customers.”

Many factors have been adduced for trade imbalance between Nigeria and Japan. But while one may accept the argument that the high price of commodities and availability of alternative sources made import from Nigeria unattractive, the question of distance is unconvincing. After all, the distance did not affect Nigeria’s import from Japan but why the other way round?

Japan adopted an export oriented approach to its foreign economic relations. She maintained a greatly undervalued currency, restricted imports, stimulated home production and undertook vigorous export promotion drives. The success of this policy had enabled her to enjoy a balance of trade surplus which had also helped to finance her enormous import bills mainly for raw materials. Nigeria, unlike Japan possessed large arable land area as well as abundant supply of raw materials including the highly priced energy resource-petroleum. Nigeria’s international trade was characterised by the export of raw materials mainly and importation of manufactured goods (Owoeye, 1986:320 and Bukarambe, 1988: 266). The structural differences between Japan and Nigeria point to the existence of a high degree of commodity complementarities between the two economies. What Japan lacked but needed was possessed in large quantities in Nigeria and vice-versa. Since Nigeria became a significant exporter of oil in the 1970s, Japan had been a very reluctant customer. The reason often put forward as enumerated above was distance. With exception of the N148.5 million purchases of 1981, Japan had not been buying much oil from Nigerian since 1977 (Owoeye: 1986).
Adeleke, Nigeria and Japan

The question of oil purchase by Japan from Nigeria has pointed to two things here. The first is that while Nigeria was hampered by her undiversified economy, Japan continued to enjoy the sale of her attractive products. Apart from oil and gas, Nigeria’s other minerals include tin, columbite, coal and limestone but none of these were exported in large quantities. Therefore going by comparative structure of the economy, Nigeria was not competitive enough. This could explain why Nigerian-Japanese trade relations remained unbalanced. (Bukarambe: 1988). Nevertheless, despite all these the fact still remained that Japan has emerged as a very important supplier of finished products to Nigeria. It is observed that Japan is Nigeria’s largest source for the importation of automobile and electronic equipment in sub-Saharan Africa at least. The reputation enjoyed by Japanese goods in Nigeria was due largely to the quality and durability of Japanese goods (Owoeye: 1986: 322).

The trade imbalance between Nigeria and Japan has given rise to the adoption of some measures by successive governments in Nigeria. The first of such measures to redress the situation was ‘moral suasion’. Several appeals were made to Japan at various levels to increase her import of Nigerian goods so as to rectify the imbalance. The Prime Minister of Nigeria, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa expressed his dissatisfaction with the lopsided pattern of trade between the two countries on the occasion of the presentation of credentials of Mr. Kazuo Futamata, Japanese Ambassador to Nigeria in 1965. Nigeria also tried to apply sanctions on Japan to correct the trade imbalance. Also there was the imposition of differential tariff quota systems and the invocation of the GATT Article 35 on Japanese goods. The first in the series of retaliatory measures came up in 1963 when the Balewa Government placed restrictions on the importation of textiles from Japan. In 1965, restrictions were extended to all goods, except textiles (Owoeye: 1986).

The reaction of the Japanese Government to the trade embargo placed on her goods by Nigeria was the announcement of 10 million pounds grant for Nigeria (Olukoju: 2007; Owoeye: 1986). The credit according to them was to compensate Nigeria for the losses she suffered in the trade imbalance between them. The acceptance of the loan attracted a mixed feeling both in the private and public circles in Nigeria. The Federal Government expressed doubts as to how the trade imbalance could be corrected by the offer of a loan. This made the Japanese Government to send a 15-man delegation to Nigeria in 1967 to come and explain the rationale behind Japan’s offer of the controversial 10 million pound loan. As a measure to improve the trade relations, the delegation also promised to launch a campaign to increase imports of Nigeria’s cocoa, groundnuts, cotton and crude oil (Owoeye: 1986). The Japanese Government also suggested the arrangement for an exhibition of Nigerian products in Japan. This measure according to the Japanese Government was a step forward in solving the imbalance of trade between the two countries (Embassy of Japan, Lagos).

In response to the trade embargo imposed by Nigeria on Japanese goods, there was the launching of a programme in Japan in 1966 which Japanese officials believed would increase Japan’s imports from Nigeria. The programme entailed that all Japanese products to Nigeria were to be placed under a control system. The exports would in essence require government approval before they can be forwarded. The measure was to
reduce Japanese exports to Nigeria and increase Nigeria’s export to Japan. The programme was carried out by the Japanese Government in collaboration with some trade firms under the auspices of the Japanese MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry) (Owoeye: 1986), now METI (Ministry of External Trade and Industry) (Olukoju: 2007).

As a result of this response from Japan, the Nigerian Government decided to relax the restriction imposed on Japanese goods. Thus the restriction placed on the importation of machinery, spare parts and raw materials from Japan was lifted. However, not long after the drama of trade restrictions, the trade disequilibrium between the two countries resumed. In the trading year of 1971 for example, Nigeria recorded a staggering N36.7 million deficit in her trade with Japan. The lopsided trade pattern was maintained till 1973 when Nigeria recorded her first remarkable surplus in trade with Japan. The improvement in balance of trade between Nigeria and Japan in 1973/74 trading year persuaded the Gowon Government to lift the trade embargo on Japanese goods. Despite the attempt to improve trade between them however, the imbalance persisted and even worsened thereafter. For instance, Nigeria recorded the worst trade imbalance with Japan in 1981 when the deficit ran into more than N2 billion.

**Activities of Japanese Companies in Nigeria**

One of the measures adopted by the Japanese Government to correct the trade imbalance between her and Nigeria was the “local manufacturing” of those commodities that were being heavily imported to Nigeria from Japan by the Japanese companies alone or in collaboration with state and private firms (Olukoju: 2007). The initiative increased the activities of the existing and new Japanese companies in Nigeria. Today, there are many Japanese firms in Nigeria. They engage in manufacturing, construction engineering, shipping, banking, insurance and fishery (Bukarambe: 1988:267). Some of the Japanese companies in partnership with Nigerian interest are listed in Table II below.

**Table II: Some Japanese Companies and their area of activities in Nigeria**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>COMPANY</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>ACTIVITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Pioneer Metal Products Co. (Ltd.)</td>
<td>Ikeja (Lagos)</td>
<td>Manufacturing: Galvanized roofing sheets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Nigerian Wire and Cable Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>Ibadan</td>
<td>Manufacturing: Wires and cables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Metal Box Toyo Glass</td>
<td>Agbara (Lagos)</td>
<td>Manufacturing: Bottles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Japanese construction companies have handled some of the most important Federal and State government projects in Nigeria. For example, Japanese Construction firms such as Chiyoda and Marubeni have won many multi-million dollar turnkey projects in Nigeria in the past years (Business Concord, 28 February 1979). Some of the most important contracts handled by Japanese companies in Nigeria included: Katsina Steel Rolling Company (1979), Anambra River Irrigation (1980), NNPC Fourth Oil Refinery, Port Harcourt (1985), the First Phase of the Petrochemical Company in Kaduna (1985) and the construction of the Gas Turbine electric power plant in the Niger Delta.

Apart from relations at the governmental level, private operators in both countries have contributed their own quota to the bilateral relations by forming the Nigeria-Japan Associations. The Japanese formed their own thirty years earlier while the Nigerian body was formed in 1989. Relations between these bodies went sour during the crisis that followed the annulment of the June 12, 1993 Presidential election. The crisis in addition to the bad years of General Sanni Abacha administration also led to the scaling down of the activities of the Japanese companies in Nigeria. The return to civil rule in 1999 however restored the relations to the level it was before 1993 (Olukoju: 2007).

Nigeria’s trade with Japan requires special attention. This is because of the degree of trade imbalance which calls for urgent measure to redress the situation. Redressing the situation would also go a long way in improving our country’s economy. For example,
figures have shown that outside South Africa, Nigeria is the most important destination for Japanese consumer durables especially electrical goods and automobiles (Sunday Concord, 8 February 1987 and Olukoju: 2007).

The essay has discussed the growth of Nigeria-Japan trade relations, the trade imbalance and the activities of Japanese companies in Nigeria. The essay will proceed with a discussion on Japanese grants, foreign technical aid and assistance to Nigeria.

Japanese Grants, Technical Aid and Assistance to Nigeria
The institution of the Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) programme and foreign aid became a priority in the Japanese foreign policy after the Second World War. Japanese foreign aid was different from those of the Western European countries or the United States because it was not used to retain stronghold on former colonies, compelled by humanitarian considerations or aimed at pursuing strategic or ideological goals. But the Japanese foreign aid came up as a result of the astronomical growth of its economy in the 1950s and 1960s which as well made it possible to pursue its foreign policy goals without the use of military force as a global economic super-power. (Eyinla: 1999 and Olukoju: 2007). Japan’s aid policy had sought to mend relations with her Asian neighbours as well as promoting friendly relations with other nations of the world. This made Japan to participate in the 1954 Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social Development in Asia and the Pacific. The Colombo Plan kick-started the Japanese foreign aid policy (Adeleke: 2002).

There are four major components of Japan’s ODA: ODA takes the form of loans, bilateral grants, contributions to international organizations and technical aid. While grant aid takes the form of direct assistance in cash, general grant aid covers various activities like education, health, communication, agriculture and public welfare. Technical aid has to do with technology transfer and the exchange of personnel aimed at capacity building in the recipient countries. ODA or Yen loans are given on long-term, low-interest basis and are refundable by the recipient nations unlike grants. It has been argued that Japan’s contributions to multilateral organizations to facilitate development projects in the less developed countries is the least contentious and most unobtrusive of its aid programmes. (Eyinla: 1999 and Olukoju: 2007).

Under Japan’s programme of economic and technical cooperation with Africa, the trans-African highway-plan was the most important in the 1970s. The multi-million naira project covering 4,000 miles road network was proposed to run from Mombasa in Kenya through Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Central Africa Republic, and Cameroon, to terminate in Lagos, Nigeria. The Japanese Government realized the importance of the project as they believed that it would not only serve as a unifying factor for African States, it would also strengthen inter-state economic ties between them. (Japan and Africa, v.62 May 1971). The project did not take off eventually perhaps because of loss of interest by the Japanese authorities.

It has been observed that Japanese foreign aid and investment have increased considerably. Her aid in medical field to African nations for example was very
important. In a bid to eradicate river blindness in Africa, for instance, the World Bank in 1974 called on advanced nations to finance a U.S. $50 million fund set up to tackle the problem. In response to the appeal, Japan contributed U.S. $500,000 in 1975 to help stamp out the parasitic enchorcerciasis eye disease in Africa (Japan and Africa, v.112 May 1975). Other technical aid and assistance which had been given to Africa included food aid to drought infested areas of Africa. The Japanese government donated U.S. $930,000 to alleviate the effects of drought in Sahel Africa in June 1973. The aid scheme grew to U.S. $1,800,000 in 1974 (Japan and Africa, v. 97 April 1974).

Before 1981, Nigeria was not qualified for Japanese aid because Nigeria was considered a rich-developing country. However, Nigeria received her first grant amounting to N500 million in 1981. Even then Nigeria had been benefiting from Japanese loans before this time. In 1966 Nigeria got 10.80 million Japanese Yen for various projects. The second credit facility worth N6.20 million was granted to Nigeria in 1974 for the purchase of 200 coaches for Nigerian Railway Corporation (Ekpe: 1990: 43). Nigeria also involved Japan in the industrial development of the country; this might be one of Nigeria’s efforts at benefiting from the rapid industrialization of Japan in major industrial projects. In 1971 for instance, the Nigerian government proposed to establish a fertilizer factory and the government sought Japanese assistance towards the implementation of the project (Japan and Africa, vol. 69 December, 1971).

The trend in technical cooperation between the two countries continued in 1986 with the formation of a joint committee to draw up an agenda of cooperation for the re-forestation of the semi-arid areas of Nigeria. The programme was spearheaded by Japan International Cooperative Agency (JICA). Under the scheme, the Japanese Agency was expected to provide the expertise to the Ministry of Science and Technology through the Forest Research Institute of Nigeria (Federal Ministry of Information, Lagos, April 2 1986). The aim was to assist Nigeria to arrest the alarming rate of desert encroachment in Nigeria and Africa in general. In pursuance of the scheme, Japan sent a delegation to some African Countries including Nigeria in 1988 under the banner of Green Sahel ‘88’. About 690 hectares of land were planted during the 5-year exercise. Some 25 hectares were planted in 1987 and another 240 hectares in 1988 (The Democrat, July 1, 1988).

Also, Japanese assistance to Nigeria took humanitarian dimensions. This started during the Nigerian Civil War. For instance, in May 1970, 500 tons of rice and ten 5-truck vehicles came from the Japanese Government (Japan and Africa, v. 50 May 1970). Also in 1970, another 8 Toyota Crown ambulances were donated to Nigeria by the Japanese Red Cross Society (Japan and Africa, v. 55 October 1970). In 1971, the Japanese owned Teijin Nigeria Limited donated a quantity of clothing materials to the National Rehabilitation Commission. These were meant for the reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts in the war affected parts of Nigeria (Japan and Africa, v.58 January 1971).

In December 1986, another agreement was signed between the Japanese Ambassador to Nigeria, Mr. Mitsuro Donowaki and the Nigerian External Affairs Minister, Professor Bolaji Akinyemi. The grant, totaling N26.6 million was to improve the facilities of the Nigerian Institute of Oceanography and Marine Research (NIOMR) Lagos. Part of the
grant was also used for the procurement of agricultural machinery and fertilizer under the
country’s National Rice Programme (Federal Ministry of Information and Culture, 1986).
The National Rice Programme was designed to cover the production of 14,000 hectares

Apart from agricultural aid and assistance; Japan has extended other forms of loans and
grants toward infrastructural and educational development in Nigeria. For instance, the
establishment of the Department of Petroleum Engineering at the University of Ibadan
was financed from a U.S. $3.2 million grant by three Japanese oil companies in the
1970’s. These were Mitsui Oil Exploration, Teikoku Oil, and Teijin Ltd. Also, the
modernization and expansion of fishing ports in Nigeria benefited from the grant (Japan
and Africa v. 59 February 1971). The Japanese companies also made available U.S.
$555,000 to promote education in Nigeria in 1971/72 financial year (Japan and Africa v.
59 November 1972). Also in March 1972, members of Japanese Government delegation
visited the University of Ife (Now Obafemi Awolowo University) to look into possible
areas of cooperation and assistance to the University’s newly established Faculty of
Health Sciences (Japan and Africa v. 22 March 1971).

Apart from credit loans and grant aid facilities, Japan has continued to contribute
significantly to Nigeria’s manpower development. The Association for Overseas
Technical Scholarship (AOTS), a non-profit organization was established in 1959 under
Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). The main objective of the
organization was to promote technical cooperation for the industrialization and the
development of developing countries. The organization trained over 400 Nigerian
technicians between 1959 and 1986. Similarly, many senior officials from various
Federal and State Institutions and Ministries have benefited from training under the Japan
International cooperation Agency’s manpower Development scheme from developing
total aid grant of more than U.S. $10.87 million to the Nigeria Institute of Oceanography
audio-visual aids equipments worth N5.8 million were presented by Japan to the Centre
for Management Development (CMD) in Lagos in 1988. This, according to the Japanese
Embassy in Lagos, was to enhance managerial skill and productivity in Nigeria (Punch,
12 December 1988).

Japan has also assisted Nigeria in the area of medical rehabilitation. A technical
cooperation project for medical research and development was signed between Nigeria
and Japan in 1982. Three Japanese experts served the University of Jos from October
1982 under the technical agreement. The first donation of medical equipment of Y40,
405, 794 (about N110, 000) was made in September 1983. The project was accelerated
with the donation of laboratory equipment and materials for medical research worth Y26,
684, 507 (about N800, 000). The number of Japanese experts working on the project at
the University of Jos increased to four in 1984 (Daily Times, 15 June 1984). In the efforts
of the Federal Government of Nigeria at controlling the yellow fever epidemic, Japan has
played a very vital role. For example in 1987, Nigeria received a U.S. $200, 000 grant
from the Japanese Government for the purchase of about 700,000 doses of Yellow Fever
Vaccine. The then Minister of Health, Professor Olikoye Ransome Kuti; emphasised that Japan was the first country to respond to the campaign against yellow fever (Ministry of Information and Culture, Lagos, 24 June 1987).

Japanese Government assistance towards Nigerian economic recovery started from the 1970s. To correct the trade imbalance between them, Japanese industrialists have been making concerted efforts to manufacture locally those commodities that were hitherto imported into the country from Japan (London Business Times, 8 January 1974 and Olukoju: 2007). A grand purpose grant of U.S. $23.4 million was extended to Nigeria during the visit of the Foreign Minister, Major General Ike Nwachukwu to Japan in 1988. The grant was Nigeria’s share of Japan’s special U.S $500 million grant to sub-Saharan African countries over three years (1987 – 1989). The amount was to help the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) introduced by the Babangida Administration to rejuvenate the economy. Japan like other Nigeria’s trading partners and creditors believed that SAP was invaluable to long term economic recovery of Nigeria and a prerequisite for the payment of her huge debts. (The Guardian, 1988).

In pursuance of Japan’s support for SAP in Nigeria, Japanese Government sent an economic mission to Nigeria in November 1988 to assess Nigeria’s progress in SAP (The Guardian, 7 November 1988). The Japanese loan in support of SAP in Nigeria for 1989 amounted to U.S. $200 million. The loan was provided by the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund under the finance recycling scheme of the Japanese Government (Federal Ministry of Information and Culture, Lagos, 10 March 1989). To further pursue her support for Nigeria’s economic recovery, Japan donated a sum of (Y2.5 billion) to the Federal Government in 1990. This was in form of a non-project type UN-tied grant-in-aid. Part of the grant was used for mitigating some of Nigeria’s economic difficulties and for servicing the country’s foreign debts. Also an additional sum of N155.6 million grant-in-aid was given to Nigeria in 1991 (Nigerian Tribune, 14 March 1990).

Political and Cultural Dimensions of Nigeria- Japan Relations
It has often been said that the political and cultural dimension of Nigeria-Japan relations was unusual. This was because of the prominence of trade and low political element in the relations between the two countries (Bukarambe: 1988:263). However it should be noted that international cultural relations is as old as any other relations between states and as old as civilization itself. International cultural relations did not begin to be integrated into the foreign policy of the states until the late nineteenth century. Its integration into states foreign policy was as a consequence of the development of the nation states in Europe (Harnold: 1979: 13). Nowadays, there has grown an ever-increasing awareness of the need to strengthen the direct influence of politics on foreign cultural relations. The numerous international cultural organizations which have UNESCO as their cultural cleaning house have undoubtedly achieved considerable foreign political importance. There was a sudden change of attitude of the various governments in the world with regard to active participation in cultural relations. This was because of the advancement of science, democracy and education which had accompanied the Industrial Revolution (Harnold: 1979: 18).
The existing pattern of relations between Nigeria and Japan was largely defined by Japan’s industrial development (UNESCO: World Communication: 1956). According to Bukarambe (1988), the only explanation to that effect may be Japan’s perception of herself as a trading nation. Perhaps, this development has made Nigeria’s relations with Japan to be stark culturally and politically from the beginning. Between Nigeria and Japan there was the lack of the almost customary colonial, historical and political (i.e. ideological) garb that familiarly dressed up Nigeria’s relations with other industrial states of the world. Japan is Asiatic, geographically and culturally distant and an industrial power in search of markets and raw materials. Nigeria is an African and developing country, an exporter of raw materials but has a potential market for industrial goods. These differences have led to the argument that Japan has no accompanying political role in Nigeria (Bukarambe: 1988). Nevertheless, Japan had often endeavored to strengthen relations with African states. It has always been the observation of Japanese diplomats stationed in Africa that for Japan to strengthen her political tie with Africa, infrastructural amenities have to be sponsored by her through the African Development Bank (Japan and Africa v. 56 November 1970).

Since 1957, when Japan opened formal diplomatic relations with Nigeria, there has been a regular exchange of ambassadors and other officials between the two countries. It is also very interesting to note that during the Nigerian Civil war, Japan supported the Federal Military Government as she opposed the disintegration of Nigeria as a Federation (Japan and Africa). There has also been frequent exchange of visits at the governmental level by Nigerian and Japanese policy makers in the history of their relations. For instance, in 1974, the Japanese Foreign minister, Toshio Kimura paid a visit to Nigeria. He was the first Japanese Foreign Minister to do so. Also in 1979 the Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Sunao Sonada paid a two-day official visit to Nigeria as a guest of the Federal Military Government. The visit provided the opportunity for both countries to discuss matters of mutual interest between them (Japan and Africa: v.104 November/December 1974). Nigeria has over the years also sent high power delegations to Tokyo for bilateral talks. In January 1976, the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Industries, Ahmed Joda went on a ten-day visit to Japan as a guest of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. The visit afforded the Secretary to hold talks with Japanese Government officials and businessmen on ways of increasing the volume of trade between them (Federal Ministry of Information, Lagos, 19 July 1979).

In the late 1970s Nigeria proposed to build a high-speed trunk railway like that of Japanese Shinkansen “bullet-train” service. The proposal took the Nigerian Transport Commissioner, Colonel M. Magoro to Japan in 1976. In Japan, Colonel Magoro met the Japanese Foreign Minister, Kiichi Miyazawa and Transport Minister Matsuro Kimura on the proposed project (Japan and Africa: v.118 January 1976). In 1983, the Nigerian Foreign Minister, Ishaya Audu visited Tokyo to seek Japanese economic aid for Nigeria’s agricultural development. The visit also enabled the minister to reach an agreement on Japanese assistance towards the construction of liquefied petroleum gas facilities and oil cracking plants in Nigeria (Japan and Africa: v.124 July 1976). In October 1988, the minister of External Affairs, Major General Ike Nwachukwu paid a 5-day official visit to Tokyo at the invitation of the Japanese Government. During the visit, the minister and
members of his entourage held discussions with Japanese senior government officials as well as members of the organized private sector. The visit enabled the two countries to review their relations and also enabled Japan to grant a loan of 3 billion Japanese yen to Nigeria. General Nwachukwu’s visit helped to strengthen relations between the two countries. It was a successful visit in view of Nigeria’s emphasis on economic diplomacy (*Nigeria: A New Direction*, Ministry of External Affairs, 1989).

Perhaps one of the most important events in the history of Nigerian – Japanese relations was the 5-day official visit to Japan by President Ibrahim Babangida in February 1989. It was the President’s visit to Japan on the occasion of the burial of Emperor Hirohito of Japan. President Babangida’s visit was significant in the relations between the two countries in three major ways: First, the visit pointed out that Nigeria had finally realized that every opportunity should be used to promote her economic goals. The Presidential visit was significant in view of the fact that such can be used to cement the socioeconomic and cultural links exiting between the two countries. Second, there was the need to reduce the yawning gap in the balance of trade between Nigeria and Japan. Third, there was also the need for the President to solicit for Japan’s diplomatic and financial support in rescheduling Nigeria’s then U.S. $9 billion debt at the talk scheduled to hold in London with the Paris Club of Western creditor nations the following month (*The Guardian*, 23 February 1989).

Another importance of President Babangida’s visit to Japan in Nigeria’s foreign policy was the chance it created for Nigeria to exert her influence on the Middle East affairs. The visit afforded the president the opportunity to meet with his Israeli counterpart, Clarm Hergog in Tokyo. President Babangida made it clear to his Israeli counterpart that Nigeria would not alter her position on the Middle East issue unless Israel recognized the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the rights of the Palestinians (*The Guardian* 23 February 1989).

Japan is culturally different from Africa, nevertheless over the years efforts have been made to promote cultural relations between her and African countries. According to Ade Adefuye (1992:3), culture itself is a complex phenomenon. It is the sum total of a people’s way of life and consists of values, beliefs and perceptions of the world that underlie the behaviour of the people. Culture is shared by a particular society and it is that aspect of people’s existence that makes them similar or different all over the world.

The first effort at promoting cultural relations between Nigeria and Japan was the participation of Nigeria in Japan World Exposition (Expo’70) which took place in Osaka in 1970. Expo’70 was the first universal and international trade exhibition ever to be held in Asia. Over 70 countries including ten African nations participated. The occasion presented Nigeria an opportunity to expose her wealth of ornaments. These included historic wooden and ivory sculptures, beautifully designed calabashes, decorative gourds and fanciful leather wares. Other works of arts from Nigeria on exhibition were artists’ impressions of animals’ life carved from wood and bones and a variety of colourful earthenware. The exposition also gave Nigeria an added advantage of parading her economic potentialities to the rest of the world. Nigeria was able to convince prospective
investors and customers that despite the ravages of the Civil War that had just ended, her economy was still buoyant. Nigerian traditional commodities like crustaceans and mollusks, cocoa, groundnuts, cotton seeds and raw cotton, crude rubber and rubber crepe were displayed at the Nigerian pavilion (Nigeria-Japan Economic Newsletter, September 1969: 2-4).

Almost twenty years after Expo 70, an exhibition basically organized for Nigeria took place in Japan. In 1989, the exhibition of Nigerian arts and culture titled 2000 years of Nigerian Arts ran for 6 months in Japan. The exhibition was witnessed by over 50,000 Japanese visitors. The 140 items comprising Nigerian works of art and artifacts used during the exhibition came back to Nigeria in January 1990. The exhibition marked a step further in the cultural relations between the peoples of both countries. Nigeria has been a beneficiary of many cultural grants-in-aid from Japan. The purpose of such grants was to promote the cultural relations between the two countries. The first of such agreement was reached between the two countries in 1983. Under the agreement, Japan donated 861 sets of microscopes to Nigerian Secondary Schools. Also in 1987, Japan showed a continuous interest in the activities of the National Commission for Museums and Monuments when a cultural grant-in-aid agreement was reached in Lagos. The agreement was signed by the Minister of Information and Culture, Prince Tony Momoh and the Japanese Ambassador to Nigeria, Mr. Mitsuro Donowaki. Under the agreement Japan donated equipment worth N800,000 for the preservation and recording of cultural assets (Federal Ministry of Information and Culture, Lagos, 27 February 1990).

To further promote cultural exchange between the two countries, the Japanese Ambassador in Nigeria, Mr. Yasushi Kurokochi announced the donation of lighting equipment to the National Theatre and a Language Laboratory for the University of Lagos in February 1990 (Federal Ministry of Information and Culture, Lagos, 27 February 1990). Also in 1992, Japan donated a number of books to the University of Lagos library. The books were donated to the University under the Japan Foundation’s library support programme. Areas covered by the books included geography, history, politics, economics, encyclopedia and laws of Japan (The Guardian, 6 February 1992). Similar donation of books has been made to the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Lagos and many other institutions across Nigeria by Japan Foundation of Tokyo in recent years.

The area of music and entertainment was another aspect of cultural relations between the two countries. Some Nigerian popular musicians have performed in Japan. The first of such was Victor Uwaifo and his Akwete band who were invited to represent Nigeria at the EXPO ’70 (Japan and Africa: v. 51 June 1970). During the “Africa Week” hosted by Japan in 1984 different social and cultural aspects of the African life featured. King Sunny Ade of Nigeria was one of the artistes invited to perform in Japan (Daily Times: 3 August 1984). King Sunny Ade performed both in Osaka and Tokyo. (Nigerian Statesman, 29 October 1984).

In the early part of 1991, the National Troupe of Nigeria was invited by the Japanese Government. The troupe’s visit to Japan afforded them opportunity to interact with other
artistes from Japan and also learn from Japanese culture. In the same year, the Kogo Drummers from Japan performed in various parts of Nigeria including Lagos. The group’s visit to Nigeria enabled them to see more of Nigerian culture. Before the end of 1991, a group of visiting Japanese artistes led by Mr. Motohiko Tsutsura came to Nigeria. Apart from music and entertainment, since EXPO’70 Japan has been making concerted efforts at making her culture accessible to Nigerians at home. This basically started in 1971 when there was an exhibition of the Japanese craft of intricacies of flower arrangement in Lagos. The craft is one of Japan’s most distinctive traditional art-forms. It was sponsored by the Japanese Information Centre in Lagos. In December 1971, there was a display of the traditional Japanese art of paper folding (origami) organized by the Japanese Embassy in Lagos. In the 1980’s there were no significant Japanese cultural display in Nigeria until 1991 when an exhibition of Japanese dolls was held at the gallery of crafts and designs of the National Arts Theatre in Lagos The exhibition was a display of different Japanese achievers, (heroes and heroines) as immortalized in the Japanese legends and folklore (Federal Ministry of Information, Lagos, 5 November 1991).

Between 1986 and 2006, it has been observed that the Japanese Embassy in Nigeria continued to carry out the exhibitions of some aspects of Japanese culture in some locations around Nigeria. According to Ayodeji Olukoju (2007), there was an abrupt cessation of cultural exchange activities between 1993 and 1996 because of the worst atrocities of the Abacha years when Nigeria became a pariah state in the comity of nations. He argued that the resumption of activities after a three-year break suggested that the Japanese considered that the situation had improved or that such activities should be resumed for strategic reasons while others remained suspended. (Olukoju: 2007).

Cultural relations should not be used merely as a tool of political and economic policy. If this happened, the essential purposes of cultural programme would be defeated. Rather cultural programme should be used to advance the security of a people directly, i.e., by directing them toward stimulating free cultural development on the international level (Thomson and Laves: 1969:43). Therefore the relationship between culture and foreign policy of a country should not be over-emphasized. Each country has its own distinctive traditions, social and intellectual orientations. There is a fundamental relationship between a country’s cultural system and its behaviour in the international system. To understand the diplomacy of a country, something must be known about its culture (Adefuye: 1992:3). In international politics, Japan and Nigeria share some fundamental differences. Africa is the cornerstone and nerve-centre of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Japan on the other hand is Asia-centered and conducts her foreign policy in a manner consistent with its position as a country in the Asia Pacific region. Nevertheless, in spite of the Afro-centricity of Nigerian foreign policy, she is not culturally biased towards any country. Japan seems to be culturally far away from Africa and perhaps negative toward African culture. A good case in point was a statement made by the Japanese Prime Minister, Mr. Yasuhiro Nakasone in 1986 regarding the intelligence quotients of Blacks and Hispanic vis-à-vis whites in the United States. Mr. Nakasone’s apology notwithstanding, it must be stressed that the statement went beyond Blacks in the U.S.A., it encompassed all Blacks of the world (Adefuye: 1992).
A snag in Nigeria – Japan relations was the fact that Japan did a lot of business with Apartheid South Africa. Although Japan did not exchange ambassadors with South Africa, trade between them surpassed that of any other African country (Olusanya and Akindele: 1986: 4-5). Before the pressure from Nigeria and the international community forced the apartheid regime of South Africa to organize a multi-racial democratic election in April 1994, Japan had never registered a strong protest voice against apartheid and racism. It has been suggested that perhaps, Japan being a one race nation did not understand the full implication of racial discrimination (The Guardian: 16 October 1986). Japan could strengthen her political and cultural relations with Africa by sponsoring more Afro-centric programmes in her foreign policy. This is very important for two major reasons: First, Japan could be a source of maintenance of peace and equilibrium in the world. Also, Japan has an important mission to act as a bridge between the North and South in order to enhance international cooperation (New Nigeria: 22 November 1980).

**Conclusion**

Nigeria had a healthy relations with Japan during the period under study although there were occasional disagreements caused by trade imbalance between them. Available evidence reveals trade imbalance between the two since independence. The value of Nigeria’s exports has been largely responsible for the imbalance. Whereas Nigeria exports agricultural commodities which are available from other sources, Nigeria imports electrical appliances and motor vehicles from Japan among others. The attitude of Nigeria and Japan to the trade between them may be explained by the difference in its relative importance to each country. The trade with Japan is of considerable significance to Nigeria. It accounts for a fairly large share of her imports. But Nigeria accounts for a relatively small proportion of Japan’s total trade.

The Colonial structure of Nigerian economy has not changed. The institutional and structural foundation of colonial economy is still present in Nigeria. The problem is at the level of production not exchange. Nigeria is yet to be economically independent and Japan is technologically more advanced. This has made it increasingly difficult for Nigeria to compel Japan to change her trade policy. Nevertheless the Nigerian market is the largest in Africa and in terms of potentials, it is of considerable importance to Japan. Japan could not afford to forfeit her Nigerian market if she has to think of her future economy. It is important to stress here also that as long as Nigeria remains a producer of primary commodities, the problem of trade imbalance with industrialized countries may remain. Although Japan has increased economic assistance to Nigeria, it is by no means adequate. Japan being a member of Group of seven (G-7) is in position to increase industrial loans and grants to Nigeria. (Adefuye: 1994). It is also suggested that the trans-African highways proposed by Japan in the 1970s should be revisited. This would help in accelerating economic development in Africa South of the Sahara (Japan and Africa v. 90 September 1973).

It is my considered opinion that Japanese auto industries like Toyota, Nissan, Hino and Mitsubishi should revisit their proposal to build assembling plants in Nigeria. For a country like Nigeria which is in dire need of training, the assistance of Japan cannot be over-emphasized. Japan can also increase technical assistance to Nigeria by setting up a
research centre in appropriate technology, particularly in the field of electronics and computer. There is also the need for Japan to increase the number of Nigerian students being trained in Japan under its Official Development Assistance (ODA).

In order to make ‘transfer of technology’ possible in Nigeria, ‘copy technology’ is not the best answer. However, Nigeria could imitate Japanese technology based on improved engineering. *(The Guardian: 9 November 1991)* In essence, there is the need to look inward rather than depend on Japan for most of our technological needs. This could be achieved through adaptation of Japan’s technology to suit Nigerian raw materials *(National Concord: 27 July 1991)*. In imitating Japanese technology, Nigeria has a number of lessons to learn. Japan started her major developmental experience in the mid-18th century when she imported Western Capitalist technology. The initial results developed into the genesis of her engineering expertise and the architect of the most advanced weaving machinery in the world. Thus she initiated an impressive economic liberalization policy. This necessitated further hiring of foreign experts to help mend and nurture some of her imported ideologies. Also, Japan sent out her citizens in large numbers to the West to learn. Nigeria can do the same to ensure a meaningful economic and technological development *(National Concord: 4 December 1991)*.

In their efforts at nation building, it has been observed that Japanese were most patriotic and nationalistic. Nigerians should learn from the Japanese long experience of democratic practices. Japan’s trials and errors in development is a good lesson for Nigeria. The realistic approach and sincerity with which the Japanese Government and entrepreneurs alike pursued the course of development is highly emulative. In contrast, more attention is paid to power struggle in Africa. This has masterminded political instability and economic development. *(Adefuye: 1994)* Nigerian Government should commission a direct study into Japan’s humble and turbulent beginning and learn from it for necessary modifications. There is no doubt that Japan has contributed immensely to the economic recovery of Nigeria over the years, nevertheless, the rich Asian nation still has an enormous duty to perform towards the promotion of technical cooperation between her and Nigeria. A very important area Japan could do this is to extend her present technical aid and assistance to Nigeria and by funding projects in designated sectors of the economy. Such projects include agro-allied industries, petrochemicals, and power generation, as well as transmission.

Many advantages lie in both countries knowing more about each other’s cultures. For instance Nigeria would gain a lot if she knows more about how Japan attained her present industrial development by improving its culture and tradition and applying science and technology. It is also a good lesson for Nigeria to know that Japan did not see industrialization and modernization as Westernization.
References


Federal Ministry of Information and Culture, Lagos.


Nigeria Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies, (NIPSS), Kuru, JOS. Papers presented at the All Nigerian Conference on Foreign Policy, April 1986.


Victims and Couriers: Females and Hard Drugs Trafficking Business in Nigeria, 1980-2008

Omon Merry Osiki
School of Social Development
Nanjing Normal University, China

Abstract

Human trafficking, like its twin phenomenon of hard drug trafficking has become a major issue in international relations, especially the aspect of trans-national migration. Although issues related to trafficking transcend gender debates, the role of females as victims of human trafficking and couriers in the illicit trafficking in hard drugs cannot be underestimated. This work is devoted to an assessment of the role of the female gender in the two categories of trafficking as victims and agents since the 1980s. It examines newspaper reports and other related documents as well as gender related theoretical frameworks to x-ray the involvement of females in the trafficking networks.

Introduction

The phenomenon of human trafficking has become a major issue of concern to policy-makers, public affairs commentators and even scholars. Although scholarly efforts such as those of de Haas (2005) Bolz (1995: 147-158) Kanics (1998), and Ogwu (2007), have provided some insights into the workings of the human trafficking networks, none of them explicitly compared the involvement of women as victims of human trafficking as well as their roles as couriers in trans-national hard drugs business. The current effort is an attempt to discuss and analyze the role of the female gender in the growth of human and hard drugs trafficking in Nigeria since the 1980s.

The global pandemic of human trafficking has become a major aspect of international migration since the 1980s when major cities in Africa became major supplying, transit and destination points. By 2008, the social malaise had taken huge tolls on the women folk because they were subjected by traffickers to the dual roles of victims of human trafficking and as couriers for the movement of hard drugs across international borders. The development was part of the escalation in the human and hard drugs trafficking business at the global level, especially in the 1980s and 1990s. Specifically, in the 1980s and 1990s, Nigeria was blacklisted by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) for her involvement in international trafficking and particularly her lack of cooperation in the global fight against hard drugs trafficking (Tribune, 3 September, 2007: 8). In 1985, as part of its reactions to the global outcry the military government of Major General Mohamadu Buhari outlawed trafficking in hard drugs raising the punishment to death on conviction. The idea was to check the trafficking of hard drugs into the country. Among the victims of the controversial law were late Bernard Ogedengbe and Bartholomew Owoh who were executed at the Bar Beach, Lagos. The execution was aimed at discouraging hard drugs trade in Nigeria (Ugwoke, 2006:18).

Although initially females played a secondary role and were outside the radar of trafficking records, they however became vital part of the business in the late 1980s and early 1990s
Factors such as poverty and greed have been attributed to their involvement in the phenomenon. With the dawn of the 21st century, more females became involved in the human and hard drugs trafficking business. In addition, the 21st century recorded unprecedented media attention on the involvement of women in the two aspects of trafficking (Okpalakunne, 2006: 35).

**Conceptual Framework**

Generally, trafficking can be interpreted as any illicit or illegal transporting, trading or transaction of human beings, drugs, arms and ammunition, and any other illicit items, locally or internationally for economic or other personal gains. This definition connotes some or all of the following elements: facilitating the illegal movement of women or men to other countries with or without their consent or knowledge; deceiving migrant women or men about the purpose of their migration, legal or illegal; controlling the women’s or men’s lives through coercion, abuse or physical violence, debt bondage or threats to reveal their illegal/illicit status and activities to the local authorities or their families back home; physical or sexual abuse of women (or men) as a means of gaining control over them to facilitate further illicit activity; sale or trade of women or men for the purpose of employment, marriage, prostitution, or other activities for profit; and illegal sale or movement of arms and ammunition, and hard drugs (International Organization on Migration, 2000).

The United Nations Convention against Transitional Organized Crime and Protocols provides a specific definition for human trafficking as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons by the threat or use of abduction, fraud, deception, coercion, or the abuse of power or by giving or receiving payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another, for the purpose of exploitation” (Chukwuezi, 2002; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2005). Human smuggling is slightly differently from human trafficking in that it concerns “the procurement of illegal entry into or illegal residence of a person in a state of which the person is not a national or permanent resident in order to obtain directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefits” (Chukwuezi, 2002; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2005).

**The Involvement of Females as Victims and Couriers of Trafficking: Emerging Theoretical Paradigms**

Gender related issues are at the root of the phenomenon of trafficking. Between the 1980 and 2008, females dominated the number of victims of human trafficking, while in the case of hard drugs trafficking, males dominated the number of couriers and barons. However, females were employed by males to transport hard drugs into and out of Nigeria. Coomaraswamy, (2006) studied the reason for the preponderance of women as victims of human trafficking and opined that:…the lack of rights affordable to women serves as the primary causative factor at the root of both women’s migration and trafficking in women. The failure of existing economic, political and social structures to provide equal and just opportunities for women to work has contributed to the feminization of poverty, which in turn has led to the feminization of migration, as women leave their homes in search of viable economic options. Further, political instability, militarism, civil unrest, internal armed conflict and natural diseases also
exacerbate women’s vulnerabilities and may result in an increase in trafficking (2006: 27; UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 2000).

Dottridge agrees with the gender perspective of trafficking and added that gender-specific features must be taken into cognizance in any meaningful analysis of human trafficking. His major contribution to the literature on trafficking lies in his emphasis on the age factor in the trafficking business. He examined the role of age in the recruitment of persons for the purpose of trafficking and argued that young people were preferred by traffickers because of natural reasons (Dottridge, 2004: 19; Dottridge, 2002: 38-42). The significance of age in the understanding of the complex nature of trafficking concerns the social and economic conditions which predispose children and women to be used for trafficking as well as conditions under which they were subjected. Truong has posited that “in many respects, the 1980s and 1990s could be referred to as the decades of ‘lost growth’ and ‘lost human development’ for Sub-Saharan Africa”, and that the gender and age dimensions to trafficking became intensified during the period (2006: 56-65; International Organization for Migration, 2002: 5-29).

Truong also maintained that where intra-regional regimes of trafficking in children and women were concerned, the specificities of their vulnerability from local contexts such as, for example dysfunctional families affected by war or disaster, situations would contribute to the creation of a child-specific and female-specific demand for wide-ranging types of work within the region, including commercial sex, domestic service, armed conflict, service industries such as bars and restaurant, or into hazardous forms of work in the factories, mines, construction, agriculture and others (Truong, 2006: 56-65; International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2002: 5-29). This conclusion underscores our position that gender dynamics occupies a major position in the discourse on trafficking and the involvement of females in human and hard drugs trafficking.

**Human and Hard Drugs Trafficking: the Plight of Nigerian Females**

Nigerian women were part of the evolving human and international hard drugs trafficking business between 1980 and 2008. The economic and social disequilibrium in the country contributed to their involvement in the malaise (Tribune, 2005: 10). Human traffickers recruited females and their male counterparts, who they trafficked out of Nigeria through some strategic exit locations and areas in the country such as airports and border posts. Similarly, women were used as couriers of hard drugs for the international markets.

The *Champion* reported that a former minister of communications in Nigeria was involved in a drug cartel that specialized in the use of oil drums in ferrying hard drugs across Nigeria’s borders (11 November, 2004: 34). The cartel recruited some females for the purpose. They disguised as traders but were actually couriers of hard drugs. Narcotic operatives of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) on a routine surveillance along the Nigeria-Benin border once intercepted a lorry conveying mostly women, and following a check on the tins, discovered that there were scraps of drugs neatly wrapped in cellophane bags and concealed in the tins of oil (*Champion*, 2004: 34). Further investigations revealed that the alleged kingpin in the palm-oil business was a former communication minister in Nigeria. The suspects claimed they were ignorant of the contents of the tins of oil, as their own business was to hand over the
consignment to a buyer in Cotonou as well as collect money meant for the tins of oil (Champion, 2004: 34). The NDLEA remarked that:

the new drug war facing the NDLEA is that of barons who are mostly retired military and police personnel-they are being fingered as the brains behind the thriving of the trafficking business, as they now resort to using the services of innocent villagers, especially market men and women who are willing to enter into trading partnership with these barons but quite ignorant of the fact that they are being used as carriers. (Champion, 2004: 34).

Further, in June 1999, officials of the NDLEA arrested a 35-year-old woman over an alleged attempt to export 660 grams of cocaine through Seme border. (New Nigerian, 1999: 19) The then Western Zonal Commander of the NDLEA, Mr. Umar Mbombo said the suspect was arrested in the baggage section of the departure wing of the border post after successfully clearing other security checks to cross to the Republic of Benin. He also said that the cocaine, in 102 wraps, was neatly packed in a black polyethylene bag and held casually under the suspect’s armpit as she attempted to pass through the baggage section (New Nigerian, 1999: 19). When the lady was intercepted, she claimed the bag contained foreign currencies but after intense interrogation, she admitted that the hard drug was sent to her by a childhood friend in Bangkok. It was later discovered that she was merely a courier working for a cartel (New Nigerian, 1999: 19).

Moreover, thirteen drug suspects, including a 51-year old woman and two Togolese were arrested by the NDLEA at the Murtala Mohammed International Airport, Ikeja in Lagos in November 2003. A total of 11,480 kg of cocaine and 4,710 kg of heroin were seized from the suspects. The suspects included:

**Names of Hard Drugs Trafficking Suspects and their Genders**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names of Suspects</th>
<th>Age of Suspects</th>
<th>Sex</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gadge Kofi</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bukola Abiodun Adetunmobi</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abisoye Ganiyu Ajayi</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philemon Manyome</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darkooh Ayawovi Hana</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chibiko Okafor</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osuntoki Kolawole</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olatayo Segun Babajide</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebecca Wilson</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria Agukwe</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The table shows that by 2008 females had gradually emerged as strong forces in the drug trafficking business in Nigeria. Like hard drugs trafficking, women were also exploited in the human trafficking business. The beginning of the phenomenon in Nigeria in the modern times has been traced to the 1980s when the country and several others on the African continent experienced economic crises. Some sources indicate that “it seems that the first cases of women who left Nigeria to come to prostitute themselves in Italy date back to the end of the 80s and beginning of the 90s. At that time, it was mature women, often widows or separated with children who were principal victims” (Prina, 2003: 30). It later expanded to involve young ladies. A government official once remarked in 2002 that about 45,000 Nigerians were trafficked to Europe every year (Okenwa, 2002). According to him:

Many of the people who are mostly women die in the course of being ferried across the Atlantic while several others are killed in the Sahara. Most of the girls are not prostitutes as they are often tagged. They are actually victims of human trafficking. People arrange to take them abroad for one job or the other only to abuse them. Even housewives with kids are deceived on the grounds of taking them abroad for work only to be used for sex labour (Okenwa, 2002).

The Nigerian figure is part of the alarming global figure on human trafficking. The United States’ annual report of 2004 put yearly figures of persons trafficked across international borders at between 600,000 and 800,000 out of which 80 per cent were usually women and girls and 50 per cent were minors. Majority of such transnational victims were trafficked into commercial sexual exploitation (Ifijeh, 2005: 20). The report observed that the alarming enslavement of people for the purposes of labour exploitation in their countries as well as transnational trafficking for sexual exploitation was gradually becoming a serious aspect of international relations (Ifijeh, 2005: 20).

The Nigeria Immigration Service’s checklist of human trafficking indicates that in March 26 and 27, 1994, fifty one under-aged children, mostly young girls were rescued at Ikot Abasi in Eket Local Council area of Akwa Ibom State (Adeyemi, 2001: 14-15). In March 1996, three girls and a boy were saved as they were being trafficked out of Nigeria across the Atlantic to the Central African country of Gabon for domestic works (Adeyemi, 2001: 14-15). Similarly, in July 1996, seventy three teenagers were rescued at the point of being trafficked (Adeyemi, 2001: 14-15). In January 1996, over 100 people perished when a Gabon-bound ferry from Ibeno, in Nigeria capsized, killing all passengers on board including 75 children between the ages of seven and sixteen (Adeyemi, 2001: 14-15). Nevertheless, considering that there exists legitimate economic and cultural links between the peoples of Gabon and Nigeria, every movement of people between the two countries does not constitute human trafficking in January 1997, one hundred
Osiki, Victims and Couriers

and fifty children were rescued from the merchants’ ship intended to ferry the young males and females out of West Africa, including Nigeria to Central Africa (Adeyemi, 2001: 14-15).

A Beninoise, who was trafficked to Lagos in the early 1980s, remarked that:

It was a dream of almost every young person in our village to be taken to Lagos as house help at that time and even up till now. So when it was my turn to come to Lagos I was very happy and was sure my life would not be that of a village girl again. We were about 20 that came at that time and I was given to this woman who took me to her house in Gbagada (Adeyemi, 2001: 14-15).

In her community, she became a sort of role model to the people. Many parents chased her around to get their children fixed up in Lagos. Thus, unwittingly, she became an agent and head of a network of human trafficking. According to her, “each time I went home, I would come with three or four children but later the demands were so high that if I had 50 children I won’t meet up” (Adeyemi, 2001: 14-15). Popularly called Iya Tope, Mrs. Bodunrin said her business fetched her over N70,000 monthly and that a prospective client would normally purchase a form at N2,000 (Adeyemi, 2001: 14-15). After obtaining the form, the client would pay transport fee of between N6,000 and N7,500 to bring the maid from Benin Republic, then wait for the time ‘supply’ will come (Adeyemi, 2001: 14-15). She normally deducted 20 per cent from whatever was paid to the ladies as her service charge. In addition, as the head of the trafficking network, Mrs. Bodunrin served as surrogate mother for the maids while in Lagos and settled all complaints from both the clients and the maids. As common with the exploitative nature of the trafficking business, the maids were instructed never to give their real names even to the families they were living with for security reasons. This was because “a foreign name will easily give them out and may attract the attention of the police (Adeyemi, 2001: 14-15). The ever-increasing demands for the housemaids and the problems posed by the immigration officers at the border encouraged Mrs. Bodunrin to expand her source of supply beyond Benin Republic to Togo and other cities in Nigeria (Adeyemi, 2001: 14-15).

Conversely, many Nigerian females were trafficked to other West African countries where they were engaged in prostitution and domestic services or kept in some transit camps for onward movement to Europe and America. Between 2003 and 2005, many young women were rescued and repatriated back to Nigeria while some traffickers were arrested for human trafficking business. A study conducted by the Nigerian Embassy in Togo indicated that some Ghanaian human traffickers had contacts in Edo, Delta and many other states in Nigeria from where they recruited young girls for international prostitution (Adeyemi, 2001: 14-15). While in Togo, many of the young women were forced into prostitution in preparation for their journey to Europe across the Sahara Desert. A Nigerian official in Togo once explained that:

There are about 200 Nigerians crossing over to this place daily because they just need N500 and you are here. Some of them just come in here, no passport, no identity card and they become consular problems for us. There are about 1.8 million Nigerians in Togo….We have Nigerians coming to the embassy-young girls, who have been misled to come out for women and child trafficking. As people are trying to get to Europe, they come through this place, try to go through the Sahara, Mauritania and Libya” (Shadare, 2005).
A NAPTIP/UNICEF situation assessment of Child Trafficking in Southern Nigerian states in 2004 reported that 46 per cent of repatriated victims of international trafficking in Nigeria were children with a female to male ratio of 7 to 3. A breakdown of the data shows that the victims engaged mainly in prostitution were 46 per cent, domestic labour 21 per cent, forced labour 15 per cent and entertainment 8 per cent (Ojukwu, 2005: 14). This was similar to the situation in India where every year by 2008, an average of 22,480 women and 44,476 children were reported trafficked (Kaul, 2004: 34). The 2008 NAPTIP situation assessment of Child Trafficking in Nigeria revealed that females still dominated the victims of trafficking. 60 per cent of repatriated victims of international trafficking in Nigeria by 2008 were children with a female to male ratio of 7 to 3 (Kaul, 2004: 34).

In February 2005, the Anti-human Trafficking Unit of the Nigeria Immigration, Seme border command, at Ilado, near Badagry arrested one Boniface Bosu and his two brothers for human trafficking offences. About sixty two people were freed from the man who claimed to be a pastor of a Celestial Church of Christ (CCC). Those rescued included 10 girls, aged between 8 and 10 years; six boys whose ages ranged between 18 and 25 years; and women in their 40s (Okoro and Okwara, 2005: 25).

**Comparison of the Involvement of Women as Victims and Couriers of Trafficking**

Both human and hard drugs trafficking witnessed huge involvement of females from the 1980s up to 2008. Careful observations indicate that the rise in the hard drugs trafficking business from the late 1990s up to 2008 was contemporaneous with the increase in the global human trafficking trade. The consequence of this development was that more females were subjected to victims and couriers of trafficking than ever (Ekerette, 2009). A thorough scrutiny of the record of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA-Nigeria) indicates that age and sex determined to a large extent the scope and success of the trafficking business in the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century (Ekerette, 2009; NDLEA Record, 2008). The source also indicated that many of the victims rescued from traffickers confessed that they were forced to smuggle hard drugs across the West African sub-region as well as to Europe and America as part of the trafficking networks (Ekerette, 2009; Babatunde, 2009; Momoh, 2009). Women’s role in the narcotics trade was also directly connected to psychological issues related to sex exploitation. For instance, attempts were sometimes made to make victims drug users before they were sold on to the consumer markets, primarily in Europe and America as well as in the transit regions. A study indicated that the narcotic networks promoted addiction among prostitutes so that pimps and traffickers could easily exert control over them (Swanstrom, 2007: 13; Nigerian Tribune, 2005: 10).

Moreover, the socio-biological make-up of women could easily be exploited by trafficking networks for the movement of hard drugs from one place to another. A study indicated that barons recruited women who were willing to use any part of their body for trafficking purposes (Swanstrom, 2007: 13; Nigerian Tribune, 2005: 10). Official reports are replete with cases of female suspects who concealed hard drugs in their private parts. (Nigerian Tribune, 2005: 10) Apart from swallowing or concealment in containers, drug couriers (traffickers) sometimes used their shoes and other accessories to ferry drugs across international borders. They connived with
shoe manufacturers to manufacture shoes that would enable the substance to be hidden in them. Sometimes, they used insulator soles, which rendered results of electronic searching devices negative. A research observed that women’s penchant for fashionable shoes made them easy targets for the testing of various trafficking methods and strategies (Champion, 2000).

**Efforts to Combat the Use of Females as Victims and Couriers of Trafficking**

Governmental efforts to checkmate the trafficking business in general and the use of females as “commodities” and facilitators of trafficking in Nigeria have colonial antecedents in form of enactment of anti-trafficking legislation. (Criminal Code Act (Cap 77), Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004, pp.109-111, 137, 146, 175, 176, 161, 72, 75; National Archive, Ibadan (NAI), Colonial Secretary’s Office (CSO): 26: 06353: Drug and Poisons Ordinance, 1915; and NAI: CSO: 30055/8) However, unlike in the colonial period, contemporary trafficking business is wider in scope and strategy. Routes have assumed the tripod of land, sea and air, with air and sea constituting the easiest form of movement of persons and hard drugs across international borders. The new trend has come with its challenges and complexities. This notwithstanding, the Nigerian government developed some measures, which benefitted from international initiatives on the matter. With respect to human trafficking, the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP) was the most effective governmental agency established to combat the illicit trade in women, children and men. It had a multi-faceted mandate, which included investigation, arrest, prosecution of traffickers and counseling and rehabilitation of victims (Ekah, 2005: 16).

The establishment of NAPTIP was anchored on relevant anti-human trafficking legislation in Nigeria’s constitution and the Criminal Code. Specifically, in the Criminal Code of the Laws of the Federation 2004, there are several sections such as section 223(b) inserted to prescribe the punishment or a fine of N10,000.00 for any female person who engages in prostitution or other immoral acts within or outside Nigeria; a new Section 223 (c) prescribes two years imprisonment or a fine of N10,000.00 for any man who patronizes prostitutes; and Section 223(d) punishes any woman who lures or induces any man to engage in sexual intercourse with her for any gratification. (Criminal Code Act (Cap 77), Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004) The new Section 225 increases punishment of the offence already defined from two years to ten years in prison or fine of N50,000.00; the new Section 225(a) substitutes “every person” for “Every able person” and increases the punishment by adding N50,000.00 fine to the existing two years imprisonment for offenders. (Criminal Code Act (Cap 77), Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004).

NAPTIP’s effort was boosted by collaborations and cooperation from international organizations and associations. For instance, the assistance of the United States Agency International Development (USAID) towards the alleviation of trafficking in women (and children) was outstanding. The agency granted $500,000 to the International Office for Migration (IOM) to support shelter in Lagos for returned trafficked victims, mostly women deported from Europe. The USAID also promised to provide approximately $3million to support anti-trafficking efforts in the areas of policy dialogue, information dissemination, publication and direct support by 2008 (Laba, 2004: 22).

On hard drugs trafficking, efforts were made to combat the illicit business and by extension reduce the use of women as couriers. The United States of America was a leading external actor
in the fight against hard drugs trafficking in Nigeria. At the signing of a bilateral agreement between Nigeria and the US, the US government granted a $1 million dollars in assistance to Nigeria to finance programmes in the following areas- $150,000 to the National Drugs Law Enforcement Agency for training at its academy in Jos; $400,000 for the police modernization programme to train the trainers and officer cadets at the Officer Academy in Kano and $560,000 for expansion of basic recruit training to the Police College in Maiduguri, Enugu and Lagos. Indeed, the total United States’ government assistance to Nigerian law enforcement programmes to combat hard drugs trafficking amounted to about $10 million since 1999. (Onwubiko, 2004: 13) As a result of Nigeria’s positive response to the various international assistance the country got a drug free certification for three consecutive years 2001, 2002, and 2003. (Onwubiko, 2004: 13) Nigeria was also admitted into the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs (UNCND) after four years of exclusion (Onwubiko, 2004: 13). The country received more positive recognition from international bodies by 2009.

Conclusion

The worldwide incidence of women trafficking for illicit transnational activities has continued to pose a major challenge to gender-related issues in African studies. Although the exact figures of cases of female trafficking remain difficult to obtain because of the illicit and clandestine nature of the trade, the impact it has had on the women-folk cannot be underestimated. The commoditization of females is gradually changing the traditional female roles as mothers and role models to future generations.

This paper has shown that the female folks were exploited in the process of trafficking and as couriers to generate resources for those who recruited them. Push and pull factors such as poverty, ignorance, greed, unemployment and the socio-biological make-up of females predisposed them to the manipulative tendencies of the traffickers. The paper concludes on the note that all necessary national and international mechanisms must be mobilized to combat trafficking and liberate women from being used as victims and couriers in the trafficking chains (Kaul, 2004: 34).

References

Champion (April 22, 2000).

135


Ifijeh, G. (31 October, 2005) “Human Trafficking”, *ThisDay*.


*New Nigerian* Newspaper (5 June, 1999).


Okenwa, L. (5 February 2002) “15,000 Nigerians Trafficked to Europe-Minister”, *ThisDay*.


*Tribune*, (20 October, 2005), “Nigerian Women and Drug Trafficking”. 
Tribune (3 September, 2007), “Upsurge in Drug Trafficking”.

UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC),
Witchcraft, Culture, and Theology in African Development

Jim Harries
Kima International School of Theology
Maseno, Kenya

Abstract
A comparison between a forest and a vegetable plot illustrates problems arising from ignoring cultural differences in contemporary mission. Attempt by Westerners to wish away difference between them and Africans can and does lead to inauthentic existence among the latter. Ignoring the reality of witchcraft (often called Satanism) rather than acknowledging it among Africans perpetuates poverty, resulting in the emergence of many booming but apparently shallow African churches. The adoption of European languages for everyday use in Africa can be harmful to indigenously-rooted development. Applying little known western theological principles to the issue of witchcraft can be a tasking enterprise. For the achievement of any connection between their theology and their lives, African churches must resort to the use of African languages. This article explores the phenomena of witchcraft, indigenous culture and theology in African development and concludes that failure to acknowledge the interwoven relationships among the above-mentioned themes has been the root cause of Africa’s persistent crisis of underdevelopment.

Glossary
References to ‘Africa’ in this essay should be taken as being to Sub-Saharan Africa.

Introduction
This article considers macro as well as micro issues of human society, especially in the African context. Its conclusion is radically theological and challenges the wisdom of our age. The author has been closely integrated into the rural African community of the Luo people of Western Kenya since 1993. The reader is asked to bear in mind from the beginning a much neglected aspect of human communication, namely that language is context-specific. This means that language is mutually comprehensible only in so far as culture is common. It follows that clear communication across cultural divides is difficult (Harries 2008). Failure to acknowledge this has been the cause of numerous blunders in intercultural communication, threatening the foundations of many communities, especially in Africa.

Use of Western languages in Africa
We might well begin with an allegory: A European planted a vegetable plot in an African forest. It included cabbages, bananas, potatoes and tomatoes. Hearing of his success, people back in the West gave him gifts and loaned him money. Adjoining forest residents were impressed by his income. The European told them they must do things in his way if they were to benefit from his monetary largesse. They found this impractical and undesirable. But the forest contained plants related to those in the vegetable plot including wild bananas, tomato-like fruit and sweet potatoes that looked like ‘real’ potatoes. Instead of talking about the forest having vines, exotic trees, dense undergrowth, snakes and numerous birds and monkeys, they described it as containing potatoes, bananas and cabbages, and were given access to the same gifts and money as the
Europe. Is one kind of cabbage superior to another? Is a local variety inferior to the foreign one? Why, indeed, should a cabbage be called a tomato?

Mission scholars erode differences. Translation practices “purify … situations of their social and historical variables…” (Venuti 1998:25). Examples abound: an African palaver can be called a ‘discussion’ (Armstrong 1979:14). A large polygamous homestead can be called a ‘home’ (An illustration of a house is given the label ‘dala’ in Capen (1998:28) whereas a dala is a homestead, not just a house.) A scrawny and ferocious guard animal can be called a ‘dog’, as is a European poodle! The terms superstition, primitive, magic and so on can be omitted from discussion. Then “… one generation’s conscious omissions [can] become the next generation’s genuine amnesia” (Tambiah 1990:28).

“Scholars have scratched their heads for a satisfactory definition of magical beliefs and puzzled over the mentality of people who can subscribe to them” then concluded that “… the savage was a credulous fool” (Douglas 1966:22-23). Condemnation and sweeping generalizations rather than appreciation and understanding have become normal in the West’s approach to African beliefs and practices. Applying ‘witchcraft’, a European word, to African practices (see Ellis (2007:31-33)) results in the assumption that the African belief is the same as the European understanding of the word.

African people have attempted to align themselves linguistically with dominant economic powers to avoid ridicule (Haar 2007:110). They echo ideas from the West in order to avoid being ridiculed. Historical and spiritual/religious circumstances that propelled wealth creation in the West are downplayed among Africans. I take this as being because secularists who are somewhat dominant in Western society today undermine their position if they concede a necessary ‘religious’ component to their own history (See Weber 1930 and Trouillot 2003:107-108). Few contemporary scholars acknowledge the role of the Gospel in the history of the West. This is so as to perpetuate the ‘myth’ that anybody around the world, regardless of religious persuasion, should be able to devise and operate a ‘modern’ economy – preferably before the millennium project deadline of 2015 AD (Millennium 2008). The use of terms as ‘economy’, ‘efficiency’, ‘strategy’, ‘sustainable’, etc in relation to poor nations seems to erase differences between them and their wealthy counterparts.

There is little motivation to do otherwise where a European language is the official lingua franca as is the case in many African countries. Thus Africans are compelled to use European words or equivalents to describe peculiar African experiences. It is in this sense that a KiSwahili speaker uses ‘love’ as the equivalent of upendo; ‘house’ for nyumba; ‘God’ for Mungu; ‘work’ for kazi and witchcraft for uchawi. This is invariably the translation approach taken even where the KiSwahili word is very different from the European word. ‘House’ in English does not fully describe what the Kiswahili call nyumba. Such cultural difference is the reason why a native English speakers will laugh at the idea of witchcraft where the same idea will inspire awe in a KiSwahili speaker (See Haar 2007:110).

The Christian worldview influences much of the thinking and attitude of Western European scholars who tend to view matters from a historically Christian perspective. This manifests, for
example, in their definition of what constitutes religion or superstition. A refusal to recognize such distinction is ultimately futile.

Projects designed in the West to benefit the poor in Africa can be fatally flawed if they fail to account for cultural differences. Unless the reality of witchcraft is faced “many projects and investments, especially in the rural areas, are bound to fail” (Hinfelaar 2007:229). Projects wholly managed by Westerners tend to encourage a culture of dependency which in turn encourages corruption (Odongo 2007).

The subjective takes precedence over the objective as the example of the Alur, a group ethically related to the Luo of Kenya, who put “great verbal stress” on that which does “not obtain in practice” (Southall 1970:238) illustrate. Contrary to Western ideals of objectivity, the use of language among Africans (Luo) is heavily oriented to generating reality (Harries 2007:21). Overwhelming reliance on foreign support and funding blunts the Kenyan’s ability for objectivity, leading them to proffer spiritual explanations to physical experiences. (Blunt 2004:318). What can such an attitude portend for a modernizing / developing Africa?

The idea of witchcraft is central to the day to day experience of an Africa and permeates every aspect of life in Sub-Saharan Africa. There is the constant awareness of the reality of evil induced by witchcraft. Thus warm greetings and handshakes can serve to counter evil thoughts and intentions from others. Expressed agreement can be more a way of avoiding heart-to-heart offence, than an expression of objective truth. Laughter can be a means of arresting bad forces before they enter and invade the body following threatening interpersonal encounters. Church services could be an exercise in the exorcising of witchcraft in the manner of ritual sacrifices. Sexual encounters can be employed as a weapon for neutralising evil powers in a woman. Beliefs such as these are outside the immediate experience of Westerners (see also Harries 2007).

The Degree of Charitable Dependence in Africa
In this section the level of dependence on foreign aid in Africa will be considered. While the experience upon which my claims are made came largely from my stay in Western Kenya, and to a lesser extent Tanzania and Zambia, I believe that the points I make have wider applicability. Foreign aid donors may in their dealings want to replicate what happens ‘at home’, unfortunately many feedback, accountability and control mechanisms are not functional inter-culturally: “Precision and rigor in keeping accounts … is foreign, threatening, and indicates a lack of understanding of the needs of ordinary [African] people” (Maranz 2001:38). The need for accountability can be counterproductive as time and effort expended on correcting ineffective procedures can be better utilised in the interest of a community. If subalterns cannot speak (Spivak 1988) then they cannot give feedback on projects (Harries 2008c). It is hereby proposed that a proportion of international interactions should be on the basis of ‘vulnerable mission’ – in which Westerners use indigenous languages and local sources of funds (Harries 2008c). This will help in the re-education of westerners uninformed in the logic and cultural practices of non-Westerners.

My home area in Western Kenya now falls directly under the massive all-encompassing United Nations donor-based Millennium Development Project (MDP) (Mutua 2007). While other projects target specific objectives, (Odongo 2007) the MDP attempts to do everything required to eradicate poverty in a given community, while bringing other initiatives under its umbrella
The MDP is oriented to: hunger and poverty, primary education, gender equality, child mortality, maternal health, HIV/AIDS, environmental sustainability, global partnership & development (Mutua 2007).

This community had been heavily dependent on foreign aid prior to the advent of the MDP. Numerous foreign church-based orphan projects have recently mushroomed in the area. A local water supply has been funded, I understand, by the European Union. The educational system (increasingly offered for free) is heavily subsidised by foreign donors. There is a bank offering finance and loan services in the village. Churches are finding it harder to survive without financial incentives from foreign donors to encourage church attendance among the people. Many buy low-priced, second-hand clothes, donated from the West, at local markets. Roads are being built with funds from China and elsewhere. Food aid comes to supplement local shortages. The most widely read newspapers are in English and their style shows their indebtedness to Western journalism. Medical services are available for free, or almost free, thanks to foreign donors. To cap it all – foreigners are credited with bringing Kenya back from the brink of a civil war following electoral disputes Dependence on foreign support is not limited to the aforementioned areas. My local seminary (Kima International School of Theology) was built and is being run with foreign funds. Over 90% of the students survive on foreign scholarships. This is based on personal estimate as I teach part-time at this school.). While these foreign aids are detrimental to the future growth of Africans, the people not ready to concede to this fact as they fear it might lead to a cut in funding. The consequence is that Africans approach the physical through the spiritual (Senghor 1964:72). It is gods / spirits / ancestors and not physical cause / effect reasoning that are thought to bring life-success (Maranz 2001:135).

Historically, Africa’s lack of physical productivity is clear. What we nowadays call ‘poverty’ has been the ‘normal’ way of life for generations of Africans (Melland (1923:53 and Wilson 1952:89). Prior to the arrival of Westerners, Africa has little to show of her civilization. Hunter gathering, nomadic pastoralism and minimal hand-cultivation on a rotating basis were widespread economic norms. How can such be transformed into profit-maximizing surplus producing economies? Studies done to explore this question tend to be sidetracked (Harries 2008). Western approaches to Africa tend to assume a prior ‘blank slate’ rather than a pre-existing culture (personal observation). Observant Kenyan people note how almost everything they have and use these days is of foreign origin, and that African people themselves produce relatively little in exchange for goods – except poverty to win sympathy. I explore the reasons for this below.

What Limits the Productive Capacity of Africans
The subsidy attached to ‘solutions’ to poverty from the West itself makes them attractive to cash-strapped African communities. But they do not work. The educational solutions that Africans suggest are frustrating for many Westerners. Africans tend to blame the Devil or Satan – often used as a synonym for witchcraft – for their ills. The defeat of the Devil ushers in ‘progress’ (Harries 2006:153). Secular Westerners shake their heads incredulously at this apparent ignorance. The existence of evil as a personalized experience is to many Westerners the figment of a wild imagination. Western churches practice “disbelief in the reality of witchcraft” (Murray 1970:28). Witchcraft is for Westerners a concocted invention. The reality however is that hard work can be counter-productive in witch-bound societies because it results in somebody being
bewitched by the jealous. The readiness of Westerners to scoff at the reality of witchcraft and deny the existence of witches has been damaging to development.

The irony of the matter is that ‘Satan’ is of Arabic origin (Johnson 1939:419). Used interchangeably with witchcraft or ‘evil spirits, Satan is blamed for the ills of Africa (Douglas 1987, Murray 1970 and Imperato 1966). Biblical teaching, in its assumed dualism between God and the Devil / Satan, appropriates diverse and older African categories. The term for ancestral spirit in many African languages is taken as a synonym of ‘Satan’, a troubling and misleading practice (Maluleke 2005). A number of options have been advocated to counter the machinations of Satan (i.e. troublesome ancestral spirits) by the Luo of Kenya:

1/ Animal sacrifice (Evans-Pritchard 1950:86).
2/ Stabbing the remains of the corpse of the person who is the source of a troublesome spirit (Mboya 1997:206).
3/ Burning a corpse in its grave (I have periodically heard of this practice.)
4/ Killing suspected witches.
5/ Breaking the virginity of a girl’s corpse should she die unmarried (Mboya 1997).
6/ Ensuring that widows are inherited, even after their death (if necessary through ritual sex with the corpse), and so on. (Rituals such as breaking the virginity of a dead girl or ensuring that widows are penetrated even after their death if they were not inherited when alive are carried out to prevent the living from being haunted by ancestral spirits.

The Luo term jachien, (considered a synonym to Satan) is related to others such as sepe, mumbo, mireri (Ocholla-Ayayo 1976:174), olele (Mboya 1997:107) and especially juok (the “supreme natural power”) (Ocholla-Ayayo 1976:174). Juok (jok) can be translated back into English as vital force, mystical power or God (Ogot 1961). Kenyan Luo speakers often translate the term into English as witchcraft (Capen 1998:61). Witches (nyakalondo, jajuok, juuwog wang, janawi and perhaps jabilo) are all considered to use juok, or juok power in their evil arts. Juok is also the power arising from jochiende (plural of jachien, i.e. Satan). In a complex way the power lying behind juok (witchcraft) is none other than that of malevolent ancestral spirits.

Older women are most likely to be accused of being witches (Dovlo 2007:71), especially close family members—co-wives, mothers-in-law, sisters-in-law etc. Older women in African society are often poor, troubled, rejected by their husbands in favour of younger women, or bereaved. They are relatively powerless, often emotionally vulnerable, and least likely to fight back if accused of practicing witchcraft. They are widely imagined to be jealous, bitter and envious. African people are known for their jealousy and old women are the archetypal suspect. Maranz points out, for example, that many African people hide their wealth from the knowledge of others (Maranz 2001:138). This is not surprising when the belief persists that unused wealth can be considered available to any interested person (Maranz 2001:150; see also Ntloedibe-Kuswani 2007:215). Barren women are assumed to wish for the death of their co-wife’s children than to sit in lonely misery as another woman enjoys the company of devoted offspring. Jealousy, it is believed, surely troubles old widows who observe other women enjoying their husband’s company and wealth. More likely to be neglected and ignored than men when sickly or aged, old women are prone to bitterness and jealousy.
I have elsewhere traced beliefs in Satan, spirits and witchcraft to what I see as their common denominator – bitterness and a jealous heart (Harries 2007:219-223). When good is considered to be of limited supply, then someone else’s possession of it (husband, children, food, quality housing etc.), means loss for another (Foster 1973). The reluctance to accumulate visible wealth is extremely important to economics (see also Harries, 2008). It results in people not wanting to be held accountable (Maranz 2001:102), not wanting to hold others accountable (Maranz 2001:41), fear of wealth, and a love of the appearance of poverty.

Belief in witchcraft-induced jealousy is very strong among Africans. Some people are said to be pre-occupied with trying to bring down those who seem to be doing better than them while such potential victims avoid the appearance of doing well in order not to stir the jealousy of witches. The following examples illustrate the impact of witchcraft on life, including the economy: a prosperous farmer who lost his child to what he believed were witches in Zambia left his place abode and business unexpectedly at night so he would not be attacked again by witches. A prosperous villager in Zambia stood in line at a funeral as a coffin was passed by. Suddenly and unexpectedly those carrying the coffin stumbled and the coffin tilted sideways pointing at him. It was for the bystanders an indication of his guilt in the deceased’s death. The apparently innocent man took to his heels. He was never seen again. A Tanzanian farmer living in a semi-desert area was told that water had been found under his land. A post was erected to mark the place. But the farmer, fearing the jealousy of his neighbours should he become wealthy through having the borehole for the whole community on his land, secretly moved the post. When the bore-hole diggers came, they did not find any water. People in Western Kenya spend much money and time on funerals attended by numerous family members, at least in part to prove that they do not rejoice at the departure of the dead. “Most Luos of Western Kenya spend less on preserving life than caring for the dead” (Kodia 2005:33). An Anglican bishop insisted that his funeral be cheap and simple, but “more than half a million [over $8,300, was raised] to cover the funeral expenses” (Kodia, 35).

The people most likely to be accused of being selfish by the jealous are those who have accumulated wealth through their own efforts. Means of investment that are indivisible are much desired, to avoid the social obligation to share one’s wealth (Maranz 2001:20). People may be quick to put their wealth into bricks and mortar. Education is much preferred to money, as once acquired it cannot be taken away. Receiving wealth from a foreigner does not make someone guilty of the same degree of selfishness (that would be used to justify jealousy), because the beneficiary has not worked for it. This is another reason why donors are much loved. Across the continent witchcraft has enslaved many, trapping them to a life of poverty. Witchcraft thus hinders economic progress. Witchcraft fears result in people directing resources not towards the maximization of profit or output but a minimization of witchcraft (jealousy). While people live in constant fear and trepidation – those churches which are still guided if not controlled by the West, tell the people plagued by disease, poverty, calamity, house-fires, barrenness and AIDS that witchcraft does not exist! The church is failing in its duty. Witchcraft, surely, is exactly what the church ought to be tackling? Many African Indigenous Churches are doing so (Murray 1970). But others are slow to learn from them. African Christians have learned, often the hard way, that there is no point in telling most Western Christians / missionaries that their problems are caused by witchcraft. The response – that witchcraft does not exist – amounts to saying that there is no jealousy in so far as “… it is difficult to define … [witchcraft] in isolation from the
idea of jealousy” (Ntloedibe-Kuswani 2007:225). This can be so contrary to the evidence as to be ridiculous, and certainly of little or no help in day-to-day life. At best perhaps – it can drive witchcraft underground. And this is what happens. Witchcraft beliefs are not a vestigial organ that can be excised, leaving the body intact and functioning ‘normally’. They are the DNA of life, or its central ideology. Even if ‘removed’ from certain community members, the effect on behaviour lingers. ‘Witch-bound’ communities attempt to force aberrant members into line.

The 2008 Kenyan post-election violence has its roots in ‘jealousy’. The Nilotes and other ethnic groups in the West of Kenya were jealous of their wealthy neighbours the Kikuyu for having the corner on prosperity, so led a revolt to drive the Kikuyu people from their land. This was a very traditional way of dealing with witches – albeit on a larger scale than usual, demonstrating that Akrong was right to say that witchcraft beliefs affect the political sphere (2007:61). Africa continues to groan under the heavy burden of witchcraft beliefs (Haar 2007:1).

The church in Africa is in many ways under the control of the West as it depends on donor-funding for its survival. How can the West rectify this?

The Transfer of knowledge of God from the West to the non-West

The missionary project on the African continent has in many ways been a success (Jenkins 2002). Critics such as the anthropologist Beidelmann (1982) have come to an acceptance of this fact. The African church is there, its members numerous, and its influence widespread (Jenkins 2002). Yet it is said that the church is ‘a mile wide but only an inch deep’ (Obed 2008) and that it is plagued by the prosperity Gospel; a “cynical manipulation” (Cotterell 1993:2). It may not be too far from the truth to say that the failure of the African church to develop an indigenous theology is the consequence of a fundamental error on the part of the Western Church’s in applying Western ways and culture, including Western languages, to African problems. This would not be such a serious problem if the African church already had its own foundations in place. That is – it would be different if the churches were meeting and interacting as equals. Then the African church could learn from ‘the other’ selectively. As it is, however, many African churches have been denied the value of indigenous solutions to the challenges facing them. Secularism, with its associated doctrines and belief systems, has been on the rise. Secularists’ disdain for spiritual mystery has rubbed off on Western Christians. What Christians do not always perceive, is that the resultant desire for straightforward Scriptural comprehensibility is contextually dependent. That is the desire to demystify and simplify the Bible is a product of a secular age, and not necessarily integral to eternal truth.

If African theology is to develop using African English, because the meanings (or impacts) of the English terms African people use are profoundly different to those of Western English, then Westerners will not (or even ‘cannot possibly’) understand (or agree with) the theology being produced in Africa – unless they first master the English language as used and understood in Africa in all its complexity. Advocating that African theology develops distinctly from Western theology may appear to some as splitting the church. But should it be one? The church needs to be more than one in order for her to be one. If the destination is the same, let’s say, but the starting points differ, then those at different starting points need to move in different directions in order to arrive at the same destination. (See illustration in Figure 1 below.)
Figure 1. Different Starting Points Aiming to Find a Knowledge of God.

In Figure 1 the X and Y axes represent any two characteristics or attributes of God. If *Yhwh* is the true God, then people B must be directed along path b and people A along path a in order to reach the truth. Directing people B along path a does not take them closer to but further from truth, as also illustrated for people A by path b. For example, people A may understand the power of God but not the love of God, so need to be taught his love, whereas people B may understand the love of God, but not the power of God, so need to be taught about God’s power.

Some scholars have questioned whether belief in a high-God is native to the Luo people: (Nyarwath 1994:141 and P’Bitek 1970:58-69). Do the Luo take the term *Nyasaye*, commonly translated ‘God’, as some kind of ‘mystical power’? Western theology does not address the need to educate people into the understanding that there is one powerful God, it takes this as a given, to be accepted or not by faith. That which African people need to understand, that seems to be irrelevant to modern Western theology, is how God would have them overcome witchcraft.

Because to be helpful in Africa, theology often will not be acceptable to Westerners, hence I draw another conclusion: in order for African theology to advance and progress, it must be done in a language other than English, i.e. in an African language; “You are right” was Bediako’s response, repeated six times, to my suggestion that English may be enemy number one to theology in Africa (Bediako 2006).

**Barriers to Accurate Reporting**

Why do efforts at writing African theology in English continue when barriers to the success of such a project are almost endless? Why are such barriers to the development of a theology that can effectively counter witchcraft so widely ignored? I suggest reasons for this in this in the following.

Numerous strategies evolved to ease race tensions between Blacks and Whites (and others) have contributed. Internationally these strategies in emphasising inter-ethnic equality, in effect equal capability in contexts guided by the West between Westerners and non-Westerners, can curtail or pre-empt efforts at compensating for difference. I appeal to such not to allow the privilege of a few to be the demise of whole communities. African people are not inherently inferior to others (Trouillot 2003:106). African communities can develop, through thinking about themselves and their societies in familiar categories as does the rest of the globe, and not by simply imitating others: “There is a need, therefore, for policy change in the whole of Africa towards using African languages as a media of education in order to bring about development” (Qorro 2003:194), “… development in Africa will not be forthcoming until we start using our languages as LOI [Language of Instruction] from the beginning to the end of the education process” (Prah
Harries, Witchcraft and Development

2003:24), Short-term advantages gained by winning foreign charity should not be allowed to derail Africa’s self-development project.

Overcoming Witchcraft in Africa

Limitations in communication as discussed above mean that attempts by the West at ‘helping’ Africa to develop often create dependency. An important part of the African worldview often ignored overlooked by Westerners is the matter of witchcraft. Knowledge of these cannot be transported intact across cultural divides, and is frequently concealed from view even to scholars. Witchcraft and associated beliefs in magic are widespread, ancient and incredibly resilient (Haar 2007:1). Her co-authors make various suggestions on how to do away with witchcraft. Some of these are contradictory – so some authors find education to be the key (Dovlo 2007:89), whereas others find education to be ineffective (Haar (2007:9) and Kgotla (2007:287)). Some advocate Christianity and the church (Kgotla 2007:283-285), whereas another warns us that the church can enhance witchcraft beliefs (Bongmba 2007:130-137). Prosperity may not help, as Dovlo reminds us that “the incidence of witchcraft accusation increases both in cases of economic well-being and disaster” (Dovlo 2007:69). Some emphasise the spiritual side of the solution to witchcraft, causing Haar to talk of “the need for new theologies” (Haar 2007b:26). “Changing witchcraft beliefs in Africa, then, can only be the result of a long-term process. What is needed … is to cultivate alternative modes of interpretation of life-events in order eventually to undermine the witchcraft mentality. But any type of education in this regard … must be culturally based in order to be effective” Haar (2007b:24-25) concludes.

A prerequisite for the effective and lasting overcoming of witchcraft, I suggest, in line with the discussion above, is that people use a language that they understand. That is, either their mother-tongue, or a language closely related to it. Expecting the overcoming of mankind’s great enemy using a language which does not resonate with or articulate people’s deep beliefs is, I believe, asking too much. Witchcraft beliefs can remain intact, but hidden. Education in Africa cannot be expected to overcome witchcraft if it occurs in foreign languages that ignore it.

For Africa to be free, the bondage of witchcraft has to be broken. (Hinfelaar 2007:229). The key for this to happen, I suggest – is faith in God, i.e. Yahweh – the creator and the Father of the Lord Jesus Christ. This is primarily because God is God. It may be important to state at this stage that these thoughts on how to overcome witchcraft, and the assumptions regarding the nature and preeminence of witchcraft underlying them, may not be shared by African people themselves. My advocacy of belief in God as solution to witchcraft belief is both positive and negative. Positive, because I believe in God and I believe that He has left us His Word, that he came to die for mankind, and that the greatest thing a person can do is to become a follower of Jesus Christ. Related to this – I have seen God transform people’s lives and found Christian teachings to have brought positive transformations to people in diverse contexts and circumstances. On the other hand I subscribe to the promotion of Christianity because I have seen that alternative strategies of intervention by the West ‘do not work’. In some cases their immediate impact is negative, and in other cases the dynamics they engender create unhealthy dependency or outright corruption (Odongo 2007). This is because such interventionary strategies provide incomplete knowledge. True knowledge of and faith in the one God the creator of the universe must reduce fear of witchcraft. There can be no question about this at all. The Bible can be taken as an ‘anti-
witchcraft’ manual, on the nature of which I can mention only a few specifics: The 10th commandment (Exodus 20:17 and Deuteronomy 5:21) contains direct commands condemning jealousy (see above for the link between jealousy and witchcraft) – “do not covet”. The first four commandments point to God’s singular supremacy. The Bible condemns witches and witchcraft (Exodus 22:17-18) outright. Ostracising witches / witchdoctors was somewhat widespread and customary in Israel (I Samuel 28:3). The command is clear: “fear God [not witches] and keep his commandments” (NIV Ecclesiastes 12:13). New Testament activity is overtly anti-witchcraft. In condemning Simon the sorcerer (Acts 8:20-21) and Elumano (Acts 13:9-10), burning books associated with witchcraft (Acts 19:19), warning the Galatians (Galatians 3:1), listing witchcraft amongst other sins (Galatians 5:20) and so on. Jesus never identified a witch as responsible for people’s ills; his healing (unlike that of many traditional healers) was never ‘against a witch’. The impression is that he did not want to credit witches with the privilege of such recognition.


Instead of blaming and exorcising witches and spirits, the recognition of one supreme God is a way to seek a unified purpose even in that which seems to be an act of bewitchment. Jesus taught love of enemies and that revenge is God’s (Romans 12:19). It can be said in summary that the whole of Christian teaching is aimed at countering beliefs in malevolent powers such as of witchcraft. The way this anti-witchcraft message is delivered is important. I have already mentioned the necessity of the use of indigenous languages. Christian leaders need to demonstrate genuine faith by personal example. The propagation of this message cannot be left to foreign donors. People must be sufficiently convinced to follow the example of Jesus and his disciples – to give their lives voluntarily in God’s service to make all nations followers of the liberating teachings of Jesus (Matthew 28:19).

**Conclusion**

This article begins by comparing a forest to a vegetable garden, the former representing Africa and the latter Europe. The features of the forest are hidden to vegetable gardeners, who could tend their plots without realising they are doing away with a forest. Forest dwellers, while pleased with such transformation, are disadvantaged in never having learned how to clear a forest or plant vegetables for themselves. Instead they are rendered dependent on foreigners. That dependency is hidden by strictures in communication under the cover of countering racism and other theoretical oversights that conceal difference.

One aspect of African life often concealed from Western view is its solid belief in witchcraft. The profound effect this has on interpersonal relationships has adverse effects on diverse aspects of socio-economic development. Bitterness and especially jealousy are at the root of witchcraft, which is little understood by Westerners, who often deny its existence. This denial means that inter-church relations can be based on misguided assumptions. As meaning is context-based, such ignorance of ‘the other’ can throw theological and ecclesial teaching off course, leaving much of Africa dependent on the West primarily because of the subsidization of its education by the latter. This article suggests that a better alternative could be the use of regional African
languages, especially in theological education on the continent. In this way Biblical scholarship could be applied in the light of African experience including witchcraft and magic. The Biblical message of God and his son, Jesus Christ, working through the church, can be powerful tool to combat witchcraft and superstition in Africa.

References


Mutua, Patrick. (2007). ‘Sauri Millennium Village Project Site.’ Lecture given at Kima International School of Theology, June 1, by Patrick Mutua.


Abstract
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) is one of the deadliest epidemics in human history and the greatest threat to human existence today. In Nigeria, there have been massive campaigns and advertisements by the government, government agencies, international donor agencies (WHO, UNICEF, UNAIDS, USAID, NGO’s) on the disease and its scourge through different media and channels creating an that the majority of Nigerians are roundly informed of the disease, its transmission, treatment and prevention and that people’s attitudes have changed towards people living with the HIV. To ascertain this impression, this researcher collected data on Yoruba (a major Nigerian language) names for HIV and AIDS from local people (through field interview), television and radio HIV and AIDS awareness drama, and from existing scanty literature in Yoruba. The result of the analysis of the names reveals that many or names for HIV/AIDS are inadequate and are capable of encouraging stigmatization. Not only that, the names exhibit ignorance of the disease and its characteristics. The essence of this paper, therefore, is to make a case for appropriate use of linguistic resource in making reference to HIV/AIDS in indigenous languages.

Introduction
Medical researchers have shown that Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) is a transmissible disease of the immune system caused by a virus known as Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). The virus slowly attacks and destroys the cells of the immune system rendering them incapable of performing their function of putting up resistance against infections caused by bacteria, fungi, parasites and other viruses. A patient with advanced HIV related illness is therefore made vulnerable to a variety of these infections and others and certain malignancies that eventually cause death. When a person is infected with the virus, such a person is referred to as HIV positive. AIDS describes the anaemic stage of the disease when the presence of all sorts of fatal infections and cancers are noticeable.

HIV transmission occurs when a person is exposed to body fluids infected with the virus, such as blood, semen, vaginal secretions, and breast milk. The disease is primarily transmitted through such ways as having sexual intercourse with an infected person; using non-sterile or contaminated hypodermic needle, sharp object or razor blade; accidental pricking by a contaminated needle or cut by a contaminated blade; transfer of the virus from an infected mother to her baby during pregnancy, childbirth or through breast feeding.

Historically, AIDS was first diagnosed by Dr. Michael Gottlieb of the Medical School of the University of Los Angeles in California, United States of America in May, 1981. Before the end of the 1980’s, HIV/AIDS had been reported in all parts of the world and it reached epidemic level in the 1990’s (Gallow and Montagnier, 1988: 10; Akinrogunde, 2007:28; AIDS, 2009). Makinde (2008:23) paints a very grim picture of the global fatality of HIV/AIDS. According to him, “…from 1981 to 2006, over 25 million people have died from HIV/AIDS”. The African
continent is the worst hit by the scourge of HIV/AIDS due to several socio-economic and political factors which favour its expansion (Ojeh, 1992: 6). The first cases of HIV/AIDS in Nigeria were identified in 1985 and reported at an international conference in 1986 (Adeyi, 2006: 20). Ever since, the statistics of HIV/AIDS prevalence has been hugely awful. The UN 2000 HIV/AIDS report on Africa put the number of infected adults in Nigeria at over 5% (UNAID, 2000). And in 2008, The Director General, National Action Committee on AIDS (NACA), now National Agency for the Control of AIDS (NACA), an intervention agency established by the Federal Government through the Federal Ministry of Health with the sole objective of minimizing the prevalence of the scourge through creation of awareness, favourable attitudes and the inoculation of knowledge of causes and prevention strategies, reported as follows:

*Nigeria is the second largest country in the world with huge population of persons living with HIV/AIDS, with a national adult prevalence rate of 4.4 percent equivalence to about three million of the nation population. Current statistics show that women and girls account for over 50 percent of the infected person with the highest prevalence rate of 4.9 percent among young women aged between 25 and 29 year (The Guardian, Monday, Nov. 3 2008, p.8).*

Udoakah & Iwokwagh (2008), citing UNDP (2004) and UNAIDS/WHO (2006), report that 30,000 Nigerians die of HIV/AIDS yearly and by 2010 if the epidemic is not controlled it would have disastrous effect on Nigeria human capital.

Jegede, (1993:9) identified some socio-cultural practices among Nigerians that are favourable to the spread of the HIV/AIDS. Such practices include tribal marking, body scarification, tattooing, bloodletting, blood oathing, female circumcision and so on, particularly with the use of unsterilized sharp objects.

However, in an HIV/AIDS prevalence study conducted by NACA in 2003, 2005, NACA reports a decline in the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in Nigeria. The Director General of NACA says:

*... there has been a reduction in the HIV/AIDS prevalence rate from the all time high of 5.8 per cent in 2001 to 5.0 per cent in 2003 before dropping to 4.4 per cent by 2005. (The Guardian, Feb. 11, 2008, p.4).*

The NACA boss attributed the zero prevalence to increased government presence, leadership and commitment in form of awareness campaign on a national scale and offering of free treatment to HIV positive. According to him:

*... that has affected the psyche of those who are living with the virus. It has given them more courage and confidence. It has brought down stigma and discrimination so people are coming out, that is what is happening. (The Guardian, Feb. 11, 2008, p. 4).*
The zero prevalence claims have been queried by the Executive Director of the Network on Ethics/Human Right law, HIV/AIDS Prevention, Support and Care (NECA), Professor Femi Soyinka states that:

*We still have a high prevalence of about 10 percent. Therefore, when we talk about the prevalence going down, we need to look in and see how we came about the figures. When you go to screening centres, they tell you that what they see is much more than what the zero prevalence figure says. Even from what we see on the field, the number of people infected is not going down either ....* (Nigerian Tribune, Feb. 28, 2008, p.15).

The above exposes a harvest of claims and counter claims!

Kolawole (2006) identified lack of effective communication strategy – a strategy that involves the use of indigenous languages in advocacy, awareness, and education on transmission, effect and prevention of HIV/AIDS in Nigeria - as a major set-back to the campaigns on HIV/AIDS in Nigeria. His exact words:

*It is on record that apart from posters which have been translated into Yoruba, Igbo, Hausa and many other languages to aid mobilization efforts of field workers, there is no serious literature on the dreaded disease in indigenous languages apart from English. Besides, there is no sustained campaign in indigenous languages. The question then is how does one expect campaigns about a foreign-induced disease reported in a foreign language spoken by a little less than 25% of Nigerians to be effective in carrying a very serious message of HIV/AIDS to Nigerians where close to five hundred indigenous languages exist?.*

Kolawole added further that because people are not reached with serious message of AIDS through the use of indigenous languages very many people still indulge in acts that are incidental to the spread of HIV/AIDS such as making incision and circumcising with unsterilized knives or razor blades, and engaging in prostitution.

**The Present Study**

Language is the facility for expressing our mind. It describes how a person or culture behaves or how nature, reality or events are perceived. In the words of Sapir (1929), cited in Egbokhare (2004:4):

*...the real world is to a large extent unconsciously built on the language habits of the group. The worlds in which different societies live are distant worlds, not merely the same world with different labels attached to them. We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choice of interpretation. Language is not merely a vehicle of communication by which man talks about some objective*
One of such ways in which language represents the reality of our world is through the names we give to special and tangible things either living, as in the case of a person or an animal, or inanimate, as in the case of a place or a concept as in the case of the HIV/AIDS.

In the following segment, we shall examine some of the various Yoruba names for HIV/AIDS and their implications on response to it and people’s attitudes towards people living with it. However, the first attempt will be to give an English translation of these names. This is shown below:

1. àísàn ilú ilá “disease of urban areas”.
2. àísàn kò-gbóógún “incurable disease” (Egbokhare, 2004:27)
3. éèdí “spiritual spell”
4. àísàn máarù-máagbè “disease that makes its victim to be emaciated”
5. éèdí Yorùbá phonological adaption of AIDS (Egbokhare, 2004: 27)
6. kòkòrò èjè “disease of the blood caused by micro organisms”.
7. mágún Ìyìǹbò white man’s version of Yorùbá’s ‘magun’
8. àísàn ibálòpò “venereal disease”
9. pásàn ágbèrè “fornication or adultery inflicted disease”
10. àísàn ifábo-sókọ “disease of women who have sexual intercourse with women”
11. àísàn ifako-sayà “disease of men who have sexual with men”
12. àrùn olómòge/omidan “disease of mature ladies.”
13. àísàn onígbàjáámọ̀ “disease that is contacted at barber shop”
14. àísàn alábèrè “disease that is contacted through injection”
15. àísàn oníóròbà “disease that is covered with condom”
16. àísàn adójútínì “disease that makes one to be stigmatized”
17. àísàn àjéṣára “disease of the immune system”
18. àísàn àígbèsé okun ara “disease that renders immune system ineffective” (YMPD)
“a new form of gonorrhoea”  
(figurative)

19. āisàn arẹkun  
system (figurative)"

20. āisàn gbajumọ tuntun  
“new disease of the celebrity”  
(literal)

21. āisàn asekúpani  
“a killer disease”

1. Āísàn ilú ílái: This term localizes the disease to the urban areas alone. To the rural populace, once they don’t leave their locality they are immuned from the disease and there is tendency of seeing people leaving in the urban areas as potential carriers. This is ignorance. In their study, Lawal and Akinmoladun, (2000) report that HIV/AIDS has penetrated deep into the rural areas of the country which are usually excluded in most studies on HIV/AIDS prevalence.

2. Āísàn-kọ-gbọgùn. A major feature of the early prevention strategy of HIV/AIDS in Nigeria and other parts of the world in the 1980’s was the use of scare tactics. AIDS was presented to the public as a disease to be greatly feared as there was no cure for it, that no cure can ever be found to it and that HIV positive people only have a couple of years to live. As a matter of fact, crosses and human skulls and skeletal images were common symbols of anti-HIV/AIDS campaigns (Talbot, 1993: 12). The use of the term āisàn-kọ-gbọgùn reflects the early HIV/AIDS intervention period and has stuck. It is common to hear some people praying for others as follows:

Ăísàn tí kọ gbọgùn kọ ní se ó, kọ ní se ọmọ ọ̀rẹ́.
May you and your household never be afflicted with an incurable disease.

The use of the word creates tension in the mind of the carrier. When one is infected the next thing to expect is death. The use of the word reduces the dream of carriers to rubbles. According to Egbokhare (2004:14):

āisàn-kọ-gbọgùn emphasizes the fatality of AIDS and assumes that it cannot be managed. At the same time, we are trying to educate people not to stigmatize those living with AIDS even though we have already sentenced them as condemned and beyond help.

3. Èdì: Èdì in Yoruba is a charm that casts spell on an individual. Such a person behaves contrary to reason. The use of the word to describe HIV/AIDS implies that carriers are under some strange hypnotic condition engineered by a certain person or a god. So when such condition is reversed through some spiritual means the carrier becomes healed.

4. Āísàn máarù-máagbẹ̀: The use of the word to describe HIV/AIDS implies that once one is HIV positive, he begins to be gradually and progressively emaciated. This is ignorance. One can be emaciated due to some other health condition or psychological state. It is only at the advanced stage of the infection that carriers become noticeable emaciated.
5. Êdè: It is Yoruba phonological adaptation of AIDS. It is a synonym for other names HIV/AIDS is called.

6. Kòkòrò èjè: The use of the word to described HIV/AIDS reduces it to ordinary infection of the blood caused by fungi or bacteria.

7. Mágùn òyìnò: “Mágùn” is a Yoruba charm that is placed on a woman secretly as a nemesis for her secret lover. Mágùn Òyìnò therefore, is a metaphor for an imported white man’s charm that is secretly placed on a woman to kill her secret lover. The implication of the use of the word to describe HIV/AIDS is that HIV/AIDS is an exotic disease that can be acquired for a fee or free of charge by a jealous husband to kill his wife’s concubine and that only a randy man dies of HIV/AIDS. Mágùn òyìnò is reflection of the skepticism and misconception people have had about HIV/AIDS since it was officially reported in Nigeria. Some people even call it American Invention to Discourage Sex (Olubuyide, 1995:5; Otufodunrin, 2007:15).

8. Àísàn-ibálọpọ: Amusa (2010), reporting NACA’s (2004) report, says the key mode of transmission of the disease in Nigeria is sexual intercourse: oral, anal, vaginal sex and men having sex with men (MSM). It constitutes about 80 % of the HIV/AIDS cases in Nigeria. The use of the term àísàn ibálọpọ reduced the contact point of the disease to only sexual intercourse. In other words, to be free from the disease, one has to abstain from sexual intercourse and those who are not living with HIV/AIDS are those who have been living a celibate life.

9. Pássàn àgbèrè: The use of the term pásàn ágbèrè to describe HIV/AIDS is judgemental and reduces the disease to spiritual ailment that is not accessible to scientific enquiry and cure. The term implies that God uses the disease to punish a randy and once he has mended his ways, because God is a God of infinite mercies, He forgives such a randy and heals him of the disease. To be free from the scourge one should not keep illicit sexual affairs.

10. Àísàn fako-sayà/fabo-sòkọ (Gay/lesbian disease): The use of the term to describe HIV/AIDS in Yorùbá probably takes its root from the historical source of the disease. However by the conservative nature of much of the cultures that make up Nigeria, the act of men having sexual intercourse with men or women having sexual intercourse with women is actually an aberration. This cultural mindset receives a big support from faith-based organizations. To the Muslims, homosexualism contravenes the shariah penal code. Christians describe the act as unbiblical. For instance, the former Primate of the Anglican Church in Nigeria, Most Rev. Peter Akinola, describes AIDS as follows:

\[
\text{HIV/AIDS is God’s judgement on a sinful world in the area of promiscuity, adultery, homosexuality and fornication...} \\
\text{(The Glitterati 2 Dec. 2007, p. 45)}
\]

So, when a person is infected or affected by HIV/AIDS, the conservative assumption would be that such a person could have committed a culturally sanctioned and religiously abhorred act. The carrier is consequently despised and stigmatized either as a desecrater of African values, a pagan or an infidel.
11. Ärùn ọlọmọge/omidan: The use of the term to describe HIV/AIDS is feminizing the disease. The term is chauvinistic, biased and restrictive. It suggests that women and young ladies only bear the brunt of the epidemic and that the man, especially, is naturally immune against the disease. Describing HIV/AIDS as àrùn ọlọmọge/omidan is ignorance and misinformation although in terms of sexual distributions, the female has preponderance of HIV in both urban and rural areas of Nigeria (FMoH, 2005, pp. 17-30). The continued use of the term could make men to seek to violate younger girls in the belief that they are not infected.

12. Àisàn oníròbá: One of the ways that have been emphasized by which sexual transmission of HIV/AIDS can be prevented in Nigeria is through the promotion of appropriate use of condoms. However, the use of the term àisàn oníròbá suggests that some people are still ignorant of the protective value of condom against the HIV and other venereal diseases. So, when a man carries or buys it there is tendency for him to be looked at with the second eye as an HIV positive person who is just being considerate not to transfer the disease to his spouse or lover. The use of this word to describe HIV/AIDS only suggests that it is men that are the potential carriers of HIV.

13. Àisàn gbájámo: Certainly one of the means by which one can contact the disease is through the use of unsterilized scissors or blade at hair crop shops. Again this is just one of the channels of contacting HIV virus.

14. Àisàn alábére: Again, one can contact HIV virus if one is given an injection with unsterilized needle. The fear that HIV/AIDS is only contacted through injection made one of my interviewees to decline to take her child to a nearby clinic for medication. The woman replied in Yorùbá as follows:

Ọgá, kò rí bẹ̀ẹ̀, mo mọ ohun tì ó ń sẹ è. Bí mo bá ti sin ní gbéré rè, tì mo si fiun ní ìgbò, ara rè óyó balé. Gbígbé òmọ lọ sì hôsípitù ní àkókò yìí lèwú nítorì àrùn tuntun tì wọn sọ pé wọn le tì ara abére gbígígà kó.

*I know the nature of his sickness and its cure. I would do incision on his body and prepare herb concoction for him and he would get well. Taking children to clinic for medication is dangerous nowadays because of the new disease that we are told can be contacted through injection."

This is ironic. The same woman who is running away from the hospital for the fear that her child would be given injection that contains HIV virus is the same woman who prefers to do incision on the child’s body with absolute ignorance of the safety status of the incision tool.

15. Àisàn adójútini: The term emphasizes the stigma associated with the HIV/AIDS, the people living with it and their family. The use of the term àisàn adójútini is a reflection of the way people living with HIV/AIDS are discriminated against, deserted, disposed, and treated like unwelcome strangers even by their immediate family members and subjected to an unimaginable dept of inhuman treatment. A recent case was that of a lady in Iseyin, Oyo State, Nigeria. The
lady was abandoned in a dilapidated building by her people for fear of being infected by the virus. The father says:

She is my daughter. We were helpless when she was infected with the virus. I was told that the disease is contagious and in a bid to stop its spread, we decided to put her in that dilapidated building (The Guardian, Nov. 3, 2008, p. 17).

Another person living with the disease recounted her ordeal the day her family got to know her HIV status. She says: “That day was terrible and I blamed myself for bringing the family name into disrepute” (Nigeria Tribune, 26 May, 2008, p.4) Referring to HIV/AIDS as ìsàn adójútini seems to prevent people from voluntarily subjecting themselves to HIV/AIDS testing. The Yorùbá would say:

 Bí eti kò gbó yinkin inú kii bájé
Information you are ignorant of does not make you unhappy

This maxim explains the observation of the President of the Association for Reproductive and Family Health (ARFH) at a dissemination workshop on a study to assess the effect of peer education on the use of Voluntary Counselling and Testing (VCT) for HIV among young persons in Ibadan carried out by a team of researchers. According to him, the rate at which people respond to free HIV testing is abysmally low (Nigerian Tribune, Feb. 14, 2008, p. 15).

16. Ìsàn àjèsára: The term is a compositional form of the Yorùbá translation of the operational definition of HIV in English. The representation is objective exhaustive, explicit, and emotion neutral. The term describes the disease as the disease of the immune system.

17. Àisàn aígbésé okun ara: Okun ara is a synonym for àjèsára in Yorùbá. The term is a description of the pathological disorder of the disease in the body: namely, the inability of the body immune system to resist infections.

18. Àisàn arčkun: The term is a shortened form of àisàn aígbésé okun ara.

19. Àisàn gbajúmò tuntun: Gonorrhea is figuratively referred to as “ãisàn gbajúmò” in Yorùbá. To refer to HIV/AIDS as a new form of gonorrhea is reducing its contact point to sexual intercourse alone. Again, it implies that the poor would never fall victim of the disease since it is a new disease of the celebrity.

20. Ìsàn asekúpani: Development of human civilization has witnessed several pandemics such as Justinian Plague, Black Death, Influenza, Bubonic Plague, Smallpox, Cholera, Ebola, Malaria, Typhus, Yellow Fever, Measles, Polio, Tuberculosis, Dengue Fever (McNeill, 1997; Charles-Edward, 1967) that have claimed several millions of people’s lives before medical solutions were found to them, and are still claiming lives - if immediate medical attention is not sought. HIV/AIDS is another of such diseases. The use of the term ìsàn asekúpani for HIV/AIDS in Yorùbá seems to be restrictive; it emphasises the fatality of the disease and forecloses the
possibility of finding any cure to it. This fires up stigmatization - the greatest challenge facing HIV/AIDS intervention today. Although no cure has yet been found for HIV/AIDS, there have been medical facilities for managing it. Idigbe (2006:10) reports that about 80% of the cost of such treatment is paid by the government and the remaining 20% paid by the patient. In essence, HIV/AIDS is no longer a “death sentence”.

Yorùbá Terms for HIV/AIDS and Canons of Terminology

The ways the HIV/AIDS is represented in Yorùbá are inadequate. They seem to suggest that some speakers of Yorùbá are aware of the existence of the disease, possibly because of the massive campaigns and advertisements as observed by the NACA boss (The Guardian, Feb. 11, 2008, p.4) but are ill informed or are ignorant of the disease’s modes of transmission, treatment and prevention as evidenced by the several names given to the disease. Again, some of the names and expressions used to refer to HIV/AIDS nakedly emphasise stigmatization. In this section we shall evaluate these terms against the canons of term formation to determine which of these terms are appropriate to be retained.

Canons of Term Formation

Localizing new terms in a target language is guided by certain canons (Awôbûlûyi, 2008:189-192; Owolabi & Kola, 2004:404; Owolabi & Kola, 2006:5 ). Some of these canons considered basic to this work are the following: felicity, exhaustiveness, economy, and explicitness.

Felicity: A new term is said to satisfy this canon if it vividly captures the general meaning, purpose, intention or description of the concepts depicted by the source term. This condition according to Owolabi (2004:404) takes precedence over the other principles.

Exhaustiveness: A new term in a target language should be able to account for all the regularities and characteristics of the source term.

Economy: By this condition, a new term that is short and can be easily memorized and used is preferred to a long and clumsy one.

Explicitness: A new term in a target language should be perfectly clear in meaning, leaving no room for vagueness, implication or ambiguity.

Evaluation of HIV/AIDS Terms in Yorùbá against the Canons of Terminology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HIV/AIDS Term</th>
<th>Felicity</th>
<th>Exhaustiveness</th>
<th>Economy</th>
<th>Explicitness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ìísàn ńlí́ńlá́</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ìísàn kò-gbòògùn</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>èèdì</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ìísàn màárù-màagbẹ̀</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Èèdì</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kòkòrò ężẹ́</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>màgùn Òyìnùbò</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ìísàn ibálópò</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Komolafe, Linguistic Representations of HIV

| pásán ãgbèrè   | _   | _   | +   | _   |
| àisàn ìfábo-ùkò   | _   | _   | +   | _   |
| àisàn îfáko-saya | _   | _   | +   | _   |
| ìrùn olomoge/ömìdan | _   | _   | +   | _   |
| àisàn onígbájámo | _   | _   | +   | _   |
| àisàn alábèrè | _   | _   | +   | _   |
| àisàn oníròbà | _   | _   | +   | _   |
| àisàn adójútini | _   | _   | +   | _   |
| àisàn àjèsára | +   | +   | +   | +   |
| àisàn àjígbésè okun ara | +   | +   | +   | +   |
| àisàn àreḵun | +   | +   | +   | +   |
| àisàn gbajúmọ tuntun | _   | _   | +   | _   |
| àisàn asekúpání | -   | -   | +   | -   |

**Key:** ‘+’ indicates occurrence  
‘-’ indicates non-occurrence

From the table presented above, ėdè, àisàn àjèsára, àisàn àjígbésè okun ara, àisàn àreḵun satisfy the requirements of the canons of term formulation and could be retained in making reference to AIDS as synonyms, while kòkòrò àrùn ėdè, kòkòrò àrùn àjèsára and àreḵun could be used to describe HIV. However, for reason of economy, àisàn àreḵun could be preferred to àisàn àjígbésè okun ara. Again, the use of ėdè should be discouraged because of its initial association with stigmatization.

**Conclusion**
This study has shown that the massive campaigns and advertisements on HIV/AIDS seem not to be yielding good results especially among the local speakers of Yoruba. This is evident in the way some of the people describe or name HIV/AIDS. Some of the names are grossly inadequate as they do not capture the general meaning, purpose, intention or description of HIV/AIDS. Again, some of the names reflect ignorance of the disease and its characteristics and encourage stigmatization. This work attempted to evaluate the available HIV/AIDS names in Yorùbá against the canons of term formation and found the terms kòkòrò àrùn ėdè, kòkòrò àrùn àjèsára, and àreḵun; àisàn àrèku and àisàn àjèsára appropriate for describing HIV/AIDS. The terms are emotion neutral, not suggestive of stigmatization and explicit.

Finally, to successfully use Yorùbá to campaign against HIV/AIDS involves the use of appropriate linguistic resource. Such expressions, phrases and words that inject fears into the psyche of the people and other such that are plain misinformation and loaded with undertone of stigma as shown in this work should be discontinued. This is justified. According to UNAIDS (2008), language shapes beliefs and may influence behaviours. Considered use of appropriate language has the power to strengthen response to HIV/AIDS.

**References**


*Daily Sketch*, 16, January


Microsoft © Encarta © 2009 (DVD). Redmond, WA, Microsoft Corporation 2008


Nigeria Tribune (2008), 28 February, p. 15.

Nigerian Tribune (2008), 14 February, p.15


*The Guardian* (2008), 11 February, p.4

*The Guardian* (2008), 3 November, p. 15


*This Day* (2007), 1 December, p. 28.


Komolafe, Linguistic Representations of HIV